1. By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner – General Manager Telecom of Palanpur has challenged the legality and validity of judgment and award dated 16.1.2003 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Reference (ITC) No. 117 of 2000 whereby the petitioner was directed to reinstate the respondent workman in service with effect from October 19,1995 and calculate and give the same benefits which were given to 40 casual labourers whose services were terminated in 1995.
2. The facts which can be culled out from the record of the petition are summarized as under :
3. That the respondent was working as Casual Labourer in Palanpur Division on daily wages from 1.8.1989 upto October 1995 and as the services of the respondent workman came to be terminated, the respondent workman raised a dispute. As the conciliation failed, the said dispute came to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal (Central), Ahmedabad, which came to be registered as Reference (ITC) No. 117 of 2000.
4. The respondent workman filed statement of claim interalia raising contention that the respondent workman was a casual labourer and was working with the petitioner since 1989 and even though he had completed 240 days in every year, his services came to be terminated from October,1995 without any prior notice or following procedure under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'I.D. Act' for the sake of brevity). It was also claimed that as other persons have been recruited after termination of the respondent workman there is breach of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. Accordingly, the respondent workman claimed reinstatement on his original post with continuity of service and back wages. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence and after considering the same passed an award directing petitioner to reinstate the respondent-workman in service with effect from October, 1995 and also ordered to calculate and give the same benefits which were given to 40 casual labourers whose services were terminated in 1995, as per Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000.
5. It was also contended by the respondent workman before the Tribunal that similarly situated 40 casual workers were terminated and those workmen challenged the order of termination before the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing appropriate legal proceedings. It was contended that the termination of those workmen came to be stayed by maintaining status-quo and thereafter the cases of those 40 casual labourers came to be considered for granting temporary status in light of the policy decision of the petitioner. It was therefore contended by the respondent workman before the Tribunal that the respondent workman being similarly situated, his case also should be considered even though it was pleaded by the petitioner that the system of casual labourers is already discontinued by the petitioner as a matter of policy and those who were in service on 1.8.1998 as casual labourers have been granted temporary status. The Tribunal after considering the evidence on record as well as the contention as regards 40 casual labourers by the impugned judgment and award directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent workman in service. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and award the present petition is filed.
6. Heard Ms. P.J. Davawala, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Hemal Acharya for the respondent workman.
7. Ms. Davawala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken this Court to the factual matrix of the matter as well as statement of claim and the evidence adduced before the Tribunal. Ms. Davawala mainly contended that the system of casual labourers is discontinued. It was further submitted by learned Counsel Ms. Davawala that the Tribunal has committed an error apparent on the face of record in coming to the conclusion that the benefits which have been given by the petitioner especially as regards grant of temporary status to 40 casual labourers who were before the Central Administrative Tribunal are similarly situated with the respondent workman without verifying the fact whether the said scheme would apply to the respondent workmen or not. Ms.
Davawala further submitted that the respondent workman has never been terminated but in fact, the workman had abandoned the service. Ms. Davawala also submitted that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal to the effect that the petitioner has violated the provisions of Sections 25F & 25H of the Act is erroneous and contrary to the evidence and thus the Tribunal has committed an error apparent on the face of the record. Ms. Davawala further submitted that in fact the respondent workman had not raised any claim as can be seen from the statement of claim filed before the Tribunal to give the same benefit as is given to 40 casual labourers by the petitioner vide their Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000. Ms. Davawala submitted that the respondent workman voluntarily abandoned the service and therefore he was not in service on the date which was fixed in the Office Memorandum being 1.8.1998 and therefore the policy laid down by the petitioner in their Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 cannot be made applicable to the respondent workman. Ms.
Davawala vehemently submitted that the Tribunal has also not considered the fact that the petitioner has throughout India in all Telecom Districts has discontinued the system of casual labourers and those who were on the service on 1.8.1998 were only considered for grant of temporary status and therefore the respondent workman as prayed in the statement of claim cannot be reinstated on his original post. In view of this, according to Ms. Davawala, no work is available as the said system is discontinued. Ms. Davawala therefore submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside.
