Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties. Heard Sri C.K.Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Rakesh Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.
Sri C.K.Parekh, learned counsel for the petitioners states that the Civil Judge, Varanasi had appointed a Court Receiver in Execution Case No. 39 of 1956 (Rai Batuk Prasad Gupta Vs. Govind Prasad). According to him, earlier the properties of the judgement debtor were attached in the execution proceedings, whereafter the proceedings continued before the Court and the property remained in the custody of the Receiver. In Execution Case No. 39 of 1956 there were 32 decree holders. The Executing Court had by the order dated 30.08.1980 approved the sale and had recorded that the decree could be satisfied when the amounts to which the decree holders were entitled were paid to them by the purchasers (petitioners) and by the orders dated 26.04.1983 and 28.04.1983, the property was directed to be transferred in favour of the purchasers (petitioners). The aforesaid circumstances regarding execution of the sale deed by the Receiver in favour of the petitioner and payment of the debts to the decree holders was recorded in the sale deed. The sale consideration deposited by the petitioners was distributed amongst the decree holders and towards income tax by the Executing Court and therefore, the stamp duty paid on the said deposited amount is in accordance with law and the value of the property would be the sale consideration paid by the petitioners for satisfaction of the decree to be paid to the decree holders. As such the stamp duty is chargeable only on the said sale consideration and hence it does not come within the scope of Section 47-A of the Stamp Act. He states that such circumstance has been dealt with in Section 24 of the Stamp Act.
Learned counsel states that the Deputy Stamp Commissioner, Varanasi by his order dated 9.4.1997 directed that the stamp duty should be paid on the value of Rs. 7,50,000/- since that was the value of the property when an earlier transaction had been made.
According to learned counsel the deficient stamp duty adjudged by the Deputy Stamp Commissioner, Varanasi in Case No. 386 of 1992-93 by his order dated 9.4.1997 was paid by the petitioner prior to filing the Revision No. 41 of 1997 (Lal Ji Agrawal and another Vs. State of U.P. and others) under Section 56 (1) of the Indian Stamp Act before the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi.
The Commissioner Varanasi Division, Varanasi has passed the impugned order dated 2.11.1998 where in he has set aside the order dated 9.4.1997 passed by the Deputy Stamp Commissioner and has remitted the matter for reassessment of the value of the property on the date of execution of sale deed on the basis of minimum circle rate.
According to Sri C.K.Parikh, learned counsel for the petitioners, transfer of immovable property in execution of a decree by the order of the Court is governed by Section 2 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act which cannot be considered as conveyance as defined under Section 2 (10) of the Stamp Act as such the provision of Section 47 -A of the Stamp Act will not apply to such a sale deed. He further submits that the value of the property would be the amount approved by the Executing Court which has been recorded in the order dated 30.8.1980 passed therein and hence even if the sale deed was executed by the Receiver on 2.7.1992 in pursuance of the direction of the Executing Court the excess stamp duty demanded was illegal since it was based on the market value whereas the provision of Article 23 Schedule 1 read with Section 2 (10) and Section 47-A of the Stamp Act were not applicable to a Court sale. He has further submitted that after the Executing Courts' order dated 28.04.1983 the sale deed was actually executed on 2.7.1992 due to proceedings of revision pending before the High Court hence the delay in executing the sale deed from 28.4.1983 to 2.7.1992 cannot be attributed to the petitioners. He submits that the impugned order requires to be set aside for the aforesaid reasons.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the Case of Hiralal Patni Vs. Loonkaram Sethiya and others reported in AIR 1962 SC 21 and refers to paragraph 23 therein for the proposition that if Receiver is appointed in a suit until judgement then the appointment is brought to an end by the judgement or if a Receiver is appointed in a suit without his tenure being expressly defined, he will continue to be Receiver till he is discharged and after the final disposal of the suit the Receiver's functions are usually terminated but he will still be answerable to the Court as its officer till he is finally discharged because the court has power to continue the Receiver even after the final decree, if so required.
