IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU ON THE 4TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2017 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.559 OF 2012 BETWEEN:
L.R.NAGU @ NAGENDRAMURTHY S/O LATE RAMAKRISHNAIAH, AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS, WORKING AS AGRICULTURIST, R/AT LINGANAHALLI VILLAGE, HESARAGHATTA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI G.MANJUNATH, ADVOCATE) AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY RAJANUKUNTE POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY LEARNED STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI SANDESH J.CHOUTA, STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR-II ALONG WITH SMT.B.G.NAMITHA MAHESH, HCGP) THIS CRL.A IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE PASSED BY THE PRESIDING OFFICER, FAST TRACK COURT-VII, DODDABALLAPUR IN S.C.NO.272 OF 2010 DATED 08.07.2011 – CONVICTING THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF IPC. THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED IS SENTENCED TO UNDERGO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND SHALL PAY A FINE OF RS.5,000/- (RUPEES FIVE THOUSAND ONLY), IN DEFAULT TO PAY FINE AMOUNT, HE SHALL FURTHER UNDERGO RIGOROUS IMPRISONMENT FOR A PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF IPC. THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED PRAYS THAT HE BE ACQUITTED.
***** THIS CRL.A. COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS DAY, JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT Whether a defect or illegality in the investigation vitiates the trial? If so, whether the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC could be sustained on the facts and circumstances of this case are the concomitant questions that fall for consideration in this appeal.
2. The facts leading to the appeal are as follows:-
PSI of Rajanakuntae police station (PW-10) registered a F.I.R against the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the “accused”) under Section 302 of IPC. In the F.I.R he alleged that on 26-4-2010 when he was in the police station at 10.45 a.m., the accused appeared before him carrying in his hand a blood stained chopper in a cement bag and informed him that his step mother Smt.Aswathamma was giving them trouble over property issue and was also interfering with the pensionary benefits of his father. She had also filed a civil suit against them. Hence, to do away with her, on seeing her alone sitting in Linganahalli Colony bus stand, he brought a chopper from his house and killed her by assaulting on her nape.
3. The PSI seized the blood stained chopper under a Mahazar, Ex.P-8 and registered a suo-motu case against the accused. This F.I.R was registered on 26-4-2010 at 11.30 a.m. Thereafter, he arrested the accused and produced him before the Magistrate. Further investigation was continued by PW-13 - CPI of Doddaballapur. He laid the charge sheet against the accused.
4. At the trial Court, the accused denied the charge. In proof of its case the prosecution examined 13 witnesses, produced in evidence 13 documents Exs.P-1 to P-13 and Material Objects at MOs. 1 to 14. By the impugned Judgment, the trial Court convicted the accused for the above offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-. The trial Court was of the view that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In arriving at this conclusion, trial Court relied on the direct testimony of PW-6 and PW-11, the eye witnesses to the incident and the evidence regarding the seizure of the weapon namely, MO.13 coupled with the motive spoken to by PW-1, PW-6 and PW-11 and found it appropriate to convict the accused for the above offence.
5. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned Judgment, the appellant/accused has preferred the above appeal.
6. We have heard Sri G.Manjunath, learned counsel appearing for the accused and Sri Sandesh Chouta, learned State Public Prosecutor-II.
7. The learned counsel for the accused has raised mainly legal contentions touching the validity of the investigation. The principal contention urged by the learned counsel is that the registration of the F.I.R is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. The PSI who was the complainant himself has registered the F.I.R. Therefore, the initiation of the criminal prosecution is bad in law. The weapon said to have been used for the commission of the offence is seized before the registration of F.I.R, which is another serious flaw affecting the trial. PW-10 who registered the F.I.R could not have embarked upon the investigation. Therefore, the evidence relating to the recovery of the weapon could not have been used in determining the guilt of the accused. It is the submission of the learned counsel that these irregularities vitiate the entire trial entitling the accused for honourable acquittal. On merits, the learned counsel contends that the evidence of the eye witnesses is not reliable. Both the eye witnesses examined by the prosecution are close relatives of the deceased and are interested witnesses. Their evidence suffers from improbabilities inasmuch as their presence at the spot of occurrence is doubtful. The confession of the accused could not have been made the basis for the conviction. Hence, he pleads for the acquittal of the accused.
