JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. The petitioner Km. Rohini Singh appeared in the entrance test for admission to M.Ed. course 1997-98 conducted by Banaras Hindu University (for short 'B.H.U.'). On 8.9.1997 a letter was received by her from the Faculty of Education, B.H.U. to present herself with certain documents for verification and confirmation of admission. On 12.9.1997, she submitted required documents and on verification, she was admitted. A fee of Rs. 223 which was meant for B.H.U. students was accepted from her. In this manner, she was admitted to M.Ed., course 1997-98. When she was pursuing her studies in the said course, a letter dated 15.9.1997 was received by the father of the petitioner, which indicated that her admission to M.Ed, course has been cancelled. It was alleged that the impugned order dated 15.9.1997 was passed without affording her an opportunity of hearing. The petitioner therefore, made a representation to the Visitor the Hon'ble President of india, New Delhi disclosing all the relevant facts. Simultaneously, she also filed Civil Misc. Writ No. 36997 of 1997, which was dismissed on 6.11.1997 on the ground that the petitioner had already taken recourse to the alternative remedy of approaching the Visitor. It was observed that the representation of the petitioner shall be decided expeditiously.
2. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india was filed to ventilate the grievance that no orders on the representation of the petitioner have been communicated to her and that the order dated 15.9.1997 cancelling her admission be quashed. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the petitioner was intimated by letter dated 15.5.1998 that her representation has been rejected by the Visitor of the University. Necessary amendment was sought to challenge the validity of the order rejecting the representation and now in the amended petition, the petitioner has claimed two distinct reliefs ; firstly that the impugned orders dated 15.9.1997, Annexure-12, cancelling the admission of the petitioner and the order dated 15.5.1998 communicating rejection of the representation of the petitioner dated 6.11.1997 be quashed and secondly, the respondents be commanded not to stop/obstruct the petitioner in her pursuing and completing the M.Ed, course and to appear in 1997-98 examination. An omnibus prayer has also been made that the Court may pass any other writ, order or direction as it may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
3. It is an indubitable fact that the petitioner has been granted admission treating her to be a B.H.U. student. The respondent-University does not dispute the fact that the petitioner was admitted in M.Ed. course on 12.9.1997. It is, however, urged that the petitioner was not a bona fide and regular student of the respective Faculty of the University as she had passed her B.A. (Hons.). 1996 and B.Ed, course, 1997 from Arya Mahtla Degree College. Varanasi. an affiliated college of the University. Therefore, she is not a B.H.U. student as provided in the information Bulletin for P.E.T. course, 1997-98. According to the provisions contained in Clause 16 (a) in the information Bulletin, at page 10 thereof, the expression 'B.H.U. student' has been defined to mean :
"A B.H.U. student is one who has been admitted through University Entrance Test, B.H.U. and has passed the qualifying examination from the institute/Faculty/Mahila Mahavidyalaya. Banaras Hindu University in the year of the test or one year immediately preceding the test. However, every such candidate shall be required to appear in the P.E.T. and also fulfil the minimum eligibility requirements for appearing in P.E.T."
4. On the basis of above definition, the stand taken by the B.H.U. is that the petitioner cannot be conferred any benefit for advantage as B.H.U. student. It was also made clear that the total intake of the students in M.Ed, course Is only against 25 seats including three supernumerary seats. Out of the 22 regular seats available for admission. 6 fall to the candidates belonging to different reserved categories. The remaining 16 regular seats are to be shared half and half by general candidates (i.e., who are not B.H.U, students) and B.H.U. students' general quota, meaning thereby, 8 seats are to go to the B.H.U. students' general quota and 8 seats are to be filled by the general candidates who may not necessarily be B.H.U, students. According to B.H.U., inadvertently in the merit list, only 7 candidates were shown against general candidates' seats instead of 8 candidates and 8 candidates were shown against B.H.U. students' seats. Thus, instead of making admission of 16 candidates against general candidates and B.H.U. general students, only 15 candidates were admitted. Due to this inadvertence/mistake during the process of admission, it is alleged. the petitioner was wrongly offered admission as per decision of the Admission Committee as a general student against left over seat of general students. Later on, when the mistake was detected, the first candidate of B.H.U. quota was shifted to that left over seat of general students' category who had secured 230 marks which were higher than 222 marks secured by the petitioner. It was in these circumstances that the petitioner's admission was cancelled as per decision of Admission Committee. According to the respondent-University, the petitioner ceased to be a bona fide student of M.Ed, course after the cancellation of her result on 15.9.1997 but somehow, she evaded the service of the cancellation order and continued to join classes upto 4.10.1997 on which date cancellation letter was served upon her through registered post.
