The writ petition is directed against the order of the first respondent dated 11.5.1999 by which the petitioner was removed from service, as confirmed by the second respondent in the order dated 30.11.1999 and to consequently direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and all consequential wages and benefits.
2.1. The petitioner has joined in the respondents/Electricity Board on 16.10.1967 as a temporary casual labour and by various promotions, he was ultimately promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer and posted at Mettur Dam. He was placed under suspension on 31.12.1996 and a charge memo was issued against him on 28.2.1997, framing five charges which are as follows:
"Charge No.1:- Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer while he was working at South Arasaradi has demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.500/- (Rupees Five hundred only) from Dr.G.Marimuthu of Madurai Kamaraj University when the latter applied for service connection to his newly constructed house during December 1995 situated at Palkalainagar area in R.S.No.3 and 3/2-A. The above act of Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer shows his corrupt practice while discharging his official duties which constitutes misconduct as per TNEB Discipline and Appeal Regulations.
Charge No.2:- Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer then at South Arasaradi has demanded a sum of Rs.500/- as bribe on 19.7.1996 from Thiru M.Raman an electrician when he presented an application for a three phase connection to a newly constructed house in the name of Tmt.R.Usha, W/o.Dr.S.Krishnasamy situated at 2/154, South 5th Street, Palkalainagar East, Madurai. When the electrician expressed his inability to pay the bribe, as he had no money on that day, immediately Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Exe. Engineer had refused to receive the application, returned it to the electrician after striking off his initials. The above act of Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer shows his habitual corrupt practice in his official duties which constitute misconduct as per TNEB Discipline and Appeal Regulations.
Charge No.3:- Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer then at South Arasaradi has demanded a sum of Rs.2000/- as bribe from Thiru M.Nehru, an employee of the Karadipatti Panchayat when he approached the former in connection with getting electrical supply to 13 Nos. sodium vapour lamps installed in the Panchayat Road. As the bribe was not paid, the Assistant Executive Engineer has not given power supply even after a year. The act of Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer indicate the corrupt practices in his official duties which constitute misconduct as per TNEB Discipline and Appeal Regulations.
Charge No.4:- Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer then at South Arasaradi habitually demanded and accepted bribe from the public whenever they approached him in official duties. By his corrupt practices, Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer has brought down the image of TNEB in the minds of public, reputation of the Board is spoiled. This constitute misconduct as per TNEB Discipline and Appeal Regulations.
Charge No.5:- Anti Power Theft Squad, Madurai has inspected the H.T.S.C.No.374 of M/s.Madurai Kamaraj University, Nagamalai Pudukottai on 4.11.94 and noticed certain defects. But the defects have not been rectified till the next inspection in December 1995. Thiru L.Manickavasagam, Assistant Executive Engineer has issued notice to the consumer H.T.S.C.No.374 on 27.7.96 and got acknowledgment only on 8.8.96 to provide a physical segregation between Tamil Nadu Electricity Board yard and the consumer structure yard with a sealable gate in Board side yard. The notice was issued only during the course of vigilance enquiry and reported the rectification to the Executive Engineer/West/Madurai on 12.8.1996 and this work is not completed till 13.8.1996. Thus there was a delay in sending interim report after a lapse of the period 27.3.95 to 6.6.96. The action of the Assistant Executive Engineer is highly irregular and he has been negligent in his duties as per TNEB Discipline and Appeal Regulations."
2.2. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 28.4.1997, denying the charges. It is stated that an enquiry was conducted between 24.6.1997 and 3.9.1997. Three witnesses were examined on the side of the respondents/Electricity Board. The petitioner has examined one Muthiah, Ex-Block Development Officer, Thiruparankundram, apart from himself.
2.3. It is the case of the petitioner that the charges levelled against him are not established and that during the enquiry he has asked the Enquiry Officer to summon (i) the Charge-sheeting Officer; (ii) Abhimanyu, Commerical Inspector, (iii) Victor Thiagarajan, Commercial Inspector/Arasaradi; and (iv) T.Sridhar and that has not been heeded to. It is stated that the enquiry has been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and the Enquiry Officer has found that Charge Nos.2 and 5 were alone proved. It is the case of the petitioner that the report of the Enquiry Officer was not furnished, but a show cause notice was issued on 29.1.1998 asking as to why the petitioner should not removed from service.
