JUDGMENT S. N. Srivastava, J.
1. Litigative dispute in the instant petition having originated in the year 1901, has been erupting at regular intervals like proverbial sphinx emerging from ashes. The initial dispute culminated in the award dated April 2, 1901. Now the matter having journeyed upto the Apex Court has again come up before this Court by means of the present petition in which the petitioner has assailed the order dated 10.7.2003 assed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Muzaffarnagar whereby the matter has been remanded to the Consolidation Officer for decision afresh ostensibly holding that the decision of the Apex Court has been misconstrued and has not been implemented in letter and spirit.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed that the rights and shares of the parties stood clinched by the judgment of the Apex Court dated 6.3.1984 and the only question that remained was to levy implementation to the judgment of the Apex Court. It is further canvassed that the Consolidation Officer passed orders in obedience to the directions embodied in the judgment of the Apex Court but the Deputy Director of Consolidation on fallacious assumption of the facts that parties were not given adequate opportunity of hearing remitted the matter to the Consolidation for decision afresh. Per contra, learned counsel representing the opposite parties contended that the order of remand has been made rightly and in accordance with law.
3. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to delve into the judgment of the Apex Court in order to get at the substance of directions and further to cull out whether by the impugned order the Deputy Director Consolidation has observed in flouting the mandatory directions of the Apex Court. What the Apex Court has epilogized in its judgment dated March 6, 1984 may be quoted below :
"It is clarified that all that plots specified with numbers in the award dated April 2,1901 may be identified with reference to the new numbers allotted to them and shall be taken over according to the allotment made in the award. If some one other than the allottees is in possession, the allottee will be entitled to claim possession under the decree. This appeal is allowed and the decree is made in terms herein set out with no orders as to costs throughout."
I have searched the entire order and I have not stumbled across any direction which envisages rehearing of the parties and it is implicit in the order that all the plots specified with numbers in the award dated April 2, 1901 have to be identified with reference to the new numbers allotted to them and shall be taken over according to the allotment made in the award. The directions is explicit enough and leave no manner of misgiving in so far as its compliance strictly in terms of the award is concerned. The only way envisaged in the order of the Apex Court for the authority concerned is that the plots enumerated in the award should be identified with new numbers. It has been further expatiated upon by the Apex Court that if some one other than the allottees is in possession, the allottees would be entitled to claim possession under the decree. In the light of the aforestated directions of the Apex Court, I have flipped through the judgment and order passed by the Consolidation Officer dated 7.6.1988. The Consolidation Officer after detailed discussion in relation to the shares of respective parties consistent with the directions of the Apex Court rendered its verdict and corrected the revenue records. I have also been taken through the impugned order/Judgment rendered by the Deputy Director Consolidation and what surfaces from the text of the judgment is that the revisional authority has exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction in directing rehearing of the parties which in fact is not consonant with the tenor of the directions of the Apex Court. It is too patent to be ignored that the order passed by Apex Court in appeal rendered in the year 1901 was to be acted upon and no deviation from the directions was, in my opinion, permissible. The authority was required to give effect to the Judgment of the Apex Court. The only thing which could be done by the authority was to direct rehearing or reconsideration in relation to allotment of the plots vis-a-vis the award. In my considered view, when the direction of the Supreme Court admits of no doubt, the view taken by the Deputy Director Consolidation amounts to postponing the compliance of the order. In my firm opinion, the order passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation is wholly uncalled for and it appears that the authority instead of deciding the dispute in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court by itself, wrongly directed rehearing by the Consolidation Officer.
4. In view of what has been observed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in his judgment, it is rendered necessary to scan the provisions of Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Explanation (3) of Section 48 being germane is excerpted below for ready reference :
"Explanation (3).--The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any findings, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence."
Considering the Judgment of the Deputy Director Consolidation in Juxtaposition of the provisions of the aforesaid section, it is clear that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has misconstrued the entire situation and proceeded to pass the impugned judgment. It being a matter of compliance of the direction of the Apex Court, the power embodied in Section 48 of the U.P.C.H. Act should not impinge upon so much as to postpone its compliance inasmuch as the Judgment of the Apex Court clearly postulated that allotment has to be made in terms of the award and direction has to be construed and observed in compliance accordingly and not otherwise. From an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances, I do not think that the matter merited remand and to all appearance, the impugned order manifests itself in contrariety of the directions of the Apex Court and cannot be sustained.
5. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.7.2003 passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation, Muzaffarnagar is accordingly quashed and it is directed that the Deputy Director Consolidation would pass fresh orders on merits in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to all parties concerned.