1. The present First Appeals have been filed by the appellantoriginal applicant being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common judgment and order rendered in Civil Misc. Application Nos.185, 301 & 429 of 1998 by the City Civil & Sessions Court dated 9th January, 1998 on the grounds stated in the memo of Appeals.
2. The facts of the case briefly summarized are that the appellantapplicant, who is the Union of India, had entered into contract with the respondent for execution of “construction of 12 numbers TypeIII Telecome Staff Quarters at Gandhinagar,” as per agreement entered into between the parties, however after some time, as there was dispute with regard to the terms of the agreement/contract between the parties, sole arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. After hearing the parties, the sole Arbitrator published his award on 28th January, 1997 allowing the claim of the respondentContractor. Therefore, Civil Misc. Applications have been filed under Section 14(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for making award as rule of the court, wherein notice was served upon the parties. The Court below after considering the material and evidence and after hearing the parties, rendered the judgment and award in Civil Misc. Application No.429 of 1997 as other two applications being Civil Application Nos.185/1997 & 301/1997 does not survive according to the Court. It is this judgment and order, which has been assailed in the present First Appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 inter alia on the ground that the application/objection filed by the appellant under Section 13, 15, 16 and 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 was erroneously disallowed and the Court below has committed serious error of law relating to jurisdiction by not setting aside the award of the Arbitrator. It is also contended that the Court below has erred in not considering the provisions of the clause of the agreement/agreement and in particular Clause 15 of the Arbitration agreement. It is, therefore, contended that the Court below has erred in holding that the sole Arbitrator has dealt with the points with regard to the limitation in award. It is also contended that the Court below has erred in not appreciating that the claims advanced by the respondentclaimant in proceedings before the Arbitrator were barred by limitation and were not permissible.
3. Learned counsel, Ms.P.J. Davawala appearing for the appellant submitted that the Court below has committed jurisdictional error both with regard to the aspect of limitation as well as jurisdiction. It was submitted that the Court below has failed to appreciate the aspect of limitation that the claims were barred by limitation. She submitted that Clause 25 of the agreement has not been considered properly for the purpose of deciding whether the claims preferred by the Contractor were time barred or not. She pointedly referred to Clause 25 of the agreement, which is reproduced in the memo of Appeal in Ground (G) and submitted that as provided in this, the demand for Arbitrator has to be made within 90 days from the receiving the intimation and if it is not made, it will be deemed to have been waived and barred by limitation. She emphasized and submitted that the document dated 28.06.1989 produced on record does not cover all the claims advanced by the Contractor and, therefore, except the claim mentioned in the communication dated 28.06.1989, remaining claims would be barred by limitation. However, the claims have been advanced by the Contractor for the first time when Civil Suit No.3703/1992 was filed on 12.10.1992. It was submitted that there is no evidence that the claimants have demanded Arbitration within a period of 90 days in respect of all the claims. Therefore, the Arbitrator could not have decided in respect of all the claims, which were not born out from the communication dated 28.06.1989. She further submitted that if the date of the claim is taken at 28.06.1989, Suit could not have been filed in the year 1992. It was submitted that some of the claims have been added while filing Suit No.3078/1998, which is not permissible. She pointedly referred to Clause 10(CC) of the standard agreement/contract and submitted that it would be relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue. Therefore, learned counsel, Mr.Davawala submitted reliance placed by the Arbitrator as well as by the Court below on Clause 10(CC) is erroneous and the present Appeal may be allowed. Learned counsel, Mr.Davawala submitted that there is no stipulation in the agreement or the contract between the parties and, therefore, the reliance cannot be placed on Clause 10(CC) of the standard agreement or contract. She submitted that it was not the terms of the agreement between the parties and, therefore, no reliance could be placed. Therefore, learned counsel, Mr.Davawala submitted that both Arbitrator as well as the Court below have erroneously resorted to Clause 10(CC) of the standard contract, which is not permitted. Learned counsel, Mr.Davawala has specifically submitted that when there is specific provision between the parties, Clause in the standard contract cannot be resorted.
