JUDGMENT Amitava Lala, J.
1. Petitioners made this writ petition in the form of a Public Interest Litigation (sometimes called as PIL) praying inter alia as follows:
I. Issue a writ, order, or direction in the nature of mandamus/prohibition thereby prohibiting the construction of the proposed 'Haj House' over the land of Khasra 1399 (area 4.535 acre) at village Arthala, situated at the bank ('doob kshetra') of river Hindon, near the National Highway No. 58 E in pargana Loni, tehsil and district Ghaziabad.
II. Issue a writ, order, or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to immediately stop the construction of the proposed 'Haj House' over the land of Khasra 1399 (area 4.535 acre) at village Arthala, situated at the bank ('doob kshetra') of river Hindon, near the National Highway No. 58 E in pargana Loni, tehsil and district Ghaziabad.
III. Issue any other writ, order, or direction, which this court may deem fit and proper.
IV. Award the cost of the petition to the petitioner.
2. Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned Senior Counsel appearing in support of the petitioners, contended that the State of Uttar Pradesh has leased out a land to the Haj Samiti, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow for a period of 30 years in November, 2004 by the side of river Hindon at Ghaziabad, which is "doob kshetra" belonging to the irrigation department. Subsequently, Haj Samiti has taken the possession in February, 2005. On 30th March, 2005 the Chief Minister of the State of U.P. laid down the foundation stone of the proposed structure of Haj House on the said land. According to the petitioners, in the inaugural speech the Chief Minister said that the construction will be made by September, 2005 and the inauguration will be made on the eve of the Gandhi Jayanti on 01st October, 2005. According to him, the Chief Minister announced grant of Rs. 2 Crores for construction of Haj House. He relied upon the certain paper cuttings of the daily newspapers, etc. and said that the State should not misuse the public exchequer. Secondly, construction of such Haj House will interfere with the construction of National Highway under the National Highway Authority of India. Thirdly, it will interfere with the Gas pipeline of the Gas Authority of India Limited. Fourthly, it will interfere with the Air Force activities. Lastly, making of Haj House at the site will destroy the communal harmony.
3. Mr. S.M.A. Kazmi, learned Chief Standing Counsel (now Advocate General) contended that writ petition is not maintainable because the petitioners have no locus standi to make the writ petition. The petitioner No. 1 is not at all a registered organisation. The deponent, who is respondent No. 3 herein, has filed the affidavit in support of the writ petition describing himself as General Secretary of the organisation. One Mahesh Kumar Ahuja, although not made party petitioner herein, is playing the role behind the screen. If this Court sees newspaper cuttings annexed with the public interest litigation, which normally the Court does not look in other litigations, name of Sri Mahesh Kumar Ahuja will be available. He has been shown as office bearer of the petitioner No. 1. Such Sri Mahesh Kumar Ahuja was or still is plaintiff to a suit, being numbered as Suit No. 472 of 2001 (Mahesh Kumar Ahuja and Anr. v. Collector, Ghaziabad and Ors.), which was instituted on the self same cause of action. An application for injunction was made therein, which was rejected by the civil court. Petitioners suppressed the material fact and filed this public interest litigation. Even during the pendency of the writ petition, in the name of one Sanjeev Tyagi a similar writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court which was dismissed in limine on 25th November, 2005.
4. The prayers as made in the suit, being Suit No. 472 of 2005, are as follows:
a). that judgment and decree be passed in favour of plaintiffs, permanently restraining the defendants from constructing and laying foundation stone of 'Haj House' on 30.03.3005 over 1/3rd part of Plot A.B.C.D. Khasra No. 1399 area 16.25 acres situate in village Arthana, Ghaziabad.
b). that the cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiffs from the defendants.
c). that any other relief be granted against the defendants, which is in plaintiffs' interest.
5. The prayers made in the writ petition before the Supreme Court are as follows:
i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of PROHIBION thereby prohibiting the construction of the proposed Haj House at Hindon River Bridge near Village Arthala, Pargana Loni, Tehsil & District Ghaziabad;
ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 13 to immediately stop the construction of the said proposed Haj house at the said village as the same is in violation of various laws of the land as well as the Constitution of India and would create communal tension between Hindu and Muslims and other factors;
iii) Award the costs of the present proceedings in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents;
iv) Pass such other and further orders as are deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the ends of justice.
6. No doubt all the proceedings were initiated on the self same cause of action.
7. According to us, public interest litigation can not be said to be maintainable as a matter of course whenever any citizen or group of citizens under any nomenclature file the writ petition of such nature. If the writ court starts entertaining public interest litigation on each and every issue taken out by anyone at any point of time or of any nature then the Court will be flooded by such type of litigations. On the other hand, in the garb of public interest litigation many private or personal or publicity interest litigations will develop, when it would be difficult to discard them. Therefore, there should be an appropriate check and balance. The Supreme Court and various High Courts already found the danger and, as such, passed various orders to restrict the scope and ambit of public interest litigations. In Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. the Supreme Court held that a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. A writ petitioner who comes to the court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulged in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserves to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases, with exemplary costs.
8. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Public interest litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be " publicity interest litigation" or " private interest litigation" or " politics interest litigation" or the latest trend " paise income litigation". If not properly regulated and abuse averted it also becomes a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight errant or poke one's nose into for a probe.
It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were also highlighted by the Supreme Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 116 Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India and .R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand.
9. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, court must be careful to see that a body of persons or a member of the public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity.
10. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that courts are flooded with a large number of so-called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra the Supreme Court held that it would be desirable for the courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the courts.
11. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and others the Supreme Court held that a person acting bonafide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of the statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique consideration by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives, and try to bargain for a good deal as well as to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. In the judgment there is a quotation as regards expression "public interest litigation". It is quoted from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. IV (4th Edition) as follows:
Public interest.-- (1) A matter of public or general interest 'does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but than in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected'....
12. In Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition) meaning of 'public interest' is given as follows:
Public interest-- Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national Government.
13. Thirdly, in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (supra) meaning of public interest litigation is given as follows:
53. The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.
14. In paragraph-8 of the judgment the above referred judgment was considered and it was held as follows:
62. Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasise that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory; because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold.
15. As per Law Lexicon 1997 Ed. the 'public interest' means those interest which concern the public at large. Matter of public interest "does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected". The expression "public interest" is not capable of precise definition and has not a rigid meaning and is elastic and takes its colours from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state for society and its needs. Thus, what is 'public interest' today may not be so considered a decade later.
16. In Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar and Ors. it was held that public interest litigation can not be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. Personal interest can not be imposed through the process of the Court in the garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law.
17. From 2006 (5) SCC 28 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (98) v. Union of India and Ors. we observe that howsoever a genuine cause brought before a court by a public interest litigation may be, the court has to decline its examination at the behest of a person who, in fact, is not public interest litigant and whose bonafides and credentials are in doubt. In an exceptional case examination can be made by appointing an amicus curiae but not with the assistance of the doubtful public interest litigants. In Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. (VI) v. Union of India and Anr. it was held by a Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court that the public interest litigation can not be entertained where the stand taken was contrary to the stand taken by those who are affected by any action. In such a case the public interest litigation is not to be entertained. In R and M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors. the Supreme Court held that locus in a public interest litigation is a very relevant factor and the Court should always inquire into the locus of person before entertaining such petition.
18. Representative actions pro bono publico are of two kinds, (i) social interest litigation, (ii) public interest litigation. Both are referred sometimes as public interest litigation. In Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C.K. Rajan and Ors. it was held that a new branch of proceedings known as "social action litigation" or "public interest litigation" was evolved with a view to render complete justice to the classes of people i.e. the poorest of the poor, deprived, the illiterate, the urban and rural unorganized labour sector, women, children, those handicapped by "ignorance, indigence and illiteracy" and other downtrodden persons have either no access to justice or had been denied justice. The Courts in pro bono publico granted relief to inmates of prisons, provided legal aid, directed speedy trials, maintenance of human dignity, and covered several other areas. There is no strict rule as to scope and ambit of the public interest litigation, as each case has to be judged on its own merits. Furthermore, different problems may have to be dealt with differently following BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors. where the Supreme Court held that PIL is not a pill or a penacea for all wrongs. It was essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which was innovated where a public-spirited person files a petition in effect ori behalf of such persons who on account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social disabilities could not approach the court for relief. There have been, in recent times, increasingly instances of abuse of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to re-emphasize the parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by a petitioner and entertained by the Court. This aspect has come up for consideration and need is there to recapitulate and re-emphasize the same.
19. The right of a person belonging to a particular religious denomination may sometimes fall foul of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Only whence the fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State and an action in relation thereto may be justified. Any right other than the fundamental rights contained under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India may either flow from the statute or from the customary laws. Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are quoted hereunder:
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.-- (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law-
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I.-- The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II.-- In Sub-clause (b) of Clause (2), the reference of Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.
26. Freedom to manage religious affairs.-- Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right-
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage it own affairs in matter of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
20. Different out look has also been taken by the Supreme Court in various matters, which are also discussed hereunder.
21. In Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India and Anr. the Supreme Court allowed the public interest litigation made under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for reasons which were available therein factually. It was held there that the petitioner may not have the locus standi as a member of public unless some legal right or interest of his is violated or threatened by such ordinance, but there what petitioner as a member of the public was complaining of is a practice which is being followed by the State of Bihar of repromulgating the ordinances from time to time without their provisions being enacted into Acts of the legislature.
22. In Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and Ors. it was held that the locus standi to approach by way of writ petition and refusal to grant relief in equity jurisdiction are two different aspects, may be with same result. One relates to maintainability of the petition and other to exercise of discretion.
Law on the formers has marched much ahead. Many milestones have been covered. The restricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of specific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide construction in wake of public interest litigation. Even in private challenge to executive or administrative action having extensive fall out the dividing line between personal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is fast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine grievance against the order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the executive and comparative decline in proper and effective administrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse challenges with public interest flavour. It is too late in the day, therefore, to claim that the petition filed by inhabitants of a locality whose part was converted into a nursing home had no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of the High Court. In fact, public spirited citizens having faith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal service by espousing cause of public nature.
They can not be ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative yardstick of the rule of locus standi or absence of personal loss or injury. Present day development of this branch of jurisprudence is towards freer movement both in nature of litigation and approach of the courts. Residents of locality seeking protection and maintenance of environment of their locality can not be said to be busybodies or interlopers. Even otherwise physical or personal or economic injury may give rise to civil or criminal action but violation of rule of law either by ignoring or affronting individual or action of the executive in disregard of the provisions of law raises substantial issue of accountability of those entrusted with responsibility of the administration. It furnishes enough cause of action either for individual or community in general to approach by way of writ petition and the authorities can not be permitted to seek shelter under cover of technicalities of locus standi nor they can be heard to plead for restraint in exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations.
23. In J. Jayalalitha v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. it was held that tax pavers have every right to maintain a public interest litigation.
24. In S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors. it was held that prime aim of the judicial process is to protect an individual rights, its concern with the regularity of law and administration is limited to the extent that individual rights are infringed. That apart, the law is being increasingly used as a device of organised social action for the purpose of bringing about socio-economic change. If breach of public duty were allowed to go on unredressed because there is no one who has received a specific legal injury or who is entitled to participate in the proceedings pertaining to the decision relating to the public duty, the failure to perform such public duty would go unchecked and would promote disrespect for the rule of law.
