1.Vembana Gounder,
2.Nachayammal
3.Kolandasami Gounder
4.Kannammal
5.Sivakami
6.Bakkialakshmi ... Respondents in A.S.No.467 of 1998 Appeals preferred against the judgment and decree dated 27.7.1994 passed in O.S.No.226 of 1983 by the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Erode.
For Appellants:
Mr.V.K.Muthusami,Sr.counsel for M/s.V.P.Sengottuvel in A.S.No.928 of 1997 Mr.T.Murugamanickam in A.S.No.467 of 1998 For Respondents:
Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy for R1 & R2 Mr.T.Murugamanickam for R4 in A.S.No.928 of 1997 Mr.V.K.Muthusami,Sr.counsel for M/s.V.P.Sengottuvel in A.S.No.467 of 1998 COMMON JUDGMENT This appeal is focussed as against the judgement and decree dated 27.7.1994 passed in O.S.No.226 of 1983 by the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Erode.
2.Niggard and bereft of details, the facts giving rise to the filing of the suit, as stood exposited from the plaint could be set out thus:
(a) The deceased Nachi Muthu Gounder had two sons and two daughters, namely, Subbanna Gounder(D1), Kolandasamy Gounder(D2), Palaniammal and Nachayammal(P2).
(b) Subbanna Gounder(D1) died on 8.5.1990 leaving behind Kannammal(D4), Sivagami(D5), Bakkialakshmi(D6) as his legal heirs. The said Palaniammal died leaving behind her sons the first plaintiff-Vembanna Gounder as her legal heir. Kolandasamy Gounder/D2's son is K.Chandrasekaran/D3.
(c) The 'A' scheduled properties are admittedly the joint family properties of the said family. The 'B' scheduled properties are the self-acquired properties of the deceased Nachimuthu Gounder. Consequent upon the death of Nachimuthu Gounder on 5.6.1980, his two daughters also along with his sons, became entitled to their respective shares as his legal heirs, in the suit properties. However, the defendants, who are the male descendants of Nachimuthu Gounder colluded together and denied the right of the plaintiffs in the suit properties.
(d) There were previous proceedings and the parties litigated up to the High Court in Second Appeal. Ultimately in the previous proceedings the Court directed the parties to file a separate suit for partition. Hence, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs herein as against the defendants, seeking 1/12th share each in favour of the first and second plaintiffs in the 'A' scheduled properties and 1/4th share each in the 'B' scheduled properties.
(e) The fact remains that at the instance of the defendants 4, 5 and 6, the 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties were also included in the suit schedule. Accordingly, the plaintiffs prayed for a preliminary decree and consequently, a final decree as per law.
3. Refuting and remonstrating, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, D1 the propositus of D4, D5 and D6 filed the written statement during his life time as under:
(i) From out of the income derived from the ancestral properties, namely, the 'A' scheduled properties, the 'B' scheduled properties were purchased by Nachimuthu Gounder and hence, those properties are also the joint family properties. Further, from out of the joint family income only, the 'C' scheduled properties also were acquired. There was some family arrangement, under which D1 and D2 were cultivating different portions of the ancestral properties and earned profit and out of that the 'D' Scheduled properties were purchased.
(ii) Owing to some misunderstanding, which erupted between Nachimuthu Gounder and D1, the former, on 19.2.1972, executed a settlement deed in favour of D3- Chandrasekaran-the son of D2, relating to Survey No.294-B, which forms part of the 'C' scheduled properties. Such a settlement deed is a sham and nominal one and not acted upon. Ultimately the said document could only be termed as a null and void one.
(iii) The said Nachimuthu Gounder also executed a sale deed on 15.3.1996 in favour of the said D3, measuring an extent of 6 acres 52 cents in Survey Nos.120/2 and 140, which also forms part of the 'C' scheduled properties,but it was not acted upon. In fact, Nachimuthu Gounder had no right to execute such a sale deed in respect of the joint family property and there was no joint family necessity also to alienate the property.
(iv) The plaintiffs are entitled to 1/12th share each and the first and second defendants are each entitled to 5/12th share in the 'A' and B' scheduled properties.
4. D2 filed the written statement seeking to allot 5/12th share in 'A' scheduled properties and 1/4th share in the 'B' scheduled properties.