2.4. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing W.P.No.2341 of 1998 challenging the said show cause notice and ultimately, the writ petition came to be allowed on 16.4.1998 on the ground that if the Disciplinary Authority wanted to differ from the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the delinquent should be afforded opportunity by giving findings of the Enquiry Officer. Thus, liberty was given to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed in accordance with law based on the report of the Enquiry Officer.
2.5. It is stated that again the first respondent has issued a memo dated 22.8.1998 disagreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer regarding charge Nos.1 and 4 and the petitioner submitted his explanation on 28.9.1998 stating that the same is against the earlier order passed by this Court. In spite of the same, the first respondent issued show cause notice on 2.12.1998 requiring the petitioner to show cause as to why the proposed punishment of removal from service should not be imposed and the petitioner was asked to submit his explanation within seven days.
2.6. The petitioner has made representation on 23.3.1999 to the first respondent along with the letter of one G.Marimuthu, who has stated that the petitioner has never demanded nor received any bribe. It was thereafter the impugned order of removal was passed by the second respondent on 11.5.1999 and the same was served on the petitioner on 19.5.1999. The said order according to the petitioner is biased, since it says that letter from G.Marimuthu has been obtained in collusion and after persuasion. The first respondent while passing the order of punishment, has referred to the past record of the petitioner without giving him opportunity. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed by the first respondent without any legal evidence and the enquiry was conducted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and the second respondent, being the Appellate Authority, has taken notice of the past record of the petitioner without giving any notice to the petitioner.
2.7. The impugned orders are assailed by the petitioner on the basis that they are opposed to the principles of natural justice; that while imposing such a grave punishment based on the past record, opportunity should have been given; that when the first respondent has differed from the findings of the Enquiry Officer with regard to Charge Nos.1 and 4, he should have given further opportunity to give explanation; that there is no specific charge of demand and acceptance of bribe; and that the Charge Nos.2 and 5 are stated to have been proved without any material evidence.
3.1. It is the case of the first respondent in the counter affidavit that one Dr.S.Krishansamy, a consumer has complained that the petitioner who was then working as Assistant Executive Engineer (South), Arasarady has demanded Rs.500/- for three phase domestic service connection in respect of the house owned by his wife; that one G.Marimuthu has given a complaint on 26.7.1996 that the petitioner has demanded Rs.500/- and accepted the same for getting temporary supply; and that another consumer, M.Nehru, working at Kariapatti Panchayat, has given a written complaint about the petitioner that he has demanded Rs.2000/- for giving supply and it was based on the said complaints, five charges were framed.
3.2. It is stated that the petitioner has submitted his explanation to the charges on 28.4.1997. One N.Thiagarajan, Executive Engineer, Samayanallur was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who submitted his report on 6.10.1997 holding that charge Nos.2 and 5 have been proved and Charge Nos.1, 3 and 4 as not proved. It is stated that the first respondent has issued a show cause notice on 29.1.1998 enclosing the findings of the Enquiry Officer to the petitioner. In the said show cause notice, the first respondent has disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer regarding charge Nos.1 and 4 and on that basis, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why he should not be removed from service and the writ petition, viz., W.P.No.2341 of 1998 filed by the petitioner challenging the same was allowed on 16.4.1998 holding that while disagreeing in respect of Charge Nos.1 and 4, opportunity should have been given to the petitioner and directed the respondents to serve the findings of the Enquiry Officer and give opportunity.
3.3. It is stated that pursuant to the order of this Court, a memo dated 22.8.1998 was issued to the effect that the finding of the Enquiry Officer in respect of Charge Nos.1 and 4 cannot be accepted and that it was proposed to hold that the said charges have been proved and directed the petitioner to submit his explanation. It is stated that the petitioner has submitted his explanation on 28.9.1998 and thereafter, a show cause notice was issued on 2.12.1998 stating that charge Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 are proved and considering the gravity of the charges, proposed to award punishment of removal from service and called upon the petitioner to show cause.