Sri C.K.Parikh has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Devi Vs. Mukund Kanwar and others reported in AIR 1965 SC 834 and submits that the provisions of Section 2 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act must prevail over the definition of transfer of property prescribed by Section 5 thereunder and hence it must be deemed to include auction sales.
Learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Ollala Amblah Vs. Avadhanula Mallanna reported in AIR 1964 AP 514 and submits that a sale by order of Court is also a transfer but it is a transfer by operation of law hence the scope of the word 'transfer' in Section 47-A of the Stamp Act would be limited to a transfer by the act of the parties and therefore when it is a transfer by operation of law it would be in reference to Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act.
Learned counsel has relied on a decision in the case of Prem Nath Vs. Mt. Sandra Wati reported in AIR 1960 Punjab 630 to state that when there is an order of the Civil Court in execution it would not be a transfer hit by provision of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Learned counsel had then relied upon a decision in the case of Padam Chand & others Vs. Ram Lal & another reported in AIR 1953 Himachal Pradesh 11 to state that Article 23 of Schedule 1 of the Stamp Act relates to a conveyance which under Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act relates to a transfer inter-vivos and therefore it does not relate to a sale in execution of a decree.
Learned counsel has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. M/s. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate reported in AIR 1966 SC 1295 and submits that it is a settled rule that the Court cannot make good any deficiencies in a fiscal statute but it can only interpret the statute in a manner favourable to the tax payer.
He has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh Vs. Rai Saheb Sidhnath Mehrotra reported in AIR 1965 SC 1092 and states that the Stamp Act is a taxing statute and must be construed strictly and if two meanings are possible the meaning in favour of subject must be given effect to.
Learned counsel has referred to a decision of a full bench of this Court in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps, Allahabad Vs. Murlidhar Kanodia, Kanpur reported in AIR 1970 Allahabad 599 to interpret Section 24 of the Stamp Act. He has relied upon another full bench decision of this Court in the case of Nar Singh Das & Brothers Vs. The State of U.P. Reported in AIR 1975 Allahabad 332 and submits that once Section 24 of the Stamp Act applies then the consideration would be the value of the debt which stands discharged or paid no matter whatever may be the market value of the property.
Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. Reported in AIR 1986 SC 403 wherein the decision of this Court in Board of Revenue, U.P. Vs. Rai Saheb Sidhnath Mehrotra (supra) was affirmed.
Sri Rakesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents has placed reliance on a decision of a full bench in the case of Ram Chandra Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & others reported in 2006(8) ADJ 1 and submits that two questions were framed by the full Bench, the first as to whether the Stamp Duty is chargeable according to the amount mentioned in the Civil Court decree or on the basis of market value of the property conveyed by instrument of conveyance. It was answered that the stamp duty is chargeable on the basis of market value of the property conveyed by the instrument and the fact that the instrument was executed by the civil court is of no relevance for invoking the power under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act. The second question was whether the Stamp duty is to be charged on the basis of market value of the property then what should be the date on which market value is to be determined. He states that the full bench answered by holding that the relevant date for determining the market value of the property being subject matter of the sale deed would be when the Court executed the sale deed on behalf of the owner of the property.
Learned Standing Counsel has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Khandaka Jain Jewellers reported in 2007 (14) SCC 339 and submits that the word execution read with Section 17 of the Stamp Act mandates that the instrument has to be seen at the time when it was sought to be registered and duration of litigation in obtaining a decree of specific performance of contract is not relevant.
Having considered the submission of learned counsels for the parties the relevant statutory provisions need to be noticed.
Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act , 1882 reads as under:-
"2. Repeal of Acts.-Saving of certain enactments, incidents, rights, liabilities, etc.-In the territories to which this Act extends for the time being the enactments specified in the Schedule hereto annexed shall be repealed to the extent therein mentioned. But nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect-
a) the provisions of any enactment not hereby expressly repealed;
b) any terms or incidents of any contract or constitution of property which are consistent with the provisions of this Act, and are allowed by the law for the time being in force;
c) any right or liability arising out of a legal relation constituted before this Act comes into force, or any relief in respect of any such right or liability; or
d) save as provided by Section 57 and Chapter IV of this Act, any transfer by operation of law, or in execution of a decree or order of a Court of Competent jurisdiction;"
Sub Section (d) is relevant for the purpose of the dispute raised in this writ petition. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act shall not affect any transfer by operation of law or in execution of a decree or order of a Court of competent jurisdiction. In the present case it is not disputed that the transfer was made by order of a competent court in execution of a decree. The exception of Section 57 and Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act has no application in this case since Section 57 provides for discharge of encumbrances made by order of Court and Chapter IV deals with transfer and extinction of a mortgagor's interest by a decree of court.
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines 'Sale' as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. In the ordinary sense price would mean money which is sufficient and adequate consideration for the sale.
'Transfer of property' has been defined in Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act as quoted hereunder:-
"5. Transfer of property defined.-In the following sections "transfer of property" means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and "to transfer property" is to perform such act.
[In this section "living person" includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.]"
It is an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future to one or more other living person and the performance of such an act is to transfer property inter vivos.
The Indian Stamp Act is an enactment for raising revenue to the State from transactions of its citizens. It is a fiscal enactment on the basis of which stamp duties are levied on transactions in the shape of stamps on instruments leviable with stamp duties and for prevention of evasion of the revenue so imposed.
Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act defines a conveyance on sale and includes every instrument whereby any property upon the sale is transferred to or vested in a purchaser.
Section 47- A was added to the Stamp Act in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh by UP Act No. 11 of 1969 which dealt with instruments of conveyance if under valued as it existed prior to the 1998 amendment. It reads as quoted hereunder:-
"47-A. Instruments of conveyance etc. if under-valued how to be dealt with. -(1) If the market-value of any property which is the subject of an instrument on which duty is chargeable on the market-value of the property] as set forth in such instrument [is less than even the minimum value determined in accordance with any rules made under this Act], the registering officer appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, shall refer the same to the Collector for determination of the market-value of such property and the proper duty payable thereon.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), if such registering officer while registering any instrument, on which duty is chargeable on the market-value of the property has reason to believe that the market-value of the property which is the subject of such instruments] has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may, after registering such instrument refer the same to the Collector for determination of the market-value of such property and the proper duty payable thereon.
(3) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) the Collector shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding an inquiry in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act determine the market-value of the property which is the subject of the instrument and the duty as aforesaid. The difference, if any, in the amount of duty shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty.
(4) The Collector may, suo motu, [or on a reference from any court or from the Commissioner of Stamps, or an Additional Commissioner of Stamps, or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps, or an Assistant Commissioner of Stamps, or any officer authorized by the Board of Revenue in that behalf within four years] from the date of registration of any instrument, [on which duty is chargeable on the market-value of the property] not already referred to him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market-value of the property which is the subject of [such instrument] and the duty payable thereon, and if after such examination he has reason to believe that the market-value of such property has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may determine the market-value of such property and the duty payable thereon in accordance with the procedure provided for in sub-section (3). The difference, if any, in the amount of duty shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty."
This section deals with the market value of a property which is subject of an instrument on which duty is chargeable on market value. Under the Uttar Pradesh Stamp Rules 1942 a minimum value is determined by the Collector and if the market value set forth in the instrument is less than the market value so determined the registering officer refers it to the Collector for determination of market value of such property and the proper duty payable thereon.
Section 24 of the Stamp Act deals with cases of transfer in consideration of debt and how it is to be charged with duty. It reads as quoted hereunder:-
"24. How transfer in consideration of debt, or subject to future payment, etc., to be charged.-Whether any property is transferred to any person in consideration, wholly or in part, of any debt due to him, or subject either certainly or contingently to the payment or transfer of any money or stock whether being or constituting a charge or incumbrance upon the property or not, such debt, money or stock is to be deemed the whole or part, as the case may be, of the consideration in respect whereof the transfer is chargeable with ad valorem duty :
Provided that nothing in the section shall apply to any such certificate of sale as is mentioned in Article No.18 of Schedule I.
