JUDGMENT
1. The plaintiffs are the reversionary heirs of one Nohar Singh. They instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for a declaration of their title and for possession of the property of Nohar Singh. Nohar Singh-left a widow, Musammat Mendo, who executed three hypothecation bonds in favour of Zalim Singh and Chandan Singh, both now deceased. Suits were brought upon these bonds and the property now in question was sold in execution of decrees obtained in these suits and portion of the property was purchased by the mortgagees. The suit of the plaintiffs in the present case was resisted on the ground that the mortgages in question were executed by Musammat Mendo to raise money for legal necessity. The Court below held that there was legal necessity for portion only of the loan taken by her and gave a decree accordingly to the plaintiffs for possession and for mesne profits. The learned Subordinate Judge deducted, however, from the mesne profits, the sums representing the amount obtained by Musammat Mendo for legal necessity.
2. Makhan Lal, a son of Chandan Singh, appeals against this decree. His case is that Musammat Mendo obtained the entire of the loans and executed the bonds, to which we have referred, for legal necessity. The consideration for the first bond is stated to be money due on account and cash for constructing a well. The second bond was for money taken to satisfy accounts and money due on a bond of the 21st of December, 1880. The third was for money raised to meet money due on accounts and a decree of one Maula Baksh. The accounts of Chandan Singh and Zalim Singh were examined to ascertain the particulars of the expenditure referred to in these bonds, and it was ascertained that the money was advanced under three principal heads: (1) for the construction of a well; (2) for defraying the expenses of a feast on the return of Musammat Mendo from Gaya, and (3) for the expenses of the marriage of Mendo's daughter. The money borrowed for the expenses of the marriage of Mendo's daughter was clearly for legal necessity, and the Court below rightly allowed the money so expended. But in respect of the other matters to which we have referred, it held that there was no legal necessity for the borrowing. Expenses incurred in the construction of a well may be a legal necessity if it be proved to be for the benefit of the estate; but there is no evidence to satisfy us that the well which was constructed by Musammat Mendo was constructed for the benefit of the estate or for the good of her tenants and cultivators. We, therefore, think that the Court below was right in disallowing this item. The other item, namely, the expenses of a feast on the return of Mendo from pilgrimage, appears also to us not to have been incurred for legal necessity. A feast given on the return of a pilgrim cannot be said to be so intimately connected with the pilgrimage as to justify its allowance as money expended for legal necessity. We know of no authority for allowing such an item as coming within the meaning of legal necessity and none has been cited to us. For these reasons we agree in the view taken by the Court below and dismiss the appeal with costs.