5. Heard Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri V. K. Upadhyaya, for the respondent - University.
6. The controversy in the present writ petition lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner who was admitted in M.Ed, course in the respondent-University has been denied the benefit to join the classes primarily on the ground that she was not a B.H.U. student and, therefore, her admission had been wrongly ordered and that no sooner the mistake was realised, a communication was sent to the petitioner not to attend the classes. Sri V. K. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the respondent-University urged that the expression 'B.H.U. student' as defined in Clause 16 (a) of the information Bulletin is virtually a statutory provision as the information Bulletin for Post Graduate Entrance Test, 1997-98 is the outcome of the statutory special ordinances framed and recommended by the Academic Council and approval by the Executive Council of Banaras Hindu University and since the said ordinances have been framed by the University in exercise of powers vested in the University under Section 18 of the Banaras Hindu University Act, 1915, the information Bulletin has the statutory force. Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged this contention. It was pointed out that prior to her admission to M.Ed, course in B.H.U., the petitioner was a student in Arya Mahila Degree College, Varanasi, which is an affiliated institution to B.H.U. for purposes of conferring degrees and migration, etc., and therefore, for all practical purposes, the petitioner shall be treated to be the student of B.H.U. as the expression 'University' includes affiliated college. It was also asserted that it is incorrect to say that the information Bulletin has statutory backing. It was not adopted as a statutory special ordinance framed and recommended by the Academic Council B.H.U. The assertion of Sri Upadhyaya is clearly in opposition to the stand taken in para 17 of the counter-affidavit in which it has been stated that the rules of admission have been framed by the experts in educational field and the Academic Council of the University has taken into account the pros and cons of its applicability on the students. The information Bulletin simply contains the parameters of admission which have been devised for regulating the admission to Post Graduate courses of the year 1997-98. With the rejoinder-affidavit, rules, regulations and ordinances, covering admission of students have been annexed as Annexure-R.A. 1. There is no such requirement that there shall be 50% quota for the B.H.U. students for admission to M.Ed, course and that the expression 'B.H.U. student' excludes the students who have studied in the affiliated colleges of the University. It appears that the various informations circulated through a Bulletin have been incorporated for the sake of convenience and to regulate the admissions. The categorization of the candidates in two categories, i.e., the B.H.U. and non-B.H.U. students is otiose. Even Otherwise, the respondent-University could not admit B.H.U. quota Students for and in place of non-B.H.U. quota students if the students of latter category are available. A bare perusal of the list of the admitted students, a copy of which is Annexure-9 to the writ petition would reveal that even out of 7 students of general quota. 6 students from serial numbers 1 to 6 belong to B.H.U. student's quota. Blneta Dawn at SI. No. 7 is a student of general category. i.e., non-B.H.U. quota. The chart of admission, Annexure-9. Indicates that the various seats falling in the B.H.U. students' category have been filled in by transposing the students who should have been in the B.H.U. quota category. The result of this anomalous situation has been that the seats in the category of non-B.H.U. students have been consumed by the B.H.U. students thereby reducing/eliminating the chance of non-B.H.U. students to find a berth in M.Ed, course. What reasons Impelled the authorities to adopt such a course of action is a fact, which remains hidden in the penumbral zone far away from judicial scrutiny.
7. There is yet another aspect of the matter. After excluding the supernumerary seats, there were admittedly 22 seats available to the B.H.U. non-B.H.U. and reserved category students. Out of 22. 6 seats have gone to the candidates of reserved category. The remaining 16 seats are to be shared half and half, i.e.. 8 seats each by the B.H.U. students and the general candidates, i.e., non-B.H.U. students. The respondent-University instead of making admission to 16 seats, admitted 15 candidates, including the present petitioner. When the mistake was detected, the respondent-University shifted first candidate of B.H.U. quota to the left over quota of general candidates who had secured 230 marks. The petitioner was deprived to continue her studies of M.Ed, course as she had secured only 222 marks, i.e., less than the candidate who was shifted from B.H.U. quota to general category. There was no justification for shifting a B.H.U. student to a non-B.H.U, category. If the candidate who had secured 230 marks and was of the category of B.H.U. students had not been shifted to general category, the petitioner would have continued to pursue her course. In any case, at least one seat was available to accommodate the petitioner in either of the categories.
