Rule. Mr. KP Raval, Ld. APP, Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah, Ld. Advocate and Mr. Umesh Trivedi, Ld. Advocate waive service of rule for respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
2. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and with the consent of learned advocates representing the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal.
3. The instant application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [for short 'Cr. P.C.'] has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing and setting aside the order dated 19/2/2005 passed by the Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Surat in connection with M. Case No. 10/2003 registered with Mahidharpura Police Station, Surat and also order dated 25/01/2011 passed by the Ld. 3rd Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Surat in Criminal Revision Application No. 49/2005 and seeks further direction to direct both the Courts below to proceed against the accused as per the law.
4. The petitioner herein, who was original complainant filed a private criminal complaint being Criminal Case No. 50/2003 in the Court of the Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Surat, against the respondent nos. 2 and 3 herein and others alleging the offences punishable under sections 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 471, 120-B read with section 34 and/or section 114 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] on 3/11/2003. Vide initial order dated 3/11/2003, the trial Court forwarded the complaint to the concerned Police Station for investigation under section 156[3] of the Cr. P.C. After concluding the investigation, on 10/10/2004, the Investigating Officer [IO] filed a closure report before the trial Court and claimed "B Summary with prosecution".
5. Upon notice being issued to the original complainant [petitioner herein], the petitioner - complainant appeared before the trial Court and filed his written objections. The trial Court, considering the summary report filed by the police and the papers annexed with that report and considering the written objections filed by the complainant as well as considering the submissions advanced on behalf of the complainant and otherside, vide order dated 19/2/2005 accepted the B Summary with prosecution report and disallowed the objections raised by the petitioner complainant. The petitioner - complainant carried the said matter before the Sessions Court, Surat, by preferring Criminal Revision Application No. 49/2005. The Ld. 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Surat, considering the submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides, dismissed the said revision application and confirmed the order of the trial Court, vide order dated 25/1/2011. Hence, this petition is filed.
6. Mr.
SV Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel with Mr. VG Popat, Ld. Advocate for the petitioner- complainant, at the outset, submitted that both the subordinate Courts committed serious error in accepting the B Summary with prosecution report filed by the police. It is submitted that the investigation carried out by the police pursuant to the complaint filed by the petitioner, is outright improper and even incomplete. There are many aspects for which either no investigation at all is made or insufficient investigation is made. It is submitted that the disputed documents are mainly 13 in number, namely 12 so called agreements to sell of the disputed land as well as one so called document of power of attorney. It is the serious challenge of the petitioner complainant that none of the documents bears his signature and signature of his family members. It is submitted that despite the fact that 13 documents were in serious dispute, the IO picked and chose only 7 documents out of the lot of 13 documents and forwarded only 7 documents to the handwriting expert, Forensic Science Laboratory [FSL]. It is submitted that through the private handwriting expert of the petitioner, all the documents were tested and as per the report of the private handwriting expert, the documents did not bear signature of the complainant or his family members and thus the documents were forged documents. Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel submitted that the report of the handwriting expert, FSL, however, revealed that the documents were not forged, but the report of the private handwriting expert revealed that the documents were forged. It is, therefore, submitted that on this count alone, instead of accepting the summary report of the police, the concerned Magistrate should have directed the police to further investigate the matter.
6.1.
Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel submitted that both the subordinate Courts relied upon two communications allegedly made by the then Executive Magistrate, Surat, whereby by first communication dated 1/10/2003 when the Executive Magistrate was shown xerox copy of the power of attorney deed, he stated that the document did not bear his signature and seal of his office and opined that the document was bogus. However, the same Executive Magistrate by communication dated 22/12/2003 made to the concerned police officer took complete 'u' turn and stated that the xerox copy shown to him by the police was bearing his signature and seals of his office. However, in the communication dated 22/12/2003 he admitted that the said power of attorney document was not registered on account of pressure of work. It is submitted that about such vital evidence, the trial Court as well as the Sessions Court took very casual approach and observed that the document was genuine. It is submitted that on account of such conflicting statements of the Executive Magistrate, it was necessary not only for the police to thoroughly investigate the matter, but even it was necessary for the Court to issue appropriate direction for further investigation.
