JUDGMENT Dalal, J.
1. The plaintiffs sued the defendant Lachhmi Prasad for possession of an occupancy holding, on the ground that he was in possession of the holding as a trustee. The question of trust is of importance as the plaintiffs desired to escape the bar of limitation by reason of the provisions of Section 10, Lim. Act. Both the subordinate Courts have held that there was an express trust and that the property had vested in the defendant-trustee. They have quoted the defendant's own statement and further referred to the fact that the plaintiffs redeemed a mortgage of the occupancy holding. It was not explained on behalf of the defence how else except as a trustee from the plaintiffs' father he could have obtained possession of the occupancy holding. Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad argued that the trust was not for any specific purpose. The words "for any specific purpose" merely indicate an express trust, i.e., a trust that is not constructive or one arising by implication of law: see Bhurabhai Jamnadas v. Bai Rukmani [1908] 32 Bom. 394. In the present case both the subordinate Courts have held that the trust was an express one for the benefit of Sheoparson's sons, the plaintiffs to the suit, and that it was Sheoparson who made the trust. The property had vested in Lachhmi Pershad, because he was managing it and treating it as his own.
2. Another point argued was that the minors could not make a trust and that on the death of Sheoparson the minors became entitled to the occupancy holding. The trust, however, is not alleged to have been made by the minors but by their father. In the case quoted by the appellant's learned Counsel Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad from Rangoon Ma Thein May v. U Po Kin A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 289 there was no express trust but the father took over the management of his daughter's property on the death of the mother of that daughter. In another case, this one of the Privy Council, the counsel drew the Court's attention to the definition of "specific purpose" given by their Lordships of the Privy Council. Their Lordships said that it must be a purpose that is either actually or specifically defined in the terms of the will or settlement, or a purpose which, from the specific terms can be certainly affirmed: (Khaw Sim. Tek v. Chuah Hooi Gnoh Neoh A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 212).
3. In the present case there is no doubt as to the specified terms of the trust and there is no uncertainty as to affirming it. In my opinion the provisions of Section 10 do apply, and I dismiss this appeal with costs.