IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND FOURTEEN PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K. JAISWAL
L.A.A.S. No.97 of 2010
And
CROSS OBJECTIONS (SR) No.11864 of 2010
Between:
The Land Acquisition Officer, Revenue Divisional Officer, Miryalguda, Nalgonda District. And M.Rajendar Reddy and others.
… Appellant/Referring Officer … Respondents THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K. JAISWAL
L.A.A.S. No.97 of 2010
And
CROSS OBJECTIONS (SR) No.11864 of 2010
JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble GC, J)
This appeal has been filed by the State, Land Acquisition Officer, against the order dated 25.02.2009 passed in O.P. No.09 of 2005 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Miryalaguda.
On behalf of the claimants cross objections have also been filed.
Brief facts of the case are that the Land Acquisition Officer, after issuing 4(1) and other statutory notifications, acquired the lands of the claimants for the purpose of formation of bypass road in Miryalaguda Town and passed award dated 19.09.2002 determining the market value of the claimants’ land at Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.2,50,000/- per acre. When the claimants filed protest petitions claiming Rs.1,00,000/- to 5,00,000/- per gunta of land, the Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short “the Act”). After appearance of the claimants, they have filed their respective claim statements claiming Rs.2,000/- per square yard. They have stated in their claim petition that the acquired lands are in the Miryalaguda Municipality and they are adjacent to the existing town and there are several colleges, institutions in the Miryalaguda Town and the lands are having high potentiality as house sites etc., and they are nearer to the developed town therefore, they prayed for compensation at Rs.2,000/- per square yard.
The Assistant Government Pleader for Land Acquisition filed reply statement stating that the contents of the award to be treated as their reply statement and prayed to dismiss the claim of the claimants.
The reference Court framed the following issues for its determination:
“Whether the claimants are entitled for more compensation than what is awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer or not?
The valuation of the present acquired lands which are in the Miryalaguda municipal limits at acreage basis by Land Acquisition Officer is correct or not?
If the valuation by Land Acquisition Officer is not correct then what is the actual market value for which the claimants are entitled?”
During the course of trial, on behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 to 11 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-12 were got marked and on behalf of the State, R.W.1 was examined and Ex.B-1 was got marked.
The reference Court, after considering the entire evidence on record, held that the market value of the present acquired land is Rs.805/- and after deduction of 30% towards developmental charges, determined at Rs.564/- per square yard. Aggrieved by the same, the State filed the present appeal and the claimants also filed their cross objections petition claiming to enhance the compensation.
The learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant would submit that the reference Court had committed an error in passing the impugned order without any basis. He also submitted that the reference Court enhanced the compensation from Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.2,50,000/- per acre to Rs.564/- per square yard i.e. Rs.27,29,760/- per acre without any basis. Further, the reference Court ought to have seen that the Land Acquisition Officer also collected sales statistics of village Miryalaguda for the crucial period of three years preceding the date of publication of notification from the Sub-registrar office.
The reference Court ought not to have considered the sales of small extent of land and small structures for fixing the compensation of large extent of land. Eventually, he submitted that the reference Court ought to have deducted 40% towards developmental charges as the acquired extent of land is large. Further, the reference Court erred in relying on Ex.A-9, which is registered sale deed in which Life Insurance Corporation has purchased the land to an extent of 3000 square yards for Rs.13,35,000/- i.e. at the rate of Rs.445/- per square yard and has fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.564/- per square yard, by wrongly applying the escalation principle. In view of the above, he sought to set aside the impugned order and to allow the appeal.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, claimants, cross objectors, submitted that the reference Court having held that the acquired lands are having high potentialities of being used for house sites and commercial establishments erred in not awarding the compensation as claimed by the claimants. He further submitted that the acquired land is located in Miryalaguda Town, which is Grade-I Municipality and Nagarjunasagar water is being supplied to the villages and consequently the entire area has become rich and the lands value have gone up substantially. The reference Court had committed an error in discarding the sale deeds i.e. Exs.A-1 to A-3 and A-5 to A-8 only on the ground that those sales are between the private parties. Eventually, he submitted that the reference Court erred in deducting 30% of value from the rate of Rs.805/- per square yard when the acquired land is developed and the purpose of acquisition is State Highway therefore, no deduction is warranted. Hence, compensation may be granted more than that of the compensation enhanced by the reference Court. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on various judgements particularly, reported in C.R. NAGARAJA SHETTY v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER AND ESTATE
[1]
OFFICER AND ANOTHER and contended that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, 30% deduction towards developmental charges is not warranted.
Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the claimants and perused the material on record.
The point that arises for consideration is whether any interference of this Court with the impugned judgment is required?
Admittedly, the appellant, after issuing statutory notifications, acquired the claimants’ land for the purpose of formation of bypass road in Miryalaguda Town and determined the market value for the acquired land at Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.2,50,000/- per acre. Having not satisfied with the said market value, the claimants filed protest petitions and the appellant referred the matter under Section 18 of the Act. Thereafter, the reference Court had considered the matter and enhanced the compensation to Rs.564/- per square yard. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant, State, preferred the present appeal and the claimants also filed their cross objections.
