ORDER R.A. Sharma, J.
1. Petitioner's father, Sri Khacher Singh filed this writ petition on 11-10-1993, challenging the Notifications dated 24-1-1983 and 14-2-1983 under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) respectively. Prayer for writ of mandamus directing the respondents to exempt the acquired area of plot No. 8 from acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Act has also been made. An additional prayer for direction to respondents to decide the petitioner's representation regarding exemption to the said plot from the acquisition proceedings is also there. On 12-10-1993 this Court granted time to the learned counsel for the respondents to file counter affidavit and passed the following interim order staying the dispossession of the petitioner from the acquired land:
"Until further orders dispossession of the petitioner from plot No. 8M. area4 Bighas 4 Biswas, 11576 square yards, situate in village Kishanpur, Pargana and Tahsil Koil, district Aligarh, shall not be made unless already dispossessed.
Sd/-
12-10-1993".
2. Respondents have filed counter affidavit and petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit in reply thereto. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. This writ petition is to be dismissed for two reasons, namely, (i) petitioner is guilty of concealment of relevant facts; and (ii) his earlier writ petition (Writ Petition No. 8891 of 1983) against the same notifications, which have been impugned in the instant case, having been dismissed on 17-7-1985, this second writ petition is not maintainable.
4. The impugned ' notifications were issued under the Act in 1983, which were challenged by the petitioner and various other tenure holders by means of writ petitions before this Court in 1983. All these writ petitions including the writ petition of the petitioner were dismissed on 17-7-1985 by this Court by a reasoned judgment on merit and this judgment is reported in 1-985 UPLBEC 1151 (sic). But the facts of filing of the writ petition against the same notifications earlier and its dismissal by this Court were not disclosed by the petitioner in the instant writ petition. It is only after the respondents raised their objections that the petitioner has admitted the fact of filing and dismissal of his earlier writ petition and in this connection he has also filed a supplementary affidavit admitting these facts. It has further been mentioned therein that special leave petition filed against the decision of this Court has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 25-9-1985; but all these facts were concealed by the petitioner from this Court when he filed the instant writ petition and obtained a stay order.
5. Rule 7 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court prohibits filing of the second writ petition on the same facts. This rule is reproduced below:
"Chapter XXII, Rule 7 -- No second application on same facts -- Where an application has been rejected, it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts.
Last para of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Chapter XXII further requires that the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition will state whether the applicant has filed in any capacity a previous application on the same facts and if so the orders passed thereon. It is as under:
"Such affidavit (or affidavits) shall be restricted to facts, which are within deponent's own knowledge and such affidavit shall further state whether the applicant has filed in any capacity whatsoever, any previous application or applications on the same facts and, if so, the order passed thereon."
Petitioner is thus guilty of concealment of relevant facts although it was his duty, in view of the last para of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, to disclose those facts. Apart from the Rules, it was obligatory on the petitioner to disclose the facts of filing and dismissal of his earlier writ petition, because a person who approaches this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must disclose all relevant facts and should come with clean hands. The facts of filing of the earlier writ petition against the same notifications and its dismissal are most relevant facts, which ought to have been disclosed by him in this writ petition itself; but he concealed them from this Court. Obvisously it was done in order to obtain favourable interim order, which in fact he got on 12-10-1993. As the petitioner has not come with clean hands and has also concealed the relevant facts from this Court, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. But as the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that his second writ petition against the same notifications is maintainable even after the dismissal of his first writ petition, we consider it proper to deal with this question on merit.
6. In view of the provisions contained in Rule 7 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court second writ petition on the same facts is not maintainable. A Division Bench of this Court in L.S. Tripathi v. Banaras Hindu University, 1993 (1) UPLBEC 448 (wrongly reported as judgment of single Judge) has laid down that besides the aforesaid rule filing of the successive writ petition is against public policy apart from being the abuse of the process of the Court. Division Bench of this Court in Saheb Lal v. Assistant Registrar, (1995) (1) UPLBEC 31) has again reiterated the same principles. Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1987 SC 88 has laid down that if the earlier writ petition has been withdrawn without permission of the Court to file a fresh writ petition, the second writ petition for the same cause will not be maintainable on the ground of public policy. The Supreme Court in this connection applied the underlying principles contained in Rule I of Chapter XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant extract in this connection from the said decision of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:
"The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao's case is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principles underlying Rule 10. Chapter XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics .....
While withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or petition under Article 32 of the Constitution since such withdrawl does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject matter since the earlier writ petition has been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition."
The instant writ petition, as such, is not maintainable.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, in this connection made two submissions, namely, (i) the second writ petition is maintainable; and (ii) because against the judgment of this Court dismissing the petitioner's earlier writ petition, the Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition on 25-9-1985 giving liberty to the petitioner to file review petition before this Court. Both these contentions are devoid of merit.
