IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 20TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR W.P.NO.57938/2018 (L-KSRTC) BETWEEN KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, KOLAR DIVISION, KOLAR, BY ITS DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER.
(BY SMT. RENUKA H R, ADV.) AND ... PETITIONER 1. THE ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY, UNDER THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, BANGALORE DIVISION 1, KARMEEKA BHAVAN, BANNERGHATTA ROAD, BANGALORE 560029.
2. THE ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER AND CONTROLLING AUTHORITY UNDER THE PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, DIVISION-3, KARMEEKA BHAVAN, BANNERGHATTA ROAD, BANGALORE 560029 3. K N KRISHNAMURTHY S/O. K NAGAIAH, ADULT, NO.3238, BHAGAT SANGH ROAD, MUTHYALAPET, MULABAGILU TOWN, KOLARA DISTRICT-563101.
(BY SMT. B.P.RADHA, AGA FOR R1 & R2, SRI S.B.MUKKANNAPPA, ADV. FOR R3.) ... RESPONDENTS THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 25.3.2015 (ANNEXURE-A) PASSED BY THE R-2 ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The petitioner is the employer-Corporation and the respondent is a retired workman who retired from his service on 28.02.2013. He would point out that the dispute pertains to the date of joining of service for the purpose of calculating the gratuity to be paid to the respondent-workman.
3. The case of the respondent is that he had jointed services in the year 1976 as a badali conductor and remained in services throughout. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent-workman had been appointed as a badali conductor and thereafter, he was removed and his order of dismissal was not overturned and has become final and that thereafter he made an application for appointment and a fresh order of appointment was issued, in the year 1980 and on completion of his probation, his services came to be confirmed in 1982.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the controlling authority and the appellate authority erred in placing reliance on Ex.P1 which the workman claimed to be a representation made on 15.06.2007 claiming that he had made some deposits in 1976 and sought for refund of the same. Neither the amount deposited nor the deposit receipt are placed and such a vague and ambiguous letter, which has neither been acted upon nor accepted by the petitioner-
Corporation, ought not to have been the basis for concluding a fact which otherwise is evidenced by the service registers placed on record by the petitioner’s corporation.
5. It is Further contended that the authorities have gravely erred in placing reliance on Exs.P3, P5 and P7 which allegedly came into existence between the years 2006-2008 when the petitioner was approaching his retirement date. That Ex.P3 and P6 are alleged declaration of assets and liabilities furnished by the employee annually. That similar declarations by the respondent for the earlier period, have been ignored and the one’s which have been made later in point of time that is, 2006 & 2008 have been accepted as material proof of the fact of date of joining of service. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the reliance placed by the authorities on a partial copy of the award is perverse as reliance on inchoate documents is impermissible. That only one sheet of the award of the document is placed and the same has been accepted and appreciated. Such reliance on inchoate documents to conclude a fact is legally unsustainable.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents would reiterate the findings of the controlling authority and the appellate authority.
7. This court has perused the documents produced by the petitioner along with memo dated 20.08.2019. It is seen that apart from the declaration furnished by the petitioner in 2004, 2006 and 2008 in respect of declarations furnished by the petitioner in respect of his assets and liabilities at the earliest point of time, the date of entry into services has been entered as 22.07.1980 which is claimed by the petitioner to be the date of entry as a temporary employee. The service book produced by the petitioner also demonstrates the said date only. The petitioner is right in contending that the appreciation of inchoate document is vitiated by perversity. In fact this court has also perused the said document marked as Ex.P7 allegedly the award said to have been passed in I.D. No.203/1999 and the only inference that can be drawn from the said inchoate document is that the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the respondent and he was removed from the service. If that be the inference, then onus was on the petitioner to show that the punishment imposed has been set-aside and he has been directed to be reinstated in the service of the Corporation. The same was put to the respondent’s counsel but the respondent was unable to place any material to demonstrate such a fact. On account of the failure of the respondent to demonstrate the setting aside or modification of the punishment imposed, this court has no other choice but to accept the date of commencement of service as 22.07.1980 as evidenced by Ex.R1, the service register pertaining to the respondent. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner’s claim that the service period of the respondent is liable to be considered from the date of confirmation of declaration or probation is erroneous.
Hence, the writ petition is partly allowed. The date of entry of service of the respondent is declared to be 22.07.1980 and accordingly, the petitioner’s corporation shall calculate and pay the gratuity sum in accordance with the findings rendered by this court. If any sum remains to be paid to the employee, the same shall be paid within four weeks along with interest calculated at the statutory rate as awarded by the controlling authority.
The writ petition stands ordered accordingly.
Chs* CT-HR Sd/- JUDGE