6.2. Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel relied upon a statement of one witness Tulsidas Manchharam, who allegedly signed the power of attorney deed as one of the attesting witnesses. Tulsidas in his statement before the police, clearly stated that neither the document bears his signature nor the alleged signatory signed in his presence. Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel, therefore, submitted that both the subordinate Courts should have given due consideration to this statement.
6.3. Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel asserted that both the subordinate Courts appeared to have given much emphasis upon a fact that in the account of the complainant as well as his family members, about Rs.30 lac came to be deposited, allegedly the consideration amount of the forged document. It is submitted that when the complainant came to know about such deposit, he immediately drew the attention of the concerned Manager of the bank to keep this amount in sundry account and the amount is not used or appropriated by the complainant.
6.4.
Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel submitted that if at all the documents 12 in number, being agreements to sell the suit land, came to be executed by the complainant and his family members on 26/11/2002, there was no reason whatsoever to execute so called power of attorney document on 6/1/2003 conferring the right and authority to Laxmanbhai Nanubhai [respondent no. 3 - original accused] to execute sale-deed. Even in the power of attorney document, no reason or any ground is assigned as to why the complainant empowered accused
- Laxmanbhai to execute the sale-deed pursuant to the earlier document of agreement to sell.
6.5. Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel further submitted that the trial Court mechanically granted not only 'B Summary' claimed by the police, but also accepted the report of the police to initiate prosecution against the complainant. It is submitted that in revision, though the Sessions Court observed that the trial Court did not assign any reason as to why 'B Summary with Prosecution' was required to be granted, but ultimately upheld the order of the trial Court. It is submitted that as a matter of fact, by filing the complaint, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any offence under the IPC, much-less any offence under Chapter 10 of the IPC. Such order passed by the trial Court is again hit by section 195 read with section 340 of the Cr. P.C.
6.6. Mr. Raju, Ld. Sr. Counsel relied upon certain decisions, which shall be discussed in this order at appropriate time. Ultimately, it is submitted that at this stage, the Court has not to examine the police papers to come to the conclusion as to whether ultimately the accused persons are going to be convicted or acquitted. Even for the purpose of framing charge, reasonable suspicion is sufficient qua the accused. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned orders passed by the subordinate Courts be set aside and the trial Court may be directed to issue appropriate processes regarding the offences against the accused persons or in the alternative, concerned police officer may be directed to carry out further investigation or the trial Court itself may inquire into the allegations levelled in the private complaint under section 202 of the Cr. P.C.
7. Mr. JM Panchal, Ld.
Counsel with Mr. Mehul Sharad Shah, Ld. Advocate for the respondent no. 2 and Mr. Umesh Trivedi, Ld. Advocate for the respondent no. 3 vehemently opposed this petition and submitted that when there is concurrent findings of fact by two subordinate Courts, there is no reason whatsoever for this Court to interfere with such concurrent findings, invoking the powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and section 482 of the Cr. P.C. It is submitted that virtually such Special Criminal Application amounts to a second revision, which is not maintainable under law.
7.1. Mr. JM Panchal, Ld. Counsel submitted that there is no dispute that out of 13 documents, 7 were sent to FSL by the police. However, it is submitted that the disputed property consisted of 2 parts, namely, 426-A-1 and 426-B-1. Regarding each property, 6 agreements for sale came to be executed by the petitioner - complainant Manharlal Ratilal Bachkaniwala and his family members, namely, Harivadan, Kalpesh, Piyush, Ketan and Divyesh in favour of the respondent no. 2 - original accused Keshubhai Patel. For the property bearing No. 426-A-1, the same parties executed 6 documents in the form of the agreements to sell and same parties executed such agreements regarding the property No. 426-B-1. Over and above that, a general power of attorney was executed by the petitioner - complainant Manharlal Bachkaniwala and other 5 persons of his family named above, in favour of the respondent no. 2 - original accused Laxmanbhai Nanubhai for executing sale-deeds. Pursuant to the said power of attorney dated 6/1/2003, the respondent no. 2 original accused executed 12 sale-deeds on 16/1/2003. It is, therefore, submitted that the police forwarded 6 documents to FSL for the opinion of handwriting expert and those 6 documents were the 6 agreements to sell signed by the complainant and his family members regarding the property bearing No. 426-A-1. Police also sent this power of attorney deed to FSL. The police did not send the remaining 6 agreements to FSL pertaining to the property No. 426-B-1 and rightly did so because that would have been the duplication of work. The 6 documents sent by the police to the FSL, contained the signatures of 6 persons including the complainant and remaining such 6 agreements also contained signatures of the same 6 persons. Therefore, it cannot be said that by not sending remaining 6 agreements to FSL, police committed any error or that for the said purpose further investigation was required. The police also sent the document of power of attorney to the FSL. It is submitted that the Government handwriting expert of the FSL opined that these documents were genuine and were bearing the signatures of the persons who executed these documents.