8. Per contra Mr. Hemal Acharya, learned Counsel for the respondent workman has supported the impugned judgment and award. Mr. Acharya submitted that the Tribunal has committed no error much less any error apparent on the face of the record which requires interference by this Court.
9. Mr. Acharya further submitted that the Tribunal after considering the evidence on record has recorded a definite finding that there is breach of Sections 25F & 25H of the I.D. Act and the petitioner has not been able to show as to why such a finding of fact deserves to be disbelieved. Mr. Acharya submitted that the case of the respondent workman and the case of the 40 casual labourers who have been given benefit of the Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 is identical and similar and therefore the Tribunal has rightly allowed the Reference and directed reinstatement of the respondent workman and has rightly directed the petitioner to give benefits as given to 40 casual labourers. Mr. Acharya therefore submitted that the petition is devoid of any merit and the same deserves to be dismissed.
10. Considering the contentions raised by both the sides and on going through the impugned judgment and award, it transpires that the respondent workman has worked for more than 240 days as daily wager in the years 1992-93 to 95. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the respondent workman should be reinstated in service. However, it is found that the Tribunal has accepted the version of the respondent workman mainly on the ground that the petitioner has given benefit to 40 casual labourers who were granted temporary status by Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000. However, it transpires that the Tribunal has not examined the aspect whether Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 would apply to the respondent workman or not. It further transpires that having recorded finding that those 40 casual labourers who were in service on 1.8.1998 were considered for granting temporary status in view of letter dated 14.8.1998 of the Department of Telecommunication, New Delhi and also extended benefits of Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000, though the Tribunal has recorded that the respondent workman was not in service since June,1995. Thus the Tribunal has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the benefits given to 40 casual labourers by Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 should also be given to the respondent workman.
11. Though it is found that the Tribunal has not definitely come to the conclusion that there is breach of Sections 25F & 25H of the I.D. Act, however on perusing oral deposition, one Mr. Lakhubhai Dosjibhai, who was working as daily wager, it transpires that the respondent workman has completed 240 days in three years as noted by the Tribunal. It further reveals that aspect of benefit of Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 is not at all found in the oral deposition of the said witness. Similarly in the oral deposition of the respondent workman (Exhibit 11), there is no mention about Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000. As noted by the Tribunal that the benefit of Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 was given to those 40 labourers who were in service on 1.8.1998 as they were granted status-quo by the Central Administrative Tribunal. It transpires that precondition of the applicability of the Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000 was that the casual labourer has to be in service 1.8.1998 in order to get benefit of temporary status. Whereas the respondent workman was not in service since June, 1995.
12. It bornes out from the record that the petitioner i.e. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited has discontinued the system of casual labourers and therefore the post on which the petitioner is directed to be reinstated is not in existence. At this stage, it can be advantageous to refer to the judgment of this Court (Coram : M.R. Shah, J.) in the case of Sub Divisional Engineer (OFC) V/s Hareshbhai Merambhai Basiya in Special Civil Application No. 9271 of 2010, wherein judgment and order dated 8.12.2010 this Court has dealt with the identical situation and in para 5 has observed thus :
“5. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length and considered the impugned judgment and award. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent was appointed and working as casual labourer on daily wages and as such he worked between 01.04.1998 to 09.08.1999 and thereafter on and from 09.08.1999, on different dates and as & when work was available, he was offered the work. It appears that thereafter the petitioner BSNL discontinued the system of engaging workman/labourer in entire country and after 01.05.1995, no casual workman/labourer has been engaged in BSNL. In view of the above, the respondent was not offered the work on and from 01.05.1995. The Tribunal has held the said termination/retrenchment in breach of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and has consequently allowed the reference and has directed the petitioners to reinstate the respondent to his original post with 20% back wages and continuity of service. It is to be noted that the post on which the respondent is directed to be reinstated, is not in existence as the system of engaging casual workman has been discontinued by the BSNL in entire country. Therefore, the post on which the petitioners are directed to reinstate the respondent, is not in existence. As stated hereinabove, respondent worked only for two years i.e. from 01.04.1998 to 09.08.1999 and thereafter on and from 09.08.1999 as casual labourer/workman on daily wages. Therefore, assuming that there is a breach of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whether the Tribunal was justified in directing the petitioners to reinstate the respondent with 20% back wages and continuity of service on his original post i.e. casual workman/labourer, which is not in existence now.”
