JUDGMENT Rakesh Tiwari, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner had been working as deed writer in Tehsll Fatehpur, district Fatehpur, connected with the office of the Deputy/Sub-Registrar's Office since 8th August. 1986. He applied on 16.3.1983 for renewal of his licence for the year 1983-84. which was recommended and forwarded by the Deputy Registrar. However, the licence of the petitioner was not renewed.
3. It is alleged that the petitioner was threatened that his licence would be cancelled and as such, he was compelled to file a suit for injunction restraining respondent Nos. 3 and 4, i.e., Collector. Fatehpur and the District Registrar, Fatehpur, from interfering in the working of the petitioner as deed writer. The defendants put in appearance and filed the written statement and had given evasive reply to the allegations made by the petitioner in the plaint. The petitioner, therefore, prayed that the respondents be directed to give specific reply to the allegations made in the plaint. The copy of the plaint has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The English translation of paragraph 1 of the plaint is as under :
That the plaintiff had been working as deed writer since 8th August, 1986 in the office of Deputy/Sub-Registrar's Office, Fatehpur and his services are governed by U. P. Deed Writer Compliance Rules, 1977."
The English translation of the reply to the aforesaid paragraph is as under :
"That the contents of paragraph 1 of the plaint are not admitted as averred."
4. It has been alleged in the writ petition that the defendants filed objection to the said application and 30.1.1986 was fixed in the case before the trial court. This case was adjourned to 20.2.1986. Since the defendants were not present, the case was, therefore, fixed on 24.2.1986 for ex parte evidence. It is submitted that on 24.2.1986, the petitioner appeared and filed his affidavit in support of his case. He was not cross-examined and his evidence was closed. The case was, therefore, fixed on 26.2.1986 for orders.
5. It has been urged that on 26.2.1986. the Court had only to pronounce the judgment and nothing more was to be done in the case. However, the defendants put in appearance on 24.2.1986 and filed an application for setting aside the order dated 20.2.1986. The proceedings of order-sheet maintained in the court below from 30.1.1986 to 24.2.1986 are as under :
30.1.1986 Application on behalf of defendants for adjournment. It was not opposed. Allowed. Fix 20.2. 1986 for disposal.
20.2.1986 Mukadma Pukara gaya. Wadi Upasthtt hua. Adhiwakta Sahit Pratiwadi anupasthit hai. AaJ mukadama prarthna patra 33Ga and 39Ga .ke nistaran hetu niyukta hai. Pratiwadigan ki or se koi na upasthit hua hai aur na koi prarthna patra aaya hai.Aadesh hua ki muka-dama dinank 24.2.1986 ko ek pachhiya nistaran hetu pesh ho.
Sd, Illegible 24.2.1986 Affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiff. Plaintiff closed its evidence. Put Up for orders on 26.2.1986. Later on application on behalf of defendants for setting aside the order dated 20.2.1986. Put up on the date fixed for disposal of objection in the meantime."
6. It is evident, from the order dated 4.3.1986, Annexure-5 to the writ petition that the trial court set aside the order dated 20.2.1986 and against the aforesaid order, the petitioner filed a revision, which was also dismissed by the Vth Additional District Judge, Fatehpur, by an order dated 31.1.1987. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Vijai Bahadur has argued that the courts below have committed an illegality in setting aside the order dated 20.2.1986 as the case was fixed by the trial court for pronouncement of the judgment after closing the evidence of the petitioner. It had no jurisdiction to set aside the order dated 20.2.1986. The provisions of Order IX, Rule 7, C.P.C. were not attracted in this case and the trial court has no Jurisdiction to give the benefit of the said provisions. He has further argued that the revlstonal court had failed to notice that the trial court ought to have pronounced the judgment. The defendants had remedy under Order IX. Rule 13, C.P.C. The conditions of Order IX, Rule 7, C.P.C. were not attracted to the case and as such the impugned order is contrary to the law and facts of the case.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the case of Arjun Singh v. Mahendra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 in support of his above contention.
8. I have perused the impugned order dated 4.3.1986 passed by the IInd Additional Munsif, Fatehpur, by which the order dated 20.2.1986 had been set aside on payment of Rs. 20 as costs as well as the judgment dated 31.1.1987 passed by the Vth Additional District Judge. Fatehpur.
9. The revtsional court has rightly held that on 24.2.1986, the plaintiff had filed only affidavit and it was directed to be put up for orders on 26.2.1986 and later on when the application on behalf of the defendants for setting aside the order dated 20.2.1986 was filed, it was directed to be put up on the date fixed, i.e., 26.2.1986 for disposal of objections in the meantime. The proceedings dated 24.2.1986 show, that the arguments had not been heard in the case and it cannot be said that the entire hearing was completed on 24.2.1986. It is absolutely incorrect that the case was adjourned on 24.2.1986 to 26.2.1986 for pronouncement of the judgment. From the perusal of the order sheet dated 24.2.1986, it is evident that the arguments were also to be heard in the case. Before the arguments could be heard, the defendants moved application for setting aside the ex parts order dated 20.2.1986. There is no illegality in the order passed by the court below. The order dated 20.2.1986 has not been passed by the learned Munsif in excess of his jurisdiction as this date was fixed for disposal of the application and no ex parte order could have been passed by the learned Munsif. Respondent No. 2 has rightly held that at the most, respondent No. 1 could have decided the application 39Ga, The facts of the case of Arjun Singh v. Mahendra Kumar (supra) are not applicable to the facts and the circumstances of this case and are clearly distinguishable for the reasons stated above.
10. In my opinion, the reasoning given by the revisional court does not suffer from any Illegality. The matter should have been decided on merits. The respondents should have been heard. Such technicality as pleaded by the petitioner, should not come in way of substantial Justice as no prejudice is caused to any person, If the case is heard and decided on merits. The Suit No. 231 of 1983 is only for temporary injunction for restraining the respondents from not interfering in his work on the basis that he had applied for renewal of his licence for the year 1983-84. i.e., for one year only. The petitioner has been working for about twenty years on the strength of the interim order of this Court and would be 66 years of age now on the basis of the declaration made in the affidavit.
11. In view of the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. The interim order dated 5.3.1987 as affirmed by an order dated 22.10.1991 is vacated. The court below is directed to proceed with the suit and decide it expeditiously.