25. In State of W.B. and Ors. v. Ashutosh Lahiri and Ors. it was held that when the writ petitions representing a Hindu segment of society had felt aggrieved by the impugned exemption granted by the State, they had no personal interest but a general cause to project. Consequently, they have sufficient locus standi to move the petition. . D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. says that the rule of law constitutes the code of our constitution and it is the essence of the rule of law that the exercise of power by the State whether it be the legislature or the executive or any other authority should be within the constitutional limitations and if any practice is adopted by the executive which is in flagrant and systematic violation of its constitutional limitations, the petitioner, as a member of the public, would have sufficient interest to challenge such practice by filing a writ petition and it would be the constitutonal duty of this Court to entertain the writ petition and adjudicate upon the validity of such practice.
26. In D.S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of India the locus standi of a petitioner was questioned. Such petitioner was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It was a non-political, non-profit and voluntary organisation. Its members consist of public spirited citizens, who have taken up the cause of ventilating legitimate public problems. The society received a large number of representations from old pensioners, individually unable to undertake the journey through labyrinths of legal judicial process, costly and protracted and, therefore, approached such society which espoused their cause. Objects, for which the society was formed, were not questioned. Referring the majority decision of S.P. Gupta (supra) that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision is permissible. Since such petitioner wanted to enforce rights of large number of infirm retirees, therefore, its locus is unquestionable.
27. In Mehsana District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. it was held that if there is any allegation of violation of statutory rules, which have been brought to the notice of the authorities, and if the authorities concerned do not perform their statutory obligation, as in the present case, any aggrieved citizen can always bring to the notice of the High Court the inaction of the statutory authorities and in such event it would always be open to the High Court to pass an appropriate order as deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
28. In 1993 (1) UPLBEC 501 Vishwa Hindu Adhivakta Sangh v. Union of India and Ors. it was held by a Division Bench of this High Court that in the matter of writ of public importance in which interest of public at large is involved and in which the grave public interest is involved, rules of either locus standi or technical rules or technical objections should not be permitted to be raised and the petitioner should not be asked to leave the premises of this Court and the said ground can not be allowed to stand nor on the said ground the petitioners, who are public spirited men and who are raising public cause, can be refused the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcing the constitutional rights of the people in general. However, the remedy of the suit not being equally efficacious is no good ground of alternative remedy. Further, if the applicants or the petitioners are asked to move for impleadment in the suit then every time every one has to move application, seek time for filing written statements in one suit or the other and then it may result in delaying the disposal of the suits, which are more than quarter century old.
29. Again different outlook of not to encourage public interest litigation has been followed in the following judgments.
30. In Bhartiya Homeopathy College, Bharatpur v. Students Council of Homoepathy Medical College, Jaipur and Ors. when the writ petition was dismissed on merit without finalisation as to the status of the students, council agitated the issue therein. The Supreme Court also held that an organisation without disclosing any material regarding their nature and functions and funding should not be allowed lightly to undertake litigation in the name of public interest, which can cause a lot of damage to others. In &M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group and Ors. the Supreme Court held that this sacrosanct jurisdiction of public interest litigation should be invoked very sparingly and in favour of vigilant litigants and not for the persons who invoke this jurisdiction for the sake of publicity or for the purpose of serving their private ends. Public interest litigation is no doubt a very useful handle for redressing the grievances of the people but unfortunately lately it has been abused by some interested persons and it has brought very bad name. The court should be very very slow in entertaining petitions involving public interest in a very rare cases, where public at large stand to suffer. This jurisdiction is meant for the purpose of coming to the rescue of the downtrodden and not for the purpose of serving private ends. It has now become common for unscrupulous people to serve their private ends and jeopardize the rights of innocent people so as to wreak vengeance for their personal ends. Many important observations of the Balco Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) were taken note therein.
31. Public interest litigation, or PIL as it is more commonly known, entered the Indian Judicial process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is primarily the Judges who have innovated this type of litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage, it was intended to vindicate public interest where fundamental and other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in socially or economically disadvantageous position and were unable to seek legal redress were required to be espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in nature and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of the parties and the court so as to secure justice for the poor and the weaker sections of the community who were not in a position to protect their own interests. Public interest litigation was intended to mean nothing more than what words themselves said viz. " litigation in the interest of public".
32. While PIL initially was invoked mostly in cases connected with the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the society and in areas where there was violation of human rights under Article 21, but with the passage of time, petitions have been entertained in other spheres, Prof. S.B. Sathe has summarized the extent of the jurisdiction, which has now been exercised, in the following words:
PIL may, therefore, be described as satisfying one or more of the following parameters. These are not exclusive but merely descriptive;
-Where the concerns underlying a petition are not individualist but are shared widely by a large number of people (bonded labour, undertrial prisoners, prison inmates.) -Where the affected persons belong to the disadvantaged sections of society (women, children, bonded labour, unorganized labour, etc.)
-Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter-country adoption, the education of the children, bonded labour, unorganized labour, etc.)
-Where judicial law making is necessary to avoid exploitation (inter-country adoption, the education of the children of the prostitutes).
-Where judicial intervention is necessary for the protection of the sanctity of democratic institutions (independence of the judiciary, existence of grievances redressal forums.)
-Where administrative decisions related to development are harmful to the environment and jeopardize people's right to natural resources such as air or water.
33. There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without any foundation that public interest litigation is now tending to become publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation and has a tendency to be counter-productive.
