JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to abide by the terms and conditions of clause 1 regarding security deposit of the conditions of the contract (G.P.W. Form 9) of respondent No. 1. It has further been prayed that the respondent be restrained from imposing the condition No. 2.b in the letter dated 12.5.1998 issued by the respondent No. 2 on behalf of respondent No. 1.
2. The petitioner is a public limited company. The respondent No. 2 issued an advertisement on behalf of respondent No. 1 which was published in the newspaper 'Indian Express' on 24.4.1997 for inviting tenders for a contract whose approximate costs was rupees 5.15 crores. In pursuance of the said advertisement published in Indian Express on 24.4.1997, the petitioner No. 1 also submitted his tender which was accepted, being the lowest. This tender was submitted by the petitioner along with the earnest money as directed in the advertisement. It is alleged in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that the petitioners tender was found to be the lowest amongst the tenders. In paragraph 11, it is alleged that the State Government has approved the terms in respect of the contract to be entered into by Greater Noida. A true copy of the G.P.W. Form 9 which has been approved by the State Government is annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition, it is submitted that clause 1 of the conditions of the contract specifically requires that any contractor shall permit Greater Noida to deduct an amount at the rate of 10% of the gross amount of the running account bill on account of security subject to the maximum of rupees five lakhs.
3. The grievance of the petitioner is against the letter dated 12.5.1998 of the respondent No. 2 a copy of which is filed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. It has been alleged that on receipt of this letter from the respondent No. 2 by the respondent No. 1, the petitioner was required to execute the said contract agreement, since the tender of the petitioner was accepted being the lowest. The petitioner has alleged that paragraph 2.b of the said letter runs contrary to the terms and conditions of the contract of Greater Noida which has been duly approved by the U. P. Government and which was regularly being followed by the respondent No. 1 with other contractors. In paragraph 2.b of the said letter, it has been provided that the security deposit will be deducted at the rate of 10% of the gross amount of each running account payment till it reaches the amount of 64 lakhs. It is alleged in paragraph 16 of the writ petition that the aforesaid clause 2.b of the letter of award dated 12th May, 1998 is absolutely arbitrary and is contrary to clause 1 relating to security deposit of the terms and conditions of the contract, namely, G.P.W. Form 9. The petitioner has alleged that since the tender of the petitioner has been accepted by the respondent No. 1, the said acceptance is being frustrated by requiring the petitioner to agree unconditionally in respect of paragraph 2.b of the letter of award dated 12th May, 1998 which requires the petitioner to give the security to the extent of rupees sixty four lakhs. The petitioner has alleged that since the tender of the petitioner has been accepted by the respondent No. 1, the said acceptance cannot be made subject to the condition 2.b stated in the aforesaid letter dated 12th May, 1998. It is alleged that the said condition is absolutely unreasonable and arbitrary.
4. Counter-affidavits have been filed by both the respondents in which the allegations made in the writ petition have been denied. The counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondent No. t has been filed by one Sri Subhash Chand who has alleged in para 10 thereof that G. P. W. Form 9 is not applicable to the present tender awarded to the petitioner. It is alleged that the tender documents on which the work was allotted to the petitioner was never governed by the conditions in G.P.W. Form 9 because the work was special work for which special terms and conditions were made and the conditions were properly approved by the respondents. It is alleged that the petitioner was well aware of clause 2.b of the terms and conditions but he never raised any objections about the same. He raised his objections only after his tender was accepted and work was awarded to him. In paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the letter for awarding the work was unconditional and it was accepted by the petitioner who is alleged to have commenced the work subsequent to the letter dated 12th May, 1998. In paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit. It is denied that the acceptance is being frustrated by clause 2.b on the other hand the petitioner is putting hindrance in execution of the work by questioning the terms and conditions of the tender.
5. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2. In paragraph 4 of the same clause 1 of the letter dated 12th May, 1998 has been quoted. In paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that in the letter for submission of tenders the petitioner has accepted that he would abide by the tender. In paragraph 28, it is stated that the contracts of respondent No. 1 are not applicable to RITES which is a separate entity under the Ministry of Railways.
6. In our opinion the dispute is not very difficult to decide if we keep certain basic principles in mind. A contract has three ingredients, namely, offer, acceptance and consideration. Only when all three ingredients are present can a contract be said to have come into existence, and only when a contract has come into existence, can it be said that a jural relation exists between the parties. There is a distinction between an offer and an invitation to offer. When an advertisement is published inviting tenders, such an advertisement is only in invitation to offer, and it is not an offer vide 1988 UPLBEC 538 (542) : AIR 1978 (NOC) 211 Cal : AIR 1966 Cal 2519 (263) : 1996 ALJ 1118 : AIR 1939 Oudh 249 (2521 : AIR 1962 Manipur 47 (50). etc. A tender made in response to this advertisement is an offer, and if the said tender is accepted unconditionally, it becomes a contract vide AIR 1962 SC 378 (385). However, if the offer is accepted subject to some conditions, this is really not an acceptance but a counter offer (1900) 24 Bom 510 (513), ILR (1956) 1 Cal. 164 (167). AIR 1938 Lah 341 (344) : AIR 1959 Pat. 540 (541) : AIR 1987 All. 329 : AIR 1991 All 343. For a contract to come into existence, the acceptance must be absolute and unqualified vide Section 7 of the Contract Act, 1972 and AIR 1970 SC 706 (712) ; AIR 1951 All 93 (FB).
7. Now let us apply these basic principles to the facts of the present case. When the advertisement was published in Indian Express on 24.4.1997, it was only an invitation to offer. When the petitioner submitted a tender it was an offer that was accepted by the letter dated 12th May, 1998, that is, subject to the condition mentioned in clause 2.b. Hence the letter dated 12th May, 1998 was really no acceptance but only a counter offer, and it brought no contract into existence. If the petitioner had any objection to this counter offer, he could have rejected it or held further negotiations, but he could not have presumed that a contract had come into existence. A contract is a mutual voluntary transaction and unless both the parties are agreed on the terms, no valid contract can come into existence. Since the letter dated 12th May, 1998 amounted to a counter offer, this could have been accepted by the petitioner as a whole or it could have been rejected as a whole, but it could not have been rejected in part or accepted in part. In paragraph 7 of the 'rejoinder-affidavit of Vinod Goel, it has been mentioned that the petitioner started the work on the site in the last week of May, 1998. This itself means that the petitioner knew about the new condition in the letter dated 12th May, 1998. Since the petitioner started the work on the basis of the contract after receiving the letter dated 12th May, 1998, it means that it has accepted the letter dated 12th May, 1998 in its entirety.
8. There is no allegation in the petition that there is any mala fide in the imposition of clause 2.b of the letter dated 12th May, 1998. Merely because in other contracts, the conditions mentioned in G.P.W. Form 9 have been made applicable, it does not follow that all contracts which the respondents enter into must have these conditions. As already stated above, a contract is a voluntary, mutual agreement between two or more parties and there is no law that a party must accept the same terms in every contract.
9. Thus, there is no force in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.