8. The provisional admission of the petitioner in M.Ed, course was confirmed by accepting the fee of Rs. 223 which is meant for the B.H.U. students. After admission, the petitioner attended the classes upto 4th October. 1997 when she was finally stopped and prevented to join the classes. The order dated 15.9.1997 by which the decision of the Admission Committee to cancel the admission of the petitioner was communicated was served on her on 4.10.1997. Sri Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the said order on two specific grounds ; firstly, that it was passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as. no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner, and, secondly, even if the petitioner was admitted on account of mistake of the respondent-University, it is now estopped from cancelling the admission and preventing the petitioner from pursuing her M.Ed. course. Sri Upadhyaya repelled both these submissions and urged that since the admission of the petitioner was the outcome of the mistake on the part of the authorities of the University, no notice was required to be given to her for correcting the mistake which has crept in the process of admission. According to him, the rules of natural justice are not rigid rules ; they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and the back ground of the statutory provisions, nature of the right, which may be affected and the consequences, which may entail on its application. It was pointed out that the question of applicability of principles of natural justice is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.
9. The law on the point is well embedded. An administrative authority in dealing with a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding is required to follow the principles of natural justice and fair-play and give an opportunity of hearing to the affected person. Even if the proceeding is not judicial or quasi-judicial, but an administrative matter affecting the rights of the party, the authority concerned is required to act in a just and fair manner in deciding the controversy and requirement of just and fair procedure mandates that a reasonable opportunity of hearing should be given to the party proceeded against. The law on the point has been thrashed out in a recent Full Bench decision of this Court in Iqbal Ahmad v. State of V. P., 1998(1) AWC 288.
10. A complete answer to the submission of learned counsel for the respondent-University is to be found in Hardayal and another v. State of J. and K. and another, AIR 1997 J. and K. 1. in which reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Board of High School and intermediate Education, U. P. v. Km. Chitra Sriuastava, AIR 1970 SC 1039. It was held that the compliance with rules of natural justice is required, not only in cases of quasi-judicial orders but also in cases of administrative orders from which civil consequences or penal consequences flow. The objective behind the compliance with the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and arbitrariness as well as to secure a fair and impartial order from the concerned authorities. In Chitra Srivastaua's case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that whether a duty arose in a particular case to issue a show cause notice before inflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority's satisfaction that the person to be penalised has no defence but on the nature of the order proposed to be passed. The fact that in the view of the authorities, the student would have no defence to the cancellation of his/her admission, even if a notice to show cause had been given, is not a valid ground for not giving such opportunity. In the instant case, the respondent-University was required to give a notice to the petitioner and to give her a reasonable opportunity to explain the position. It was admittedly not done. One cannot, therefore, escape from the conclusion that the principles of natural justice were not only flagrantly violated but were thrown to winds and the petitioner was treated in a most unjustified, arbitrary and capricious manner.