34. From the reference of the aforesaid cases it appears that leaving aside very few, in most of the cases Court of law cautioned about opening of floodgate.
35. From the aforesaid discussion it can be inferred that question of locus standi and cleanness of the petitioners are the big questions in entertaining a public interest litigation. Against this background when we go through the petition, we found that the petitioners are unable to get rid of these two hurdles. However, irrespective of the hurdles, as above, we do not want to conclude the matter in piecemeal manner particularly when the petitioners raised an issue of misuse of public exchequer being tax payers, we are of the view that we shall discuss all the points in seriatim.
36. Mr. Chaudhary submitted that the petitioners herein are the regular tax payers, therefore, they have every right to file public interest litigation if an attempt is made to change the basic structure of the Constitution. As per Article 27 of the Constitution of India, no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.
37. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt the Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held, what is forbidden by Article 27 of the Constitution is the specific appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of expenses for the promotion of maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The reason underlying this provisions is obvious. Ours being a secular State and there being freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, both to individuals and to groups, it is against the policy of the Constitution to pay out of public funds any money for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.
38. However, the Supreme Court held factually on the local law that the object of the contribution under Section 76 of the Madras Act is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or any denomination within it. The purpose is to see that religious trusts and institutions, wherever they exist, are properly administered. It is a secular administration of the religious institutions that the legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached to the religious institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for the purposes for which they were founded or exist. There is no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination in such cases.
39. As per Oxford Dictionary, the word "denomination" has been defined to mean "a collection of individuals classed together under the same name; a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name". Each one of the sects or sub-sects of the Hindu religion can be called as religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name - in many cases it is the name of the founder, - and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation. The Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner's Dictionary, New Edition, says that a particular denomination is a particular religious group which has slightly different beliefs from other groups within the same faith.
40. In 370 US 421, 8 L. Ed. 2D 601 Steven L. Engel v. William J. Vitale it was held that the philosophy is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will be a divisive force. The First Amendment (American Constitution) teaches that a government neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious interests. The aforesaid question arose to separate the Church and the State in connection with the prayer in the governmental institution. In 374 US 203, 10 L ed 2d 844 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Edward Lewis Schempp it was held that a State's financing, even in a minor degree, a Church either in its strictly religious activities or in its other activities violates the "establishment" clause of the First Amendment. The concept of neutrality, which does not permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected, does not collide with the majority's right to free exercise of religion; while "free exercise" clause of the First Amendment prohibits the use of State action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it does not mean that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. In 333 US 203-256, 92 L ed 649 People of the State of Illinois Ex Rel. Vashti McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois it was held that the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution is a prohibition, not only against government preference of one religion over another, but also against an impartial governmental assistance of all religions.
41. From the aforesaid discussion it is crystal clear that promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination by a State and administrative exigency to protect the interest of the citizen belonging to one religion of the secular State are two distinct and different features. No public fund can be misutilized for the purpose of promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. But there is no bar to the administration to protect the interest of the pilgrims of one religion because such pilgrims are the citizens of the secular State. This is the basic and important difference in between misuse of public exchequer in favour of one religion and use of public exchequer in favour of the citizens in the name of religion. Administrative exigency is obvious. We live in diversified society where many religion, caste, race are living together side by side. If we forget to discharge such functions to the pilgrims taking an outlook that those pilgrims are related to one particular religion then the administration will collapse and the citizens irrespective of religion will be affected. One further aspect is to be clarified herein in view of the above cited American judgments that the American Constitution was amended to protect the interest of minority by separating Church from the State, but factually herein the intention of the petitioners is to defeat the interest of the minority within the secular activities taking the name of religion.
42. According to us, Article 27 of the Constitution of India can not be read in isolation but with the true perspective of the religious activities. The Constitution says that the power is only in respect of promotion or maintenance of a religion or religious denomination. Therefore, one has to apply his mind how making of a Haj House can promote or maintain a particular religion or religious denomination by the State. One has freedom to propagate his religion under Article 25. Particularly Article 25(2) says that propagation of religion shall not affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity, which may be associated with religious practice. Therefore, difference has to be seen whether the State from its exchequer is promoting or maintaining any particular religion or religious denomination or regulating any secular activity associated with the religious practice. From this outlook the scope and ambit of the Haj Committee Act from its inception till the latest promulgation are to be seen carefully. In 1932 there was an Act, which was called as 'The Port Haj Committees Act, 1932'. The Act was introduced with a preamble to establish committees in the principal ports of pilgrim traffic to assist the Muslim pilgrims to the Haj. The object of introduction of the Act as available from the extract of the Bill is quoted hereunder:
Object.-- "The Haj Inquiry Committee, which was appointed by the Government of India in March, 1929, in pursuance of an undertaking given in September, 1928, in the course of a debate in the Legislative Assembly, to enquire into the arrangements in force for pilgrims proceeding to the Hedjaz from India, discussed the question of Port Haj Committees in Chapter XIII of their Report. The Committee proposed that Central Legislation should be undertaken for the purpose of converting the Haj Committees already existing at the ports of Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta into statutory bodies, revising their constitution, and widening their powers and functions. The present Committees have been in existence for many years, but owe their existence merely to executive orders issued by Government, and are mainly advisory and consultative bodies. All executive work in connection with the pilgrim traffic is at present carried out by a Government Pilgrim Department at each port. Each Department includes a Protector of Pilgrims appointed by the Local Government under a Local Act. The head of the Department and Chairman of the Committee is' the Commissioner of Police at Bombay and Calcutta. At Karachi the head of the Department is the Collector, but the Chairman of the Haj Committee is elected by the Committee itself. In the opinion of the Haj Inquiry Committee, the work done would gain in value if the Committees could be released, at any rate to a large extent, from official control and given wider duties. The Haj Inquiry Committee therefore proposed that the Port Haj Committees should cease to be merely advisory and consultative bodies and should be entrusted by law with the administration of all work connected with the pilgrim traffic at the ports.
