JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner-tenant, aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court hereby the trial Court decreed suit filed by the landlord, approached the revisional Court under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The revisional Court dismissed the revision filed by the petitioner-tenant, thus this writ petition.
2. The plaintiff-landlord filed a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on the ground that the petitioner is defaulter in payment of rent and has not paid rent beyond 1st October, 1981. A decree for ejectment and arrears of rent was sought. It is stated that since the construction is the new construction, provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 do not apply. The petitioner-tenant filed written statement and has taken defence that since the construction in question is a new construction, therefore, provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 do not apply. The petitioner also stated that the petitioner was tenant of the premises in question since before its reconstruction which was reconstructed when the landlord filed an application under Section 21 (1) (b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 before the prescribed authority in the year 1978 wherein allegations were that the building is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. It was, therefore, prayed by the landlord-respondent in its application under Section 21(1) (b) that the building may be released in his favour so that the building may be demolished and reconstructed. During the pendency of the aforesaid case before the prescribed authority the parties entered into a compromise dated 6th November 1979. Pursuant to the said compromise it was agreed upon between the petitioner-tenant and respondent-landlord that the tenant will vacate the premises for demolition and reconstruction and after reconstruction the landlord agreed to let out the agreed space in the newly constructed building on a monthly rent of Rs. 80/- per month. In pursuance thereto the premises has come up after reconstruction and the tenant has entered into possession of the specified space but as stated above the petitioner has not paid any rent as agreed upon in the compromise dated 6th November, 1979 which was subject matter of the order of release passed by the prescribed authority.
3. The landlord also stated that since there was no allotment under Section 24(2) of the Act in favour of the petitioner-tenant, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for protection of the Act and is liable for ejectment. The petitioner, as stated above, has submitted that in view of provisions of Section 24 of the Act the allotment under Sub-section (2) of Section 24 will be required only in favour of such person where the landlord has not put in a tenant in possession of the premises under Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act whereas in the present case the petitioner-tenant has enter into the premises under Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act.
4. The opening sentence of. Section 24, which is reproduced below, clearly makes Sub-section (1) distinguishable from cases under Sub-section (2):
"(1) Where a building is released in favour of the landlord and the tenant is evicted under Section 21 or on appeal under Section 22, and the landlord either puts or causes to be put into occupation thereof any person different from the person for whose occupation according to the landlord's representation, the building was required, or permits any such person to occupy it, or otherwise puts it to any use other than the one for which it was released, or as the case may be, omits to occupy it within one month of such extended period as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession or, in the case a building which was proposed to be occupied after some construction or reconstruction, from the date of completion thereof, or in the case of a building which was proposed to be demolished, omits to demolish it within two moths or such extended period as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession, then the prescribed authority or, as the case may be, the District Judge, may, on an application in that behalf within three months from the date of such act or omission, order the landlord to place the evicted tenant in occupation of the building on the original terms and conditions, and on such order being made, the landlord and any person who may be in occupation thereof shall give vacant possession of the building to the said tenant, falling which, the prescribed authority shall put him into possession and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary.
5. Here in view of compromise entered into between the parties before the prescribed authority, tenant has been put into possession after reconstruction and since the landlord had put back the petitioner-tenant into possession the provisions of Section 24(2) do not apply. This argument of the petitioner has to be accepted. Learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent contended that even assuming that the tenant was validly occupying the premises but since he has defaulted in payment of rent as agreed upon in the compromise dated 6th November, 1979, the landlord has every right to file suits after determining tenancy of the tenant and thus the suit was maintainable. On the applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 suffice to say, even assuming for the argument sake. Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable since the trial Court as well as the revisional Court has arrived at a concurrent finding that the suit was filed after determining tenancy of the petitioner-tenant who was in default, therefore, the suit was liable to be decreed and, therefore, has rightly been decreed which has been affirmed by the revisional Court.
6. No other point was argued.
7. In view of what has been stated above and the concurrent findings I do not find any error in the orders passed by the trial Court as well as the revisional Court. Therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
8. Lastly learned Counsel for the petitioner prayed that since the petitioner is living in the accommodation for fairly long time he should be granted some time to vacate the premises in question. I consider it in the interest of justice that the petitioner may be granted time till 30th June 2005 to vacate the permission in dispute provided:
(i) the petitioner furnishes an undertaking before the trial Court within fifteen days from today that on or before 30th June 2005 the petitioner shall hand over peaceful vacant possession of the accommodation in question to the landlord; and
(ii) the petitioner shall deposit the entire arrears of rent and damages at the rate of rent till the date within fifteen days from today, if not already deposited, and shall continue to deposit the same month-by-month by first week of every succeeding month so long as the petitioner remains in possession or till 30th June 2005 whichever is earlier.
(iii) in the event of default of any of the conditions, it will be open to the landlord to get the decree executed.
9. In view of the aforesaid observations the writ petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed.