IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2017 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN WRIT PETITION Nos.56121-56133/2017 (L-RES) BETWEEN :
THE MANAGEMENT OF B.W.S.S.B CAUVERY BHAVAN, K. G. ROAD, BANGALORE-560 052, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER, NO.1, CAUVERY HEAD WORK SUB-DIVISION, BWSSB, T.K. HALLI - 571 421. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI B. L. SANJEEV, ADV.) AND 1. SRI M. MAHADEVA AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, S/O. MARIKENCHEGOWDA, R/A GOLLARAHALLI VILLAGE, HALAGUR POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
2. SRI VENKATESH AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, S/O. HUCHAIAH, R/A HALAGUR POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
3. SRI R. RAMESHA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, S/O. RAMAIAH, R/A D-41, BWSSB COLONY, T. K. VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
4. SRI S. R. KUMAR GHATI AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, S/O. S. RANGANATH R/A HALAGUR VILLAGE & POST BRAHMIN STREET, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
5. SRI K. NAGARAJU AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, S/O. KULLAIAH, R/A R-29, BWSSB COLONY, T. K. VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
6. SRI NAGARAJU AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, S/O. CHILLALAIAH, R/A T. K. VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
7. SRI N. CHANDRA AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, S/O. NANJAIAH, QUARTERS NO.R-17, BWSSB QUARTERS, T. K. VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
8. SRI B. C. PANDURANGA AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, S/O. CHIKKAPUTTAIAH, R/A BYADRAYALLI VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
9. SRI T. M. MUNISWAMY AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, S/O. MANCHAIAH, R/A T. K. VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
10. SRI G. RAJU AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, R/O. H. BASAVAPURA, HALAGUR POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
11. SRI SHIVASHANKARA AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, S/O. KEMPAIAH, R/O R.28, BWSSB QUARTERS, T. K. HALLI VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
12. SRI D. SRINIVASA AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, S/O. DASEGOWDA, R/O GOLLARAHALLI, HALAGUR POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
13. SRI SHIVA AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, S/O. MANCHAIAH, R/O BYADRAYALLI VILLAGE & POST, MALAVALLI TALUK, MANDYA DISTRICT-571404.
14. M/S. CREATIVE ASSETS PROTECTION GROUP 120, SRINIVASA NILAYA, LIG, 7TH MAIN, 2ND PHASE, KHB COLONY, BASAVESHWARA NAGARA, BANGALORE-560 046. ... RESPONDENTS THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DTD 08.12.2017 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE ON IA NO.3 FILED IN I.D.NO.16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 36 AND 41/2008, VIDE ANNEXURE-E TO E12 AND DIRECT THE PRINCIPAL LABOUR COURT, BANGALORE TO SUMMON THE DOCUMENTS AS SOUGHT FOR BY THE PETITIONER IN IA NO.3 FILED IN I.D. NOS.16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 36 AND 41/2008.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING :
O R D E R The management of B.W.S.S.B., the petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 08.12.2017, passed by the Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Bangalore, whereby the learned Labour Court has rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, read with Section 151 of CPC, for production of certain documents relating to M/s. Creative Assets Protection Group, the respondent No.14, in respect of the respondent No.1, the alleged workman, filed by respondent No.14 before the P.F. Commissioner.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner- Board invited tenders for deployment of trained watch and ward personnel, and supervisors, for carrying out security work at its units located in different parts of Bengaluru. As per the terms and conditions of the tender, M/s. Creative Assets Protection Group offered to take care of the security by deploying trained watch and ward personnel and to carry out the work of supervision. Subsequently, the tender was awarded to the respondent No.14. Therefore, the contractor furnished large number of workmen for carrying out the responsibility assigned to them. Moreover, according to the petitioner, the respondent Nos.1 to 13, who were working for the petitioner, were being paid by the Contractor. Their work was also being supervised by the said Supervisors also appointed by the contractor. The contractor was free to give any work to his workers on expiry of the contract with the Board.
3. However, the respondents have approached the learned Labour Court by filing an application under Section 10 (4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and prayed that direction should be issue to the petitioner-Board to reinstate them with full back wages and continuity of service and other consequential benefits. According to the respondent Nos.1 to 13, they were employed by the petitioner-Board, and the petitioner management abruptly refused to appoint them without following Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. After hearing both the parties, by award dated 16.04.2013, the learned Labour Court partly allowed the claim statement and directed the petitioner- Board to reinstate the respondents as daily wages within one month from the date on which the award becomes enforceable.
4. Since the petitioner-Board was aggrieved by the award dated 16.04.2013, it filed a writ petition, namely W.P.No.33086-106/2013 before this Court. By order dated 23.07.2015, this Court not only set aside the award dated 16.04.2013, but also remanded the case to the Labour Court for fresh consideration.
5. Subsequently, after remand of the matter, the contractor was impleaded as a party-respondent before the learned Labour Court. However, he did not appear before the learned Labour Court. Since the contractor did not appear, the petitioner-Board filed an application in all the claim statements filed before the Labour Court by the respondent-workmen, wherein it prayed that the Labour Court should summon the documents pertaining to the contractor. However, by order dated 08.12.2017, the learned Labour Court has dismissed the said application. Hence, this petition before this Court.
6. Mr. Sanjeev B.L., the learned counsel for petitioner, has vehemently contended that these documents are essential in order to establish the fact that the workmen are the workmen of the contractor, and they are not working in the petitioner-Board. Thus, the question of reinstating the petitioners, back into service, does not even arise. However, without summoning the documents, the learned Labour Court has rejected the application. Therefore, the impugned order should be set aside by this Court.
7. Heard the learned counsel for petitioner, and perused the impugned order.
8. Undoubtedly, in cases where a workman claims to be a workman under the employer, it is for the workman to establish the said fact through cogent and convincing evidence. He is also required to establish the fact that he is not only the workman, but also worked for 240 days in a year for the said employer. Therefore, the learned Labour Court is certainly justified in concluding that the burden of proof lies on the workman, and does not lie on the petitioner- Board.
9. Moreover, a bare perusal of the impugned order clearly reveals that the learned Labour Court has also noticed the fact that the documents, which the petitioner- Board wants to summon from the Provident Fund office relating to the workmen, have already been filed by the petitioner-Board, and have already been marked as Exhibits by the learned Labour Court. Thus, no fruitful purpose would be served by summoning the same set of documents.
Lastly, the learned Labour Court has noticed the fact that the case has been pending before it since 2008, i.e. for the last nine years. Therefore, summoning of the documents is a clever ploy to prolong the proceedings before the learned Labour Court.
10. The reasoning given by the learned Labour Court cannot be faulted by this Court. In case, the relevant documents have already been submitted by the petitioner- Board, and have been marked, naturally no fruitful purpose will be served by summoning same exact set of documents from the office of the Provident Fund Commissioner. Moreover, the petitioner cannot be permitted to prolong the proceedings by filing applications which are frivolous in nature.
11. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 08.12.2017. Since the petition is devoid of any merit, it is, hereby, dismissed.
Sd/- JUDGE Np/-