5. The gist and kernal of the averments in the written statement of D3 could be portrayed and parodied thus:
The deceased Nachimuthu Gounder executed a registered sale deed dated 15.6.1973, conveying the items 1(a) and (b) of 'C' Scheduled properties in favour of D3; there at he has been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the same. Under one other registered sale deed executed in favourh of D3, he is in possession and enjoyment of the second item of 'C' Scheduled properties as owner. The 3rd and 4th items of the 'C' scheduled properties were settled by Nachimuthu Gounder as per the Registered Settlement Deed dated 19.12.1972 in favour of D3, whereupon he has been in possession and enjoyment of those properties. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the suit for partition in respect of the 'C' scheduled properties.
6. Defendants 4, 5 and 6, after they having been impleaded as LRs of deceased D1, filed their common written statement, contending that 'A', 'B' and 'C' scheduled properties in the plaint are all joint family properties and that already partition deed dated 30.11.1984 had emerged and hence, the present suit was not maintainable.
7. The defendants 4 to 6 also filed additional written statement adopting the written statement of D1, but however, contending that the entire suit properties should be divided into 12 equal shares and allot 5 shares in favour of D4, D5 and D6.
8. The plaintiff filed the reply statement also, reiterating their previous stand.
9. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During trial on the side of the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A3 were marked. D2 examined himself as D.W.1 and D4 examined himself as D.W.2 and on defendants' side Exs.B1 to 57 were marked.
10. Ultimately, the trial Court passed a preliminary decree in its own way and it is extracted hereunder.
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11. Being aggrieved by and dis-satisfied with the judgment and decree of the Court below, D3 filed the appeal A.S.No.467 of 1998 on various grounds, the gist and kernal of them would run thus:
(a) the judgement and decree of the lower Court in respect of 'C' scheduled properties is against law and weight of evidence; instead of dismissing the suit relating to the 'C' scheduled properties, the trial Court simply treated those properties also as joint family properties and included in the partition.
(b) Even though the plaintiffs never claimed any right over the 'C' scheduled properties, the trial Court granted relief in respect of those properties also.
Accordingly, D3 prayed for setting aside the decree and judgement and decree of the lower Court in respect of the 'C' schedule of the suit property.
12. Anim-adverting upon the judgement and decree of the trial Court, the defendants 4, 5 and 6 filed the appeal A.S.No.928 of 1997 on various grounds, the warp and woof of them could be set out thus:-
(a) the trial Court was wrong in ordering partition of the 'D' scheduled properties also, ignoring the fact that 'D' scheduled properties were purchased by D1 and D2 from out of their own exertion and it should not have been treated as joint family properties of the entire family.
(b) the trial Court was wrong in giving a finding that Nachimuthu Grounder intended to settle item 2 of 'C' scheduled properties in favour of D3
(c) the trial Court also failed to note that Ex.B2 was executed in favour of D3 only to teach a lesson to D1 and not intended it to be a sale.
(d) the trial Court was wrong in holding that Ex.B2 was valid in respect of Nachimuthu Gounder's share when the Court accepted the case of D3 to D7 that the sale was illegal and improper in respect of the joint family property.
(e) the trial Court failed to note that consequent upon the partition deed dated 30.11.1984 (Ex.A47) there was a division of status; D1 was enjoying his share separately and earned income; from out of the said income, he purchased 'D' scheduled properties jointly with D1 and such 'D' scheduled properties should not have been treated as joint family properties.
Accordingly D4, D5 and D6/the appellants A.S.928 of 1997 prayed for deleting the 'D' scheduled properties from the decree of the trial Court and consequently, prayed for setting aside the judgement and decree of the trial Court.
13. Heard both sides and perused the records, including the impugned judgment.
14. The points for consideration are:
(i) Whether 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties of the plaint are all co-parcenary properties, liable for partition or not?
(ii) Whether the plaintiffs are not having right to claim any share in the 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties of the plaint?
(iii) Whether the sale deed-Ex.B2 and the settlement deed-Ex.B14 emerged in favour of D3 relating to certain items of 'C' scheduled properties are valid or not?
(iv) Whether there is any infirmity in the judgement and decree of the trial Court?
(v) What are the respective rights of the parties?