11. Now I come to the other limb of submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was urged that even if the stand of the respondent-University is accepted to be correct in its entirety, the admission of the petitioner could not be cancelled as the respondent-University was estopped to do so. For the mistake of the University, it was urged, petitioner should not suffer. In support of this contention. Sri Aditya Narain placed emphatic reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Chand Singhvi v. University of Jodhpur, 1989 (15) ALR (SC) 357. In that case, the Vice-Chancellor had accepted the recommendations made by the Dean and on 16.1.1988 an order for admission to Ashok Chand Singhvl was issued by the Dean, Faculty of Engineering. Pursuant to the order of admission, Singhvi deposited the requisite fee and joined the classes from January 16. 1988 onwards. He was communicated on 9.2.1988 with an order dated 20.1.1988 of the Dean, directing that his admission was put in abeyance until further orders. The matter went before the Supreme Court. The following observations of the Supreme Court at page 360 of the report are quoted for ready reference :
"It is submitted on behalf of the University that it was through mistake that the appellant was admitted. We are unable to accept the contention. It has been already noticed that both the Dean and the Vice-Chancellor considered the objections raised by the Offlcer-in-Charge admissions and thereafter direction for admitting the appellant was made. When after considering all facts and circumstances and also the objections by the office to the admission of a candidate, the Vice-Chancellor directs the admission of such a candidate, such admission could not be said to have been made through mistake. Assuming that the appellant was admitted through mistake, the appellant not being at fault, it is difficult to sustain the order withholding the admission of the appellant. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Kamataka University and another. 1986 (Suppl.) SCC 740. In that case, the appellants were admitted to certain private Engineering Colleges for the B.E. Degree Course, although they were not eligible for admission. In that case, this Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the students whose admissions were subsequently cancelled and the order of cancellation was upheld by the High Court. At the same time this Court took the view that the fault lay with the Engineering Colleges which admitted the appellants and that there was no reason why the appellants should suffer for the sin of the management of these Engineering Colleges. Accordingly, this Court allowed the appellants to continue their studies in the respective Engineering Colleges in which they were granted admission. The same principle which weighed with this Court in this case should also be applied in the instant case. The appellant was not at fault and we do not see why he should suffer for the mistake committed by Vice-chancellor and the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering.
A reference may also be made to another decision of the Supreme Court in Sanction Gauda v. Beharampur University and others, (1990) 3 SCC 23. The principle which weighed with the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Chand Singhvi and Rajendra Prasad Mathur (supra), would squarely apply to the instant case, Even assuming that the petitioner, on account of the mistake of the authorities of the University was wrongly admitted to M.Ed. course, there being no fault on the part of the petitioner, her admission could not be cancelled. She cannot be prevented to pursue her studies in M.Ed, course as obviously the petitioner was not at fault in bringing about a situation, if at all there was any mistake. The impugned order dated 15.9.1997 which has the effect of cancellation of the admission of the petitioner in M.Ed, course cannot be sustained on the above two grounds and has, therefore, to be quashed.
12. Sri V. K. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the respondent-University urged that the relief claimed by the petitioner cannot be granted as the academic session of 1997-98 for which she was admitted in M.Ed, course, has come to an end. According to him. since the session stands concluded, and the final examinations of M.Ed, course of the year, 1998 has taken place, and the result of the said examination has already been declared, coupled with the fact that the admissions for 1998-99 session have already been made, the petitioner cannot be allowed to pursue the studies on the basis of admission of the session 1997-98. To fortify his submission. Sri Upadhyay placed reliance on the decision dated 9.4.1998 in Kamlesh Chandra Mishra v. Vice-chancellor. B.H.U. and others. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35718 of 1997, (unreported decision), in which reliance was placed in the case of Dr. Pramod Kumar Joshi v. Medical Council of india and others, JT 1991 (5) SC 186. I have given thoughtful consideration to the matter. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-University on the point related to admission either to Medical course or to M.Sc. Physics, in which periodical practical tests are prescribed. The reason which weighed with the Court was that since the petitioner has not studied the subject for the whole year, he cannot be granted permission to appear in the examination at a late stage even if it is found that the petitioner was wrongly refused admission. In the present case, since the petitioner was wrongly refused admission and unlawfully prevented from pursuing her studies in M.Ed, course in the session 1997-98, as well as, she was not allowed to appear in the 1998 examination, she can be allowed to pursue her studies during the 1998-99 session. After all it was the fault of the respondents who stopped the petitioner from pursuing her studies and to appear in the examination. The session 1998-99 has commenced only a few months back. The petitioner can make up her studies, as the M.Ed, course primarily involves study in theory papers and at the fag end of the session certain practical training is imparted, which stage has not yet come in the current session. I am of the view that the petitioner who ought to have been allowed to pursue her studies in 1997-98 session and was wrongfully prevented for no fault on her part, she should be allowed to Join the M.Ed, course in the current session. The high-handed manner in which the petitioner has been dealt by the respondent-University cannot but be condemned.
13. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are hereby commanded to give admission to the petitioner in the M.Ed, course for the current session 1998-99 immediately. The petitioner shall not be prevented. In any manner, from pursuing her studies and to appear at the final examinations in the year 1999, after the conclusion of the session. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the petitioner shall get Rs. 2,000 as costs from the respondent-University.