13. Hence, even if it is believed that the respondent workman has completed 240 days. Considering the binding decision of this Court as well as Apex Court this Court feels that lump sum monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement as awarded by the Tribunal will subserve the ends of justice. As aforesaid, the Tribunal has committed an error apparent on the face of the record by directing the petitioner to give the same benefits which were given to 40 casual labourers whose services were terminated in 1995 from Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000. This Court in the case of Sub Divisional Engineer (supra) dealt with the said aspect after considering various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in paras 6 & 7 thus :
“6. Identical question came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagbir Singh (Supra) and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision considered catena of decisions in recent time and thereafter laid down the aforesaid. In paras 7 to 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under:
7. It is true that earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention to the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
8. In U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey1, the question for consideration before this Court was whether direction to pay back wages consequent upon a declaration that a workman has been retrenched in violation of the provisions of the Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (equivalent to Section 25F of ‘the Act, 1947’) as a rule was proper exercise of discretion. This Court considered a large number of cases and observed thus : (SCC pp.491 92, paras 4143 & 45)
“41. The Industrial Courts while adjudicating on disputes between the management and the workmen, therefore, must take such decisions which would be in consonance with the
purpose the law seeks to achieve. When justice is the buzzword in the matter of adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, it would be wholly improper on the part of the superior courts to make them apply the cold letter of the statutes to act mechanically. Rendition of justice would bring within its purview giving a person what is due to him and not what can be given to him in law.
42. A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. If that principle is applied, the functions of an Industrial Court shall lose much of their significance.
43. The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this Court, probably having regard to the changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy, globalisation, privatisation and outsourcing, is evident.
* * * 45. The Court, therefore, emphasised that while granting relief, application of mind on the part of the Industrial Court is imperative. Payment of full back wages, therefore, cannot be the natural consequence.”
9. This Court in Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. V.
M.C. Joshi2 held that relief of reinstatement with full back wages were not being granted automatically only because it would be lawful to do so and several factors have to be considered, few of them being as to whether appointment of the workman had been made in terms of statute/rules and the delay in raising the industrial dispute. This Court granted compensation instead of reinstatement although there was violation of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (equivalent to Section 25F) of the Act, 1947. This is what this Court said : (SCC p.356, para 9) “9. Although according to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant the Labour Court and the High Court committed an error in arriving at a finding that in terminating the services of the respondent, the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act were contravened, we will proceed on the basis that the said finding is correct. The question, however, would be as to whether in a situation of this nature, relief of reinstatement in services should have been granted. It is now well settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court that the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would not be granted automatically only because it would be lawful to do so. For the said purpose, several factors are required to be taken into consideration, one of them being as to whether such an appointment had been made in terms of the statutory rules. Delay in raising an industrial dispute is also a relevant fact.”
10. In the case of State of M.P. & Ors. v. Lalit Kumar Verma,this Court substituted the award of reinstatement by compensation. In yet another decision in the case of M.P. Administration v. Tribhuwan4, this Court reversed the High Court’s order directing reinstatement with full back wages and instead awarded compensation. It was opined :
“12. In this case, the Industrial Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It merely directed the amount of compensation to which the respondent was entitled had the provisions of Section 25F been complied with should be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. We are not suggesting that the High Court could not interfere with the said order, but the discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Industrial Court, in our opinion, should have been taken into consideration for determination of the question as to what relief should be granted in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Each case is required to be dealt with in the fact situation obtaining therein.
13. We, therefore, are of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and particularly in view of the fact that the High Court had directed reinstatement with full back wages, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if the appellant herein be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 75,000 by way of compensation to the respondent. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent.”
11. In Sita Ram v. Moti Lal Nehru FarmersTraining Institute5, this Court considered the question as to whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding reinstatement of the appellants therein: (SCC p.81, paras 2125) “21. The question, which, however, falls for our consideration is as to whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding reinstatement of the appellants in service.