14. The parties are referred to here under, for convenience sake, according to their litigative status before the trial court.
15. Points (i) to (iii): These points are taken together for discussion as they are interconnected and inter-linked, inter-woven and entwined with each other.
16. The warp and woof of the arguments of the learned Senior counsel for D4, D5 and D6/the appellants in A.S.NO.928 of 1997 would be that undoubtedly, the 'A' scheduled properties are the ancestral properties, the 'B' scheduled properties, even though purchased in the name of deceased Nachimuthy Gounder; nonetheless it is obvious that from out of the income derived from the 'A' scheduled properties only the 'B' Scheduled properties were purchased; the 'C' scheduled properties are also joint family properties of the family of Nachimuthu Gounder and he had no right to alienate by way of sale and settlement in favour of D3-his grand son; the 'D' scheduled properties were purchased jointly by D1 and D2 from out of the income derived from the properties, which were allotted to them as per the earlier partition and they cannot be treated as ancestral properties; the plaintiffs filed the plaint citing only the 'A' and 'B' scheduled properties and claimed partition; it is their consistent case even during trial that the alienations made by Nachimuthu Gounder in favour of D3 were valid; the plaintiffs did not claim any share in the 'C' scheduled properties; in view of the 'D' scheduled properties being the properties purchased by D1 and D2, from out of their own exertion the plaintiffs themselves have not chosen to pray for partition, in the plaint or at least by getting the plaint amended; the lower Court was not justified in ordering partition of all the suit properties; the decree passed by the lower Court is confusing and no head or tail could be made out of it.
17. The learned counsel for D3/appellant in A.S.No.467 of 1998 would submit that the alienations made by Nachimuthu Gounder in the form of sale and settlement are valid, as Nachimuthu Gounder had the right of alienation, which D4, D5 and D6 cannot challenge.
18. The nitty-gritty of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs in both the appeals would be to the effect that all the suit properties are ancestral properties; even though the plaintiffs, at the first instance did not include the 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties in the plaint schedule, nonetheless at the instance of D4, D5 and D6 themselves, those properties were added, as it was they who pleaded that those properties also have to be partitioned.
19. The factual matrix, as found detailed and delineated, evinced and evidenced from the above, would necessitate this Court to analyse the status of the parties at the first instance. Unassailably and incontrovertibly, Nachimuthu Gounder and his two sons, namely, D1 and D2 constituted the coparcenary and they had 1/3rd share each in the 'A' scheduled properties; even though the plaintiffs contended in the plaint that the 'B' Scheduled properties were acquired by Nachimuthu Grounder from out of his own earnings and exertion, they could not fortify their stand. Absolutely there is no speck or morsel, dot or miniscule of evidence to buttress the stand that the 'B' Scheduled properties are the self-acquired properties of the deceased Nachi Muchu Grounder. Hence, the finding of the trial Court that the 'B' Scheduled properties are also the coparcenary properties, warrants no interference.
20. The same logic applied for holding the 'B' Scheduled properties as the ancestral properties could rightly and legally logically and reasonably be applied to hold the 'C' Scheduled properties also as coparcenary properties, in view of the fact that items 1(a) and 1(b) of the 'C' scheduled properties were purchased by Nachimuthu Gounder vide sale deed-Ex.B1 dated 29.11.1949; item Nos.3 and 4 of the 'C' scheduled properties are admittedly the ancestral properties. However, relating to item No.2, there is some controversy in view of the fact that the said item was purchased as per Ex.B41 dated 7.7.1972, by citing D3-the then minor aged about 7 years, represented by Nachimuthu Gounder, as the purchaser. According to D4, D5 and D6-the then minor D3 had no financial wherewithal to purchase the said items by paying such a sum of Rs.21,000/- as sale consideration and it was the said Nachimuthu Gounder, who from out of the coparcenary funds purchased the said property in the name of D3 and consequently, the said property should be treated as the ancestral property.
21. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned Senior counsel for D4, D5 and D6 that the item.No.2 of the 'C' scheduled properties also should be treated as ancestral property and that too in the absence of any evidence in support of the contention of D3, that it was D3's exclusive property. Considering the evidence of D.W.1(D3)-Chandrasekaran as well as P.W.1, it is crystal clear that the 'C' scheduled properties are also the joint family properties.
22. The contention of D3 that as per Ex.B2-the sale deed dated 15.6.1973, the said Nachimuthu Gounder executed the sale deed in favour of D3 the then minor, citing D3's mother-Arutkaniammal as natural guardian, in selling the items 1(a) and 1(b) of the 'C' scheduled properties, is valid, cannot be countenanced as such, for the reason that a sum of Rs.40,000/- is referred to as the sale consideration, which was received by Nachimuthu Gounder from the minor Chandrasekaran, but absolutely there is no shard or shred of evidence to indicate and evidence that such sale consideration was paid. The relationship between Nachimuthu Gounder and D3 is an admitted one. Palpably and pellucidly, it is therefore, clear that the said sale deed is nothing but a disguised donation executed by Nachimuthu Gounder in favour of D3-the minor son relating to the said ancestral property.
23. The factum of the Item Nos. 3 and 4 of the 'C' scheduled properties having been settled by Nachimuthu Gounder in favour of D3 as per Ex.B14-the settlement deed dated 19.12.1972, is being correctly floored and attacked, inveighed and impugned by D4, D5 and D6 on the ground that Nachimuthu Gounder had no right as per the Hindu Law to effect any settlement of donation with regard to the undivided coparcenary property.
24. It is a trite proposition in Hindu Law that a coparcener cannot donate or settle his undivided share in the suit property. In support of his contention, the learned Senior counsel for D4, D5 and D6 cited the following decisions:
(I) AIR 1961 Madras 405-KULASEKARAPERUMAL VS. PATHAKUTTY THALEVANAR AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"7. In view of the terms of Ex.I set out above, it is not possible to construe it as a gift deed pure and simple. A Hindu coparcener governed by the Mitakshara as administered in Madras may dispose of his undivided ancestral estate by contract and conveyance. He may mortgage, sell or otherwise alienate for value his undivided share of the joint family properties. The Judicial Committee in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh 6 Ind App 88 (PC) stated the law thus at page 101, Since the decision, however, of the cases of Viraswami v. Aiyasami Gramani, 1 Mad H.C.R.471 of Peddamuthulaty v. Timma Reddi 2. Mannaru Naickan, 2.Mad H.C.R. 416 and Rayacharlu v. Venkataramaniah, 4 Mad H.C.R.60, it has been settled law in the presidency of Madras that one coparcener may dispose of ancestral undivided estate, even by contract and conveyance, to the extent of his own share; and a fortiori that such share may be seized and sold in execution for his separate debt".
The equity in favour of the alienee for the value is perhaps the foundation for the power of alienation of a coparcener in respect of his undivided share. But it is equally well settled that gift or devise by a coparcener in a Mitakshara family of his undivided interest if wholly invalid, subject to certain exceptions. There is a long catena of decisions of this court commencing from Baba v. Timma, ILR 1 Mad 357 (FB) holding that a gift by a member of a joint family of his interest in the joint family property in favour of a stranger or a relative is invalid so as not to bind even the coparcener, who made the gift.
(8) In Rottala Runganatham Chetti v. Ramaswami Chetti, ILR 27 Mad 162 it was held as follows:
"It is not competent to an individual member of a Hindu family to alienate by way of gift his undivided share or any portion thereof; and such an alienation, if made, is void in toto. This principle cannot be evaded by the undivided member professing to make an alienation for value when such valueh is manifestly inadequate and inequitable."
Can Ex.I in the case be called a gift?
Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act defines gift as follows:
"Gift is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person called the donor, to another called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee."
A gift is essentially a gratuitous transfer. Complete absence of consideration marks the transfer as a gift and differentiates it from a grant.
(9) In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.18 page 364, paragraph 692, it is observed as follows:
"A gift inter vivos may be defined shortly as the transfer of any property from one person to another gratuitously while the donor is alive and not in expectation of death".
In the footnote the following passage is quoted from Blackstones Commentaries:
"Gift then, or grants, which are the eighth method of transferring personal property are thus to be distinguished from each other, that gifts are always gratuitous, grants are upon some consideration or equivalent(2 B.1 Co.440)."
