JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. The application for substitution is allowed. The applicants may be substituted as petitioners. The matter is very old after the substitution is allowed the matter is taken up for hearing. By an order dated 10.9.1984, the prescribed authority had dismissed the application for eviction of the predecessor in interest of the petitioner from the public premises on account of unauthorised occupation. The case made out by the State in the said application was that the petitioner was the District Inspector of Schools and was accommodated in the premises which was taken on lease by the State from the owner. The said eviction was rejected on the ground that the premises having taken on lease by the State does not fall within the definition of public premises. The appeal court on an appeal being Misc. Appeal No. 265 of 1984 had held that the prescribed authority had failed to appreciate the definition of public premises and did not consider the materials and evidence on record and, therefore, the appeal court had remanded the matter. Sri Sushil Harkauli, learned counsel seeks to press an application for addition of parties respondents on the ground that they are the owners of the property. In my view, the said application is misconceived. If he has any remedy he may pursue the same in other forum.
Therefore, I am not inclined to allow the said application, for the reasons following.
2. U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 22 of 1972), hereinafter referred to as the said Act, was promulgated with the subject "to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises". Public premises are those as defined in Section 2 (e). Unauthorised occupants are those as mentioned in Section 2 (g). For the purpose of eviction of unauthorised occupant from public premises, a machinery has been provided in the said Act by means of appointment of prescribed authority under Section 3 of the said Act. A procedure for eviction is guided or governed by Section 4 of the said Act. Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 4 as are relevant for our present purpose provides that:
"(1) If the prescribed authority, either of its own motion or on application or report received on behalf of the State Government of the corporate authority, is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the prescribed authority shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made."
3. Thus, the procedure contemplated under Section 4 relates (i) a public premises, (ii) for eviction of unauthorised occupants, (iii) by the prescribed authority either, (iv) on its own motion or, (v) on application or report on behalf of State Government or a corporate authority, (vi) if it is of opinion that such person is in unauthorised occupation, (vii) after issuing notice to show cause to all persons liable to be evicted. Where these tests are satisfied, the order of eviction of unauthorised occupant of a public premises is passed under Section 5 after the prescribed authority, upon cause being shown by such person, is satisfied that the person is in anauthorised occupation of the public premises.
4. Thus the parties concerned in such a proceedings are the unauthorised occupant of the public premises of the State Government or the corporate authority. No person other than those as contemplated in Sections 4 and 5 are necessary or proper parties. It is an established principles of law that only those who are proper or necessary parties they can be parties to a lis.
5. Mr. Harkauli's client claims to be the landlord of the State Government who had taken the premises on lease from the former. In a proceedings under this Act, there is no lis between the landlord and the Government. The landlord has been given no right under this Act, where the public premises is taken on lease by the Government, either to evict the unauthorised occupant or the State Government. In other words, the landlord cannot seek recovery of possession of the premises given on lease to the Government or any person occupying upon it.
6. Neither in the rules enacted under Section 18 being U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1973 any provision has been prescribed by which a landlord as referred to above could be deemed to be a proper or necessary party. The proceeding does not concern the landlord in any manner. The landlord might have right to recover possession either from the State Government or any one coming to occupy under it through any other procedure provided by law but such right has nothing to do with a proceedings under this Act.
7. I have perused the appellate order and the pleadings. In paras 2 and 3 of the writ petition it has been pleaded by the petitioner himself that the said property belongs to one Shanti Devi Chaturvedi which developed upon one Roop Kishore Chaturvedi on the death of the original owner. Mr. Harkauli's client is the heir of Roop Kishore Chaturvedi. In para 3, it has been alleged that the said property was taken on rent by the State Government for housing of the office of the District Inspector of Schools, Agra, and for his residence. Therefore, on the face of the pleadings made by the petitioner, it appears that the house was taken on lease by the Government for housing the office of the District Inspector of Schools as well as for his residence. The definition of public premises as has been quoted by the appellate authority himself is a building "belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government, including the Government of any other State, and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public section corporation". On the very face of the pleadings made in the writ petition, the said premises satisfy this test of public premises as defined to be a public premises. The lower appellate court had also come to the said finding after relying on various decisions. The reasoning given in support of such finding appears to be absolutely correct. There cannot be any second opinion to the said legal proposition.
8. Public premises has been defined in Section 2 (e) as far our present purpose is concerned to mean "any premises belonging to or taken on lease .....by or on behalf of the State Government.....". In the present case having regard to the pleadings made out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the writ petition, the premises in dispute surely satisfies the definition. Admittedly (1) the premises was taken on lease by the Government and as such it is a public premises ; (2) the office and residence of the District Inspector of Schools, Agra was housed in the said premises by the State Government ; (3) the petitioner as District Inspector of Schools, Agra (D.I.O.S., Agra) was allotted the residence by virtue of his office, by the State Government; (4) he was thereafter transferred to some other place and was asked by the State Government to vacate on account of the fact that he having ceased to be the D.I.O.S., Agra could not be housed In the residence meant for D.I.O.S., Agra ; (5) then his occupation ceased to be authorised on account whereof the State Government sought for his eviction.