4. Learned counsel, Ms.Davawala also submitted that the communication dated 28.06.1989 has been for the purpose of inclusion of 10(CC) as the claim was otherwise barred under Clause 25 of the agreement. Learned counsel, Ms.Davawala submitted that in fact, Suit itself is barred and all the claims are beyond the period of limitation as provided in Clause 25. Learned counsel, Ms.Davawala has referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in 1997 (10) SCC 528 and submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in this judgment that when the payment has been accepted in full and final settlement in view of the contract, the appellants stood discharged from the liability. She has also referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1983 Dehli High Court 508 and submitted that the contract and the clause for the Arbitration is required to be considered in a way that it does not cause any prejudice to the party. It was for the Arbitrator to decide about the claim in the arbitration and the Court is not required to decide. She also referred to this judgment and submitted that the facts of this case are similar to the points involved and also submitted that as observed in this judgment, if no demand for Arbitration in respect all claims is made within 90 days from receiving the bill or intimation from the Government, the Contractor will be deemed to have waived and is barred by limitation. Therefore, it was submitted that the entire claim was barred by limitation, which has not been appreciated.
5. Learned counsel, Mr.Sukhwani for the respondents referred to the papers including the impugned order and the award of the Arbitrator. He submitted that the agreement/contract between the parties provides for the arbitration clause and it is not in dispute that the claim has been made. He submitted that the claim could be made after the intimation regarding the payment that he would come to know that there is difference in the claim made by him and acceptance thereof. He, therefore, submitted that as observed in the impugned judgment, the claim was made by the respondent in respect of Clause No.2 and the Clause No.1 was withdrawn. Further, the dispute is with regard to the amount of Rs.75,000/ in respect of the work done which has not been paid in final bill. Learned counsel, Mr.Sukhwani submitted that as admittedly the contract has been awarded and the respondentContractor had to file Suit for referring the disputes to the Arbitrator in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement. However, as the Arbitrator has after discussing in detailed considered the claims and passed the order which the Court below has made the rule of the Court. He submitted that therefore aspect of limitation under Clause 25 would not be attracted as both the Arbitrator as well as the Court below has considered this aspect of limitation with reference to Clause 25 of the agreement/contract. He further submitted that the submission with regard to Clause 10(cc) is misconception as the Arbitrator has considered the clause in the standard form of agreement for the purpose of formula or the modality. He submitted that if the agreement does not provide specifically for any such item or the procedure, the standard agreement or the form can be referred. He referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in case of Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1989 SC 777 and submitted that the scope of the Court could be limited once the Arbitrator has passed an award on merits after considering the evidence and the Court may not re appreciate evidence or reconsider the same. He has also referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in case of Food Corporation of India Vs. Joginderpal Mohinderpal & Anr. as well as Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s. Veshno Rice Millers, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1163 & 890 and submitted that the grounds for setting aside the award are very limited when the Arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings or is said to have exceeded the jurisdiction. Learned counsel, Mr.Sukhwani submitted that in the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the Arbitrator has exceeded jurisdiction. He submitted that the Arbitrator had considered and interpreted the clause of the agreement and it cannot be said that the interpretation which he has considered is possible and even if other view is possible by that itself will not be sufficient to interfere with the award. He has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in case of M/s. Associated Construction Vs. Pawanhans Helicopters Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 2008 SC 2911 again to emphasize the scope of the interference with the award and submitted that the Court below has rightly after considering the entire record as well as clause in the agreement passed the impugned order and, therefore, the present Appeals are not maintainable. He submitted that another aspect of limitation is also without any basis as the limitation has been interpreted and the claims which it is stated to have been added are in fact the same claim with respect of the work done for the escalation of the price in the material and labour and, therefore, the Arbitrator was bound to consider this aspect. Learned counsel, Mr.Sukhwani submitted that it cannot be said that he has exceeded the jurisdiction as the claims have been made and, thereafter, the Arbitrator has on the basis of the evidence after considering the objection decided the issue. He submitted that pursuant to the arbitration clause in the agreement, the Arbitration was resorted. Therefore, it is not open for the appellant to challenge on the ground that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction or there is any jurisdictional error. He has referred to clause 10(cc) of the agreement/contract and submitted that it clearly provide for the compensation for escalation in the price for the work done. He submitted that on the basis of this clause, the Arbitrator has allowed, which cannot be said to be erroneous.
