JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. Pursuant to certain earlier agreement a sale deed was executed on 19.5.1984. By reason of Section 5 (c) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 1953, the sale deed was declared void, since no permission was obtained before effecting the sale deed at the time when notice under Section 4 (2) of the said Act was already issued. Plaintiff obtained necessary permission from the Settlement Officer. Consolidation on 18.6.1984. Thereafter a suit has been filed for specific performance of contract being Suit No. 353 of 1984. On the basis of written statement an issue was framed as to the maintainability of the suit. The said issue has been decided in favour of the plaintiff by an order dated 20.8.1997. Civil Revision No. 210 of 1997, was preferred by the defendant-petitioner. By order dated 28.3.1998 passed by the IXth Additional District and Sessions Judge. Muzaffarnagar, the said revision was dismissed.
2. Mr. P. K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there was an agreement for sale of certain lands executed on 13.3.1981. Subsequently some more lands were alleged to have been agreed to be sold by the defendants to the plaintiff. Accordingly another agreement dated 12.3.1983 in respect of certain additional lands were executed while some lands included in the agreement dated 13.3.1981 was excluded. On the basis of such agreement, the alleged sale deed was executed on 19.5.1984. Since the sale deed was declared void, it placed the parties at the same position before agreement to sell alleged to have been entered into. After the agreement was so acted upon, no agreement remains for being specifically performed since it had already been performed. By reason of Section 5 (c) of the said Act, the performance thereof having been declared void, there is no scope of any further agreement being enforced. At the same time, the plaint does not disclose as to what agreement was being sought to be specifically performed. In the absence of disclosure of cause of action, the plaint is liable to be dismissed under Order VII. Rule 11, C.P.C. He specifically points out from the order dated 20.8.1997 that the learned trial court had found that no particulars of agreement has been disclosed in the plaint but because of non-mentioning of particulars in the plaint, the same shall be taken to be ascertained through oral evidence. According to Mr. Singh such conclusion is wholly perverse in the facts and circumstances of the case. Inasmuch as no reasonable person can arrive at such a conclusion after having found that no particulars about the agreement sought to be enforced has been disclosed. He contends that similarly the decision in the revision is perverse. According to him, the revisional court has proceeded on the basis of the very sale deed, which was declared void, and observed that there is no necessity of proving the agreement for sale and therefore sufficient cause of action has been disclosed. According to Mr. Singh such conclusion is also wholly perverse in the facts and circumstances of the case and it cannot be sustained in law. According to him, agreement for sale was to be specifically performed. It is a void agreement which was sought to be specifically performed. Now the sale deed could be treated as an agreement for sale since it has already been declared as void. The declaration of sale deed as void, according to him, amounts to denial/existence of the sale deed itself. According to him the word Void' implies that there is no existence of the deed. Therefore, the decision of the revisional court cannot be sustained. In support of his contention, Mr. Singh, relied on the decision in the case of Governing Council of Kayastha Pathshala v. Ram Chandra Srivastava, 1991 AWC 1064, particularly para 22 of the said decision and contended that the question under Order VII. Rule 11 has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings available on the plaint and not on basis of any other material beyond the plaint. According to him the pleading does not disclose any cause of action and thereby the plaint attracts the application of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. On this ground, according to him, the plaint should be rejected.
3. I have heard Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner at length.
4. So far as the ratio decided in the case of Governing Council of Kayastha Pathshala (supra) there is no doubt about or dispute with regard to the proposition laid down there that for the purpose of deciding an issue under Order VII. Rule 11 of the Code that the pleadings made in the plaint can only be relied upon and nothing beyond the pleading contained in the plaint can be relied upon.
5. In order to sustain the pleadings, when the pleadings do not disclose sufficient cause of action, sufficient cause of action may be disclosed through evidence that might be led at subsequent stage cannot be a ground. The finding with regard to such question cannot be dependent on the basis of expectations that evidence or materials may come in at the time of trial. The question is to be looked into on the basis of the pleadings as stood when the plaint was filed and on the date when the question was decided.
6. Under Order VII. Rule 11 of the Code the plaint, if does not disclose a cause of action, is liable to be rejected. There is a distinction between the case that there is no cause of action for the suit and that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. In the former case the suit may be dismissed after trial but the plaint cannot be rejected, which in the latter case the suit cannot be dismissed but the plaint is to be rejected.
7. If the plaint discloses a cause of action, the correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting the cause of action cannot be gone into for the purpose of resorting to Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. The only scope open to the Court is to examine the allegations as contained in the plaint without testing the veracity or otherwise thereof as to whether the same disclosed a cause of action.
