JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.
2. The petitioners, who are heirs of tenant Munni Lal, are residing in the premises in question, are carrying on occupation of shoes repairing, as is clear from the assertion made in the application filed by the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', aggrieved by the order dated 18th March, 1992, passed by the prescribed authority, whereby the release application filed by the landlord was allowed, copy' whereof is annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, approached the appellate authority by means of appeal under Section 22 of the Act, which has been dismissed by the appellate authority vide its order dated 15h March, 2002, copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-12 to the writ petition. These are two orders which have been challenged by the petitioners by means of present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3. In short, the facts of the present case are that the landlord-contesting respondent filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act before the prescribed authority for the release of the premises in question for his personal requirement. The prescribed authority considered the case of the respective parties and arrived at the finding that the need of the landlord is bona fide and comparatively more pressing than that of the tenant, therefore, allowed the application and released the premises in question in favour of the landlord. Aggrieved thereby the tenant-petitioners preferred an appeal before the appellate authority under Section 22 of the Act. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the prescribed authority with the finding that the need of the landlord is bona fide and the tilt of the comparative hardship is in favour of the landlord. Sri Pankaj Mithal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-petitioners argued that from the narration of the facts in the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, it is apparent that the requirement of the release of the premises in question is for non-residential premises, inasmuch as the landlord has asserted that in case the shop in question is released in his favour, his wife will start a general merchant business in which he will also help his wife after his retirement, who is likely to be retired from service. On the strength of the aforesaid assertion, Sri Mithal submitted that since it is admitted case of the parties that the premises in question is purely a residential and the release sought for is for establishing a general merchant business by wife of the landlord. Sri Mithal further contended that the release sought for is in fact for non-residential purposes and in view of the third proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, which is reproduced below, the prescribed authority as well as the appellate authority has committed manifest error of law, therefore, this application ought to have been rejected by the prescribed authority :
"Provided also that no application under Clause (a) shall be entertained...........
(i) .........................................
(ii) in the case of any residential building, for occupation for business purposes,
(iii) ........................................"
4. It can be better explained from the assertion made by the landlord in his application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, which is annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Paragraph 1 whereof is reproduced below :
"1. That the applicant is the owner and landlord of the premises more fully described at the foot of the application and the O.P. is tenant of the applicant on monthly rent @ Rs. 7.60 p.m. and the O.P. carries on business of shoe repairing, therein."
5. In view of the aforesaid admission of the landlord, which has not been denied by the tenant-petitioners, I do not think that the statutory provision, which is brought for the help of tenant by learned counsel for the tenant is really applicable to the facts of present case, there is no evidence on record that accommodation is used purely for residential purposes or that it is allotted as residential purposes, therefore, the views taken by the prescribed authority as well as by the appellate authority do not warrant any interference by this Court. No other point was argued on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner. This writ petition therefore has no force and deserves to be dismissed.
6. Lastly it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners-tenant that the tenant may be granted some reasonable time to vacate the premises in question. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also in the interest of justice, I direct that the order of eviction will not be executed against the petitioners till 30th June, 2005, provided :
(i) the tenant-petitioner furnishes undertaking before the prescribed authority within three weeks' from today that tenant will handover the peaceful vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlord on or before 30th June, 2005 ;
(ii) the tenant will pay/deposit the entire arrears of rent/ damages at the rate of rent, if the same has not already deposited, to the landlord within the same period and further he continues to pay the rent/damages as and when the same falls due by first week of each succeeding month, so long he remains in possession or till 30th June, 2005, whichever is earlier ;
(iii) in the event of default of any one of the conditions mentioned above, it will be open for the landlord to execute the order of eviction.
7. With the aforesaid observation, this writ petition is dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.