7.2. Mr. JM Panchal, Ld. Counsel, about the two communications of the then Executive Magistrate, Surat, submitted that on the first occasion, the Ld. Advocate representing the complainant only showed the xerox copy of the power of attorney and on the basis of said xerox copy, the Executive Magistrate opined that the same was not bearing his signature and seal of his office, but subsequently during the course of police investigation when the police collected the document and when the same was shown to the Executive Magistrate, he opined that the same was bearing his signature and seal of his office. Thus, it is submitted that on first occasion, as a matter of fact, the Executive Magistrate was misled and the Executive Magistrate in his subsequent communication dated 22/12/2003 addressed to the IO, clearly explained that on first occasion some different xerox copy was shown to him and, therefore, he opined accordingly on 1/10/2003. That such explanation tendered by the Executive Magistrate in his communication dated 22/12/2003 has been rightly accepted by both the subordinate Courts and there is no reason to interfere with said finding.
7.3. About the statement of witness Tulsidas Manchharam, Mr. Panchal, Ld. Counsel stated that the IO and in turn, both the subordinate Courts rightly did not pay much attention to it for the simple reason that he happens to be near relative of the complainant and the said fact he has admitted in his statement itself. It is further submitted that the police collected sufficient material in the form of FSL report of the handwriting expert and other material to reveal that this witness Tulsidas had in fact, signed the power of attorney document as an attesting witness.
7.4. Mr. Panchal, Ld.
Counsel asserted that it is admitted position that approximately Rs.30 lac came to be deposited in the bank account of the complainant and his relatives on 16/1/2003 and the police collected necessary evidence from the bank that the complainant operated his bank account and he was knowing about the deposit, yet just to create false evidence, in support of his criminal complaint, he wrote a communication to the Bank Manager to put said money in dormant account. It is submitted that the said amount is nothing but the consideration amount of the sale transaction.
7.5. Mr. Panchal, Ld.
Counsel submitted that the police collected the evidence to reveal that as soon as on 26/11/2002 12 agreements to sell came to be executed, the complainant and his family members obtained the affidavits of sisters showing that they were relinquishing their rights in the property and towards the consideration of such waiver, by cheques, money came to be paid to mother and 3 sisters. On 21/12/2002 release-deed came to be executed by them. On 27/12/2002 and on 1/1/2003 the complainant and his family members executed a document regarding the family settlement. Thus, after the execution of those agreements, it was the complainant who undertook this exercise to clear the way for executing sale-deeds. These circumstances are prima-facie sufficient to come to the conclusion that the complainant and his family members were keen to dispose of the land and property and, therefore, in fact, they executed the agreements. It is submitted that in the document of power of attorney itself, reasons are stated as to why these 6 family members including the complainant empowered respondent no. 3 - accused Laxmanbhai to execute the final sale-deeds because certain formalities in the Revenue Department were required to be completed. It is submitted that as soon as the power of attorney holder executed the sale-deeds on 6/1/2003 and as soon as the same came to be registered on 22/1/2003, an application was filed in the City Survey Department for change of name and pursuant to that, notice under section 135-D was issued, necessary mutation entries were posted, which came to be certified by the concerned revenue authority. The complainant received certified copy of the sale-deed. These are the circumstances which were considered by the police and the subordinate Courts while accepting the summary report.
