Heard Mr.N.Manokaran, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.T.Seenivasan, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2, apart from Mr.K.V.Shanmuganathan, learned counsel for the third respondent.
2. The writ petition is directed against the order of the first respondent dated 7.11.2007, by which the first respondent, by exercising his suo moto powers conferred under Section 153(1) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act (for brevity, "the Act"), while setting aside the order dated 29.5.2007 passed by the second respondent under Section 153(1) of the Act, held that the petitioner is deemed to have resigned from service as per his letter of resignation dated 24.1.2005, which was confirmed by the resolution of the third respondent/Bank dated 11.10.2006.
3.1. The brief facts leading to the passing of the impugned order by the first respondent are that the petitioner was appointed as a Clerk in the third respondent/Bank on 19.8.1988 and subsequently, he was promoted as Assistant Secretary of the third respondent/Bank on 31.3.2003. It is stated that due to certain reasons he has submitted his resignation letter on 24.1.2005, which according to him was not accepted for a period of two years. It is his case that on 9.10.2006 and 7.11.2006 he has written letters to the third respondent withdrawing the resignation letter dated 24.1.2005. However, the third respondent/Bank on 11.10.2006 has passed resolution accepting his resignation dated 24.1.2005 and passed appropriate orders.
3.2. As against the resolution of the third respondent dated 11.10.2006, the petitioner has filed an application before the second respondent under Section 153(1) of the Act. The second respondent, after conducting enquiry, by order dated 29.5.2007 directed the third respondent to reconsider the case of the petitioner afresh and pass appropriate orders. However, in the order, the second respondent has recorded a finding that the resignation given by the petitioner on 24.1.2005 was voluntary in nature and not under extraneous circumstances or at the compulsion of anyone.
3.3. It was thereafter, based on the order of the second respondent dated 29.5.2007, the third respondent has passed an order on 13.8.2007 reinstating the petitioner in service as Assistant Secretary. It was in those circumstances, by exercising the suo moto powers under Section 153(1) of the Act, the first respondent has passed the impugned order. Admittedly, the first respondent before passing the impugned order has directed the petitioner by his communication dated 30.10.2007 to appear in person for an enquiry on 5.11.2007 at 5 p.m. It is also admitted by the petitioner that on 5.11.2007 at 5 p.m. he participated in the enquiry conducted by the first respondent. Thereafter, within two days, namely on 7.11.2007, the impugned order came to be passed by the first respondent observing that the second respondent in the earlier order dated 29.5.2007 having found that the petitioner has given resignation on 24.1.2005 voluntarily, ought not to have given direction to the third respondent to reconsider the case of the petitioner and holding that the resignation given by the petitioner on 24.1.2005 having been given voluntarily and having been accepted by the third respondent by resolution dated 11.10.2006, there is no question of reconsidering the case of the petitioner and concluded that the conduct of the third respondent in reinstating the petitioner from 13.8.2007 is not valid in law.
4. The grievance of the petitioner, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that even though the petitioner has appeared for an enquiry on 5.11.2007, within two days the impugned order came to be passed and the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to participate in the enquiry to defend his case.
5. Mr.T.Seenivasan, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 has produced the file. Counter affidavit has also been filed by the respondents. It is seen from the file that the petitioner has, in fact, participated in person in the enquiry conducted by the first respondent on 5.11.2007 and the same is evident from the signature put by him in the proceedings of the first respondent and thereafter, within two days the first respondent has passed the impugned order.
6. It is not the case of the petitioner that he was not permitted to put forth his defence in the suo moto revision. His case is that sufficient opportunity has not been given to him to explain his case before the first respondent and therefore, the first respondent has not followed the principles of natural justice. As it is has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, compliance of principles of natural justice is not an empty formality. It is a meaningful phrase. Wherever it has to be applied, it has to be applied in full sense. What is to be seen is that whether the petitioner should be given reasonable opportunity to put forth his case elaborately once again or not.
7. The facts which are stated above clearly show that the second respondent, who has passed the earlier order dated 29.5.2007 under Section 153(1) of the Act, has given a categoric finding that the petitioner has given resignation letter on 24.1.2005 and the same was given voluntarily and not at the instance of anyone. The records show that the reason that the petitioner has given in the resignation letter is that enormous number of depositors have approached the third respondent for the purpose of refund of money and it was in those circumstances, out of fear, the petitioner and others have submitted resignation letters.
