Hon'ble Naheed Ara Moonis, J.
The petitioners are owner of plots no. 62, 144 and 145 of village Balpur Patti, Pargana Jahanabad, Tehsil and District Pilibhit. A notification dated 21.8.2012 was issued by the Central Government under Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), which was for acquisition of the plots of the petitioners, as well as a large number of other plots. The said notification was published in the newspapers on 12.9.2012. Several land owners whose land was involved in the said notification, filed their objections alongwith the one dated 18.10.2012 filed by the petitioners, the hearing of which is said to have taken place on 29.1.2013. Thereafter, vide order dated 26.2.2013, the objections were decided against the petitioners.. Subsequently, the notification under Section 3-D of the Act was issued on 17.4.2013, which was published on 28.5.2013. The compensation has also been awarded vide order dated 30.9.2013 and a notice has been issued by the competent authority on 7.12.2013 asking the land owners to collect the amount of compensation, which had been deposited in the Bareilly Treasury.
Challenging the said notifications dated 21.8.2012 and 17.4.2013 issued under Sections 3-A and 3-D of the Act respectively, this writ petition has been filed. The orders dated 26.2.2013 and 30.9.2013 whereby the objections of the petitioners have been decided and the determination of the compensation has been made, have also been challenged. A further prayer has also been made for a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from the plots in question.
We have heard Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Counsel along with Sri Arpit Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as Sri Pranjal Mehrotra, learned counsel for the contesting respondent no. 3-National Highway Authority of India (N.H.A.I.) and have perused the record. Though notice has been served on learned Assistant Solicitor General of India appearing for the respondents no. 1 and 2 but he has neither put in appearance nor has any counter affidavit been filed. Pleadings between the contesting parties have been exchanged and with consent of learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself.
The challenge to the notifications and the order disposing of the objections is in two folds. Firstly, it is contended that the notification issued under Section 3-A of the Act is wholly vague and has been issued mechanically without application of mind. It is secondly contended that the objections have been decided without giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, and without considering the specific objection/proposal of the petitioner with regard to the alternate plan/site, which would be available to the respondents, and consequently the need of such acquisition of the plots of the petitioners not being there.
Sri Pranjal Mehrotra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent no. 3-N.H.A.I. has firstly submitted that the petitioners have not approached the Court within a reasonable time for the disposal of their objections, as the objections were decided on 26.2.2013 whereas the writ petition has been filed in February, 2014. The notifications, which have been challenged in this petition, were also issued nearly ten months before the filing of this writ petition. It has thus been contended that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches. He has further submitted that the notification under Section 3-A of the Act is neither vague nor has been issued mechanically, as it gives the specific plots of land to be acquired and the purpose for acquiring the same. As regards the disposal of the objections of the petitioners, Sri Pranjal Mehrotra has submitted that the purpose of acquisition was clearly stated in the notifications, which was for widening the National Highway and as per the technical report of the Authority, the question of there being alternate site or plan being available (as suggested by the petitioners) because of which plots of the petitioners should not have been acquired, was neither feasible nor relevant.
Learned counsel for both the parties have relied on certain decisions of the Apex Court, which shall be dealt with at the relevant stage.
The first question to be considered is regarding the laches in filing this petition. Since the question raised by the petitioners would go to the root of the case, inasmuch as they claim that the notification issued under Section 3-A itself was bad because of vagueness, we are of the view that this writ petition does not deserve to be thrown out merely on the ground of laches. In support of this, we rely on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory, 2005 (13) SCC 477, which has been given while dealing with the acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act itself and paragraph 11 of the said judgement is reproduced:
"11. The learned counsel supporting the acquisition submitted that the delay in filing the Writ Petition is fatal to the case of land owners. It is true that 11th June, 1998 Notification was challenged only in September, 2001 by filing the Writ Petition. But if the Notification violates the very statute from which it derives its force, will delay in challenging it clothe it with legitimacy? The Act requires the Notification to be issued in a particular manner with brief particulars of land being acquired. The Notification in this case fails to meet this requirement. We have held it to be bad in law. It has no legs to stand. The conduct of the opposite party cannot be used to make it stand. Moreover, the Writ Petitioners have explained the reasons for the delay in filing the Writ Petition."
As regards the contention of the petitioners that the notification issued under Section 3-A is wholly vague, inasmuch as, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, it merely reproduced the provisions of Section 3-A by mentioning that the land is required for the building, maintenance, management or operation of the national highway, we are of the view that on a careful reading of the said notification, it does specify that it is required for the broadening/four laning/two laning of the National Highway No. 74 and gives the details of the points from where to where the said widening is to be done.
The Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Kushala Shetty, (2011) 12 SCC 69 has also, while considering a case based on similar facts, held that where the purpose of acquisition is widening of three national highways and the notification also describes the plots proposed to be acquired, the same would be sufficient. As such, we are of the opinion that the purpose given in the notification under Section 3-A is neither vague nor has been issued mechanically and as such, does not deserve to be quashed on the ground of vagueness.