3.4. It is stated that, at that time, the petitioner has filed a contempt application in C.A.No.26 of 1999 before this Court stating that the conduct of the respondents is against the order passed by this Court in W.P.No.2341 of 1998 and that contempt application came to be dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner has submitted his explanation on 23.3.1999 to the show cause notice dated 2.12.1998 and the first respondent has passed order on 11.5.1999 removing the petitioner from service and against the said order an appeal was filed to the second respondent, who, after considering the appeal, has dismissed the same on 30.11.1999 holding that there is no ground to interfere.
3.5. It is also stated that instead of filing a Memorial to the Board under the TNEB Employees Discipline and Appeal Regulations, the petitioner has straight-away filed writ petition which is not maintainable. It is the case of the respondents that by referring to various factual aspects, the petitioner is attempting to make this Court as an appellate authority. It is further stated that when the finding in respect of Charge Nos.1 and 4 were quashed by this Court in the earlier writ petition, a direction was given permitting the respondents to proceed with the enquiry after furnishing copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, which has been submitted. It is, therefore, stated that notice has been given at every stage and opportunity has been provided to the petitioner.
4.1. Mr.Balan Haridas, learned counsel for the petitioner would mainly contend that:
(i) there is no acceptable evidence in respect of the charges;
(ii) the Enquiry Officer having found Charge Nos.2 and 5 alone are proved has given a perverse finding;
(iii) there are no material to differ in respect of the finding of the Enquiry Officer regarding Charge Nos.1 and 4, the reasons are extraneous and no opportunity was given to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority while differing from the finding of the Enquiry Officer regarding Charge Nos.1 and 4;
(iv) the respondents relied upon the past record for which no opportunity was given to the petitioner; and
(v) the Appellate Authority has not adduced any reason and there is nothing to conclude that the Appellate Authority has applied its mind.
4.2. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that when the application for service connection was received by the petitioner as Assistant Executive Engineer, it was forwarded to the Commercial Inspector after the petitioner has put his initial and when the Commercial Inspector has returned the papers to the petitioner saying that the person who has signed the application was not a registered wiring contractor and therefore, the application was defective, the application was in turn returned to the complainant by striking off the initial of the petitioner, which is the usual practice. It is the submission of the learned counsel in this regard that when the petitioner has asked for the Commercial Inspector to be examined, no steps have been taken. It is also the case of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner's evidence in this regard has not been taken note of and in fact, the petitioner's statement has not been cross-examined.
4.3. It is his contention that the communication of the Executive Engineer dated 27.3.1995 which has been relied upon by the respondents has not been produced before the Enquiry Officer. It is his case that in respect of Charge No.1, the complainant, G.Marimuthu himself has not come forward to give evidence and that was the case in respect of Charge No.3 also, as found by the Enquiry Officer himself and the Appellate Authority has not discussed anything about the defects in the entire proceedings.
4.4. It is his submission that the Enquiry Officer should give reason for not accepting the petitioner's case by relying upon the judgment in Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and others, [1985] 3 SCC 378.
4.5. He would also rely upon the judgment in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, [2009] 2 SCC 570, apart from the decision in B.Padmaiah v. Union of India & 5 Others, 2007 WLR 7 to substantiate his contention that mere suspicion is not a legal proof.
4.6. He would submit that Charge No.4 is on the face of it vague and in this regard he would rely upon the judgment in Surath Chandra v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 752.
4.7. To substantiate his contention that the Appellate Authority should give reasons, he has relied upon the judgment in Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and other, [2009] 1 SCC (L&S) 806.
4.8. Regarding the contention in respect of the violation of principles of natural justice, he would rely upon the judgment in Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Limited and another, [2008] 5 SCC 554.
4.9. It is submitted that the petitioner has been working for over 30 years and except the present charge, there is no other case against him.
5.1. Mr.M.Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would fairly submit that it is true that in respect of Charge Nos.1 and 3 there is no evidence, that Charge No.4 is not specific, and that in respect of Charge No.5 attributing negligence, no documents have been furnished to the petitioner and therefore, those charges need not be taken into consideration. However, he would submit that Charge No.2 stands proved since there is abundant evidence to show that the petitioner has demanded bribe. He would also submit that in corruption cases there should be no leniency.
5.2. It is his submission that when the petitioner has received the application for service connection by putting his initial, the very admitted fact that he has struck off the initial and returned the application creates a suspicion about the conduct of the petitioner.
