JUDGMENT Allsop, J.
1. The last male owner of the property in suit died before the year 1912. He left him surviving a widow and two daughters. The widow made a gift of the whole property to the daughters. She purported to transfer an absolute title. Thereupon some collaterals instituted a suit as reversioners in order to obtain a declaration that the deed of gift was not binding upon them. It happened that the son of one of the daughters was alive, but inspite of that fact the widow and the daughters and the collaterals entered into a compromise about the year 1913 by which the collaterals were given an absolute interest in 1/4th of the property and the daughters an absolute interest in the other 3/4ths. A few years later, in 1916, the daughter's son brought another suit and there was another compromise which overruled the previous one. By this second compromise the collaterals got 1/6th of the property and daughters and the daughter's son got the remaining 5/6ths. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted by two sons of the other daughter who were not born in the year 1916 when the last compromise was effected. They sought a declaration that the compromise was not binding upon them. It seems to us quite clear that it was not. They were not parties to it and it is impossible that anybody should have purported to represent them before they were born. Learned Counsel has urged that this was a family settlement but the use of that term does not cover all defects. The agreement may have been binding upon the parties to it because it was a family settlement but it could not bind the plaintiff-appellants who based their claims on their descent from the last male owner and not from their mother who was a party to the compromise. Even if they had been alive their mother could not have bargained with their reversionary interest and a fortiori could not, when they were not born, transfer her life-interest and deprive them of rights which would come into existence at the times of their births. We need only refer to the case in Har Naraini Kunwar v. Sajjan Pal Singh ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 181. Another point taken by the defendants-respondents was that the second suit by the son of one of the daughters was a representative suit and that all the reversioners were represented by him. It seems quite clear to us that a reversioner who enters into a compromise solely in his own interests cannot bind others who may subsequently come into existence.
2. The third point, on which the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court was based, was that the declaration claimed in the suit was an empty declaration and should not be granted. The allegation was that the plaintiffs could not obtain a declaration about the second compromise while taking no steps to get the earlier compromise and the deed of gift set aside. With the greatest respect we do not think that this is a good argument. The deed of gift and first compromise were abrogated by the second compromise and no longer affected even those who were parties to them. Even if that were not so, we can see no reason why a person, who feels that his rights are affected by one document, should not obtain a declaration that the agreement evidenced by that document is not binding upon him only because there may be other documents or other agreements which may affect his interests and which he does not feel called upon to avoid. In our judgment the compromise of 1916 is not binding upon the plaintiff-appellant and there is no reason why they should not obtain the declaration that they sought. We, therefore, set aside the decree of the learned Single Judge of this Court and restore the decree of the learned additional Civil Judge of Jaunpur. All the costs in this Court shall be paid by the defendants.