9. By virtue of his occupation as aforesaid, the petitioner cannot claim any relationship with the owner either during the period he was in occupation authorised by the State Government or after the authorisation ceased. The landlord owner can never come to the picture in such a proceedings. If the petitioner claims any relationship with the owner independent of the State Government governed under the Rent Control Act, the same can never be subject-matter of consideration within the relationship between the State Government and the petitioner. If such a situation is accepted, it would open up unholy mischievous State of collusion between owner and the occupier to dispossess or oust the State Government from the premises taken on lease by it, simply through manipulation and machination directly against the principle and statutes governing the relationship of lessor and lessee as the case may be.
10. The appellate court has also gone through the materials on record and has discussed the defence of the petitioner. As is apparent from the order, the plea of tenancy claimed by the petitioner was that he had applied for allotment under Section 14 of U. P. Rent Control Act. But the said application for allotment was rejected which was filed as paper No. 113C in the said proceedings. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any Independent right other than the right which the State Government had. He also claims that he had paid the rent for the premises. But the fact that only 10 per cent of the house rent was deducted from him while 40 per cent was paid by the Government. Therefore, this 10 per cent deduction from salary on account of house rent cannot be said to be a payment of rent to the owners of the premises which the petitioner sought to claim that he had become a tenant on his Independent right under the owners, namely, the client of Sri Harkauli. Then again the said question cannot be decided in the present proceeding in which the client of Mr. Harkauli is not party. This proceeding is not a proper forum for such decision. The prescribed authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the same inasmuch as the same is a question to be decided under the provisions of U. P. Rent Control Act, with which the prescribed authority has no manner of concern. He is only an authority authorised under Section 3 of the said U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act which confers power only to the extent provided in the said Act. The appellate court had come to a finding that the petitioner had sought to mislead and confuse the issues. He had also discussed the petitioner's defence and come to a finding that a mere payment of rent does not make the petitioner tenant to the exclusion of the Government who is in possession. The possession of the petitioner was a possession of the Government, he cannot claim any independent right other than that through the Government.
11. The above discussion clearly show that the material available on record is sufficient to decide the case. The prescribed authority had decided all the issues involved. In such a case, the appeal court was not justified in remanding the case. Inasmuch as if it does not agree with the decision it ought to have come to proper findings of its own. In such case, it would be shirking of duty and entirely wrong to send the case on remand. Vide Promatha u. Nagendra, 33 CWN 1211 ; Kallu v. Narayan, AIR 1927 Bom 111 ; Choudhary v. Mithu, AIR 1927 Pat 296 : Ratilal v. Gangabai, AIR 1962 Guj 61. If no useful purpose is served by a remand and the issue can be decided on the facts available, the empty formality must be eschewed to advance the cause of justice. Vide Suresh Chandra v. Ramachandra Arora, AIR 1988 MP 247. Here in the case the facts are admitted. The question is as on these admitted facts the premises is a public premises or not. Thus, the question is a pure question of law. There can be no remand to decide a pure question of law. See Raj Lakshmi v. Banamali, AIR 1950 Cal 510.
12. Then again Rule 24, Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure provides that where the evidence on the record is sufficient to enable the appeal court to pronounce judgment, it may after resettling the Issues, if necessary, finally determine the suit, notwithstanding that the Judgment of the Court from where decree the appeal is preferred has proceeded wholly upon some wrong ground other than that on which the appellate court proceed. The Code of Civil Procedure as such is not applicable to a proceedings under U. P. Act No. 22 of 1972. Rule 10 of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1973 provides that the "prescribed authority or the appellate authority shall have the same power as are vested in the civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure .....in respect of.....(d) the power referred to in Section 151 of the Code .... to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of the authority concerned.....". Therefore, the principle underlying the appeal courts power as envisaged in Rule 24, Order XLI, Code of Civil Procedure can also be exercised by the appeal court under the 1972 Act through the power vested under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure in it.
13. I have examined the records and perused the orders and have found that the finding of the appellate authority is correct and legal. Read with the case made out in the writ petition particularly in paras 2 and 3, there cannot be any second opinion which is a question admitted by the petitioner himself that he was in occupation under the Government and, accordingly, he was occupying the public premises and he having been transferred had directed to vacate and having not done so, he was occupying the public premises without any authorisation by the State. Therefore, he is liable to be evicted under the provisions of the said Act. Accordingly, the application for eviction ought to have been allowed.
14. Admittedly, a considerable period has lapsed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the appellate authority is modified to the extent as observed in the concluding portion of the proceeding paragraph.
15. In that view of the matter, the State Government shall take appropriate steps for eviction of the petitioner through the said proceedings as early as possible preferably within a period of two months from the date a certified copy is produced before the State Government. The prescribed authority shall accordingly take steps to pass appropriate order in terms of this order passed by this Court for eviction of the petitioner as early as possible preferably within two months from the date of communication of this order. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the prescribed authority at once at the cost of the Court.
16. With these observations, the writ petition is thus decided. There will be no order as to costs.