Explanation.-In the case of a sale of property subject to a mortgage or other incumbrance, any unpaid mortgage money or money charged, together with the interest (if any) due on the same, shall be deemed to be part of the consideration for the sale :
Provided that, where property subject to a mortgage is transferred to the mortgagee, he shall be entitled to deduct from the duty payable on the transfer the amount of any duty already paid in respect of the mortgage."
In the State of Uttar Pradesh Schedule 1 has to be read as schedule 1-B.
For purpose of this case Section 24 of the Stamp Act would be read as where the property is transferred in consideration of any debt hence such debt is deemed to be the consideration in respect where of the transfer is chargeable with ad valorem duty. Article 18 of Schedule 1B of the Stamp Act deals with an instrument relating to a certificate of sale granted to a purchaser of property sold by public auction by a court and the proper stamp duty would be the same duty as a conveyance (Article 23 Schedule 1 in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh) for a consideration equal to the amount of the purchase money only.
The substance of the above referred provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Stamp Act is that;
a) the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act do not affect any transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of a decree or order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
b) 'transfer of property' as defined in the Transfer of Property Act is an act inter vivos.
c) under the Stamp Act a conveyance is a transfer inter vivos.
d) a transfer when made in consideration of debt then such debt is to be deemed as the consideration whereof the transfer is chargeable with ad valorem duty.
(e) in a property sold by public auction by a court in consideration of any debt the consideration would be the purchase money only and that is the consideration which would be chargeable to stamp duty.
In view of the above position of law the impugned order dated 02.11.1998 has to be seen.
Sri C.K. Parekh learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the property in question is situate in Mauja Habibpur, Pargana Dehat Amanat, District Varanasi. It is described as Araji No. 42 area 61 decimal and Araji No. 43 area 65 decimal. There is a House no. C/32/2 constructed thereon. It was purchased by the petitioners for a sale consideration of Rs. 5,34,975/- in a auction by the court in Execution Case no. 39 of 1956 (Rai Batuk Prasad Vs Govind Prasad).
The Deputy Commissioner of Stamp has not accepted the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deed dated 02.07.1992 executed by the Receiver of the Court. He has enhanced the value of the property to Rs. 7,50,000/- from Rs. 5,34,975/- on the ground that an earlier transaction was for the enhanced amount. The Revisional Court has not accepted the value of the property at Rs. 7,50,000/- and has remitted the matter back for valuing the property in accordance with the circle rate existing on the date of sale deed dated 02.07.1992 and for realising the deficient stamp duty thereupon.
The view taken by the Deputy Commissioner of Stamp and the reasoning given by the Revisional Court are clearly not in accordance with law.
In the case of Laxmi Devi Vs Mukund Kanwar and others (supra) the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 and 16 had held as quoted here under:-
"15. This position, however, has become somewhat complicated by reason of the provisions contained in S.5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 5 provides, inter alia, that in the following sections "transfer of property" means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons. In other words, in terms, the definition of the expression "transfer of property" as used in all the sections of the Transfer of Property Act is intended to take in transfers effected by acts of parties inter vivos, and an auction-sale clearly is not such an act. Section 5 would, therefore, appear to exclude auction sales from the purview of S.100 altogether. This result would appear to be consistent with the provision in the preamble of the Act which says that the Transfer of Property Act was enacted because it was though expedient to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to the transfer of property by act of parties. That is the position which emerges from the reading of S.5 coupled with the preamble; and that naturally raises the question as to how to reconcile these two inconsistent positions.