6.1. After hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents and referring to the various documents filed, when analyzing the charges one by one, in respect of Charge No.1 which relates to a complaint by one G.Marimuthu, it is stated that for giving service connection to his house, the petitioner has demanded and accepted Rs.500/- as bribe. The said G.Marimuthu has not been examined and in the absence of any evidence, the Enquiry Officer has reported that the charge has not been proved. It is merely based on the instigation of M.W.2, one Krishnasamy, who had an axe to grind against the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority has found the petitioner guilty.
6.2. Again, in respect of Charge No.3 which relates to an alleged demand of Rs.2000/- from one M.Nehru, working at Kariapatti Panchayat, for providing electricity supply to 13 Nos. sodium vapour lamps to be installed in the panchayat road, a reading of the charge shows that there are no particulars as to when the demand was made and the said complainant, M.Nehru has given complaint to S.Krishnasamy, M.W.2 and the Enquiry Officer in his report has found the said Charge No.3 not proved and in fact, it was found that the then Block Development Officer, Thiruparankundram, Muthiah has deposed that there was no delay on the part of the Electricity Board officials and the petitioner has never demanded bribe of Rs.2000/- for providing electricity supply to sodium vapour lamps and that M.W.3, M.Nehru has never told him that the petitioner has demanded bribe.
6.3. With regard to Charge No.4, which simply says that the petitioner has habitually demanded and accepted bribe from public whenever they approached, as it is seen, the said charge is vague.
6.4. In respect of Charge No.5 to the effect that the defects have not been rectified after Anti Power Theft Squad inspection, admittedly, such instructions given by the Squad or the communication dated 27.3.1995 of the Executive Engineer based on the squad inspection conducted on 4.11.1994, has not been produced even during the time of enquiry, especially when it was the case of the petitioner that such report of the squad has never been communicated to him. Even though the Enquiry Officer has found that it cannot be said that the petitioner has not received such defect notice, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, even during the time of enquiry nothing has been produced to show that the defect notice has been served on the petitioner, more particularly, when the charge itself is that there has been a delay in sending interim report from 27.3.1995 to 6.6.1996. In the absence of evidence to show that the defect notice has been served on the petitioner, the finding by the Enquiry Officer as well as by the Disciplinary Authority in this regard can be only termed as a charge stated to have been proved without any evidence.
6.5. Therefore, in respect of above said charge Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 they can be termed as findings given by either the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority without any evidence.
7.1. But the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is with particular reference to Charge No.2, which is stated to have been proved. The said charge relates to an allegation of demand of Rs.500/- by the petitioner as bribe from one M.Raman, who has presented an application for three phase connection to the newly constructed house of R.Usha, W/o.Dr.S.Krishnasamy situated at 2/154, South 5th Street, Palkalainagar East, Madurai, which application was received by the petitioner, initialled and was thereafter returned to the electrician after striking off his initial.
7.2. The explanation submitted by the petitioner in this regard is that in cases of new connections, if a consumer gives application, the Assistant Executive Engineer after receiving the same puts his initial and forwards the same to the Commercial Inspector to verify as to whether the application is in order and thereafter, further proceedings will be effected. According to the petitioner, the Commercial Inspector has returned the application saying that the application was defective since it was not accompanied with the original house tax receipt, the registered wiring contractor has not signed, and the registration fees has not been paid. It was after such return by the Commercial Inspector, the petitioner is stated to have returned the application by striking off his initial. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondents that the petitioner has demanded bribe and since the same was not paid, the petitioner has returned the application by striking off his initial.
7.3. A reference to the entire records shows that the application was presented to the petitioner by one M.Raman, Electrician. The said Raman has given evidence, apart from Dr.Krishnasamy, the complainant. It is the finding by the Enquiry Officer, which is not in dispute, that Thiru Isakki, Wiring Contractor is not a registered contractor who has registered his name either in the Sub-division office or the Section Office at Alwar Nagar. It is also the finding of the Enquiry Officer that the application fees was not paid on the date of presentation of the application, viz., on 19.7.1996. But it is stated that the present Assistant Executive Engineer, Yathendran has said that the payment will be made only if the application is found in order by the office of the Assistant Executive Engineer and therefore, the finding of the Enquiry Officer is that in such practice, the claim of the petitioner that for non-payment of the application fee the application was returned was turned down.
