JUDGMENT Vinod Prasad, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the revisionist the learned A.G.A.
2. The application of the revisionist, which was filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 29.7.2006 clearly discloses commission of cognizable offence. The said application was not a complaint as is mentioned under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. The aggrieved person never wanted the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. He was not inclined to file the complaint and lead the evidence under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. The aggrieved person Lal Chand Nishad, the present revisionist was at liberty to file a complaint or not. The Magistrate had no right to refuse the prayer for registration of the F.I.R. and investigation of the offence once the cognizable offence was disclosed and transform the application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. into one under complaint suo-motu. The Magistrate can take cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. only in three eventualities provided under the law. The first eventuality under Section 190(1)(a) relates with the filing of the complaint, which is the sole domain of the complainant or the victim. The complainant or the victim cannot be compelled to file a complaint once he did not want to file a complaint. The trial court cannot become party to the litigation by taking cognizance suo motu by transforming an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. into complaint under Chapter XV Cr.P.C. The Court wrongly interpreted the judgments of the Apex Court in . A perusal of the impugned order dated 21.9.2006 passed in the aforesaid Misc. Case No. 377 of 2006, which is now registered as complaint case No. 2182 of 2006, itself indicates that cognizable offence was disclosed. Since the cognizable offence was disclosed the Additional Judicial Magistrate, court No. 17, Gorakhpur committed a manifest error of law in not directing the police to register the F.I.R. and investigate the offence as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426 and many other subsequent judgments. Crime detention and crime prevention is the power and duty of the police as has been heW by the Privy Council in the case of Khwaja Nazir Ahmad 1945 PC 17. The A.CJ.M. Court No. 17 Gorakhpur did not act in accordance with law and started the litigation on its own which power is not vested in him. So far as Chapter XV of the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned, there may be thousands of reasons for the complainant not to start the litigation. Some of the reasons may be that the accused are so powerful that the complainant or the victim deterred from filing a complaint. The other reason may be that he is so poor as not being to able to bring the witnesses to the court on his own expenses, third reason may be that the accused are so powerful that the witnesses may not be inclined to support the case of the complainant. Another reason is that the complainant may not be in the knowledge of many things, which could be deciphered or brougt-forth during investigation. Another reason may be that the victim intended to get the prosecution launched by the State and not to launch the prosecution himself. I may remind that prosecution launched on the basis of the complaint requires that it is the complainant who has to prosecute the accused and in his absence even his complaint can be dismissed under Section 249/256 Cr.P.C. These are the reasons, which may desist the complainant not to file a complaint. The CJ.M. concerned while transforming the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. with only the prayer to get the matter registered and investigated by the police of cognizable offence, therefore, committed a manifest error of law and the impugned order cannot allowed to be sustained. Consequently the order dated 29.8.2006 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, court No. 17, Gorakhpur passed in Misc. Application No. 2182 of 2006, Lal Chand Nishad v. Markandey Rai and other, under Sections 406, 419, 420, 504 and 506 I.P.C., P.S. Bans Gaon, district Gorakhpur is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Magistrate concerned to take the application of the applicant under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C afresh and decide it in accordance with law. Since I have quashed the order dated 29.8.2006 by which the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was transformed into a complaint under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. hence all subsequent proceedings and the number of the complaint allotted to the said application is also hereby set aside. The Magistrate concerned is directed to dispose of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as is mentioned above within a period of two weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order before it.
3. This application is allowed.