22. Keeping in view the period during which the services were rendered by the respondent (sic appellants); the fact that the respondent had stopped its operation of bee farming, and the services of the appellants were terminated in December 1996, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where the appellants could have been directed to be reinstated in service.
23. Indisputably, the Industrial Court, exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, but such discretion is required to be exercised judiciously. Relevant factors therefor were required to be taken into consideration; the nature of appointment, the period of appointment, the availability of the job, etc. should weigh with the court for determination of such an issue.
24. This Court in a large number of decisions opined that payment of adequate amount of compensation in place of a direction to be reinstated in service in cases of this nature would subserve the ends of justice. (See Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai [(2006) 11 SCC 684], M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban [(2007) 9 SCC 748] and Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn.
v. M.C. Joshi [(2007) 9 SCC 353])
25. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that payment of a sum of Rs.1,00,000 to each of the appellants, would meet the ends of justice. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.”
12. In Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar & Anr.6, this Court again considered the question whether the Labour Court was justified in awarding the relief of reinstatement with full back wages in favour of the workman and held :
“18. The first respondent was admittedly appointed on a daily wage of Rs. 17 per day. He worked for a bit more than two years. It has not been disputed before us that sanction of the State of U.P. was necessary for creation of posts. The contention of the appellant before the Labour Court that the post was not sanctioned after 3131990 by the State was not denied or disputed. If there did not exist any post, in our opinion, the Labour Court should not have directed reinstatement of the first respondent in service.
19. A statutory authority is obligated to make recruitments only upon compliance with the equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Any appointment in violation of the said constitutional scheme as also the statutory recruitment rules, if any, would be void. These facts were required to be kept in mind by the Labour Court before passing an award of reinstatement.
20. Furthermore, public interest would not be subserved if after such a long lapse of time, the first respondent is directed to be reinstated in service.
21. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant should be directed to pay compensation to the first respondent in stead and in place of the relief of reinstatement in service.
22. Keeping in view the fact that the respondent worked for about six years as also the amount of daily wages which he had been getting, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs 50,000 to the first respondent. The said sum should be paid to the respondent within eight weeks from date, failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.”
13. In Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula7, it was observed : (SCC pp.57778, paras 613) “6. Such termination of service, having regard to the fact that he had completed 240 days of work during a period of 12 months preceding the said date, required compliance with the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. An order of retrenchment passed in violation of the said provision although can be set aside but as has been noticed by this Court in a large number of decisions, an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed.
7. The factors which are relevant for determining the same, inter alia, are:
(i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory rules, if any, had been complied with;
(ii) the period he had worked;
(iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and
(iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the date of termination or passing of the award.
8. The respondent is a local authority. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees are governed by a statute and statutory rules. No appointment can be made by a local authority without following the provisions of the recruitment rules. Any appointment made in violation of the said rules as also the constitutional scheme of equality as contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be a nullity.
9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible, but by reason thereof an employee cannot claim any right to be permanently absorbed in service or made permanent in absence of any statute or statutory rules. Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of retrenchment, the same would not mean that his services were liable to be regularised.
10. Applying the legal principles, as noticed hereinbefore, the relief granted in favour of the appellant by the Labour Court is wholly unsustainable. The same also appears to be somewhat unintelligible.
11. The High Court, on the other hand, did not consider the effect of noncompliance with the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellant was entitled to compensation, notice and notice pay.
12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that in a situation of this nature instead and in place of directing reinstatement with full back wages, the workmen should be granted adequate monetary compensation. (See M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban)
13. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that as the appellant had worked only for a short period, the interest of justice will be subserved if the High Court’s judgment is modified by directing payment of a sum of Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) by way of damages to the appellant by the respondent. Such payment should be made within eight weeks from this date, failing which the same will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.”
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee.
6.1 In the case of Santosh Kumar Seal and Others (Supra) also, in paras 9 and 10, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under:
9. In the last few years it has been consistently held by this Court that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if termination of an employee is found to be illegal or is in contravention of the prescribed procedure and that monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages in cases of such nature may be appropriate, (See U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey;Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi2; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Lalit Kumar Verma3; Madhya Pradesh Administration v. Tribhuban4; Sita Ram & Ors. v.