7.6. Mr. Panchal, Ld.
Counsel submitted that the complainant allegedly got the documents examined by his private handwriting expert and it has come on record that within the period of 2 days, said private handwriting expert of Mumbai, not only received the documents, but examined them and he submitted his report. As against that, there is report of the Government handwriting expert, which was rightly accepted by the subordinate Courts and there is no reason whatsoever for this Court to interfere with the said finding.
7.7. Mr. Panchal, Ld.
Counsel submitted that a Civil Suit bearing No. 263/2003 came to be filed on 16/10/2003, seeking declaration and a prayer to set aside sale-deed, filed by the complainant against the accused. Thus, it is submitted that with a view to bring pressure upon the accused, who are the defendants in the suit, a false criminal complaint is filed, giving a shape of civil dispute into a criminal offence.
7.8. Mr. Panchal, Ld.
Counsel further submitted that the document of power of attorney was signed by the concerned advocate and even the concerned advocate in his statement on oath, did not deny his signature in the document. Mr. Panchal, Ld. Counsel for the respondent no. 2 and Mr. Trivedi, Ld. Advocate for the respondent no. 3 relied upon certain decisions, which shall be discussed in this order at its proper place. It is, therefore, submitted that the trial Court was justified in accepting not only B Summary report, but B Summary report with prosecution as the only object of the petitioner - complainant was to involve the accused persons in a false case by concocting evidence. Ultimately, it is submitted that the petition may be dismissed.
8. I have also heard Mr. Raval, Ld. APP for the respondent no. 1 - State.
9. At the outset, there is no dispute that so far as the factual aspects which emerged on record are concerned, both the subordinate Courts, namely the trial Court as well as the Sessions Court, examined police papers and arrived at the conclusion that the B Summary as claimed by the police deserved to be granted. There is also no dispute that the petitioner - complainant feeling himself aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of the trial Court, preferred Criminal Revision Application before the Sessions Court and he was unsuccessful in the said revision. In that view of the matter, there is further no dispute that under the Cr. P.C., second revision is not maintainable. The instant matter is Special Criminal Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and under section 482 of the Cr. P.C. In the case of Krishnan v/s.
Krishnaveni reported in [1997] 4 S.C.C. 241, Hon'ble the Apex Court held that though the second revision before the High Court after dismissal of first revision application, is not maintainable by the same petitioner, but the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Cr. P.C., is still available. It is further held that even invoking the provision under section 482 of the Cr. P.C, the High Court can exercise inherent powers. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the said decision, however, in para. 8 observed that the powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Cr. P.C., is very wide, but the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under section 397[1] of the Cr. P.C.
10. In the above view of the matter, though this Special Criminal Application is maintainable, but the fact remains that so far as the factual scenario and the police papers are concerned, both the subordinate Courts examined them and came to the concurrent findings. The findings arrived at by the trial Court came to be re-examined by the Sessions Court.
11. There is no dispute that out of the 13 documents collected by the police, the police sent only 7 documents for the opinion of the Government handwriting expert of the FSL and those 7 documents were power of attorney deed and 6 agreements for sale of the land bearing No. 426-A-1 allegedly executed by the complainant Manharbhai and his 5 family members referred to above. What was not sent by the police to the FSL were remaining 6 agreements, though allegedly signed by the complainant and the same 5 family members, but of the property No. 426-B-1. Both the subordinate Courts thoroughly examined this aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion that the remaining 6 documents, therefore, were rightly not sent by the police to the FSL because they contained the signatures of same persons. From the very beginning, it is the case of the complainant that not a single agreement came to be executed and was signed by him or his family members. The 7th document which came to be forwarded by the police to the FSL was power of attorney deed. There is no dispute that the FSL reported that the documents were genuine and were bearing the signatures of the persons, whose specimen signatures were sent by the police. Thus, in nutshell, as per the opinion of the Government handwriting expert, there was no forgery. Under such circumstances, there was no justifiable reason for the police to send the remaining 6 documents to the FSL and at the same time, there was no valid ground for the subordinate Courts to direct the police to undertake further investigation and to send the remaining 6 documents to the FSL.