8. The learned State Public Prosecutor –II has argued in support of the impugned Judgment. At the outset, he would submit that whatever illegalities or infirmities in the investigation pointed out by the defence cannot be a ground to acquit the accused. The prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused to the hilt by examining the eye witnesses to the incident. The testimony of these eye witnesses is clear and cogent and does not suffer from any contradictions. The motive is clearly spelt out and proved. Further, the medical evidence leads to the inevitable conclusion that the accused committed the said offence with the weapon MO.13. The accused himself having surrendered the said weapon before the police and the F.I.R having been registered on the basis of the information furnished by the accused, the trial Court was well justified in recording the conviction against the accused and hence seeks for dismissal of the appeal.
9. We have considered the submissions and have examined the records. Coming to the merits of the case, we find that the case of the prosecution is rested on the direct evidence of the eye witnesses who are examined as PW-6 and PW-11.
10. PW-6 is the brother-in-law of the deceased. He has stated in his evidence that on the date of the incident, the deceased had come to the house of PW-4 in connection with a religious function. At about 9.30 or 9.45 a.m, she was sitting in Lingenahalli Colony, bus-stand waiting for a bus to go to her village. At that time, the accused came from behind, held her plait and assaulted with a chopper on the back of her neck. By the time, she could raise an alarm she collapsed on the ground. The accused ran away from the spot carrying the chopper with him. This witness has further deposed about the motive for the commission of the said offence and has stated that there was a dispute in respect of the property owned by the family of the accused and the deceased. The deceased was the first wife of late Ramakrishnaiah. The accused is the son of said Ramakrishnaiah through his second wife. Ramakrishnaiah died about a year prior to the incident. After his death property dispute ensued between the parties. The deceased had filed a suit in respect of the said property. She was also laying a claim for the pensionary benefits of her husband and on account of this, the accused was nursing grudge against the deceased which motivated him to commit the said offence.
11. In the cross-examination, except suggesting that he did not give any statement before the police, the evidence given by PW-6 regarding the occurrence and the overt-acts committed by the accused have not at all been challenged or discredited in the cross-examination. The defence has not even denied the presence of the accused at the spot of occurrence. PW-6 has not only spoken about the overt-acts committed by the accused but has also spoken about the motive for the commission of the offence which has also remained unchallenged.
12. The evidence of PW-6 is substantially corroborated by PW-11. This witness is the sister of the deceased. According to her, on 26-4-2010 namely, on the date of the incident, at about 9.00 a.m. PW-6 - Munirajappa and the deceased had come near the bus stand. She was about 50 feet away from the bus stand.
The deceased was sitting under a Jackfruit tree on a stone. In the meanwhile, the accused came near the deceased, caught hold of her hair and assaulted her with a chopper on the neck. The deceased fell down on the ground. The accused went away from the scene taking the chopper by covering it in a plastic bag. By the time she went near, she found that the neck of the deceased was cut and she died on the spot.
13. Even in the cross-examination, she reiterated the fact that the accused came to the spot where the deceased was sitting and assaulted her on the neck with the chopper. She identified the said chopper MO.13. She reiterated that even before the police, she has narrated the incident as stated in her evidence before the Court. We do not find that the defence has been able to shake her testimony to any extent. On the other hand, she has asserted in her cross examination that it was the accused who committed the murder of the deceased on account of the property dispute and the dispute regarding the pensionary benefits.