6. In view of the rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present First Appeals can be entertained or not.
7. Though the submissions have been made by the learned counsel, Ms.Davawala, there is discussion with regard to the compensation amount of Rs.42,372/ towards the reimbursement of increasing prices of materials and labours. The Court below has referred to Clause 10(cc) of the agreement and it has been said that the Arbitrator has referred to this Clause in the standard agreement, which is also required to be considered for the purpose of adjudication of the claims. In this context, the observations made in the award by the Arbitrator are required to be considered when he has observed that “at this stage, onus remains on the Sole Arbitrator to determine justified compensation for the increase in the price of materials and labour specially in view of the breaches occurred on account of the respondents. Formulas approved in the standard contract forms (under Cl. 10 (c)(c)) are considered reasonable and justified for working out amount of such compensation.” Thus what the Arbitrator has referred Clause 10(cc) is for the purpose of working out the formula for the purpose of claim in respect of the price rise in the price of material and labour. At this stage, a useful reference can be made to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in case of M/s. Hindustan Tea Co. Vs. M/s. K. Sashikant & Co. & Anr., reported in AIR 1987 SC 81, wherein it is observed that “Under the law, the Arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the dispute between the parties. The Award is not open to challenge on the ground that the Arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion for he failed to appreciate facts.” It is well settled that the grounds for setting aside the award are very limited and specific inter alia that (i) the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings and (ii) he has exceeded the jurisdiction. It is required to be mentioned that there is no question of any misconduct or the proceeding.
8. On the other hand, the issue with regard to the jurisdiction is not in fact a issue regarding his exceeding jurisdiction in asmuchas the claim has been preferred and the matter has been referred to the Arbitrator in respect of some of the claims which were not granted, for which, Arbitration has been resorted. Therefore, the Arbitrator could have considered the claims, which have been made. The contention regarding the limitation has been discussed and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is any error. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of M/s.Sudarsan Trading Co. Vs. The Government of Kerala & Anr., reported in AIR 1989 SC 890(1) has made observation that while examining whether the Arbitrary has acted correctly in allowing and disallowing the claim, the Court cannot substitute its own finding based on evaluation of the material. In other words, the award of the Arbitrator can only be interfered with set aside or modified within the limitation as provided under the Act. The Court below has considered this aspect though may not have specifically focused but appreciated the claims which he has considered and thereby partly allowed the misc. applications.
9. Moreover, a useful reference can be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in case of Food Corporation of India (supra), wherein it has been observed that the Court cannot substitute its own decision. In similar situation with regard to the claim for additional amount, it has been observed that “But, in the instant case the court had examined the different claims not to find out whether these claims were within the disputes referable to the arbitrator, but to find out whether in arriving at the decision, the arbitrator had acted correctly or incorrectly. This, in our opinion, the court had no jurisdiction to do, namely, substitution of its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained was a decision within the competency of the arbitrator in this case. By purporting to construe the contract the court could not take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. It has to be determined that there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised.” Therefore, when pursuant to the arbitration clause, it has been referred to the Arbitration, the objections have been lodged and after considering the same, when the Arbitrator has made the Award, which is sustained mostly by the Court below while making it rule of the Court, it cannot be said that there is any error.
10. Much emphasize given on the aspect of limitation also has to be considered in the background of Clause 25, which has been reproduced in the memo of Appeal and also it has been considered in the impugned judgment. It is very evident that the application for arbitration has been made by the respondent earlier in point of time and, therefore, there is no question of claim having been made within 90 days. He has made application after some of the claims were not allowed, for which, he invoked arbitration clause and the communication cannot be considered as only containing the limited claims. A bare look at the communication dated 28.06.1989 has a reference to all correspondences and it is stated the respondent is not satisfied the communication dated 18.07.1989 is regarding finalization of the bill and, thereafter, the claim has been made, which cannot be said to be erroneous. In fact, communication dated 18.07.1987 from the Executive Engineer to the respondent clearly states that the respondent is requested to submit the request for the appointment of the arbitrator but though it has been stated, it is without prejudice to the limitation laid down in
cannot be said that there is any error apparent on the face on record or the Arbitrator has exceeded jurisdiction, which has not been appreciated by the Court below and the impugned judgment and award calls for any interference with the present Appeals.
11. Therefore, the present First Appeals deserve to be dismissed and accordingly stand dismissed even on the smallness of the claim even on merits, there is no substance in the matters.
(RAJESH H.SHUKLA, J.)
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