The word "consideration' used in S.122 of the Transfer of Property Act is used in the same sense as the term is defined in the Indian Contract Act. The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act as embodied in S.2(d) is as follows:
"When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise."
In English Law the terms "consideration' bears the meaning given to it in the classical judgement of Currie v. Mis, (1975) 10 Exch.153 at page 162, "A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other.
..........Detriment to the promisee is of the essence of the doctrine, and benefit to the promisor is when it exists, merely an accident (Holdsworth, History of English law, VIII page 11)".
Though the Indian Contract Act does not in terms provide that consideration must be good or valuable to sustain a contract it has always been understood that consideration means something which is of some value in the eye of the law. It must be real and not illusory, whether adequate or not, adequacy being a matter purely for the contracting parties to decide and to agree upon. So long as the consideration is not unreal it is sufficient if it be of slight value only.
(10) Chitty in his Contact, 21st Edn. Page 47, Vol.I, observes as follows:
As regards the extent of trouble, loss or obligation which the promisee has taken upon himself at the promisor's request, we shall find, on considering the cases to be presently referred to, that it is immaterial that the detriment or charge thus assumed is, in fact, of the most trifling description, provided it be not utterly worthless in fact and in law; and that, unless it appears that the promisee incurred no detriment whatever, it need not be shown, in order to constitute a good consideration, that benefit resulted to the promisor from the performance by the promisee of the stipulated act. It has also been pointed out that the emphasis in consideration is not on the benefit of the promisor but the detriment to the promisee."
(II) 1969 THE MADRAS LAW JOURNAL REPORTS 597 SRINIVASA PADAYACHI V. PARVATHIAMMAL AND OTHERS, relevant extracts from it would run thus:
"Now at the time of execution of Exhibit A-1, the properties were joint family properties and the settlement was made by a coparcener. The other coparcener filed the suit for partition and secured his half share therein. In that suit, there was no plea as between the settlor and the present plaintiff, that the document was void, nor was there any finding in that suit given as to the true character of the settlement deed, whether it was a gift or conveyance for consideration. The plaintiff in that suit, the brother of the plaintiff's husband was given a half share in the properties, ignoring the alienation as not binding on his share, overruling the defence that it was not joint family property. But if in law the alienation was a gift, it is well settled that the same would not bind even the settlor and the absence of a finding in the earlier suit is neither here nor there. It was sufficient for the determination of that suit if it did not bind the plaintiff therein. The law is thus summed up in Mullah's Hindu Law 13th edition at page 291, thus-
"According to the Mitakshara law as applied in all the states, no coparcener can dispose of his undivided interest in coparcenery property by gift. Such transaction being void altogether there is no estoppel or other kind of personal bar which precludes the donor from asserting his right to recover the transferred property."
(III) 1980 MADRAS LAW JOURNAL REPORTS 507 DURAI ALIAS KARUNANIDHI V. D. DEVARAJALU NAIDU AND 10 OTHERS, an excerpt from it would run thus:
"9. However, a Hindu father or other managing member has no power to make a gift except within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable properties and that too only for pious purposes. According to the Mithakshara law, as applied in all the States, no coparcener can dispose of his undivided interest in coiparcenary property by gift. Such transaction being void altogether there is no estoppel or other kind of personal bar which precludes the donor from asserting his right to recover the transferred property. He may, however, make a gift of his own interest with the consent of the other coparceners. (see paragraph 258 of Mulla's Hindu Law 14th edition). In Ratnasabapathi Pillai and another v. Saraswathi Anmmal', a Bench of the court went into this problem and in the course of the judgment referred to a decision of Venkatappa v. Raghavayya. In the last mentioned case, a gift deed was executed by the plaintiff for himself and on behalf of his minor son in favour of a stranger, conveying an item of joint family property. The plaintiff thereafter instituted a suit contending that the deed of gift was void and praying for a declaration that it was not valid in law and enforceable. Raghava Rao J., who decided the case in this Court, referred to the earlier decisions on the subject, and observed that the well recognised common law maxim that a man shall not derogate from his own grant had no application to a case in which the personal law of the parties rendered altogether void a grant by him which must, therefore, be treated in the eye of the law as altogether non est, and there being no rights created by a void transaction of that kind, there was no estoppel or any other kind of personal bar akin thereto, which precluded the plaintiff from asserting his right to recover. An exception to this proposition was, however, pointed out at page 462 of the report Ratnasabapathy Pillai and another v. Saraswathi Ammal, as follows:
"Suffice it to observe that a gift made with the consent of all the coparceners, where there is no minor or child in the womb, could not be attacked as being void in toto........."