The other question, which is to considered by this Court, is as to whether the objections raised by the petitioners were considered properly and with application of mind or not.
The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there were two type of objections raised by the petitioners, one related to utility of the plots for the petitioners from which they were earning their livelihood to the extent of about two lacs per bigha per annum, which is sought to be acquired, and since it was fertile land, it should not be acquired. The other objection was to the effect that the construction of bypass road was not necessary because nearly 100 meters away, there was another National Highway leading to the same destination. To substantiate the same, they have filed a site plan showing that a highway already goes to same destination passing through a railway line, and the present proposed highway would thus be unnecessary and involve huge expenditure of the State.
It is contended that the objections, which were decided on 26.2.2013, dealt with the objections raised by the 14 land owners and the decision taken on these objections have been generalized by the competent authority, inasmuch as it has only dealt with the first objection and not even mentioned about the second objection.
The first objection primarily relates to the value of the land, which is a matter to be considered at the stage of grant of compensation. The acquisition proceedings cannot thus be quashed on this ground as long as the purpose of acquisition is found to be justified.
In support of his contention dealing with the objection of land owners with regard to there being alternate site, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hukum Chand versus State of Haryana, (2013) 11 SCC 578 wherein it has been held that 'not only this, he can produce evidence to show that another piece of land is available and the same can be utilised for execution of the particular project or scheme.' Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on two other decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 4 SCC 210 and Gurbinder Kaur Brar vs. Union of India, (2013) 11 SCC 228 to support his contention that the hearing in the objections should be effective and not be an empty formality. It has been contended that in the present case, no adequate opportunity of hearing was given to the parties in support of their objections nor were they permitted to be represented through any legal practitioner.
As regards the latter point, which is with regard to the petitioners not being provided proper hearing, we are of the view that at no stage had the petitioners filed any application before the competent authority to be represented through a legal practitioner or for filing any further evidence. Even otherwise, the hearing of the objections was held on 29.1.2013 and thereafter objections were decided on 26.2.2013. In between these dates or even thereafter, prior to the passing of the order or filing of this petition, at no stage had the petitioners raised any such grievance before any authority whatsoever. In our view, if the petitioners had any such grievance, they should have produced some documents to show that they had raised such grievance either before the competent authority or the Central Government, with regard to the petitioners not being provided proper opportunity of filing evidence or of hearing on their objections. As such, in the facts of this case we are unable to hold that the petitioners were not provided adequate opportunity before their objections were decided.
We now come to the last question, which is with regard to there being no consideration of the second objection of the petitioners, which was to the effect that there could be an alternate site or plan for the proposed national highway and hence the acquisition of the plots of the petitioners was not necessary. Though there is no consideration of the same in the order dated 26.2.2013, yet in matters of building of National Highways, the Courts would normally be very conservative in interfering with such acquisition proceedings as it is a technical matter of how and where the National Highway should be laid out. Though not directly, but the Apex Court has considered this aspect in the case of Union of India vs. Kushala Shetty (supra) and the relevant paragraph 28 of the said judgement is reproduced below:
"28. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of National Highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex-facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In the case in hand, neither any violation of mandate of the 1956 Act has been established nor the charge of malice in fact has been proved. Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained."
Technically the competent authority should have looked into the matter and given its finding on the said objections. However, we have considered the matter in light of the aforementioned decisions of the Apex Court as well as what has been stated in paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit, which is to the effect that the existing highway passes through a level railway crossing, which causes delay because of closure of railway crossing and very often accidents take place on the site, and that the turning radius near level crossing for vehicles plying on road is not adequate as per National Highways norms for which a Railway over-bridge has to be constructed, which has been technically designed and approved by the Railway authorities for which the land of the petitioners would be required.
Such explanation ought to have been given while deciding the objections of the petitioners but in the facts of the present case, not having decided such objections of the petitioners would not be fatal as the same can be considered by this Court while disposing of this petition as there would be no purpose in remanding the case back to the authorities for re-consideration on this ground alone. Even otherwise, except for a bald statement/objection that there could be an alternate site plan, without the petitioners placing on record any material or evidence in support thereof, would be meaningless. Accordingly, this objection of the petitioners also does not hold ground as from the site plan itself (which has been filed by the petitioners) the submission of learned counsel for the respondent appears to be correct that the Railway Over Bridge, which would be necessary as per the technical report, cannot be constructed at the same site as there would not be enough turning radius.
We may reiterate that the consideration by the Court while dealing with cases under the Land Acquisition Act would be different from the cases, which fall under the National Highways Act. In latter cases, the purpose is of construction of road or Highway, which is a highly technical matter and would, as such, be different from the acquisition of land for the purpose of setting up an industry or housing colony which is covered under the Land Acquisition Act. The cases, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to how the objections are to be dealt with, are all under Land Acquisition Act and not under the National Highways Act.
In the aforesaid facts of this case, we are of the view that the second objection of the petitioners was also not such that the acquisition could be held to be bad on this count.
For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.