Court No. - 48
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 28420 of 2019 Applicant :- Lajpat Ray Opposite Party :- State Of Up And Another Counsel for Applicant :- Upendra Kumar Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh,J.
Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State.
The present criminal misc. application under sectin 482 Cr. P.C. has been filed by the applicant with the prayer to quash the order dated 10.05.2019 passed by Additional Session Judge, Court No. 7, Bareilly in Criminal Misc. Application No. 263 of 2018 (Lajpat Ray Vs. State of U.P. and others), in Complaint Case No. 546 of 2015 (Smt. Champa Devi Vs. Sompal and others) pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-2nd, Bareilly , under section 452,354,323,504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station Bhojipura, District Bareilly and also the summoning order dated 16.11.2017 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrte-2nd, Bareilly in complaint case No. 546 of 2015.
It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that impugned summoning order dated 16.11.2017 as well as order dated 10.06.2019 have been passed by the learned counsel below in mechanical manner without applying judicial mind and ignoring the facts of the matter. It has been submitted that prima facie no case is made out against the applicant and that there are contradictions in the statements of the witnesses.
Learned A.G.A. has opposed.
Perusal of record shows that applicant Lajpat Ray was summoned for trial under sections 452, 354, 323, 504, 506 I.P.C. vide impugned order dated 16.11.2017. The applicant has preferred revision against the impugned order dated 16.11.2017 alongwith application under section 5 of the Limitation Act before the Sessions Court, however, application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, Court No 7 Bareilly vide impugned order dated 10.05.2019 and thus the revision could not be heard on merits.
It is well settled that section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers the court to admit an appeal or an application after the prescribed period, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not preferring it within such period. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the courts and authorities to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. A justifiable liberal approach is, therefore, necessary in the matter of condonation of delay. Generally delays in preferring appeals should be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In case of Ghanshyam Dass V Dominion of India (1984) 3SCC 46, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex court that substantial justice should not be sacrificed for hyper technical pleas based on strict adherence to procedural provisions. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy JT 1998 (6) SC 242, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
It is clear from various decisions of the Supreme Court that the expression "sufficient cause" in section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to deliberate tactics to seek their remedy promptly. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put- forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.
It has been pointed out that the applicant came to know about the impugned summoning order dated 16.11.2017 on 01.04.2018 and thereafter, application was moved on 02.04.2018 for certified copy, which was received on 20.04.2018 by the counsel and that revision alongwith application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was presented before the learned Sessions Judge, Bareilly on 07.05.2018, however the application under section 5 of Limitation Act was rejected vide impugned order dated 10.05.2019.
In view of the facts of the matter and aforesaid legal position, it appears that impugned order dated 10.5.2019 has been passed ignoring well settled principle of law on the point of limitation.
In view of the specific facts and circumstances of the matter, it would be appropriate to quash the impugned order dated 10.05.2019 in exercise of power conferred under section 482 Cr P.C.
Accordingly the impugned order dated 10.05.2019 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.7, Bareilly is set aside and Criminal Misc. Application No. 263 of 2018 (Lajpat Ray Versus State of U.P. and others) under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the applicant before the learned Sessions Judge, Court No 7 Bareilly is allowed and the delay in filing the revision is condoned and revision preferred by the applicant before the Session Court shall be heard and decided on merits in accordance with law.
With the overvaluations, the present criminal misc. application under section 482 Cr. P.C. is disposed of.
Order Date :- 30.7.2019 T.S.