8. In support of his first submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 and the Division Bench of this Court in Munna Lal Tewari v. State of U.P., 1986 UPLBEC 235. These decisions are of no assistance to the petitioner. In Daryao v. State of U.P. (supra) what was decided was the question as to whether the dismissal of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the High Court would create a bar of res judicata against the similar petition filed before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution on the similar facts and for the similar relief. Supreme Court held that if a writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution was considered and dismissed on merit, the decision would bind the parties and it is not open to them to ignore it and move a fresh petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. But if the petition under Art. 226 was not dismissed on merit on account of delay and laches or alternative remedy then the dismissal of the writ petition would not create a bar to subsequent writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The question regarding the maintainability of the second writ petition under Art. 226 on the similar facts and for the similar relief when the first writ petition had been dismissed was neither involved before the Supreme Court nor was it decided by it. In Munna Lal Tewari v. State of U. P. (supra) the question involved was whether a second writ petition against the order of suspension of an employee on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings is maintainable when the first writ petition was dismised more than about two years ago by a no speaking order. The Division Bench of this Court held the second writ petition as maintainable on two grounds, namely, (i) the principles of res judicata are applicable only when the earlier writ petition is disposed of by a speaking order; but these principles cannot be applied when the petition is dismissed in limine by a nonspeaking order. In its support this Court placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. (supra) and some other decisions of the Supreme Court where the Daryao's case was considered and applied; and (ii) suspension is continuing cause of action and it is open to an employee to challenge the order of suspension at any time on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings. In that case earlier the order of suspension was challenged by means of writ petition, which was dismissed on the ground that it is not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution; but in the second writ petition the cause was different being inordinate and unreasonable delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. This decision is also not an authority for holding that the second writ petition can be filed after the first has been dismissed. In this connection reference may again be made to Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (supra), wherein the Supreme Court distinguishing the case of Daryao v. State of U.P. (supra) held that the second writ petition is not maintainable even if the first writ petition has been dismissed as withrawn without permission to file a fresh petition not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy. It was further laid down that if the writ petition has been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh writ petition, it may not bar the other remedies like a suit or petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution but the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned in respect of the cause of action relied on in the earlier writ petition, which was withdrawn.
9. The second writ petition, therefore, will not be maintainable under Art. 226 of the Constitution if the earlier writ petition was dismissed by the High Court even in limine by a nonspeaking order. As held by this Court in L.S. Tripathi v. Banaras Hindu University (supra) and Saheb Lal v. Assistant Registrar (supra) entertaining the second writ petition on the same cause when the first writ petition has been dismissed, apart from being contrary to the rules of this Court is against the public policy and amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. That apart, in the instant case the earlier writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed by a reasoned judgment by this Court in 1985 and that judgment operates as res judicata and bars the second writ petition. For this reason also the instant writ petition is not maintainable. The first contention of the learned counsel has got to be rejected.
10. The second submission also deserves the same fate. It is true that while dismissing the special leave petition on 25-9-1985 against the judgment of this Court dismissing the earlier writ petition of the petitioner Supreme Court gave liberty to the petitioner to file a review application before this Court, because his grievance was that this Court has failed to decide some of the points raised by him. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, dismissing the special leave petition is as under:
"The petitioner says that the High Court has failed to notice a number of issues raised before it and, therefore, claims special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court. If that is the case, it will be open to the petitioner to apply to the High Court for review of the judgment and the High Court will then consider in the exercise of its jurisdiction whether or not there is the truth in the complaint. Special leave petition is rejected."
It is accordingly submitted that the second writ petition against the same notifications is not barred. It is further contended that apart from challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act petitioner has also made additional prayer for grant of exemption of his land from acquisition proceedings under Section 48 of the Act, and therefore, this petition will be maintainable.
11. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that he has filed a review application in 1985 itself before this Court; but whether that application is still pending or has been disposed of is neither known to the learned counsel for the parties nor is there anything about it on the record of this case. Be that as it may, merely because the Supreme Court gave liberty to the petitioner to file a review application before this Court in his earlier writ petition, he cannot have any justification to file the second writ petition against the same notifications and that too without disclosing the facts that his earlier writ petition has been dismissed.
12. It is true that in the instant petition the petitioner has also made a prayer for appropriate direction to the Government to exempt his land from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act. In this connection it has also been stated by the petitioner that a part of the plot of the petitioner has already been exempted from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act; but the Government has failed to exempt the whole plot. As the petitioner is guilty of concealment of relevant facts and has not come to this Court with clean hands, it is a fit case where this Court should not entertain this second writ petition.
13. For the reasons given above, this writ petition is dismissed with costs.
14. Petition dismissed.