Laljibhai Varvabhai Desai & 1 ­

1.0 Present Criminal Revision Application under Section 397 r/w Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the applicant herein – original accused to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Revisional Court ­learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patan in Criminal Revision Application No.46 of 2003 dated 20.3.2004, by which, learned Revisional Court has allowed the said Revision Application preferred by the respondent no.1 herein ­original complainant by quashing and setting aside the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan passed in Court Inquiry Case No.45 of 2003 and dismissing the said complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the said complaint is barred by limitation as provided under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and further directing the learned Magistrate to register the said complaint and to proceed further with the same in accordance with law and on merits.

2.0 The facts leading to the present Criminal Revision Application are as under:

2.1. That the applicant herein­original accused issued the cheque in favour of the complainant on 30.9.2002. The same came to be presented with his banker on 21.11.2002, which came to be returned by the concerned Bank on 26.11.2002 and the intimation from the bank with respect to return of the cheque was received by the complainant on 14.12.2002. That within period of 15 days of such intimation, the complainant issued statutory notice as required under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act, however the said notice came to be returned and the same was not served upon accused. Therefore, again complainant issued notice on 22.1.2003 at the same address which was admittedly not served. Therefore, the complainant served another notice on 15.3.2003 at the new address which came to be served and within period of 45 days from issuing of the last notice dated 15.3.2003 i.e. within a prescribed period of limitation as provided under Section 138 of the N.I. Act r/w Section 141 of the N.I. Act, the complainant has filed complaint before the concerned Court on 4.4.2003. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order for Court inquiry and consequently said complaint was registered as Court Inquiry No.45 of 2003. That the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 13.10.2003 dismissed the said complaint in exercise of powers under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that same is barred by limitation as provided under Section 138 of the N.I. Act considering issuance of first notice dated 23.12.2002 as starting point of cause of action and the limitation and it was held that from the date of issuance of first notice dated 23.12.2002, the complaint which has been filed on 4.4.2003 is beyond the period of limitation under the N.I. Act.

2.2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan dated 13.10.2003 passed below Exh.5 in Inquiry No.45 of 2003 in dismissing the said complaint on the ground that the same is beyond the period of limitation as provided under the N.I. Act, the respondent no.1 herein­original complainant preferred Criminal Revision Application No.46 of 2003 before the learned Revisional Court­ learned Sessions Court, Patan and the learned Revisional Court by impugned judgment and order has allowed the said Criminal Revision Application by quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patan dismissing the complaint and directing the learned Magistrate to register the said complaint and to proceed further with the same.

2.2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patan passed in Criminal Revision Application No.46 of 2003, the petitioner ­original accused has preferred present Criminal Revision Application under Section 397 r/w 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3.0 Ms. Archana R. Acharya, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioner and Shri B.P. Dalal, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent no.1­original complainant and Ms. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has appeared on behalf of the respondent State.

3.1. Ms. Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner herein­ original accused has vehemently submitted that the learned Revisional Court has materially erred in allowing the revision application preferred by the respondent no.1 herein­original complainant and quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate dismissing the complaint which has dismissed on the ground that the same is beyond period of limitation as provided under the N.I. Act.

3.2. It is further submitted by Ms. Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner herein­original accused that admittedly the complainant issued first notice under Section 138 of the Act on 23.12.2002 and therefore, the cause of action to file complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act would commence from the issuance of first notice dated 23.12.2002 and therefore, the complaint which has been filed on 4.4.2003 was beyond the period of limitation and therefore, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate rightly dismissed the complaint as same was found to be beyond the period of limitation as provided under the Act. Relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.C.Alavi Haji vs. Palapetty Muhammed and Anr reported in (2007) 6 SCC 555, it is submitted by Ms. Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner herein­original accused that as observed and held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision that there is presumption of service of notice upon the accused when the same has been issued by the complainant and therefore, the first notice dated 23.12.2002 was presumed to have been served upon the accused and therefore, the complainant ought to have filed the complaint within a period of 45 days from issuance of first notice dated 23.12.2002 which the complainant failed.

3.3. Ms. Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner herein­ original accused has also relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadra vs. Madhavan Sunilkumar reported in AIR 1998 SC 3043 as well as in the case Tameeshwar Vaishnav vs. Ramvishal Gupta reported in AIR 2010 SC 1209 by submits that as held and observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the cause of action to file the complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act would arise only once and therefore in the present case when a cause of action in favour of the complainant to file the complaint arose when the notice dated 23.12.2002 was issued, thereafter there cannot be any another / firther cause of action to file complaint on issuance of second notice and / or even third notice. By making above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is requested to allow the present Criminal Revision Application by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Revisional Court and restore the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate.