8. Now, another fact which has to be considered is as to whether the letters of the petitioner dated 9.10.2006 and 7.11.2006, stated to have been the letters by which the earlier letter of resignation dated 24.1.2005 was withdrawn, are actually letters of withdrawal of resignation or not.
9. If really the petitioner has given resignation on 24.1.2005 due to the reasons which are beyond his control, due to illness, etc. and thereafter before the resignation letter is accepted by the competent authority if the petitioner either becomes physically alright or otherwise, he is given opportunity to withdraw his resignation so as to enable him to continue his functions and that is the purpose for which such right is given to a government servant to withdraw his resignation. Under the facts of the present case, as it is seen, the resignation is not given on account of illness of the petitioner or for reasons beyond his control, but it is given out of fear, as large number of depositors were seeking refund of the amounts deposited and that does not give a right to the petitioner to rethink to join duty in the third respondent, once the position of the third respondent/bank has become stable.
10. On the other hand, a reading of the said two letters dated 9.10.2006 and 7.11.2006, which are posed to be letters of withdrawal of resignation dated 24.1.2005, makes it abundantly clear that those are not letters withdrawing the resignation letter dated 24.1.2005 at all. The letter dated 9.10.2006 says that even though the petitioner has voluntarily given resignation on 24.1.2005, since there is a change in the Government and the previous Executive Committee has changed and the third respondent/Bank has been brought under the Special Officer's control, he has decided to join duty once again.
11. Again the further letter dated 7.11.2006 of the petitioner states that since the resignation given by the petitioner has not been accepted for two years, he has decided to join duty and therefore, requested the third respondent to give him employment.
12. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even though the contents of the letter may not satisfactorily indicate that it amounts to withdrawing the resignation, the same have to be taken as withdrawal of resignation on a total reading of the said letters. I do not accept the said contention. A reading of the said letters categorically show that the petitioner has never given any reason for the purpose of withdrawing of the earlier letter of resignation dated 24.1.2005. The petitioner has not even stated that he is withdrawing the earlier letter of resignation dated 24.1.2005.
13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to extract the said letters dated 9.10.2006 and 7.11.2006, which read as follows:
Letter dated 9.10.2006:
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED Letter dated 7.11.2006:
VERNACULAR (TAMIL) PORTION DELETED
14. By no stretch of imagination, on a reading of the said letters one can come to a conclusion that the petitioner has by the said letters withdrawn the earlier letter of resignation dated 24.1.2005. In such circumstances, the third respondent, who is the competent authority who has passed the resolution accepting the letter of resignation, is well within its powers. While so, it is not known as to why the second respondent, while considering the application of the petitioner under Section 153(1) of the Act, having recorded the finding that the petitioner has given resignation letter voluntarily on 24.1.2005, has directed third respondent to reconsider the case of the petitioner. The said direction given by the second respondent is totally opposed to the powers conferred on the second respondent under Section 153(1) of the Act.
15. It is only to rectify that patent defect that has been committed by the second respondent while exercising the revisionary power conferred under Section 153(1) of the Act, the first respondent has exercised the suo moto power under Section 153(1) of the Act which is well within his jurisdiction and passed the impugned order. In such view of the matter, the plea made by the petitioner that adequate opportunity has not been given has no meaning at all. By giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner, the petitioner is not going to improve his case.
16. As per the records, the second respondent has found that the petitioner has given resignation voluntarily and there is nothing more to be decided. The only point which has to be decided in the light of the factual finding that the petitioner has given voluntary resignation is whether the second respondent, while exercising the powers conferred under Section 153(1) of the Act, was right in directing the third respondent to consider the case of the petitioner. In my considered opinion, for the foregoing reasons, the second respondent has no business to give such a direction to the third respondent.
For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the first respondent by exercising the suo moto powers under Section 153(1) of the Act is in order and does not warrant interference. The writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.
sasi To:
1. The Additional Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Sales, Plan and Development) Chennai 600 005.
2. The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Erode Region Erode 638 003