14. On considering the evidence of PW-6 and PW-11, we are of the view that their evidence is truthful and reliable and finds intrinsic corroboration in the testimony of each other. The learned counsel for the accused however has sought to challenge the testimony of PW-6 and PW-11 on the ground that both these witnesses are related to the deceased and they are interested witnesses. We do not find any substance in the said submission. Merely because, the witnesses are related, their testimony cannot be doubted or disbelieved nor can it be branded as interested testimony because of their relationship. The court is required to adopt cautious approach in appreciating the evidence of related witnesses. On dispassionate evaluation of their evidence, we are of the view that their evidence deserves full credence. Both these witnesses have narrated the circumstances under which the deceased happened to be at the spot of occurrence. They have consistently stated that the deceased had come to the house of PW-4 to attend the religious ceremony. This fact is corroborated by PW-4, another material witness examined by the prosecution. PW-4 has clearly stated on oath that the deceased had come to his house to attend a religious function. He has further deposed that on the date of the incident, after the deceased left his house to go to her village, he took his luggage van and set out to Society. Since the Society was not open, he returned back and on the way he saw the accused carrying a blood stained chopper with him. The evidence of this witness suitably corroborates the testimony of PW-6 and PW-11 with regard to the fact that on the date of the incident, the deceased had come to the village and was waiting for the bus and at that time, after committing the murder, the accused went away carrying the chopper in the direction in which PW-4 was returning from the Society. In our view, none of these witnesses could be branded as chance witnesses. They have given cogent and convincing explanation for their presence at the spot. We do not find any exaggeration or inconsistency in their testimony either with regard to their presence or with regard to the overt-acts committed by the accused. Nothing has been brought out in the cross- examination of PW-4, PW-6 and PW-11 to suggest that they had any reason to falsely implicate the accused or to depose against him. We do not find any reason to doubt or disbelieve the testimony of these witnesses.
15. Further, the testimony of PW-6 and PW-11 is further corroborated by the medical evidence. PW-9 the Medical Officer who conducted the post-mortem examination has narrated the injuries noted on the body of the deceased as under:-
“ External injuries:
1. Deep incised injury over right and posterior side of neck extending from the angle of right mandible, posteriorgly to left mastoid process, cervical, vertebra are exposed, muscles and blood vessels of neck are cut and exposed. Length 22 cm breadth 10 cm, depth 10 cm.
2. Deep incised injury over posterior side of right shoulder exposing under lying bones and muscles. Length 20 cm, breadth 5 cm, depth 4cm.
3. Fracture of right scapula present face and sculf are blood strained.
4. Fracture of 2nd and 3rd cervical vertebra present.”
The injuries noted in Ex.P-9 correspond to the ocular testimony of PW-6 and PW-7. Further, the prosecution has convincingly established that the weapon used for the commission of the offence was seized in the police station from the possession of the accused. Though the evidentiary value of this recovery is disputed, for the present, suffice it to note that it is proved in evidence that after the commission of the offence, the accused himself proceeded to the police station and surrendered the said weapon. PW-7 and PW-8 witnesses to the seizure Mahazar Ex.P-8 have unequivocally stated that in their presence the said weapon was seized and packed. Therefore there cannot be any manner of doubt regarding the fact that the said weapon was seized from the possession of the accused in the police station.
16. It is also borne on record that the said weapon was sent for chemical analysis and the opinion of the F.S.L has been marked as Ex.P-13. This document is admissible under Section 293 of Cr.P.C. This evidence lends sufficient corroboration to the direct testimony of the eye witnesses namely, PW-6 and PW-11. The above evidence in our considered opinion is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused for the offence under Section 302 of IPC rendering him liable for conviction for the said offence. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence and the entire material, we do not find any reason to differ with the view taken by the trial Court with regard to the guilt of the accused for the offence charged against him. The said finding therefore deserves to be confirmed.