4.0 Present Criminal Revision Application is opposed by Shri B.P. Dalal, learned advocate for the respondent no.1­original complainant. It is submitted that admittedly first two notices which have issued on 23.12.2002 and 22.1.2003 were not served upon the accused and therefore, unless and until the notice issued under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act is served upon the accused, complainant can not file the complaint against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is submitted that as such the complainant can file the complaint against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act within a period of 45 days from the date of service of statutory notice upon the accused. It is submitted that therefore, unless and until the statutory notice as provided under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act is served upon the accused there is no cause of action to file the complaint. It is submitted that in the present case the notice dated 15.3.2003 came to be served upon the accused for the first time and within period of 45 days from that date, the complainant has filed the complaint on 4.4. 2003 and therefore, the Revisional Court has rightly held that the complaint is within the period of limitation as provided under the N.I. Act.

4.1. Shri Dalal, learned advocate for the complainant has submitted that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court C.C.Alavi Haji (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. It is submitted that observations in the decision are required to be considered in light of the facts and controversy raised in the said matter. It is submitted that in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court it was the accused who disputed the service of statutory notice though it was issued and sent at the correct address and to that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held considering Section 27 of General Clauses Act that there is always a presumption that the notice sent at the correct address has been served. It is submitted that in the present case admittedly first notice has not been served at all and therefore, there is no question of raising any presumption with respect to service of notice as sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner now. It is further submitted that even in the said decision also the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed and held that even in such a case where the accused disputed the receipt of the notice, summons received by him can be treated as notice and within 15 days, he could have make payment. Therefore, it is submitted that the aforesaid decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

4.2. It is further submitted by Shri Dalal, learned advocate for the respondent­original complainant that as such the aforesaid controversy raised in the present revision application is squarely covered in the recent decision of this Court in the case of Patel Paresh Atmaram vs. State of Gujarat and Anr reported in 2012 (2) GLH 21 in which, it is held by this Court that cause of action to file the complaint and / or period of limitation to file the complaint would start from the date on which the statutory notice is issued and actually served upon the accused.

Therefore, it is submitted that as such no illegality has been committed by the learned revisional Court in holding that the complaint is within the period of limitation and consequently has rightly passed an order directing the learned Magistrate to register the complaint. By making above submissions and relying upon the decision, it is requested to the dismiss the present Criminal Revision Application.

5.0 Shri Dabhi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has supported the original complainant and has submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned revisional Court and therefore, it is requested to dismiss the present revision application.

6.0 Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. The short question which is posed for consideration of this Court is whether the complaint which has been filed by the respondent no.1 herein­original complainant against the petitioner for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is within the period of limitation as provided under the N.I. Act or not ?

7.0 As stated above, the cheque was issued by the original accused drawn in favour of the complainant on 30.9.2002.The same came to be presented with his banker on 21.11.2002, which came to be returned by the concerned Bank on 26.11.2002 and the intimation from the bank with respect to return of the cheque was received by the complainant on 14.12.2002. That within period of 15 days of such intimation, the complainant issued statutory notice as required under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act. However, admittedly the said notice was not served upon accused. Therefore, again complainant issued notice on 22.1.2003 at the same address which was admittedly not served. Therefore, the complainant served another notice on 15.3.2003 at the new address which came to be served and after service of statutory notice after waiting for 15 days as provided under Section 138 of the N.I. Act r/w Section 141 of the N.I. Act, within a period of 30 days thereafter the complainant has filed complaint before the concerned Court on 4.4.2003. Therefore, as such from the date of service of statutory notice issued under Section 138 (b) of the Act on 15.3.2003, the complaint has been filed on 4.4.2003 which is within the prescribed period of limitation as provided under the N.I. Act.

8.0 However, relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.C.Alavi Haji (supra) it is sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioner accused that when the notice has been issued the same is presumed to have been served upon the addressee and therefore, the limitation to file the complaint would start from 23.12.2002 i.e. the day on which the first notice was issued and not the last notice i.e. 15.3.2003. It is also the case on behalf of the applicant accused that cause of action to file the complaint for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act arises once and therefore, if once the limitation to file the complaint from the issuance of first notice has expired and the cause of action has gone thereafter there cannot be any second cause of action by issuance of notice again and again. Therefore, the case on behalf of the petitioner is that the learned trial Court had rightly dismissed the complaint by observing that the complaint is beyond the period of limitation as provided under the N.I. Act. It is an admitted position that first notice issued by the complainant on 23.12.2002 and 22.1.2003 were admittedly not served upon the accused. Therefore, after getting fresh new address notice was again issued on 15.3.2003 which has been served and within the period of 45 days from 15.3.2003, the complaint has been filed. Therefore, when admittedly the notice dated 23.12.2002 and 22.1.2003 were not served upon the accused there is no question of raising any presumption of service of notice upon the addressee. A presumption is required to be raised in case where there is no proof whether the notice has been served or not. Under the circumstances, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.C.Alavi Haji (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there was a dispute whether notice which was issued at the correct address has been served or not and to that considering Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and considering the provision of Evidence Act the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when notice has been issued at the correct address of the addressee it is presumed to have been served, however such presumption is rebutable. In the said decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that even in a case where the receipt of the notice has been disputed by the accused, in that case also, the summons received by him from the learned Magistrate can be treated as notice and within the period of 15 days he can make the payment to show his bonafide and they can approach the learned Magistrate. In any case, in the present case as stated above, it is not disputed that first notices were admittedly not served upon the accused, therefore, as stated above, there is no question of raising any presumption. The aforesaid has no substance at all.

