IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF MAY, 2019 :PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE L.NARAYANA SWAMY AND THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS WRIT APPEAL NO.4854 OF 2013(LA-RES) BETWEEN KONKAN RAILWAY CORPORATION LIMITED, SHRIWAD KARWAR 581 306 KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY ITS ESTATE OFFICER SHRI RAJU PATGAR S/O SHRI P T PATGAR AGED 46 YEARS ... APPELLANT (BY SRI MADHUSUDHAN R NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI ABHISHEK MALIPATIL, ADVOCATE) AND 1. K GOPALKRISHNA PRABHU S/O SRINIVAS @ SARVOTHAMA PRABHU PRESENT ADDRESS:
R/AT MADHAVA BHAVAN POST SRINIVASANAGARA SURATKAL, MANGALORE TALUK DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT PIN-575014 2. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER CUM ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER MANGALORE SUB DIVISION MANGALORE 575010 DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT 3. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT REVENUE DEPARTMENT M S BUILDING BANGALORE 560 001 ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI K CHANDRANATH ARIGA, ADVOCATE FOR R1 SRI V SREENIDHI, AGA FOR R2 & R3) THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN THE WRIT PETITION 4947/2012 DATED 30/8/12.
THIS WRIT APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, DEVDAS J, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT The question that was raised for consideration before the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.4947/2012 is whether an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) could be entertained if it is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein?
2. Sri Madhusudhan.R.Naik, learned Senior Counsel submits that when the learned Single Judge heard the matter, the decisions of the Apex Court which were holding the field were Union of India and Ors.
/vs./ Mangatu Ram and Ors.1, Tota Ram /vs./ State of U.P. and Ors.2, which were followed in State of A.P.
1 AIR 1997 SC 2704 2 (1997) 6 SCC 280 and Anr. /vs./ Marri Venkaiah and Ors.3, But the said decisions of the Apex Court were not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. As a consequence, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No.1 herein, while directing the authorities to re-determine the compensation by entertaining the application filed by the respondent No.1 herein, in proceedings LAQ:CR:50/11-12, in terms of the enhanced compensation which was granted to other Land Owners similarly placed and as determined in LAC No.44/1992, on the file of the III Addl. Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Mangalore.
3. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the law declared by the Apex Court in the decisions mentioned above would clearly hold that an application under Section 28A is to be filed within three months from the date of the award passed by the reference Court. No application could be entertained beyond the period of three months, from the date of the award. The learned Senior Counsel would further submit that this 3 AIR 2003 SC 2949 position has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Popat Bahiru Govardhane etc., /vs./ Special Land Acquisition Officer and Anr.4, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765.
4. Sri K.Chandranath Ariga, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 submits that the Land Acquisition Officer was duty bound to conduct an enquiry as provided in Clause (2) of Section 28A of the Act. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the LAO should have conducted an enquiry to find out whether there was any delay in filing the application, taking into consideration the reasons furnished by the respondent No.1, explaining the delay.
5. Heard Sri Madhusudan.R.Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Sri K.Chandranth Ariga, learned Counsel for respondent No.1 and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3.
6. The provision in Section 28A of the Act, as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Mangatu 4 2013(10) SCC 765 Ram and Ors, Tota Ram, Marri Venkaiah and reiterated in Popat Bahiru (supra) leaves no room to doubt that an application under Section 28A is required to be filed within a period of three months from the date of the award passed by the Reference Court. The provision further provides that the period of limitation is to be calculate excluding the date on which the award is made and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award. In view of the express language of the statutes, the question of knowledge of the applicant did nor arise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court/Authority has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
7. Since the provision does not contemplate filing of application within 3 months from the date of knowledge of the award having been passed, the question of holding an enquiry by the LAO, to find out if the application is in time and whether the delay could be condoned, does not arise. Such an argument at the hands of the respondent No.1, cannot be countenanced.
8. It is trite to note that their Lordships, have infact observed that the statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to particular party. But the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maximum “dura lex sed lex”, which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has been consistently held that inconvenience is not a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.”
9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 30.08.2012 in W.P.No.4947/2012, is hereby set aside.
SD/- JUDGE KLY/ SD/- JUDGE