The recommendations which the Haj Inquiry Committee made regarding the composition, powers, functions, staff, sources of income and financial liabilities which should be given to the Port Haj Committees in future have been examined by the Government of India in consultation with the Governments of Bombay and Bengal, and other interested parties, including the Standing Haj Committee of the Indian Legislature; and they have come to the conclusion that the Haj Inquiry Committee's proposals should be accepted with certain modifications. The Bill is designed to give effect to the conclusions which have been reached." (Statement of Objects and Reasons)
43. Officers and servants of Port Haj Committees as given under Section 14 of the Port Haj Committee Act, 1932 are as follows:
14. Officers and servants of Port Haj Committees.-- (1) Until the expiry of a period of four years from the date of the publication of the list of members of a Port Haj Committee on its first constitution, the Local Government shall, in consultation with the Committee, appoint, for each Port Haj Committee, a person to by Executive Officer, who shall also be Secretary to the Committee, and shall also be in like manner appoint such other officers and servants as it may consider necessary for the efficient discharge of the duties of the Committee.
(2) The Local Government may make rules--
(a) regulating the relations between a Port Haj Committee and its Executive Officer;
(b) regulating the subordination of the other officers and servants of a Port Haj Committee to the Committee and to the Executive Officer;
(c) determining the conditions of service of an Executive Officer and other officers and servants;
(d) prescribing the powers and duties of the Executive Officer in so far as they are not prescribed by this Act; and
(e) prescribing the powers and duties of the other officers and servants of a Port Haj Committee.
(3) Rules made under Sub-section (2) may authorise a Port Haj Committee to make by-laws providing for any other matters specified in that sub-section in so far as such matters are not provided for in the rules.
44. The duties of the Port Haj Committees under Section 18 of such Act are as follows:
18. Duties of Port Haj Committees.- (1) The duties of a Port Haj Committee shall be-
(a) to collect and disseminate information useful to pilgrims;
(b) to advise and assist pilgrims during their stay at the port, while proceeding to or returning from the Hedjaz, in all matters including vaccination, inoculation, medical inspection and issue of passes and passports, and to co-operate with the local authorities concerned in such matters;
(c) to give relief to indigent pilgrims;
(d) to negotiate and co-operate with railways and shipping companies for the purpose of securing travelling facilities for pilgrims;
(e) to find suitable Muslims for employment by shipping companies on pilgrim ships;
(f) to bring the grievances of pilgrims and any irregularities or omissions on the part of a master or owner of a pilgrim ship in the carrying out of the provisions of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, to the notice of the authorities concerned, and to suggest remedies;
(g) to authorise whenever practicable an individual pilgrim or a committee of pilgrims on board a pilgrim ship to represent the grievances of the pilgrims to the master or owner of the ship; and
(h) such other duties in connection with the pilgrim traffic as may be entrusted to it by Government.
(2) The Local Government shall afford all reasonable assistance to the Port Haj Committee in the discharge of the duties imposed by this section.
Section 20 of such Act provides for Haj funds, as follows;
20. Haj Funds.-- In each port in which there is a Port Haj Committee there shall be. created a fund, to be called the Haj Fund of the port concerned, and there shall be placed to the credit thereof the following sums, in so far as they arise or have arisen in the port concerned, namely:
(a) the interest on all deposits made by the pilgrims under Clause (b) of Section 208A of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923:
(b) sums realised from the sale of the effects of deceased pilgrims, and sums of money left by deceased pilgrims, which are unclaimed and have lapsed to Government;
(c) any fees which may be levied for the issue of visitors' passes to friends and relations of pilgrims who desire to go on board a pilgrim ship;
(d) the amount now standing to the credit of the fund known as the Indigent Pilgrims' Fund : provided that such amount shall be applied by the Committee solely for the relief of indigent pilgrims;
(e) any sums received by the Haj Fund from private sources; and
(f) any sums allotted by Government to the Haj Fund.
45. Section 21 of such Act is made for application of Haj fund, which prescribes as under:
21. Application of the Haj Fund- A Haj Fund of a port shall, subject to rules made under Section 22, be under the control and management of the Port Haj Committee for that port, and shall be applicable to the payment of charges and expenses incidental to the objects specified in Section 18, and of any other object specified by rules made under Clause (c) of Section 22.
46. Section 22 provides power to make rules for the financial control of the Committee, whereunder Clause (c) is prescribing the objects to which Haj Funds shall be applicable, in addition to those prescribed in Section 18.
47. After independence the Port Haj Committee Act, 1932 was repealed by the Haj Committee Act, 1959. Non-obstante clause in the repealing section has no manner of application hereunder, as such no observation is made. The object and reasons for making such Act in 1959 are as follows:
According to the Port Haj Committees Act, 1932, as originally enacted, three Port Haj Committees were constituted at the three ports of Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi. Consequent upon constitutional changes in the country, the Act was suitably amended to provide for the continuance of the Calcutta and the Bombay Committees only, the reference to the Karachi Committee being omitted therefrom. The Calcutta Committee, however, ceased to function from 1948 owing to the partition of Bengal and there is a balance of about Rs. 15,000 lying to the credit of the defunct Port Haj Fund, Calcutta, which can not be utilised for any other purpose or transferred to any Port Haj Fund unless the Act is amended. Further all pilgrim traffic to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran is now centralised at Bombay.
