IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF AUGUST, 2019 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR.ABHAY S. OKA, CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMAD NAWAZ WRIT APPEAL NO. 2494 OF 2019 (KLR-RR/SUR) BETWEEN:
M. ANANDAIAH S/O. K.H. MAREGOWA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS THE TAHSILDAR KANAKAPURA R/AT DR. PUTTADAS ROAD 1ST LEFT CROSS KANAKAPURA TOWN KANAKAPURA TALUK - 562117 (BY SHRI ANIL KUMAR R., ADVOCATE) AND:
1. SRI. VENKATESH S/O. LATE VENKATAPPA AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS R/AT HULAGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE HAROHALLI HOBLI KANAKAPURA TALUK RAMANAGARA DIST - 562112 2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER RAMANAGARA DISTRIACT BANGALORE MYSORE HIGHWAY RAMANAARA - 562159 ... APPELLANT 3. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER RAMANAGARA SUB-DIVISION BANGALORE MYSORE HIGH WAY RAMANAGARA - 562159 4. THASILDHAR KANAKAPURA TALUK RAMANAGARA DISTRICT – 562117 5. DEPUTY THASILDHAR HAROHALLI HOBLI KANAKAPURA TALUK RAMANAGARA DISTRICT RAMANAGARA – 562112 6. REVENUE INSPECTOR HAROHALLI HOBLI KANAKAPURA TALUK-562112 7. VILLAGE ACCOUNTANT HULAGONDANAHALLI VILLAGE HAROHALLI HOBLI KANAKAPURA TALUK RAMANAGARA DISTRICT - 562112 ... RESPONDENTS (BY SHRI D.R. RAVISHANKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SHRI P.B. ACHAPPA, AGA FOR R2-7) THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DATED 13/06/2019 IN WP NO.6430/2018, BY ALLOWING THIS APPEAL AND ETC.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, CHIEF JUSTICE DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the second to seventh respondents.
2. In view of the direction contained in paragraph 4 of the impugned order, the appellant is directly affected by it. Hence, permission will have to be granted to the appellant to prefer an appeal against the impugned order and accordingly I.A.No.2/2019 stands allowed.
3. The first respondent is the writ petitioner before the learned Single Judge. The writ petition was filed by the first respondent containing the following prayer:
“Issue a writ of Mandamus/order/direction to the respondent no.3 to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 9/05/2017 for effecting mutation/Khatha and revenue entries in RTC in respect to sy.no.58 measuring 1 acre, in the survey no.58 of Hulagondanahalli village, Harohalli Hobli, Kanakapura Taluk Ramanagara District. Vide Annexure A. as this Hon’ble court may deem fit under the circumstances of the case including costs, in the interest of justice and equity.”
4. We must note here that the fourth respondent- Tahsildar was made a party in the writ petition in his official capacity and he was not made a party in his individual name. The appellant being holding the post of Tahsildar on the date of passing impugned order, has preferred this appeal. The impugned order dated 13th June 2019 notes that the present appellant was called upon by the learned Single Judge to remain personally present. The statement made by the present appellant before the learned Single Judge on 12th April 2019 is noted in the impugned order in paragraph 4. The statement made by the appellant (who was the Tahsildar) on 13th June 2019 has been recorded, in which he stated that the application made by the first respondent for seeking change of khatha cannot be considered. The learned Single Judge observed in paragraph 4 that the appellant has committed a breach of undertaking given by him earlier and therefore, he directed the Registrar to initiate the contempt proceedings. That part of the paragraph 4 which is impugned in this appeal, reads thus:
“Meanwhile, the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department is directed to keep the Tahsildar under suspension inasmuch as his conduct in causing hurdles to the smooth functioning of his office. It is also seen that he is deliberately harassing general public as could be seen from his conduct before this Court. Therefore, this Court would direct the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department to keep Mr. Anandaiah, Tahsildar under suspension within one week from the date of communication of this order and report the same to this Court.”
(underline supplies) 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the aforesaid direction could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as the same was beyond the scope of the writ petition filed by the first respondent. It is pointed out that the appellant in his capacity of the Tahsildar is the adjudicating authority for dealing with the application which was made by the first respondent. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent stated that the appellant has even today not acted upon the directions contained in the impugned order.
6. We also heard the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the second to seventh respondents.
7. As narrated earlier, a very limited prayer was made by the first respondent in the writ petition directing the third respondent to consider the representation made by him for effecting mutation/khatha and revenue entries in respect of the said land. Depending upon the merits of the case, the learned Single Judge could have directed the present appellant (third respondent in the writ petition) in his official capacity to decide the representation dated 9th May 2017 in accordance with law and to effect mutation/khatha and revenue entries if a case to that effect was made out. If the learned Judge was of the view that some undertaking was given by the appellant and that he has committed a breach thereof, he may have been justified in issuing the direction to initiate contempt proceedings for breach of the undertaking given to the Court. We are not going into the question whether any undertaking was given by the appellant and whether any breach was committed by him. The said issue will be gone into in the contempt proceedings initiated in terms of the impugned order.
8. However, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to the Principal Secretary of the Revenue Department to keep the Tahsildar under suspension was clearly beyond the scope of the prayer in the petition filed by the first respondent. Moreover, even assuming that there was a prayer made against the appellant in the said writ petition, whether disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against the appellant and whether after deciding to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the appellant could be kept under suspension are the matters to be decided by the competent authority empowered to initiate the proceedings. The learned Single judge, at highest, could have directed the competent authority to consider whether a case is made out to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and to consider whether an order of suspension deserved to be passed. Moreover, the appellant was not made as a party to the writ petition in his personal capacity and no relief was claimed against him except for a direction to decide the representation. Therefore, in our view, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to the Principal Secretary of the Revenue Department to keep the appellant under suspension was clearly illegal. Moreover, the learned Single Judge has not issued any direction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The learned Single Judge has observed that the appellant is deliberately harassing general public and therefore, suspension is necessary as his conduct is causing hurdle to the smooth functioning of his office. The observation that the appellant is deliberately harassing the general public was also not warranted inasmuch as there was no material on record to support such a conclusion.
9. Therefore, a case is made out for quashing and setting aside the portion of the paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment and order which we have reproduced in paragraph 4 above. We make it clear that a issue whether disciplinary proceeding against the appellant needs to be initiated is kept open. It is for the authority concerned to take appropriate decision. We also make it clear that we have made no adjudication on the merits of the controversy which is covered by the prayer of the writ petition.
10. Accordingly, appeal is partly allowed by quashing and setting aside a part of the paragraph 4 of the impugned order starting with the word ‘Meanwhile’ and ending with the word ‘this Court’.
11. We also make it clear that we have made no adjudication on the issue whether the appellant has given any undertaking and whether he has committed any breach thereof. All these issues are left open to be decided in the appropriate proceedings.
Sd/- CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- JUDGE SN