16. In our opinion, the positive provision contained in S.2 (d) must prevail over the definition of 'transfer of property" prescribed by S.5. No doubt, the purpose of the definition is to indicate the class of transfers to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are intended to be applied; but a definition of this kind cannot over-ride the clear and positive direction contained in the specific words used by S.2 (d). As we have already seen, the result of the saving clause enacted by S.2 (d) is to emphasise the fact that the provisions of S.57 and those contained in Chapter IV must apply to transfer by operation of law. Such a positive provision cannot be made to yield to what may appear to be the effect of the definition prescribed by S.5; and so, we are inclined to hold that notwithstanding the definition prescribed by S.5, the latter part of S.100 must be deemed to include auction sales."
Clearly the provision of Section 2 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act will prevail over the definition of 'transfer of property' given in Section 5 of the Act.
In the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Chief Inspector of Stamps Allahabad Vs Murlidhar Kanodia (supra) it was held that Section 24 of the Stamp Act did not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case since the executants had not transferred the property to the Bank for payment of its debts.
In the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Nar Singh Das and brothers Vs State of U.P. (supra) it was held in paragraph 7 as quoted here under:-
"7. Learned counsel referred to Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act in support of his submission that it is always open to a creditor to relinquish any part of the debt and this having been done by the vendee, as a creditor, the only liability which remained on the vendor was of Rs. 15,5000 and that is all what the recital in the sale-deed evidenced. The further submission was that the consideration for the sale was only Rs. 15,500 and the Board of Revenue was in error in taking the view that the consideration for the sale was of Rs. 61,600. In this connection learned counsel drew our attention to the case of Himalaya House Co. Ltd. Vs. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority MANU/SC/ 0504/1972) wherein it was held that the Revenue Authorities are not permitted by law to go behind the valuation of the property mentioned in the document for purpose of determining the stamp duty payable. We do not think that here any such question arises. Once Section 24 of the Act applies then the consideration would be the value of the debt which stands discharged or paid up, no matter whatever may be the market value of the property mentioned in the sale deed itself. The revenue authority have not gone behind the market value of the house but they have applied the provisions of Section 24 of the Stamp Act."
Therefore the law is that once Section 24 of the Stamp Act applies then the consideration would be the value of the debt which stands discharged or paid up, irrespective of the market value of the property mentioned in the sale deed.
The Supreme Court in the case of Somaniya Organics (India) Ltd. Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) laid down the law in very clear terms. Paragraph 16 of the judgement is reproduced below:-
"16. The object of section 24 of the Act is very clear. That section means that when a purchaser purchases a property for a certain amount subject to the payment of another debt, actual or contingent, he is virtually purchasing the property for the said amount plus the amount of the debt and the aggregate of the two amounts ought to be treated as the true amount for which the property is being sold. Otherwise there is bound to be a difference between the true consideration and the consideration which is made liable to stamp duty. To illustrate, take the present case itself. The properties which had been treated as sufficient security by the Bank for the liability of Rs.65,00,000 must be ordinarily much more valuable than Rs.65,00,000 but on the date of conveyance stamp duty would have become payable only on Rs.7,76,000 but for the above rule in section 24 of the Act. In this case the amount of Rs.7,76,000 must have been fixed by the parties taking into consideration the liability to the Bank under the mortgage which might arise in future. The two decisions on which reliance was placed by the appellants are of no assistance to them. The first one was Sidhnath Mehrotra v. Board of Revenue, A.I.R. 1959 All 655. In that case the High Court of Allahabad held that where an immoveable property which was encumbered by a charge or mortgage was sold but not subject to the incumbrance, then the amount of money constituting the charge or mortgage need not be added to the consideration mentioned in the conveyance as the value of the property sold. The next 804 decision is the decision of this Court which was rendered on appeal against the above decision of the Allahabad High Court. The said decision is Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh v. RajSabah Sidhnath Mehrotra, [1965] 2 S.C.R. 269. This Court affirmed the decision of the Allahabad High Court and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. In the transaction involved in these two decisions the sale was free from all incumbrances or any mortgage. In such case even if there was some mortgage money which had remained unpaid the Explanation to section 24 of the Act could not be relied on by the Revenue to insist upon payment of stamp duty on such unpaid mortgage money. But the facts of the case before us are different. Here the sale was in fact subject to the equitable mortgage in favour of the Bank. Hence these decisions are of no avail to the appellants.-"
In the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. And others (Supra) cited by Sri Rakesh Kumar, learned counsel for the State respondents a question was answered and it was held that Stamp duty is chargeable on the market value of the property conveyed by the instrument and the fact that it was an instrument executed by the civil court will have no relevance for invoking the power under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act. This decision will not apply to this case because that was a case for specific performance and because the value fixed and agreed upon in 1960 was much less than the minimum market value determined in accordance with the Uttar Pradesh Stamp Rules, 1942 on that date hence the decree of specific performance was not relevant for determination of market value for the purpose of charge of stamp duty.