2. It is, therefore, considered desirable that the Act should be revised to bring it in line with the present requirements of the Haj pilgrims and to make the Port Haj Committee a representative body of the country.
The preamble of such Act is as follows:
An Act to establish a Committee in the Port of Bombay for assisting Muslim pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Jordan and for matters connected therewith.
Section 4 speaks about the composition of the Committee, as follows:
4. Composition of the Committee.--(1) The Committee shall consist of the following members, namely:
(a) the Collector of Customs, Bombay, ex officio;
(b) the Chairman, Port Trust, Bombay, ex officio;
(c) the Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Department, Bombay, ex officio;
(d) the Commissioner of Police for Great Bombay, ex officio;
(e) the Municipal Commissioner, Greater Bombay, ex officio;
(f) the Port Health Officer, Bombay, ex officio;
(g) two members to be nominated by the Central Government;
(h) three members of Parliament of whom two are to be nominated by the Speaker of the House of the People from among its members and one by the Chairman of the Council of States from among its members;
(i) one member to represent the State Government of Maharashtra to be nominated by that Government;
(j) two members of the Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly to be nominated by the Speaker of that Assembly;
(k) two members of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay to be nominated by the State Government of Maharashtra on the recommendation of the Muslim members of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay;
(1) three members, of whom two shall be Shia Muslims, to be co-opted by all the members of the Committee to represent such interests as, in their opinion, are directly and actively interested in the welfare of the pilgrims.
(2) Every nomination under this section shall take effect as soon as it is notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette.
Section 9 speaks about duties of the Committee, which are as follows:
9. Duties of Committees.- (1) The duties of the Committee shall be
(a) to collect and disseminate information useful to pilgrims;
(b) to advise and assist pilgrims during their stay in the city and the port of Bombay, while proceeding on or returning from pilgrimage, in all matters including vaccination, inoculation, medical inspection and issue of passes and passports, and to co-operate with the local authorities concerned in such matters;
(c) to give relief to indigent pilgrims;
(d) to negotiate and co-operate with railways, shipping companies, airways and travel agencies for the purpose of securing travelling facilities for pilgrims;
(e) to find suitable guides for employment by shipping companies on pilgrim ships;
(f) to bring the grievances of pilgrims and any irregularities or omissions on the part of a master or owner of a pilgrim ship in the carrying out the provisions of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, to the notice of the authorities concerned, and to suggest remedies;
(g) to appoint a pilgrim as "Amirul-Haj" on board a pilgrim ship to represent the grievances of the pilgrims to the master or owner of the ship;
(h) generally to look after the welfare of the pilgrims; and
(i) to discharge such other duties in connection with pilgrim traffic as may be prescribed.
(2) The Central Government shall afford all reasonable assistance to the Committee in the discharge of the duties imposed by this section.
Section 14 speaks about Haj Fund, which is as follows:
14. Haj Fund.-- The Committee shall have its own Fund to be called the Haj Fund, and there shall be placed to the credit thereof the following sums namely:
(a) the interest on all deposits made by pilgrims under clause
(b) of Section 208 A of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923;
(b) the fees charged for the registration of pilgrim passes in pursuance of any rule made under Section 213 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923;
(c) the sums realised from the sale of the effects of deceased pilgrims and sums of money left by deceased pilgrims, which are unclaimed and have lapsed to Government;
(d) any fees which may be levied for the issue of visitors' passes to friends and relations of pilgrims who desire to go on board a pilgrim ship;
(e) the amount standing at the commencement of this Act to the credit of the Fund known as the Indigent Pilgrims Fund:
Provided that such amount shall be applied by the Committee solely for the relief of indigent pilgrims;
(f) any sums received by the Haj Fund from private sources; and
(g) any sums allotted by the Central Government or any State Government to the Haj Fund.
Section 16 of such Act says about application of Haj fund, is as under:
16. Application of the Haj Fund.-- The Haj Fund shall, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be under the control and management of the Committee, and shall be applied to the following purposes, namely:
(a) pay and allowances of the Executive Officer and other employees of the Committee; J
(b) payment of charges and expenses incidental to the objects specified in Section 9;
(c) any other objects specified in the rules made under Section 17.
48. Section 17 has the rule making power and under Sub-section 2(j) the objects, for which the Haj Fund may be applied, is given.
49. Again by the Haj Committee Act, 2002 the Haj Committee Act, 1959 was repealed. Non-obstante clause in the repealing section has no manner of application hereunder, as such no observation is made. The preamble of the Act of 2002 is as follows:
An Act to establish a Haj Committee of India and State Haj Committees for making arrangements for the pilgrimage of Muslims for Haj, and for matters connected therewith.
50. The composition of the committee is given under Section 4 of such Act, as under:
4. Composition of Committee.-- The Committee shall consist of the following members, namely:
(i) three members of Parliament of whom two are to be nominated by the Speaker of the House of the People from among its Muslim members, and one by the Chairman of the Council of States from among its Muslim members:
Provided that a member of Parliament shall, upon ceasing to be a member, cease to be a member of the Committee and the Speaker of the House of the People or the Chairman of the Council of States, as the case may be, shall make a fresh nomination upon request by the Central Government;
(ii) nine Muslim members of the Committee shall be elected, three from those States sending largest number of pilgrims during last three years and one each from the zones as specified in the Schedule, in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that not more than one member shall be elected from a State falling in the zone as specified in the Schedule;
(iii) four persons not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India nominated by that Government to represent the Ministries of External Affairs, Home, Finance and Civil Aviation, as ex officio members;
(iv) seven Muslim members shall be nominated by the Central Government from among the following categories of persons, namely:
(a) two members who have special knowledge of public administration, finance, education, culture or social work and out of whom one shall be a Shia Muslim;
(b) two women members, out of them one shall be a Shia Muslim;
(c) three members who have special knowledge of Muslim theology and law, out of them one shall be a Shia Muslim.
51. Duties of the Committee has been prescribed under Section 9 of such Act, as under:
9. Duties of Committee.-- (1) The duties of the Committee shall be--
(i) to collect and disseminate information useful to pilgrims, and to arrange orientation and training programmes for pilgrims;
(ii) to advise and assist pilgrims during their stay at the embarkation points in India, while proceeding to or returning from pilgrimage, in all matters including vaccination, inoculation, medical inspection, issue of pilgrim passes and foreign exchange, and to liaise with the local authorities concerned in such matters;
(iii) to give relief to pilgrims in distress;
(iv) to finalise the annual Haj plan with the approval of the Central Government, and execute the plan, including the arrangements for travel by air or any other means, and to advise in matters relating to accommodations;
(v) to approve the budget estimates of the Committee and submit it to the Central Government at least three months before the beginning of the financial year for its concurrence;
(vi) to co-ordinate with the Central Government, railways, airways and travel agencies for the purpose of securing traveling facilities for pilgrims;
(vii) to generally look after the welfare of the pilgrims;
(viii) to publish such proceedings of the Committee and such matters of interest to pilgrims as may be determined by bye-laws -made in this behalf by the Committee;
(ix) to discharge such other duties in connection with Haj as may be prescribed by the Central Government.
(2) The Central Government shall afford all reasonable assistance to the Committee in the discharge of the duties specified in Sub-section (1)." Composition of the State Committee as prescribed under Section 18 is as follows:
18. Composition of State Committee.-- (1) A" State Committee shall consist of sixteen members, to be nominated by the State Government, namely:
(i) three members from the Muslim members of --
(a) Parliament representing the State;
(b) State Legislative Assembly; and
(c) Legislative Council, where it exists;
(ii) three members from Muslim members representing local bodies in the State;
(iii) three members having expertise in Muslim theology and law including one who shall be a Shia Muslim;
(iv) five members representing Muslim voluntary organization working in the fields of public administration, finance, education, culture or social work;
(v) the Chairperson of the State Wakf Board; and
(vi) Executive Officer of the State Committee, who shall be the ex officio member of the State Committee:
Provided that a Committee for any Union territory or a Joint State Committee shall consist of such number of members as may be prescribed.
(2) In case where there is no Muslim members in any of the categories mentioned in Clauses (i) and (ii) of Sub-section (1), or where there is no Legislative Council in a State, nomination may be made in such manner as may be prescribed.
Central Haj Fund is given under Section 30, as under:
30. Central Haj Fund.-- The Committee shall have its own fund to be called the Central Haj Fund, and there shall be placed to the credit thereof the following sums, namely:
(a) sums realised from any fees and service charges which may be levied by the Committee:
(i) for registration of applications for Haj; and
(ii) for issue of Haj pilgrim travel passes;
(b) money collected from pilgrims for performance of Haj;
(c) the income from all deposits and investment of the Committee's funds;
(d) the sums realised from the sale of the effects of deceased pilgrims and sums of money left by them, which are unclaimed and have lapsed to the Central Government;
(e) any sums loaned by the Central or a State Government, or any other source approved by the Government;
(f) any amount that may be legally due to the Committee from any source; and
(g) the amount standing at the commencement of this Act to the credit of the Haj Fund or the Indigent Pilgrims Fund established under the Haj Committee Act, 1959 (51 of 1959).
52. Section 31 of such Act provides for application of Central Haj Fund, as under:
31. Application of Central Haj Fund.-- The Central Haj Fund shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder, be under the control and management of the Committee, and shall be applied to the following purposes, namely:
(a) pay and allowances of the Chief Executive Officer and other employees of the Committee;
(b) payment of charges and expenses incidental to the objects specified in Section 9; and
(c) any other expenses which are required to be met by the Committee or a State committee, as approved by the Central Government.
State Haj Fund has been given under 32, which reads as under:
32. State Haj Fund.-- The State Committee shall have its own fund to be called the State Haj Fund and the following sums shall be placed to the credit thereof, namely:
(i) all sums of money paid to it or any grant made by the Committee for the purposes of this Act;
(ii) any grant or loan that may be made to the State Committee by the State Government, or any other source for the purposes of this Act, as approved by the State Government;
(iii) any amount that may be legally due to the State Committee from any source; and
(iv) the moneys, if any, standing to the credit of a State Haj Committee, at the commencement of this Act.
Section 33 deals with the application of State Haj Fund, as under:
33. Application of State Haj Fund.-- The State Haj Fund shall, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be under the control and management of the State Committee and shall be applied to the following purposes, namely:
(i) pay and allowances of the employees of the State Committee other than its Executive Officer whose pay and allowances shall be borne by the State Government;
(ii) payment of charges and expenses incidental to the due performance of its duties by the State Committee for the objects specified in Section 27; and
(iii) any other expenses, as approved by the State Government which are required to be met by the State Committee.
53. Section 34 of such Act relates to accounts and audit, which is as follows:
34. Accounts and audit.-- (1) The Committee and every State Committee shall maintain proper accounts and other relevant records and prepare an annual statement of accounts, in such form as may be prescribed by the Central Government, or as the case may be, the State Government.
(2) The accounts shall be examined and audited annually by such auditors as the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government may approve.
(3) The accounts of the Committee or the State Committee as certified by the auditor together with the audit report thereon shall be forwarded annually by the said Committee to the Central Government, or as the case may be, the State Government.
(4) The Central Government shall, as soon as may be after the receipt of the audit report under Sub-section (3), cause the same to be laid before each House of Parliament.
