JUDGMENT B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J.
1. Messrs. Mahesh Chand Vishan Swarup, Muzaffarnagar, a partnership firm is questioning the validity of an order dated December 27, 1989, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Meerut, transferring their assessment cases from the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Special Circle I, Muzaffarnagar, to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Special Circle, Meerut, "to ensure proper and co-ordinated investigation and for other reasons" mentioned in the said order.
2. Section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, empowers the Commissioner of Income-tax to transfer any case from one officer subordinate to him to another officer subordinate to him for reasons recorded by him and also after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee concerned. In this case, a notice was given to the petitioner and 29 other assessees, calling upon them to show cause why their cases should not be transferred from Muzaffarnagar to Meerut "with a view to ensure proper and co-ordinated investigation." The petitioner and the others filed a common reply, after considering which the impugned order was passed.
3. The impugned order recites the following facts : When the officials of the Department visited the residential and business premises of the said assessees to conduct a search under Section 132(1) of the Act, they were manhandled, causing severe physical injuries to them. The officers were stripped naked and search warrants and other Government documents were snatched away from them and there was also an attempt to murder some of them. On account of these incidents, the officers and the staff at Muzaffarnagar are under constant threat and pressure, mental or otherwise, and are not in a position to discharge their duties properly. It is, therefore, in the public interest to transfer the cases of the said assessees to the nearest station, namely, Meerut. The impugned order further recites that the aforesaid incidents were not denied in the common reply given by the petitioner and other assessees, but it was averred that they had all along been very co-operative with the Department and that the Department was acting vindictively towards them. They are said to have relied upon a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sagarmal Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. CBDT [1972] 83 ITR 130, in support of their contention that mere facility of investigation was not a sufficient ground for ordering a transfer under Section 127(1). The order further recites that all the said contentions were false, which is apparent from the fact that the said assessees manhandled the officials of the Department while they were discharging their official duties.
4. Sri Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that none of the partners of the petitioner firm were responsible for the incidents in question and that merely because some incident had taken place at Muzaffarnagar, it is not open to the Department to transfer the cases of all the assessees at Muzaffarnagar to another station. We find this argument too simplistic to merit any consideration. The writ petition is filed by the partnership' firm, Messrs. Mahesh Chand Vishan Swarup. The affidavit in support of the writ petition is sworn to by Sri "Ajai Swarup . . . son of Sri Vishan Swarup, resident of 196, Civil Lines, Muzaffarnagar". The impugned order shows that 30 persons, whose cases have been transferred thereunder, constitute one group. Sri Ajai Swarup is mentioned at item No. 12. Many of the persons, it is evident from a reading of the impugned order belong to Swarup family and all of them are residents of 196-N, Civil Lines, Muzaffarnagar. Business premises of some of the said firms (mentioned at serial Nos. 2 and 3 in the impugned orders) is also shown as 196-N, Civil Lines, Muzaffarnagar. It is wrong to say that cases of all the assessees of Muzaffarnagar are transferred to Meerut. It is evident that only the cases of a group of persons who are closely associated with and also appear to be related to each other and who are partners in certain firms (including the petitioner firm) have been transferred. We cannot but observe that the incident involving violence against the officials of the Income-tax Department while they were discharging their official duties is most regrettable. In the writ petition, the incident is not denied. All that is said is that none of the partners is responsible ; but a, reading of the impugned order makes it clear that it is the group of persons mentioned therein by the Commissioner who are supposed to be responsible.
5. It was next argued by Sri Rajesh Kumar that the show-cause notices issued by the Commissioner did not mention the several facts which are mentioned in the impugned order and the only ground mentioned in the show-cause notices is "to ensure proper and co-ordinated investigation". It is submitted that the narration of several facts relating to violence against the officials in the impugned order without mentioning them in the show-cause notices, constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice. It is true that the show-cause notices do not appear to mention the facts relating to use of violence against the income-tax officials, but we find that the said ground is really technical in nature and that no prejudice has really been caused to the petitioners on this account. Significantly enough, the petitioners have not cared to file a copy of their reply to the show-cause notices, which would have shown that they were fully aware of the case against them. The impugned order sets out the substance of the common reply given by the petitioners and other assessees which clearly establishes that they were fully aware that their cases were proposed to be transferred because of the aforesaid violent incident among other grounds and that they dealt with the said ground too in their common reply. Their present grievance is thus an empty one. We are of the opinion that unless the petitioners establish the prejudice resulting from non-observance of the principles of natural justice, no interference is possible. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, AIR 1984 SC 273, 285 ; [1983] 63 FJR 312, 330, Sabyasachi Mukharji J. (as he then was), speaking for the Division Bench, observed thus (at p. 285 of AIR 1984 SC) :
". . . the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula. In order to sustain a complaint of violation of principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity of cross-examination, it has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedure followed. See in this connection the observations of this court in the case of Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa [1969] 3 SCC 392. Hidayatullah, C. J., observed there at page 394 of the report, there is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and there is a gross case this court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right'."
6. Applying the principles of the said judgment, we must hold that mere allegation that the facts relating to the incident of violence against the officials of the Income-tax Department were not mentioned in the show-cause notice by itself does not warrant the quashing of the impugned order. The petitioners were fully aware of the said ground. The impugned order shows that they had put forward their case with respect to the said incident in their reply. In other words, they knew fully well that the said incident of violence against the officials of the Department was one of the grounds for transferring their cases to Meerut and they met that case also fully. We must emphasise that the ground of transfer is ensuring of proper and co-ordinated investigation. That ground was clearly stated in the show-cause notice. The violent incident was merely a supporting fact. Since the petitioners were fully aware of, and did meet, this supporting fact too in their explanation, they cannot be heard to complain of prejudice. We are, therefore, satisfied that there has been no failure of justice in this case, nor any prejudice to the petitioners.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon certain decisions in support of his contention that the right to transfer is a very serious matter and that unless all the requirements of Section 127 of the Act are satisfied, an order of transfer cannot be made. We do not think it necessary to deal with the same, since the proposition of law, urged by counsel for the petitioners, is not in dispute.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
10. No costs.