JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. Heard the Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 18.6.1996, whereby the petitioner has been awarded an adverse entry and was reverted to his original post of Junior Clerk/Routine Clerk.
3. The facts of this case are that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1964 on the post of Routine Clerk. He was promoted on the post of Senior Assistant in the year 1985. An enquiry was conducted against the petitioner in 1981 in respect of some missing Form-31. In the enquiry the petitioner was found guilty vide enquiry report dated 3/4.6.1982 and responsibility was fixed upon one Sri V.K. Srivastava. After a lapse of 13 years a second enquiry was conducted by the Assistant Commissioner Trade Tax in the same matter/charges in which the petitioner was again exonerated from the charges. The relevant extract of the enquiry report dated 2.5.1995 is quoted below :
^^eq>s ,d tkap vf/kdkjh ds :i esa bl ckr ls cM+h dq.Bk dk vuqHko gqvk gS fd Jh ,y- ih- lDlsuk] ftls dkuiqj ifj{ks=h; usr`Ro esa vkdj dbZ o"kks± ls mRÑzz"V dk;Z fuLiknu ds fy, ekuns; ls lEekfur fd;k gS A o"kZ 1994&95 ds fy, Hkh mUgas ,slk lEeku izkIr gqvk] tks vdkj.k gh QkeZ xk;c fd, tkus rFkk mUgsa csp fy, tkus ds vkjksi esa ekufld =klnh dh x;h gS A nwljs budh dk;Z i)fr ,oa euksn'kk ij izfrdwy izHkko gksuk vLokHkkfod ugha gS A vijk/kksa dks fu%lUnsg nf.Mr fd;k tkuk pkfg, fdUrq tks vijk/kh ugha gS mls ijs'kku djuk mfpr ugha gS esjh laLrqfr gS fd Jh ,y- ih-
lDlsuk dks bl vkjksi i= ls cjh fd;k tk, A**
4. Though the petitioner was exonerated in two enquiries dated 3/4.6.82 and 2.5.93, he was subjected to third enquiry for the same charges in the year 1995. He raised objection against initiation of third enquiry for the same and similar charges.
5. The petitioner in pursuance of the order dated 15.4.1996 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 13063 of 1996 and the order dated 25.4.1996 passed by this Court in Special Appeal No. 362 of 1996, moved a detailed representation on 15.5.1996 and again on 13.6.1996 raising all the objections before the punishing authority for consideration before taking any final decision in the matter.
6. It is submitted by the Counsel for the petitioner that ignoring the aforesaid representations made before the punishing authority, the impugned order was passed on 18.6.1996. It is further submitted by the Counsel for the petitioner that before framing the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, there was no provision of second or successive enquiry, while in the present case not only second but even third enquiry was conducted for the same and similar charges and thus, the impugned order being based on third enquiry report (all the three reports being submitted much prior to framing of aforesaid Rules, 1999) is not sustainable and deserves to be quashed.
7. In 2002 (4) E.S.C 388 (All), Sushil Kumar v. Engineer-in-Chief, Irrigation, U.P. Sinchai Bhawan, Lucknow and Ors., it has been held by this Court that without cancelling/rejecting the earlier enquiry report, fresh enquiry into one and same incident is not maintainable. In K.R. Deb v. Collector, Exercise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC 1447, it has been held by the Apex Court that :
"Rule 15. on the face of it, really provides for one enquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiry Officer or Officers docs not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9."
8. If further held in Para 14 that :
"In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only unwarranted by the Rules but was harassing to the appellant."
9. From the above it is clear that a disciplinary enquiry is vitiated on account of certain technical and procedural flaws. In such circumstances the employer is at liberty to get the matter re-examined on merits by initiating the second enquiry. Other conclusion, which flows from the above decisions is that if after considering the material on record, the Disciplinary Authority has found that an employee was not guilty of the charges and has been exculpated of the allegations made against him in that event, the de novo enquiry would be nothing but harassment of the concerned employee and therefore, the de novo or second enquiry would not be legally permissible.
10. The petitioner was denied the relevant documents asked by him for the purpose of his defence, though it is not necessary to supply every document asked for, but the authorities are under obligation to supply material and relevant document and no person can be dismissed removed or reduced in rank or violated with adverse consequences in violation of the principles of natural justice and without giving him reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The respondents were under constitutional obligations to provide an opportunity to the petitioner particularly where they have been conducting enquiries on the same charges against the delinquent employee again and again. The respondents have not act reasonably and fairly. Conducting enquiry after 13 years after the petitioner was exonerated in the first enquiry, in the second enquiry and again in the third enquiry is nothing but outcome of malice and vindictive attitude causing harassment of the employee. This also appears from the recommendation of the enquiry report dated 2.5.1995 extracted above.
11. For all the aforesaid reasons and the provisions of law discussed above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs of Rs. 2000/- to be recovered from Sri Dharam Singh, the then Upper Commissioner (Prashashan), Vyapar Kar, U.P., Lucknow and paid to the petitioner as arrears of land revenue within two months. The District Magistrate will submit compliance report to this Court immediately thereafter.