JUDGMENT A.P. Sahi, J.
1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel, for the Petitioner, Sri A.K. Yadav for the Respondent No. 2 and learned Standing Counsel for the Respondent No. 1.
2. The prayer in this Writ Petition is for a direction to the Respondent No. 2 to declare the result of the petitioner, who claims himself to be duly selected for appointment as an Assistant Teacher in LT Grade (Physical Education) under the category of ex-service man pursuant to the advertisement No. 1 of 2004. The petitioner contends that his result are not being declared on the ground that the petitioner does not qualify within the definition of the words "ex-serviceman" as contained in The Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation For Physically Handicapped, Dependents of Freedom Fighers and Ex-Servicemen) Act, 1993 in short "U.P. Act No. 4 of 1993" referred to herein after.
3. The facts, which are admitted are that 30.11.2004 was the last date of filling up of the application forms under the Advertisement pursuant whereto the petitioner applied for the post. The qualifications prescribed under the said advertisement clearly stipulate that the candidate should possess the qualifications prescribed as on the last date of submission of the application form. There is also no dispute about the fact that the petitioned had not been actually discharged from Army Service as on the said last date i.e. 30.11.2004. The petitioner has filed his discharge certificate and which indicates that he has been discharged on 31.10.2005.
4. Sri Khare, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the defence authorities have given No Objection Certificate in favour of the petitioner before his actual discharge allowing him to take any civil employment and has also relied on the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in writ petition No. 35684 of 2004, Annexure-15 to the writ petition, for the proposition that the petitioner was entitled to apply for a civil post and that his selection cannot be withheld on the ground that he had not been actually discharged from service on the date when the application form was filled up by him.
5. Sri Khare has further relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Uma Shanker Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. , (paragraph No. 5) for the proposition that such terms and conditions as contained in U.P. Act No. 4 of 1993 should be construed reasonably and a technical view should not be taken as the same shall result in defeating the essential spirit of the benefits extended under the Act for "Ex-serviceman". He has further placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Hari Shanker Upadhyay v. Public Service Commission, U.P., Allahabad and Anr. 1998 ALR (32) 624, to advance his submission that the word "Ex-service Man" should be construed to include such servicemen as well who are to be discharged and for whom a No Objection has already been given by the employer. Sri Khare has referred to para 3 of the said decision which considers the 1977 Rules which admittedly are not applicable to the present controversy as they are no longer in force.
6. Sri Khare, however, very fairly pointed out the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bombay and Ors. v. Suraj Veer Singh and Ors. 1998 ALJ 181, followed in the case of Mohd. Ilyas Khan and Ors. v. Zonal Manager, LIC of India, Kanpur, 2001 (1) ESC 263, and urged that the aforesaid decisions have laid down that an ex-service man should have been actually discharged before claiming appointment but the aforesaid decisions are sought to be distinguished on the ground that the said cases were under the Life Insurance Corporation Rules about which clear instructions had been issued which stand discussed in para 14 of the Division Bench judgment referred to herein above.
7. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the provisions applicable to the controversy, the definition of the words "ex-serviceman" contained in Section 2(c) of the U.P. Act No. 4 of 1993 clearly recites that ex-serviceman means a person, who "(ii) has been released from such service on medical ground. The aforesaid definition clause is not ambiguous in any manner.
8. It is settled rule of interpretation that the intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which me ns that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.
9. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago Degama of Vedem Vasco Degama, , rules as under:
16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. "Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged" as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said: "Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.
10. The Court further went on to say as follows:
If there is obvious anomaly in the application of law the court could shape the law to remove the anomaly. If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency, the court could discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature. That could be done, if necessary even by modification of the language used See: Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal. The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the courts decide. They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the courts to decide specific cases. If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legislature but not within the literal meaning of the statute, then the court must strike the balance.
11. The following passage from Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation at page 57 further supports the conclusions drawn in this judgment:
The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. "The true way, according to LORD BROUGHAM is, "to take the words as the legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered"; and in the words of VISCOUNT HALDANE. L.C., if the language used "has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so". In an oft-quoted passage, LORD WENSLEYDALE stated the rule thus: "In construing wills and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further". And stated LORD ATKINSON: "In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense". VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said: "The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning". Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from "unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning". Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges "in the light of their own views as to policy" although they can "adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy". For a modem statement of the rule one may refer to the speech of LORD SIMON OF GLA1SDALE in a recent case where he said: "Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply 'the golden rule' of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further.
12. Applying the aforesaid principles, the Court has to interpret the provisions in the light of the intention reflected by the legislature and not what the meaning ought to be as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The words used are clearly indicative of the fact that an ex-serviceman should have been actually released from such service. The act of release has to be a fait accompli. It is only then that an ex-serviceman becomes eligible for being an applicant. He cannot be deemed to be an ex-serviceman prior to his release on the basis of No Objections relied upon by the petitioner. The No Objection issued by the defence authorities do not treat an ex-serviceman to have been actually released. The definition clause in U.P. Act No. 4 of 1993 does not carve out any such exception.
13. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this would be a too technical a view, cannot be accepted as expressing a view otherwise would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as, had this been the intention of the definition clause under scrutiny the same would have been expressed in the clause itself. In such a situation many candidates like the petitioner may not have applied, legitimately thinking that they were ineligible. To allow the interpretation suggested by the learned Counsel in favour of the petitioner would, therefore, result in injustice to all such similarly situate persons. Relaxing the definition clause would amount to widening the zone of consideration which the legislature did not intend and which the Courts are not empowered to do.
14. In these circumstances, the Court finds that interpreting the Rule otherwise in favour of the petitioner would result in serious injustice to such other persons who are similarly situated as the petitioner. In the opinion of the Court, therefore, such an interpretation has to be necessarily avoided as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
15. The definition clause in the present case clearly recites that a person shall be entitled to the benefit of ex-serviceman only if he has been released from such service. There does not appear to be any contrary intention expressed under any of the other provisions contained in the said Act. The State Government also has not expressed any intention of relaxing the aforesaid definition so as to include persons, who have not been actually discharged from service. The decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, do not come to aid his submissions. On the other hand the decision of this Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation (supra) has considered a similar definition and has held that once the Rule requires the fulfillment of a qualification on the cut of date prescribed in the advertisement, then a person cannot be permitted to seek any such benefit in the event he acquires the qualification subsequently. In the instant case, the petitioner admittedly had not been discharged from service as on the last date of submission of the application form. The petitioner, therefore, could not get the benefit of ex-serviceman and consequently the petitioner cannot claim any such benefit of ex-serviceman in pursuance of the advertisement against which he has applied. The petitioner will only be entitled such benefit only from the date he is discharged. In view of the forgoing conclusions, this Court finds the contentions raised by the petitioner untenable in law.
16. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.