ORDER Anjani Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner, who was defendant in a suit, aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court 20th December, 2004, whereby the trial Court allowed the objection raised on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent in this writ petition, bearing paper No. 10 Ga, to the effect that though the defendant has put in appearance on 23rd August, 2004, but he has not filed his written statement and more than 90 days have already elapsed but no written statement has been filed. In view of the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court does not have any power to extend or grant further time for filing the written statement, it was therefore prayed by means of the aforesaid objection 10 Ga that Court may now proceed for hearing of the suit. The trial Court accepted the objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent and directed that the suit may come up on 28th January, 2005 for arguments. Aggrieved by the order dated 20th December, 2004, passed by the trial Court, referred to above, the petitioner-defendant preferred a revision before the revisional Court. The revisional Court vide its order dated 24th February, 2005 upheld the order passed by the trial Court observing that beyond 90 days of service of the summons, the Court has no power to extend time for filing the written statement, therefore the order passed by the trial Court does not warrant any interference and the revision has been dismissed summarily.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-defendant in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court , Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., wherein the Apex Court has ruled that in the matter where the High Court exercises the original jurisdiction, High Court has power to extend the time for filing the written statement even beyond the time contemplated under Order VIII, Rule I of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was therefore contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra), the view taken by the revisional Court as well as by the trial Court deserves to be quashed and the petitioner is entitled for a direction to be issued to the trial Court to reconsider the application 10-Ga.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has relied upon a decision of this Court , Dr. Nanda Agrawal v. Matri Mandir, Varanasi, and the decision of the Apex Court , Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has relied upon Paragraphs 28 and 29 in the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya (supra), which are reproduced below :-
"28. Looking to the scheme of Order VIII as amended by Act No. 104 of 1976, we are of the opinion, that there are three modes of pleading or setting up a counter-claim in a civil suit. Firstly, the written statement filed under Rule 1 may itself contain a counter-claim which in the light of Rule 9 read with Rule 6A would be a counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff preferred in exercise of legal right conferred by Rule 6A. Secondly, a counter-claim may be preferred by way of amendment incorporated subject to the leave of the Court in a written statement already filed. Thirdly, a counterclaim may be filed by way of a subsequent pleading under Rule 9. in the latter two cases, the counter-claim though referable to Rule 6A cannot be brought on record as of right but shall be governed by the discretion vesting in the Court, either under Order VI, Rule 17 of the C.P.C. if sought to be introduced by way of amendment, or, subject to exercise of discretion conferred on the Court under Order VIII, Rule 9 of the C.P.C. if sought to be placed on record by way of subsequent pleading. The purpose of the provision enabling filing of a counterclaim is to avoid multiplicity of judicial proceeding and save upon the Court's time as also to exclude the inconvenience to the parties by enabling claims and counterclaims, that is, all disputes between the same parties being decided in the course of the same proceedings. If the consequence of permitting a counter-claim either by way of amendment or by way of subsequent pleading would be prolonging of the trial, complicating the otherwise smooth flow of proceedings or causing a delay in the progress of the suit by forcing a retreat on the steps already taken by the Court, the Court would be justified in exercising its discretion not in favour of permitting a belated counter-claim. The framers of the law never intended the pleading by way of counter-claim being utilized as an instrument for forcing upon a reopening of the trial or pushing back the progress of proceeding. Generally speaking, a counter-claim not contained in the original written statement may be refused to be taken on record if the issues have already been framed and the case set down for trial, and more so when the trial has already commenced. But certainly, a counter-claim is not entertainable when there is no written statement on record. There being no written statement filed in the suit, the counter-claim was obviously not set up in the written statement within the meaning of Rule 6A. There is no question of such counter-claim being introduced by way of amendment; for there is no written statement available to include a counter-claim therein. Equally there would be no question of a counter-claim being raised by way of 'subsequent pleading' as there is no 'previous pleading' on record. In the present case, the defendant having failed to file any written statement and also having forfeited his right of filing the same, the trial Court was fully justified in not entertaining the counter-claim filed by the defendant-appellant. A refusal on the part of the Court to entertain a belated counterclaim may not prejudice the defendant because in spite of the counter-claim having been refused to be entertained, he is always at liberty to file his own suit based on the cause of action for counter-claim.
29. The purpose of the defendant which was sought to be achieved by moving the application dated 2-5-1995 under Order VIII, Rule 6A of the C.P.C. was clearly mala fide and an attempt to reopen the proceedings including that part too as had stood concluded against him consequent upon rejection of his application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the C.P.C. Fortunately, the trial Court did not fall into the defendant's trap. If only the trial Court would have fallen into the error of entertaining the counter-claim, the defendant would have succeeded in indirectly achieving the reopening of the trial in which effort, when made directly, he had already failed. There being no written statement of the defendant available on record and the right of the defendant to file the written statement having been closed, finally and conclusively, he could not have filed a counter - claim."
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent further relied upon decision of the Apex Court Dr. J. J. Merchant v. S. Chaturvedi and the decision of this Court reported in 2005 (58) All LR 534 : 2005 All LJ 1106, Ram Saran v. Smt. Khazani and the case reported in 2004 (2) All Rent Cas 779, Nanku v. Kailash. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court argued that the provisions of Order VIII. Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure being mandatory as laid down in the decisions referred to above, the Court does not have any power to extend the time for filing the written statement beyond 90 (ninety) days. So far as the case of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra) is concerned, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the case is different on facts, inasmuch as where the Apex Court has dealt with the matter where the High Court was exercising its original jurisdiction, therefore the same will not apply. In this view of the matter, it has been submitted on behalf of learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Recently three Judges Bench in Civil Appeal No. 7000 of 2004 Kailash v. Nanhku, Reported in , which has been decided by the Apex Court on April 6, 2005. The Apex Court has ruled as under :-
"In Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra, , "We are, therefore, of the opinion that, in view of Rules 5 and 12 framed under Article 225 for purposes of the Special Act, the High Court is not powerless to extend the time for filing the written statement simply because the time limit for filing the written statement within the allowance permitted by the Proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC has come to an end."
Alternatively, Order VIII Rule 1. mandatory or directory?
This leads us to examine the alternative contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that, in any event, Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC is not mandatory but directory in nature, a submission on which both the learned counsel for the parties have forcefully argued and the learned Amicus Curiae has also made detailed submissions.
The CPC which consolidated and amended the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature in the year 1908, has in the recent times undergone several amendments based on the recommendations of the Law Commission displaying the anxiety of Parliament to secure an early and expeditious disposal of civil suits and proceedings but without sacrificing the fairness of trial and the principles of natural justice in-built in any sustainable procedure. The Statement of objects and Reasons for enacting Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976) records the following basic considerations which persuaded the Parliament in enacting the amendments :-
(i) that a litigant should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice;
(ii) that every effort should be made to expedite the disposal of civil suits and proceedings, so that justice may not be delayed;
(iii) that the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the community who do not have the means to engage a pleader to defend their cases.
By Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999) the text of Order VIII, Rule 1 was sought to be substituted in a manner that the power of court to extend the time for filing the written statement was so circumscribed as would not permit the time being extended beyond 30 days from the date of service of summons on the defendant. As is well-known, there was stiff resistance from the members of the Bar against enforcing such and similar other provisions sought to be introduced by way of amendment and hence the Amendment Act could not be promptly notified for enforcement. The text of the provision in the present form has been introduced by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 (22 of 2002) with effect from 1-7-2002. The purpose of such like amendments is stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons as "to reduce delay in the disposal of civil cases".
The text of Order VIII, Rule 1, as it stands now, reads as under :-
"l. Written statement.- The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence :
Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons".
Three things are clear. Firstly, a careful reading of the language in which Order VIII, Rule 1 has been drafted, shows that it casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the Court and also does not specifically take away the power of the Court to take the written statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for. Secondly, the nature of the provision contained in Order VIII, Rule 1 is procedural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Thirdly, the object behind substituting Order VIII, Rule 1 in the present shape is to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics, delaying the disposal of cases much to the chagrin of the plaintiffs and petitioners approaching the Court for quick relief and also to the serious inconvenience of the Court faced with frequent prayers for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. The process of justice may be speeded up and hurried but the fairness which is a basic element of justice cannot be permitted to be buried.
All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, are pertinent :-
"The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to over power substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable....Justice is the goal of jurisprudence...processual, as much as substantive."
In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, , the Court approved in no unmistakable terms the approach of moderating into wholesome directions what is regarded as mandatory on the principal that "Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice". In Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India, , the Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle.
It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words... "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by necessary implication. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The Courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form.
In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kolah, , this Court highlighted 3 principles while interpreting any portion of the CPC. They are :
(i) A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure', something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to 'both' sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.
(ii) There must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that effect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to.
(iii) No forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of the litigant's defence unless there be an express provision to the contrary.
Our attention has also been invited to a few other provisions such as Rules 9 and 10 of Order VIII. In spite of the time limit appointed by Rule 1 having expired, the Court is not powerless to permit a written statement being filed if the Court may require such a written statement. Under Rule 10, the Court need not necessarily pronounce judgment against the defendant who failed to file written statement as required by Rule 1 or Rule 9, the Court may still make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.
As stated earlier, Order VIII Rule 1 is a provision contained in the CPC and hence belongs to the domain of procedural law. Another feature noticeable in the language of Order VIII Rule 1 is that although it appoints a time within which the written statement has to be presented and also restricts the power of the Court by employing language couched in a negative way that the extension of time appointed for filing the written statement was not to be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons yet it does not in itself provide for penal consequences to follow if the time schedule, as laid down, is not observed. From these two features certain consequences follow.
Justice G.P. Singh notes in his celebrated work "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (Ninth Edition, 2004) while dealing with mandatory and directory provisions - "The Study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to be context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage LORD CAMPBELL said : "No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directly only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered'." (p. 338) "For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature", points out SUBBARAO, J. "the Court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered". If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be construed as directory." (pp. 339-340) Two decisions, having a direct bearing on the issue arising for decision before us, have been brought to our notice, one each by the learned counsel for either party. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that in Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank, , pari materia provision contained in Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 came up for the consideration of the Court. The provision requires the opposite party to a complaint to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum. The Court took into consideration the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the legislative intent behind providing a time frame to file reply and held : (1) that the provision as framed was not mandatory in nature as no penal consequences are prescribed if the extended time exceeds 15 days and; (ii) that the provision was directory in nature and could not be interpreted to mean that in no event whatsoever the reply of the respondent could be taken on record beyond the period of 45 days.
The Court further held that the provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes. The strong terms in which the provision is couched are an expression of 'desirability' but do not create any kind of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of delay so as to debar the respondent from placing his version in defence in any circumstances whatsoever.
In our opinion, the view of the law so taken by this Court squarely applies to the issue before us and we find ourselves in agreement with the law stated by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Topline Shoes Ltd. (supra).
The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, invited our attention to a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Dr. J. J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, ; wherein we find a reference made to Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC vide Paras 14 and 15 thereof and the Court having said that the mandate of the law is required to be strictly adhered to. A careful reading of the judgment shows that the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC did not directly arise for consideration before the Court and to that extent the observations made by the Court are obiter. Also, the attention of the Court was not invited to the earlier decision of this Court in Topline Shoes Ltd. case, AIR 2002 SC 2487 (supra).
It was submitted by the senior learned counsel for the appellant that there may be cases and cases which cannot be foretold or thought of precisely when grave injustice may result if the time limit of days prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1 was rigidly followed as an insurmountable barrier. The defendant may have fallen sick, unable to move; may be he is lying unconscious. Also, the person entrusted with the job of presenting a written statement, complete in all respects and on his way to the Court, may meet with an accident. The illustrations can be multiplied. If the schedule of time as prescribed was to be followed as a rule of Thumb, failure of justice may be occasioned though for the delay, the defendant and his counsel may not be to blame at all. However, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that if the Court was to take a liberal view of the provision and introduce elasticity into the apparent rigidity of the language, the whole purpose behind enacting Order VIII, Rule 1 in the present form may be lost. It will be undoing the amendment and restoring the pre-amendment position, submitted the learned counsel.
We find some merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties. In our opinion, the solution - and the correct position of law - lie somewhere midway and that is what we propose to do placing a reasonable construction on the language or Order VIII, Rule 1.
Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order VIII in the present form and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional situations, the Court may extend the time for filing the written statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days, referred to in the provisions, has expired. However, we may not be misunderstood as nullifying the enquire force and impact - the entire life and vigour - of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the defendants in law Courts are now proverbial as they do stand to gain by delay. This is more so in election disputes because by delaying the trial of election petition, the successful candidates may succeed in enjoying the substantial part, if not in its entirety, the term for which he was elected even though he may loose the battle at the end. Therefore, the judge trying the case must handle the prayer for adjournment with firmness. The defendant seeking extension of time beyond the limits laid down by the provision may not ordinarily be shown indulgence.
Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1 has to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the Court. The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the Court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking more so, when the period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the Court to its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by Order VIII, Rule 1 of the Code was being allowed to be made because the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended.
A prayer seeking time beyond 90 days for filing the written statement ought to be made in writing. In its judicial discretion exercised on well-settled parameters, the Court may indeed put the defendants on terms including imposition of compensatory costs and may also insist on affidavit, medical certificate or other documentary evidence (depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case) being annexed with the application seeking extension of time so as to convince the Court that the prayer was founded on grounds which do exist.
The extension of time shall be only by way of exception and for reasons to be recorded in writing, howsoever brief they may be, by the Court. In no case, the defendant shall be permitted to seek extension of time when the Court is satisfied that it is a case of laxity or gross negligence on the part of the defendant or his counsel. The Court may impose costs for dual purpose : (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for asking and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him.
However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order VIII Rule 1 shall be the rule and departure therefrom an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order VIII Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form; is directory being a provision in the domain of processual law.
We sum up and briefly state our conclusions as under :-
(i) The trial of an election petition commences from the date of the receipt of the election petition by the Court and continues till the date of its decision. The filing of pleadings is one stage in the trial of an election petition. The power vesting in the High Court to adjourn the trial from time to time (as far as practicable and without sacrificing the expediency and interests of justice) includes power to adjourn the hearing in an election petition affording opportunity to the defendant to file written statement. The availability of such power in the High Court is spelled out by the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 itself and Rules made for purposes of that Act and a resort to the provisions of the CPC is not called for.
(ii) On the language of Section 87(1) of the Act, it is clear that the applicability of the procedure provided for the trial of suits to the trial of election petitions is not attracted with all its rigidity and technicality. The rules of procedure contained in the CPC apply to the trial of election petitions under the Act with flexibility and only as guidelines.
(iii) In case of conflict between the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Rules framed thereunder or the Rules framed by the High Court in exercise of the power conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution on the one hand, and the Rules of Procedure contained in the CPC on the other hand, the former shall prevail over the latter.
(iv) The purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order VIII, Rule 1 of CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing. The provisions spells out a disability on the defendant. It does not impose an embargo on the power of the Court to extend the time. Though the language of the proviso to Rule 1 of Order VIII of the CPC is couched in negative form, it does not specify any penal consequences flowing from the non-compliance. The provision being in the domain of the Procedural Law, it has to be held directory and not mandatory. The power of the Court to extend time for filing the written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC is not completely taken away.
(v) Though Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC is a part of Procedural Law and hence directory, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil causes which persuaded the Parliament to enact the provision in its present form, it is held that ordinarily the time schedule contained in the provisions is to be followed as a rule and departure therefrom would be by way of exception. A prayer for extension of time made by the defendant shall not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking, more so when the period of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons to be assigned by the defendant and also be placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly, by the Court on its being satisfied. Extension of time may be allowed if it was needed to be given for the circumstances which are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. Costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support of the grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case.
In the case at hand, the High Court satisfied that the reason assigned by the defendant-appellant in support of the prayer for extension of time was good and valid. However, the prayer was denied because the High Court felt it had no power to do so. The written statement has already been filed in the High Court. We direct that the written statement shall now be taken on record but subject to payent of Rs. 5000/- by way of costs payable by the appellant herein to respondent No. 1 i.e. The election petitioner in the High Court within a period of 4 weeks from today."
5. In view of the aforesaid decision in the case of Kailash v. Nanhku (supra), in my opinion, the view taken by the trial Court as well as the revisional Court deserves to be quashed and is hereby quashed. Since the trial Court as well as the revisional Court has stopped the deficiency from filing the written statement on the grant that if had no power under Order XIII, Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure to extend the time for filing written statement beyond ninety days. I direct the trial Court to decide the objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent in the light of the observations made in this judgment and also in the light of the observations of the Apex Court referred to above, after hearing learned counsel for the parties.
6. In view of what has been stated above, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 20th December, 2004, passed by the trial Court and the order dated 24th February, 2005, passed by the revisional Court. Annexure Nos. '4' and '6', respectively to the writ petition, are quashed. The trial Court is directed to decide the objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment and also in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court, referred to above, after hearing learned counsel for the parties.
7. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to circulate the copy of this judgment to all the District Judges for circulating amongst the officers for their guidance and following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court.