7.4. The Enquiry Officer has, in fact, found that at the time when such application was received by the petitioner as Assistant Executive Engineer, he could have visibly seen about the house tax receipts without which he would not have put his initial. The Enquiry Officer has also found that even if it was found thereafter that the application was not in order, the petitioner should have given the details of the actual defects in writing to the complainant as per the procedure and instead of that the petitioner has chosen to strike off his initial and mark "CI" and therefore, the Enquiry Officer has held that the demand of bribe of Rs.500/- stands proved beyond any doubt.
7.5. As far as this charge is concerned, one cannot say that either there is no substance in the evidence or the said charge can be deemed to have been proved without any evidence at all. It is true that there is no written procedure for receiving such applications for new connection as the same is not available anywhere in the record. But it is common knowledge that when such application is received, as a responsible officer having received such application by putting his initial, it was certainly unbecoming on his part in striking off his initial and returning the same to the applicant. This certainly creates a suspicion about the conduct of the petitioner. It is trite law that in the departmental proceedings, the technical rules of evidence have no application and the doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are sufficient to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner insofar as it relates to charge No.2 that it is a case of no evidence cannot be accepted.
7.6. Inasmuch as admittedly in respect of the other charges they are either vague or orders have been passed without any legally acceptable evidence, there is no necessity for this Court to deal with the case laws cited by the learned counsel. But as far as Charge No.2 is concerned, certainly there is evidence against the petitioner regarding his conduct of returning of application.
8. There is one another aspect which needs consideration, viz., the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have referred about the past record of the petitioner for the purpose of inflicting the punishment of removal from service. But, there is no explanation about the nature of past record and it is not even the case of the respondents that the petitioner was informed about the reliance on his past record for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion regarding the quantum of punishment. These aspects have not been considered by the Disciplinary Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority.
9. It is well settled that when the Appellate Authority passes orders confirming the orders of the Original Authority no elaborate reasoning is required, but there must be some material to show that the Appellate Authority has, in fact, applied its mind and not acted as a rubber stamp to approve mechanically whatever the Original Authority as done. The Apex Court in Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2006 SC 1748 has held as under:
"28. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regard the compliance of the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules.
29. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, MANU/SC/0014/1999 : (1999)ILLJ962SC which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this Court stated:
The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities.
30. The appellate authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. The order of the appellate authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The appellate authority, when the rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression 'consider' is of some significance. In the context of the rules, the appellate authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the rules was complied with; (ii) the Enquiry Officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive."
10. In Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and other, [2009] 1 SCC (L&S) 806, while deciding about the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority, it was held that even though generally when the Appellate Authority affirms the order of the Original Authority no elaborate reason is required, in the case of reversal it is required, nevertheless, the affirmation must contain certain reasons to show that there has been application of mind by the Appellate Authority even if the reason is brief. By narrating various judgments on the issue, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
"5. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover's case, [1995] 6 SCC 279 has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority.
6. The view we are taking was also taken by this Court in Divisional Forest Officer v. Madhusudhan Rao, [2008] 3 SCC 469, and in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 671, Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1976] 2 SCC 981, etc.
7. In the present case, since the appellate authority's order does not contain any reasons, it does not show any application of mind.
8. The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, [1990] 4 SCC 594, is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons minimizes chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation.
9. No doubt, in S.N. Mukherjee's case (supra), it has been observed that:
"36. ...The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge."
The above observation, in our opinion, really means that the order of affirmance need not contain an elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the original authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need not be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view would mean that appellate authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they agree with the view of the lower authority."
11. Applying the ratio laid down in the above said decisions and taking note of the fact that except in respect of Charge No.2 in respect of other charges there is no evidence, the impugned orders of the respondents are set aside except insofar as it relates to the finding regarding Charge No.2 and the matter is remanded back to the second respondent/Appellate Authority to consider the same in the light of the observation made, including about the quantum of punishment and pass orders within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
This writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.
4.12.2009 Index : Yes Internet : Yes sasi P.JYOTHIMANI,J.
[sasi] W.P.No.14230 of 2000 4.12.2009