In State of Rajasthan Vs. Khankaka Jain Jewellers (supra) the Supreme Court considered a case of specific performance and held that if at the time of registration the registering authority found that there is under valuation of the property in the agreement to sell it could send the same to the Collector for proper valuation of the property. Clearly this decision does not apply where the Court executes the sale deed for satisfaction of a debt in favour of the decree holder.
In light of the law laid down in the above referred decisions the value of the property in the present case for the purpose of stamp duty was the consideration paid by the petitioners before the Executing Court to satisfy the decree by paying up the debts of the judgement debtor which were decreed. The sale deed was admittedly executed by the Receiver appointed by the Executing Court. Therefore, the date of executing the sale deed i.e. 02.07.1992 would not be relevant for fixing the value of the property sold in execution of a decree by the Court. The stamp duty could be charged only on the amount mentioned in the sale deed which was the amount of debt discharged by the petitioners in pursuance of the decree. The sale deed was clearly covered under Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act and it was not a conveyance within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act so as to attract the provisions of Section 47-A of the Stamp Act. It was not a transaction inter-vivos hence 'transfer of property' as defined under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act would not apply to a case of transfer in consideration of debt falling within the ambit of Section 24 of the Stamp Act.
The Taxing Officer exercising jurisdiction under the Stamp Act cannot confine his decision only to enhance stamp duty for the purpose of benefiting the State with additional revenue even though such enhancement of stamp duty is against the law and the statute. In the garb of preventing evasion of stamp duty he cannot impose liability on a citizen who is a party to a transaction of immoveable property with a duty which the citizen is not liable to pay. The Taxing Officer cannot in exercise of his powers provide the State with duty which is not realisable and by doing so it is a case of unjust enrichment by the State through its Taxing Officer. No administrative direction given by the State, if any, can confer jurisdiction on a Taxing Officer to perform in a straight jacket manner and ignore the law and the statute. More particularly the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the issue which is covered and involved in this writ petition.
For the aforesaid reasons the impugned order dated 02.11.1998 passed in Revision No.41 of 1997 (Lalji Agarwal Vs. State of U.P.) by the Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi is liable to be set aside since the Revisional Court has remitted the matter for reassessment of value of the property on the date of execution of the sale deed dated 02.07.1992 on the basis of the minimum circle rate fixed by the Collector under the Stamp Rules, 1942.
It is further held that the stamp duty was chargeable on the consideration mentioned in the sale deed executed by the Court i.e. on Rs.5,34,975/- and any stamp duty got deposited on value more than the consideration is illegal.
Thus the impugned order dated 02.11.1998 is set aside. The excess stamp duty if any deposited by the petitioners as a condition for maintaining their revision is liable to be refunded @ 6% simple interest per annum within six months. Such refund is so ordered and failure to do so within six months shall invite an interest of 8% per annum till the amount is actually paid to the petitioners.
The petitioners will also be entitled to costs of these proceedings which is assessed at Rs. 10,000/- to be paid within six months by the State respondents which will also carry an interest of 8% per annum after six months if not paid.
The writ petition is allowed with costs.
Dated:24.09.2012 Lbm/-