(5) The State Government shall, as soon as may be, after the receipt of the audit report under Sub-section (3), cause the same to be laid before the State Legislature.
54. Therefore, from the Acts particularly the latest Act of 2002, which repealed the Act of 1959, by which the Act of 1932 was also repealed, we do not find that any sum from the State exchequer is proposed to be utilized for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination but to facilitate pilgrims for going Haj. Facilitating the pilgrims is an administrative action, which can not be held to be religious action for its promotion or maintenance. If we go through U.P. Melas Act, 1938, incidentally we shall be able to find that provisions of both 'Magh Mela' for one religion and 'dargah' or 'shrine' for other religion are made therein. Under Section 9(1) of the said Act the State Government has been given rule making power inclusive of a Mela fund providing what expenditure shall be defrayed from the Mela fund and how should any: surplus be utilized. Definitely similar arrangements are made for other regions either by making law, rules and regulation, notification, government order, etc. It also means that the State has no religion and the State practices the policy of neutrality in the matter of religion. We are believing unity in diversity. Showing of patience to the minority by the majority is art of living in this country. If we consider the object of the petitioners from a different angle that there should not be any involvement of the administration in making passage for the pilgrims in the name of a religion or religious denomination then what Will happen? There would be pandemonium. No control will be there in respect of such pilgrims. Then the effect will be there in respect of the citizens not with the religion. It is the necessity of law to protect every citizen. For an example, if a traffic police has shown his one hand to stop the vehicles from one side of the road to give passage to other, it does not necessarily mean that he is discharging duties to them alone to whom the passage is given, but not to others whom he prevented. The administrative exigency should not be mixed up with religion. A need of disciplined passage by the administration is necessary requirement.
55. Now, the question is with regard to making of Haj House-- what it is? It is nothing but an assembling centre of the pilgrims of different areas from where they will proceed to board the ships or to catch flights. Under the latest law, a Schedule has been given forming different zones under Sections 4(ii) and 41 (1) of the Act. Zone-ll is for Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Uttaranchal and Jharkhand. Therefore, there is a necessity of making a place where the pilgrims will be assembled before going to an appropriate place. By such Act not only the Central Haj Committee but also the State Committee both are equally responsible. Under no stretch of imagination, establishment of Haj House can be said to be establishing Mosque. A point has been raised that pilgrims will make prayers within such Haj House, if it is built. Therefore, it will be virtually a religious place. We are surprised. For an example, if somebody sitting in his official bungalow make a prayer, the official bungalow can not be converted to a religious place. In AIR 1954 SC 282 (supra) it is categorically held that object of contribution under a particular Act is to see the religious trusts and institutions, wherever they exist, are properly administered. It is a secular administration of the religious institutions that the legislature seeks to control.,The same principle can be applicable herein. Whenever there is any administrative exigency, the administrators have no other alternative but to protect the interest of the citizens, which is made necessary not only for one religion but for all. It is not a preference to any religion but an impartial governmental assistance to all the religions.
56. However, we do not find any reason to withhold the persons concerned from making Haj House in the particular place, where it has been proposed or partially constructed. Acquiring of land by the appropriate committee for construction of Haj House is perfectly within the fore-corners of law, therefore, no such step can be regarded as religious activity. Haj House is not a mosque but house of assemble and stay of the pilgrims for going to and coming back from Haj. So far as the Chief Minister's sanction of fund is concerned, no material has been shown excepting alleged propaganda in the newspaper. Therefore, the issue of release of any fund by the Chief Minister is baseless. State's funding for a religion or religious denomination can only be established from such action of release not on the basis of apprehension or propaganda. It is also difficult to assume that making of Haj House will destroy the communal harmony. Unity in diversity is the Indian philosophy, from which concept of secularism has been borrowed in the Indian Constitution. Therefore, one has to be very careful before taking any stand in the Court of law about disruption of communal harmony because such action itself may destroy the communal harmony. There is a big difference between religion and pseudo-religion. Pseudo-religionism destroys the communal harmony but not the religion. Therefore, any indication of such nature will have to be nipped in the bud. Moreover, disruption of communal harmony is a matter of administrative agency i.e. police and intelligence. No busybody or group of persons should be encouraged. Followers of majority by religion and faith have to keep much more patience about the followers of minority by religion and faith, so that they can actually feel that they are part and parcel of the main stream of the society in all respect, which is the basic foundation of the secular thought. Amendment of American Constitution making difference between Church and State is formed to protect the interest of minority by religion and faith of that country, which the petitioners overlooked. We have called upon all the governmental authorities both under the Union or the State to record objection, if any, on their part regarding construction of proposed Haj House. They have categorically said that they have no objection in connection with construction of proposed Haj House at the place where it has been mentioned. As an afterthought chance has been taken belatedly to get amendment in the petition to the extent of question of validity of Haj Committee Act, 2002. Such prayer can not be allowed by expanding the scope. However, such order will not debar any body to challenge the validity of the Act, 2002 separately, if he is entitled to do so and if so advised. The whole intention of the writ petitioners is to prevent others from constructing Haj House by hook or by crook. Admittedly they tried their level best in their name or in the name of different persons to become successful in the District Court and also in the Supreme Court in addition to filing of the writ petition before this High Court. However, neither they became successful in getting any order from District Court nor before the Supreme Court of India. Writ petitioners suppressed such material facts before this Court. Irrespective of doubtful locus standi, the issue as raised by them has miserably failed in the aforesaid Courts of law. The petitioners have neither come with clean hands nor with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective.
57. Therefore, in totality but not only on the ground of locus standi the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Passing of this order will govern all the connected applications. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
58. However, no order is passed as to costs.