17. Coming to the contentions urged by the learned counsel regarding the evidentiary value of the information and the statement made by the accused is concerned, the evidence of PW-10 indicates that soon after the commission of the offence, the accused appeared before PW-10 in the police station and admitted to have murdered the deceased by assaulting her with MO.13. Undisputedly, the information given by the accused to PW-10 was not reduced into writing nor has PW-10 obtained the signature of the accused either on the statement or on the F.I.R prepared by him based on the said information. According to PW-10, pursuant to this information, he first seized the weapon produced by the accused and thereafter registered the F.I.R. It is a matter of record that F.I.R was registered at 11.30 a.m. The procedure followed by PW-10 no doubt calls for serious comment, nonetheless, from the evidence of PW-10 it stands established that before registration of F.I.R the accused made a confession of his guilt to PW-10.
18. “Confession” is not defined under the Evidence Act. In legal parlance “confession” is an admission of guilt by a person charged with the offence. The statement in order to amount to confession must either admit in terms the offence, or all the facts which constitute the said offence. It is not necessary that the person making the confession must be facing accusation of an offence when he made the confession. Viewed in that manner, the statement made by the accused to PW-10 disclosing the motive, preparation and the commission of the offence, undoubtedly qualifies to be a confession as understood in law. However, Section 25 of the Evidence Act renders the confessional statement inadmissible against the accused. Section 25 of the Evidence Act stipulates that;
“No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.”
19. This Section imposes a total bar in using confession against the accused. It makes no difference whether the confession was made before his arrest or while he is in custody after the commencement of the investigation. Even if such information is construed, for want of signature, as the statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., still Section 162 of Evidence Act debars the court from using the said statement in evidence against the accused. Therefore, whatever information of the commission of the cognizable offence given by the accused, in our opinion, cannot be used against him as confession of his guilt. However, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AGHNOO NAGESIA vs. STATE OF BIHAR reported in AIR 1966 SC 119, if the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. To this extent, the facts recorded by PW-10 in the F.I.R. based on the information given by the accused could be used in evidence in proof of his conduct soon after the commission of the offence. In the instant case, however, as discussed above, even without the use of this piece of evidence, the prosecution has been able to prove the ingredients of the offence charged against the accused. Therefore, the legal contention urged by the learned counsel on this count will not affect the case of the prosecution.
20. Coming to the other contentions raised by the accused is concerned, no doubt it is true that PW-10 himself being the complainant has registered the F.I.R and before the registration of the F.I.R he has embarked upon the investigation and has seized the weapon produced by the accused. These infirmities in our opinion, will not militate against the case of the prosecution. Though it cannot be disputed that PW-10 has failed to comply with the procedure contemplated under Section 154 of Cr.P.C, nonetheless, we do not find that solely on that ground the case of the prosecution could be thrown out. The law is now well settled that irregular investigation cannot be a ground to set aside the conviction unless it is shown that there is miscarriage of justice and serious prejudice has been caused to the accused thereby. It is also equally settled that the plea of invalidity of investigation cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time at the appellate or revisional stage. Section 465 of Cr.P.C., provides that:
(1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
(2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”
21. question whether a defect or illegality in investigation could vitiate the trial came up for consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of H.N.RISHBUD AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF DELHI reported in AIR 1955 SC 196. Answering the question in the negative, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held therein, that if the plea of invalidity of investigation was raised at sufficiently earlier stage, the Court inspite of taking cognizance could direct re-investigation by the competent Investigating Officer but after cognizance is taken, the trial court cannot quash the proceedings for invalidity of investigation. In view of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the accused it may be appropriate to refer to para-9 of the said Judgment which reads as under:-
“9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises.
A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C., as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance, Section 190, Cr.P.C., is one out of a group of sections under the heading "Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199.
These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537 of Cr.P.C. which is in the following terms is attracted:
"Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice".
If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in –‘Prabhu v.
Emperor’, AIR 1944 PC 73(C) and –‘Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King’, AIR 1950 PC 26 (D).
These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of investigation which we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both the cases clearly show that invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.”
22. In view of the above proposition, the contention urged by the learned counsel that the alleged illegality or irregularity has the effect of vitiating the trial is liable to be rejected.