9. Now, so far as reliance placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tameeshwar Vaishnav (supra) as well as in the case of Shadanandan Bhadran (supra) are concerned, there cannot be any dispute that the cause of action to file the complaint arises once. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case when earlier two notices were admittedly not served upon the accused can it be said that the cause of action had arisen in favour of the complainant to file complaint ? As such identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of Patel Paresh Atmaram (supra) and in the said decision this Court has also considered the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shadanandan Bhadran (supra) as well as other decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the point as well as considered the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Construction vs. Alapati Srinavsa Rao reported in (2009) 1 SCC 500 and it is specifically held by this Court that unless and until the statutory notice which has been issued as per clause b of the proviso of Section 138 of the N.I. Act has been served upon the accused /drawer, no cause of action has arisen in favour of complainant to file the complaint. In para 6.1 of the aforesaid decision, this Court has observed and held as under:

In the present case, as stated herein above, when the cheque was deposited by the petitioner with their banker which came to be dishonoured on 10.08.2006, the petitioner – complainant issued statutory notice as required under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 on 25.08.2006. However, admittedly, the said notice came to be returned with an endorsement “not known”. Therefore, when admittedly the said statutory notice was not served upon the accused, it cannot be said that cause of action to file the complaint had arisen in favour of the complainant. A cause of action to file the complaint for offence under Section 138 of the NI Act arises only when the following conditions are satisfied.

(i) that the cheque must be presented with a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn;

(ii) on the cheque being returned unpaid by the banker, a notice has been issued within 30 days from the date of receipt of the information by him from the bank regarding the cheque being unpaid;

(iii) and in the event, the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the said amount money to be paid within 15 days from the receipt thereof and a complaint has been filed within the period prescribed in terms of section 142 thereof.

Therefore, unless and until the statutory notice which has been issued as per clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act has been served upon the accused/drawer and the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice, there is no cause of action arisen in favour of the complainant to file the complaint. Therefore, when no cause of action had arisen in favour of the complainant to file the complaint and the cheque is redeposited and when again the said cheque is returned unpaid and again a statutory notice has been issued as required under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act and the said notice has been served and the drawer fails to make the payment within the prescribed period mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act, the period of limitation to file the complaint as provided under Section 142 of the NI Act would commence considering the second notice. In such a case, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadra (Supra) would not be applicable. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadra (Supra) would be applicable only in a case where the cause of action had arisen in favour of the complainant to file the complaint after having satisfied all the conditions which are provided under Section 138 of the NI Act and the complainant fails to file the complaint, he cannot have a second cause of action on redeposit of the cheque again. Therefore, in the case of Sadanandan Bhadra (Supra) before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was a case of second cause of action. Therefore, the said decision and/or any other subsequent decisions taking the similar view would not be applicable in a case like the present one where due to non­service of the notice upon the accused for dishonour of the cheque deposited for the first time, no cause of action has arisen in favour of the complainant to file the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. Therefore, considering the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.L. Construction and Another (Supra), it can be said that till the cause of action arises in favour of the complainant to file the complaint for offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, the complainant can redeposit the cheque during its validity period and period of limitation to file the complaint as provided under Section 142 of the NI Act would commence from the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act i.e. on receipt of the statutory notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138, the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment within 15 days thereafter.

10. Considering the aforesaid decision of this Court, it cannot be said that in the present case the cause of action in favour of the complainant to file the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act had arisen on issuance of notice dated 23.12.2002 and 22.1.2003. Considering the aforesaid decision of this Court as well as even considering the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the statutory notice dated 15.3.2003 came to be served for the first time and therefore, the cause of action for the complainant to file the complaint can be said to have been arisen after 15 days from the service of the said notice and within 30 days thereafter the complainant was required to file complaint, which complainant has filed on 4.4.2003. Under the circumstances, the learned Magistrate had committed an error and / or illegality in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the same is beyond the period of limitation and the same is rightly interfered with by the Revisional Court and the Revisional Court has rightly set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and has rightly directed the learned Magistrate to register the complaint against the applicant­ original accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and to proceed further with the same in accordance with law and on merits. Under the circumstances, no illegality has been committed by the learned Revisional Court in passing the impugned order which call for the interference of this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

14. In view of above and for the reasons stated above, present revision application fails and same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. Ad­interim relief granted earlier stands vacated forthwith.

kaushik sd/­ (M.R.SHAH,J.)