~~~~~~~~~~~ Antony Dominic, J.
Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the 3rd respondent and the learned standing counsel appearing for the 4th respondent.
2. This appeal is filed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.29170/2013. The said Writ Petition was filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein, mainly aggrieved by the termination of their services based on Ext.R2(a), a conciliation settlement arrived at between the appellant and the trade unions functioning in the appellant's establishment. By this settlement, the Unions agreed for the termination of five workers, including respondents 1 and 2, on the ground that they will be deemed to have completed 60 years of service.
3. In the counter affidavit filed in the Writ Petition, the appellant justified the termination in pursuance to Ext.R2(a) on the ground that for the enrollment of respondents 1 and 2 under the 3rd respondent, they were called upon to produce the birth certificate and that they had failed to do so. It is alleged that this led to a dispute, which resulted in Ext.R2(a). Therefore, according to the appellant, the necessity for the settlement and the consequent termination of respondents 1 and 2 arose out of a demand made by the 3rd respondent requiring respondents 1 and 2 to produce their birth certificate. This was the contention raised by the appellant.
4. However, in the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent, they had denied the allegation that any demand was made by them requiring production of the birth certificate of respondents 1 and 2. It was in such circumstances, the learned Single Judge interfered with the termination of respondents 1 and 2 and ordered that they shall be reinstated in service.
5. Although the learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the termination of respondents 1 and 2 was on the basis of Ext.R2(a) conciliation settlement, which is binding on the parties under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned Single Judge ought not have entertained the Writ Petition and relegated the aggrieved parties to pursue the remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act, in the given facts of this case, we are not inclined to accept this plea.
6. As we have already seen, the whole justification for the termination offerred by the appellant was the demand made by the 3rd respondent. When the 3rd respondent itself denied of having made any such demand insisting the termination of service of respondents 1 and 2, in our view, respondents 1 and 2 were entitled to the relief that was granted by the learned Single Judge. On the other hand, despite this factual position, if we are to relegate them to the forums created under the Industrial Disputes Act, that would only result in delaying the relief which respondents 1 and 2 are entitled to. We do not want such a situation to be created.
7. However, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that having regard to the age of respondents 1 and 2, it was necessary to them to retire from service. Such was not the plea of the appellant before the learned Single Judge and therefore this plea cannot be accepted by us. Be that as it may, if as contended by, any action is considered necessary, the appellant as employer will be at liberty to initiate such action which, needless to say shall be only in accordance with law.
Subject to the above observations, this Writ Appeal is dismissed.
Sd/-
ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE.
Sd/- ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE.
ps/27/6/2014