23. The contention that PW-10 having registered the F.I.R was not competent to investigate is no more res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of STATE Rep. by Inspector Of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu vs. V.JAYAPAUL reported in AIR 2004 SC 2684, wherein at para 6, it is held that:-
“Though there is no such statutory bar the premise on which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who “lodged” the F.I.R would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent Police Officer, on the basis of information received, makes out a F.I.R incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigation officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court that whenever a Police Officer proceeds to investigate after registering the F.I.R on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the F.I.R in which he records the factum of having received the information about the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack.”
24. It is not the contention of the accused that PW- 10 was not competent to register the case or to investigate the offence. It is also not the case of the defence that the registration of the F.I.R was in violation of any mandatory requirements of any statute or that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the accused. Under that circumstance, unless the accused is able to show that on account of conducting part of the investigation prior to the registration of the F.I.R has caused any serious prejudice or injustice to him, the accused cannot take any advantage of the said lapse or irregularity committed by PW-10.
25. The question whether the registration of F.I.R cannot precede the investigation or the F.I.R could be registered under the midst of process of investigation came up for consideration before the coordinate Bench of this High Court in Criminal Petition No.15941 of 2012 c/w Criminal Petition No.15852 of 2012 disposed on 5th February, 2012 (Sri GIRISHCHANDRA vs. STATE BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, YADGIR).
26. In the said case, the Investigating Officer on getting credible information that in the Sub-Registrar’s office, the Sub-Registrar was demanding and accepting bribe from the public who were presenting their documents for registration, without registering the said information, proceeded to the Sub-Registrar’s office. Upon search of the Sub-Registrar and other officials, he did not find any money in their possession, but from other persons who were in the office and who were not the officials, substantial sums were found in possession. The Investigating Officer drew up the Mahazar and seized the money from the said persons and thereafter arrested the Sub-Registrar and the official staff and came back to the police station and registered an F.I.R. In the background of the said facts this Court has held that whether registration of F.I.R should precede the investigation or that F.I.R could be registered in the midst of process of investigation would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In a situation where an offence is committed right in the presence of a police officer, it would be imprudent to insist that he should rush to the police station to record the F.I.R. The police officer should immediately act, like apprehending the accused, sending the victim to medical treatment and thereafter registration of F.I.R would be an ideal investigation procedure.
27. In the instant case, PW-10 appears to have failed to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 154 of Cr.P.C., apparently for the reason that the accused confessed the guilt before him and surrendered the weapon used for the commission of the offence. Under the said circumstances, PW-10 appears to have found it necessary to seize the said weapon immediately by securing the panchas and thereafter to go for the registration of the F.I.R. Ofcourse, we do not approve the procedure followed by PW.10 especially in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the case of LALITHA KUMARI VS. GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 wherein considering the legislative intent of section 154 of Cr.P.C., the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that any information disclosing of a cognizable offence is laid before the officer in charge of a Police Station, satisfying the requirements of section 154(1) of the Code, such Police Officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say to register the case on the basis of such information. In the instant case, PW.10 having acted in accordance with section 157 of Cr.P.C. and no prejudice or failure of justice having been made out and moreover, there being no breach of any mandatory requirements of law or jurisdiction in registering the offence or in conducting the investigation, in our view, the irregularities pointed out by the defence do not militate against the case of prosecution in any manner nor do they vitiate the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused. Resultantly, the contention urged in this regard is rejected.
28. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. On reconsideration of the entire evidence and the material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the trial court has rightly convicted the accused for the offence punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code. The findings recorded by the trial court are based on legal evidence. The trial court has relied on the direct testimony of eye witnesses coupled with the corroborating material produced by the prosecution which clearly establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant has not been able to point out any perversity in the findings recorded by the trial court. Hence, we do not find any merits in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. For all these reasons, we proceed to pass the following order:-
Criminal Appeal No.559 of 2012 is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of sentence dated 08.07.2011 passed by the Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-VII, Doddaballapur is confirmed.
Sd/- Sd/-
JUDGE JUDGE Rsk/-Bss.