12. Much is said about the demeanor of the Executive Magistrate. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner - complainant that when the copy of power of attorney deed was shown to him by the advocate of the complainant, he opined in writing that the same was fake, but when the copy of the document was shown to him by the police, he took complete 'u' turn and opined that the same was genuine. Both the subordinate Courts examined the said two communications of the Executive Magistrate and opined that in the subsequent communication dated 22/12/2003 addressed to P.I., Mahidharpura Police Station, Surat, the Executive Magistrate elaborately explained that when the advocate of the complainant showed him the xerox copy of a document, there were no round seals of his office in it and the same was found to be fake, but when the police showed him the copy of the power of attorney document, he examined it and stated that the same was bearing round seal of his office as well as his signature. On behalf of the respondents, as stated above, it has been submitted that during the first round, the Executive Magistrate, as a matter of fact, was misled and, therefore, on 1/10/2003 he addressed a communication to the learned advocate for the complainant that the copy shown to him was fake. This Court does not find any illegality or any impropriety having been committed by both the subordinate Courts while relying upon the communication of the Executive Magistrate dated 22/12/2003 wherein not only he opined about the copy of the document, which has been shown to him by the police to be genuine, but explained circumstances under which in his first communication dated 1/10/2003 he opined that the copy shown to him by the advocate for the complainant to be fake one. Moreover, advocate Mr. H.T. Patel in his statement on oath admitted that the deed of power of attorney was signed by him before the Executive Magistrate.
13. Much was stated on behalf of the petitioner complainant about the statement of witness Tulsidas Manchharam recorded by the police that this witness though allegedly shown as attesting witness to the document of the power of attorney, in his statement before the police, he categorically stated that he never signed the document nor the alleged executors signed the document in his presence. It is pertinent to note that in his statement itself, he says that he is near relative of the complainant. During the course of arguments on behalf of the respondents, statement of Kishorbhai Rangunwala recorded by the police was also relied upon. He is also relative of the complainant and in his statement, he categorically admitted the sale transaction. He stated that all those documents came to be executed and he knew this fact because he acted as broker in the transaction.
14. Over and above this, it is pertinent to note that after the transaction was over, about Rs.30 lac came to be deposited in the bank account of the complainant and in the bank accounts of his relatives. Both the subordinate Courts elaborately examined this aspect of the matter. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents herein that the amount deposited was consideration amount of the sale transaction. It was further submitted that the amount was deposited by several cheques. On behalf of the petitioner - complainant, it was submitted that as soon as he came to know about this, immediately he requested the concerned Bank Manager to keep this amount in dormant account.
14.1. Mr. Raval, Ld.
APP for the respondent no. 1 - State, during the course of his submissions, submitted that the concerned IO thoroughly investigated this aspect of the matter in the bank and collected bank statements and other relevant material from the bank. Thus, it can safely be said at this stage that even regarding the deposit, thorough investigation was made by the police.
15. It is true that the report of private handwriting expert obtained by the petitioner - complainant and the report of the Government handwriting expert of the FSL do not tally with each other. Both the subordinate Courts discussed this aspect of the matter and ultimately came to the conclusion that there was no reason at this stage not to rely upon the report of the Government handwriting expert, who had no axe to grind and who had no motive to favour either of the parties. It is true that as observed in the decision rendered in the case of State of Gujarat v/s. Vinaya Chandra reported in AIR 1967 S.C. 778, it has been observed that the opinion of a handwriting expert is relevant in view of section 45 of the Evidence Act, but on question of handwriting of person, same cannot be treated as conclusive. There cannot be any dispute regarding the ratio laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in this case. However, so far as the instant matter is concerned, it is pertinent to note that the police did not claim B Summary solely on the basis of the report of the Government handwriting expert, but collected relevant other materials during the course of investigation, which has been elaborately discussed by both the subordinate Courts in the impugned orders as well as considered by this Court in this order.