The reference Court elaborately discussed all the documents adduced by the parties and found that it is the potentiality of the land for which it is to be used is to be taken into consideration and the capability or amenability of that land for residential purposes is to be considered for valuation at the time of Section 4(1) notification. It is settled law that the actual potentiality of the land at that time is the criteria in determining the market value of that land. In view of the lands being in the Municipal limits and abutting the developed town of Miryalaguda municipality and covered with structures in certain extents and situated in between the railway station and the developed town of municipality of Miryalaguda, valuation of the acquired lands on the basis of some sales of agricultural lands in that area cannot be a correct method of valuation. The five sales relied on by the Land Acquisition Officer shows that some lands are sold at the rate of Rs.80,000/-
per acre. It is not uncommon that to avoid stamp duty and registration charges some vendors and vendees may resort to register the lands even in the municipal limits on acreage basis if not objected by the registering authority. Naturally, the stamp duty for registration will be paid on the basic valuation register in the registration department. In the present case, the parties to those sales relied on by the Land Acquisition Officer are not examined in the Court and the certified copies of sale deeds are also not placed before the Court. In the award itself the Land Acquisition Officer categorically mentioned that he perused 3,254 sales from the sub-registrar office, Miryalaguda ranging from 01.01.1997 to 31.01.2000, that itself shows that within a period of three years there are 3,254 sales of land in the Miryalaguda Town, which shows that there are several sale transactions in the municipal limits of Miryalaguda town during that three year period. Out of those sales as per page 21 No.4 of Ex.B-1 the lands in Sl.Nos.23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 to 1968, 1972, to 2097, 2104, 2141 to 3022, 3035, 3036, 3037 to 3104, 3116, 3117 to 3253 are sold away on yardage basis. Thus it reveals that out of these 3254 sales more than 2000 and odd sales are on yardage basis. Thus, it shows that there are several sales for house plots etc covered under the above registered sales in Miryalaguda Town. Naturally there shall be some more agreement of sales and some more unregistered sales to avoid stamp duty and registration charges. This itself shows that there is lot of demand in Miryalaguda town for the house sites in the year 1997 to January, 2000. Taking into consideration all these aspects, we are of the view that the reference Court did not commit any error in finding fault with the Land Acquisition Officer in fixing the market value of the land on acreage basis. After due consideration of entire evidence on record, the reference Court had rightly, taking into consideration the Ex.A-9, fixed the market value of the acquired land on yard basis. Therefore, we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.
Coming to the issue of deduction of 30% towards developmental charges, the learned Government Pleader contended that the reference Court has committed an error in ordering deduction only 30% instead of 40% even there are instances where the developmental charges are high in nature and the deduction would be up to 75% but in the instant case without assigning any reason made deduction only 30%. Therefore, such a less deduction is not justifiable and it would be at least 40%.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the claimants would submit that it is not in dispute that the principle that where the land is undeveloped the Courts would normally order deduction towards developmental charges ranging from 15% to 75%.
In the instant case, there is no material to show that the lands are undeveloped and on the other hand, the material evidence on record would show that the subject lands are situated in developed area and the Court below found that the subject lands have got good potential and they are being used for house sites. In that view of the matter, it is not warranted to deduct any charges towards development. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the aforesaid referred judgment wherein the Supreme Court observed at para 8 as follows:
“8. The High Court has directed the deduction of Rs.25/- per square feet. Unfortunately, the High Court has not discussed the reason for this deduction of Rs.25/- per square feet nor has the High Court relied on any piece of evidence for that purpose. It is true that where the lands are acquired for public purpose like setting up of industries or setting up of housing colonies or other such allied purposes, the acquiring body would be entitled to deduct some amount from the payable compensation on account of development charges, however, it has to be established by 5 positive evidence that such development charges are justified. The evidence must come for the need of development contemplated and the possible expenditure for such development. We do not find any such discussion in the order of the High Court. As if this is not sufficient, when we see the judgment of the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Bangalore, Rural District, Bangalore in Reference proceedings, we find that there is no deduction ordered for the so-called development charges. We are, therefore, not in a position to understand as to from where such development charges sprang up. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents was also unable to point out any such evidence regarding the proposed development. We cannot ignore the fact that the land is acquired only for widening of the National Highway. There would, therefore, be no question of any such development or any costs therefor.
We, therefore, hold that the High Court has erred in directing the deduction on account of the developmental charges at the rate of Rs.25/- per square feet out of the ordered compensation at the rate of Rs.75/- per square feet. We set aside the judgment to that extent. The claimant would, therefore, be entitled to the compensation at the rate of Rs.75/- per square feet with all the statutory benefits like solatium under Section 23(2), 12% interest under Section 23 (1-A) on the enhanced market value and interest at 9% and 15% as provided under Section 34 of the Act for one year and the rest of the period from the date of taking possession till the date of payment of the compensation awarded in favour of the claimant. With this, we partly allow the appeal and modify the order of the High Court.”
Though it was contended by the learned counsel for the claimant that there is no need for any such deduction in view of the nature of the acquisition for bypass road and location of the acquired land, we are of the view that the reference Court had rightly deducted 30% towards development charges as the acquired lands are situated within the vicinity of Grade-I municipality.
In view of the above, we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and therefore, the appeal as well as cross objection petition are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, appeal and cross objection petition are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any are closed.
JUSTICE G.CHANDRAIAH JUSTICE M.S.K. JAISWAL Date: 24.09.2014 LSK
[1] 2009 (4) ALD 17 (SC)