8. None of the defence or anything outside the plaint can be looked into.
The above view finds support for the decisions in the case of British Airways v. Arts Works Exports Ltd., AIR 1986 Cal 120.
8. Cause of action means whole of the material facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to allege in order to succeed. It is not intended to comprise every fact which may be proved in evidence. It has no relation to the defence that may be set up. Cause of action has definite factor which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of Court. The word 'cause of action' should be given its ordinary meaning and understood to mean as definite. In its wider sense it means the necessary contention for the maintenance of the suit. In its restricted sense it means the circumstances forming the infringement of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. These are the ratio which would be gathered from the reading of the cases in Beni Madhab Sikdar and another v. Sarat Chandra Jana. AIR 1937 Cal 643 and Ujjal Talikdar a. Netai Chand Koley. AIR 1969 Cal 224.
9. It is a bundle of facts that gives rise for the cause to the plaintiff. Different infinite simultaneous fraction of facts joins together to form a cause of action as a whole. Even separately such minute fact may compose a part of cause of action when it comes to contract it comprises of several components namely the offer and acceptance. Specific performance of contract depends on conduct of the parties which may involve number of facts. A test to be undertaken for deciding disclosure of cause of action in the plaint within the meaning of Order VII. Rule 11 of the Code. It is not necessary to scrutinise the facts on the same context as to whether the facts would stand scrutiny relating to absence of cause of action for the suit but it would be only an examination of the averments made. Whether the same shows that there are some cause of action disclosed. Whether the same would stand the test of veracity or otherwise thereof is not a question to be undertaken for the purpose if there are sufficient facts disclosed in the plaint to show that the plaintiff has some facts in support to raise the question claiming the relief.
10. Admittedly in the present case the plaint as it stood on the date of filing has not been amended till the decision on the question under Order VII. Rule 11 was decided. Therefore, the Court is bound to confine its consideration for deciding such question within the bounds of the pleadings available on record.
11. Mr. Singh had led me through the plaint as well as through the impugned order dated 20.8.1997 and had placed the order dated 20.3.1998 as well. In the plaint a cause has been made out that there was an agreement for sale in respect of certain lands, registered on 13.3.1981. Subsequently another agreement for sale deed 12.3.1983 was registered. On the basis of such agreements, the sale deed was executed on 19.5.1984 which was declared void as aforesaid.
12. It is an established principle of law that agreement is a contract which may not always be written. Agreement for sale even can be unregistered. In the present case two agreements were executed which were alleged to be registered. But the fact remains whether the agreements were valid or invalid or the execution of the sale deed after the registration of the two agreements as aforesaid brings about the presumption that there was an agreement for sale which was sought to be specifically performed by the sale deed 19.5.1984. Admittedly the document so executed was declared void and the document being non-est, it cannot be accepted as direct evidence for the purpose of proving agreement for sale of the land or transfer of interest but at the same time the said document can be used for collateral purpose for establishing the fact that there was an agreement for sale which had to be specifically performed. But these are the questions which are to be decided while deciding the suit on merits. What would be the implication of such sale as to the extent of agreement or not would be a question that is to be decided in the suit on the basis of materials placed before the Court. This is a stage for deciding the question on the basis of present fact about the evidential value of the sale deed whether it is accepted or refused. In both cases, it would be prejudging the issue with regard to the evidential value of the said document. Plain reading of the plaint discloses that there exist cause of action. It cannot be said that cause of action is thoroughly absent. The finding of the learned trial court that there was no particulars given about the agreement appears to be perverse. Since there were two agreements which were dated 13.3.1981 and 12.3.1981 very much in existence in the plaint. At the same time, it appears from the conclusion of the revisional court that it may not be necessary to prove the agreement in view of the execution of the sale deed dated 19.5.1984 does not appear to be unreasonable. But then all these findings are tentative for the purpose of deciding the issue under Order VII, Rule 11 and shall not be taken into account for deciding the suit on merit.
13. In the facts and circumstances, as discussed above, I do not find any infirmity in the order impugned. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
14. Before parting with the case. I once again observe that any of the findings recorded in the order dated 20.8.1997 and 28.3.1998 as well as those in the present order shall not in any manner influence the trial court in deciding the suit on its merit. The suit is to be decided on the basis of merit of the case itself. Since long time has lapsed in the meantime, it is expected that the suit be decided as early as possible, preferably within a period of two years from the date of production of certified copy of this order before the learned trial court.
However, there will be no order as to cost.