Court No. - 34
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2958 of 2018 Petitioner :- Mangala Yadav Respondent :- State of U.P.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mr Ashutosh Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Mr Om Prakash Singh
Hon'ble Yashwant Varma,J.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel and Sri O.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Sushil Kumar Rao, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
Under challenge is an order of 28 February 2014 whereby the respondents have sought to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Undisputedly, the petitioner had retired from service on 31 December 2008. The order impugned is challenged principally on the ground that no jurisdiction vested in the Corporation to initiate proceedings post the retirement of the petitioner.
Dealing with the competence of an employer to continue or initiate disciplinary proceedings post the retirement of an employee the Court in V.K. Jaiswal vs. U.P.S.R.T.C. and others [2017(2) ADJ 699] has held thus:-
"Having noticed the salient fact on which there is not much dispute, this Court is firstly constrained to observe that there is no material or evidence to indicate what steps the Corporation took between 30 April 1996 to 3 February 1998. There is not one shred of evidence to indicate as to whether any notice was issued to the petitioner during this period to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. As noticed above, although the order dated 24 April 1998 asserts that various dates had been fixed by the Enquiry Officer appointed on 17 February 1997, no such notice has been placed on the record nor have details of any such notice been alluded to or disclosed in the affidavit filed in these proceedings on behalf of the Corporation. Even the order sheet which stands appended along with the counter affidavit of the Corporation refers to dates which were fixed in 1996. On the above state of the record, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the disciplinary proceedings were revived only in 1998 after a long spell of unexplained silence and inaction appears to have force. On 17 February 1998, the Corporation although being fully aware of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, proceeded to pass an order holding that the petitioner would be treated to have retired from service with effect from 31 January 1998. If the petitioner was permitted to retire with effect from 31 January 1998, this Court fails to comprehend what authority inhered in the Corporation to proceed with or continue the disciplinary proceedings or to inflict any punishment upon the petitioner. As noted above, no statutory provision, rule or regulation prevalent in the Corporation was referred to or relied upon to sustain the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the petitioner on 31 January 1998. Once the petitioner had retired from service no authority vested in the Corporation to continue with the disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated against the petitioner. Retirement of an employee cuts the cord which connects the two entities and severs all relationship of master and servant or employer and employee. The retirement of an employee brings the curtain down upon the relationship of employer and employee. Once this event occurs, no further jurisdiction or authority vests in the employer to inflict any punishment upon the employee thereafter. The only exception to this position is where a statutory rule enables the employer to continue the employee in service for the purposes of concluding an enquiry already initiated and inflicting punishment even after retirement or a special provision to make good the loss suffered by the employer even after the superannuation of the employee. The position in law on this aspect is no longer res integra and stands authoritatively answered in favour of the petitioner by the Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena. The principles elucidated in the said judgment have been reiterated in Dev Prakash Tewari. This Court, therefore, must record that the Corporation had no authority to continue with the disciplinary proceedings post the superannuation of the petitioner on 31 January 1998."
Before this Court, it is conceded that the Corporation does not stand vested with any authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of an employee. The Court also notes that although the impugned order provided that the disciplinary proceedings would be concluded with expedition, till date no final orders in those proceedings have been passed. The impugned order, thus stands rendered wholly without jurisdiction and authority of law.
In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 28 February 2014 is set-aside.
The second respondent is consequently directed to release all retiral benefits which are admittedly due and payable to the petitioner within a period of two months from today. Since the retiral benefits of the petitioner have not been released even though he retired in 2008, the petitioner is also held entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum in light of the decision rendered by a learned Judge in Yogendra Singh and others vs. State of U.P. and others [Writ-A No.23639 of 2016] for the delayed disbursal of retiral benefits. The interest shall be computed as becoming payable upon expiry of three months from 31 December 2008, the date when the petitioner superannuated from service.
Order Date :- 29.7.2021 Rakesh