Moti Lal Nehru Farmers Training Institute5; Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai & Anr.6; Ghaziabad Development Authority & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar & Anr.7 and Mahboob Deepak v. Nagar Panchayat, Gajraula & Anr.).
10. In a recent judgment authored by one of us (R.M.Lodha, J.) in the case of Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board and Anr.9, the aforesaid decisions were noticed and it was stated :
“7. It is true that the earlier view of this Court articulated in many decisions reflected the legal position that if the termination of an employee was found to be illegal, the relief of reinstatement with full back wages would ordinarily follow. However, in recent past, there has been a shift in the legal position and in a long line of cases, this Court has consistently taken the view that relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and may be wholly inappropriate in a given fact situation even though the termination of an employee is in contravention of the prescribed procedure. Compensation instead of reinstatement has been held to meet the ends of justice.
* * * * * * * * * *
14. It would be, thus, seen that by a catena of decisions in recent time, this Court has clearly laid down that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25F although may be set aside but an award of reinstatement should not, however, be automatically passed. The award of reinstatement with full back wages in a case where the workman has completed 240 days of work in a year preceding the date of termination, particularly, daily wagers has not been found to be proper by this Court and instead compensation has been awarded. This Court has distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee”.
11. In view of the aforesaid legal position and the fact that the workmen were engaged as daily wagers about 25 years back and they worked hardly for 2 or 3 years, relief of reinstatement and back wages to them cannot be said to be justified and instead monetary compensation would subserve the ends of justice. In our considered view, the compensation of Rs.40,000 to each of the workmen (Respondents 1 to 14) shall meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. Such payment shall be made within 6 weeks from today, failing which the same shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.”
7. Considering the aforesaid recent decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent would not be of any assistance to him in view of the recent development and the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the change in law. Considering the facts of the case on hand and the aforesaid two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering the fact that respondent worked as a casual labourer on daily wages for the period between 01.04.1998 to 09.08.1999 and thereafter on and from 09.08.1999 only and assuming that there was breach of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and considering the fact that the post on which the respondent was serving i.e. casual labourer is not in existence, it appears to the Court that if the respondent is awarded a lump sum monetary compensation of Rs.25,000/ in lieu of reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service as awarded by the Tribunal, it will subserve the ends of justice.”
14. Recently in the case of Jagbir Singh V/s. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board And Another, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 327 and in the case of Senior Superintendent Telegraph (Traffic), Bhopal, Vs. Santosh Kumar Seal And Others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC, 773, the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken similar view.
15. In the present case also the services of the workman came to be terminated in the year 1995. Considering the facts of the present case, the
petitioner has worked for more than 240 days during three years i.e. 1992-93 and 1994. Whereas in the year 1995 the respondent workman has worked only for appointing casual labourers and daily wagers through out India and as observed above the respondent workman was not in service on 1.8.1998 and therefore the respondent workman even otherwise cannot be given benefit of the Office Memorandum dated 19.9.2000. Thus, it transpires from the fact that in light of the above factual position the petitioner cannot be directed to reinstate the respondent to his original post as claimed for by the respondent workman in statement of claim before the Tribunal as the original post is no more in existence and the said is discontinued since 1995 i.e. more than 17 years and considering the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various decisions and also considering the ratio laid down by this Court in the case of Sub Divisional Engineer (supra), if the respondent is awarded lump-sum compensation of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-five thousand only) in lieu of reinstatement as awarded by the Tribunal would subserve the ends of justice.
16. The petition is partly allowed. The judgment and award dated 16.1.2003 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Reference (ITC) No. 117 of 2000 is hereby modified to the extent that the petitioner shall pay total sum of Rs.35,000/- to the respondent workman in lieu of direction given by the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal for reinstatement and for giving his benefits which were given to other 40 casual workers. The aforesaid amount shall be paid to the respondent workman by A/c. Payee Cheque within eight weeks from today. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(R.M. Chhaya, J.) M.M.BHATT