16. There is no dispute that only because the police claims either 'B Summary' or 'C Summary', the trial Court has to accept it. In the decision rendered in the case of Abhinandan Jha v/s. Dinesh Mishra reported in AIR 1968 S.C. 117, it has been observed by Hon'ble the Apex Court that even if the police files report under section 169 of the Cr. P.C., yet the Magistrate may disagree with it and can take cognizance under section 190 of the Cr. P.C., or may order further investigation under section 156. Therefore, so far as the trial Court is concerned, it is not necessary that the trial Court shall invariably accept the closure report filed by the police. If the circumstances so demand, the trial Court can take cognizance of the offence and can issue necessary processes against the accused or can ask the police to further investigate the matter or can take up the inquiry to be conducted by the Court itself under section 202 of the Cr. P.C. But while adopting any of the courses, the trial Court shall consider the relevant police papers and shall form an opinion as to whether the closure report deserves to be accepted or that any other course deserves to be adopted. In the instant matter, as stated above, after undertaking required police investigation, the IO found that the material collected did not support the complaint filed by the complainant and claimed summary. Both the subordinate Courts, examining and re-examining the police papers, came to the conclusion that the closure report was required to be accepted.
17. Last but not the least, on behalf of the petitioner, it has been submitted that the land allegedly sold, was very valuable land and even when the alleged transaction regarding the consideration amount of Rs.30 lac was made, the real value of the land was about Rs.5 crore. Therefore, it is submitted that on this count alone, the impugned orders passed by both the subordinate Courts deserve to be set aside. This Court is of the opinion that so far as the instant matter is concerned, the only fact, which is required to be considered, is as to whether the material collected by the police during the course of investigation is sufficient and adequate for filing charge-sheet against the accused or not. As stated above, both the subordinate Courts, examining the police papers, came to the conclusion that the material was not sufficient for filing charge-sheet against the accused and, therefore, the police claimed summary and the summary was granted. Moreover, as submitted during the course of arguments, the petitioner has filed a civil suit for cancellation of the disputed sale-deeds and the agreements. That suit is pending. When such is the situation, this aspect of the matter regarding adequacy or inadequacy of the consideration, etc., is basically a civil dispute and shall be dealt with by the Civil Court.
18. In the above view of the matter, this Court did not find any reason to interfere with the orders of the subordinate Courts when the closure report filed by the police came to be accepted. However, lastly, the question is with regard to the acceptance of 'B Summary with Prosecution' by the subordinate Courts. Perusing the impugned order passed by the trial Court, no reason is assigned as to why at the time of accepting the closure report filed by the police, the complainant was required to be prosecuted. The Sessions Court in revision, examined this aspect of the matter and observed that the trial Court did not assign any reason as to why the complainant was required to be prosecuted. However, despite such observations, ultimately the Sessions Court upheld the entire order of the trial Court regarding acceptance of closure report as well as the initiation of criminal proceedings against the complainant. Apart from the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that there is a bar under section 195 read with section 340 of the Cr. P.C., and that as a matter of fact, no offence against public justice can be said to have been committed by the complainant by filing the criminal complaint before the trial Court, the fact remains that no reason is assigned by both the subordinate Courts as to why the complainant was required to be prosecuted. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that the complainant had also initiated civil proceedings against the accused seeking various reliefs including cancellation of the sale-deed. That cannot be a ground to prosecute the complainant as to why he moved two forums simultaneously, namely Civil Court and Criminal Court, to arrive at the conclusion that, therefore, he was required to be prosecuted, as suggested by the police. The criminal complaint was filed before the trial Court way back in 2003. The closure report was filed by the police in the year 2004. Under such circumstances and in light of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that both the subordinate Courts rightly accepted the closure report filed by the police, but instead of accepting 'B summary with prosecution' as suggested by the police, the trial Court should have granted 'B summary without prosecution' in this matter. To that extent only the impugned orders of the subordinate Courts deserve to be interfered with.
19. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is partly allowed and the impugned order dated 19/2/2005 passed by the Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Surat in M. Case No. 10/2003, which came to be upheld by the Ld. 3rd Addl. Sessions Judge, Surat, in Criminal Revision Application No. 49/2005 by judgment and order dated 25/1/2011 stand set aside qua the grant of "B summary with prosecution"
in this matter and the rest of the impugned orders passed by the Courts are not interfered with. In the result, there shall be "B summary without prosecution"
in this matter. Rule is partly made absolute accordingly.
(J.C.UPADHYAYA, J.) * Pansala.
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