25. In view of the above excerpts including the entire precedents cited supra, there could be no doubt that a coparcenar cannot settle or gift his undivided share in the coparcenary property. However, it is crystal clear that in this case, the said Nachimuthy Gounder, by virtue of Ex.B41-the sale Deed, which I held supra as disguised donation and Ex.B14-the settlement deed, alienated the items 1(a), 1(b), items 3 and 4 of the 'C' scheduled properties, and as such, those alienations are ineffective and would not bind the other coparcenars and the legal heirs.
26. In respect of item No.2 of the 'C' Scheduled properties, my discussion would indicate as to how the said item became the coparcenary property in view of Nachimuthu Gounder having purchased from out of the coparcenary income in the name of his grand son D3-the then minor. Put simply, the entire 'C' scheduled properties also should be treated as coparcenary properties available for partition.
27. The learned counsel for D4, D5 and D6 would refer to the excerpt from the famous treatise Hindu Code V Edition, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"13. Allotment for convenient enjoyment In Nagayasami Naidu vs. Kochadai Naidu, there is an agreement between two brothers. Defendants 2 and 1 in pursuance of which the second defendant was allowed to enjoy a substantial portion of the ancestral property and the first defendant was given about 15 items, though the items left to be retained by the second defendant and the items taken by the first defendant were not equal. It was held that during all the time when this arrangement was in force of the two brothers will each be entitled to appropriate the income from the properties so allotted for themselves and as between them inter se there will be no liability to render an account. The very idea of allotment for convenient enjoyment, though reserving a right to effect a final partition by metes and bounds, carries with it the necessary implication that the two branches were entitled to deal with the income accruing from the properties allotted to them in any manner they liked, and either branchh will have no claim as against the other in respect of properties purchased out of such income. The presumption of Hindu law that if the family owned substantial nucleus, every acquisition by a member would be presumed to be joint-family property, having been acquired with the aid of joint family property would not apply."
28. Over and above that he also cited the following decisions in support of his contention:-
(i) AIR 1969 MADRAS 329-NAGAYASAMI NAIDU AND OTHERS V. KOCHADAI NAIDU AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"20. There is on other important aspect which the lower Court has completely overlooked. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff and the first defendant that in 1947, there was an arrangement between defendants 2 and 1, in pursuance of which the second defendant was allowed to enjoy a substantial portion of the ancestral property and the first defendant was given about 15 items, though the items left to be retained by the second defendant and the items taken by the first defendant were not equal. In para 20 of the plaint, there is reference to this arrangement. In para 31 of the plaint, it is stated that till 1957, the second defendant had given the plaintiffs the amounts due to them i.e. Their share of the income upto 18.9.1957, which means that so far as the income from the family properties are concerned, second defendant has accounted for the same. In para 23 of the written statement of the first defendant, first defendant states that the second defendant was allowed to be in enjoyment of a major portion of Alagiri Naicker's properties, because by that time first defendant secured possession of the properties of Kochadai Naicker.
. . . . . .
The principle of the Bench decision of this Court reported in Ramayya Goundan v. Koalnda Gounda, 1939-2 Mad LJ 639: AIR 1939 Mad 911 and the recent judgment of Anantanarayanan O.C.J.and Natesan J.in P.N.Venkatasubramania Aiyar v. P.N.Eswara Iyer, 1966-1 Mad LJ 471: AIR 1966 Mad 266, would apply to this case. In the earlier Bench decision it was pointed out that if the joint family had made an allotment of property to a member, in order that he may maintain himself out of it without having to bring its yield into the family granary for common consumption, it is not possible in such a case to make the member accountable for the property so allotted. In that decision it was emphasised that when an arrangement of this kind his made, the predominant idea undoubtedly is that while the corpus of the property should continue to remain joint, the income should exclusively belong to and be at the disposal of the member concerned. It was also pointed out that there was no difference in principle between a maintenance arrangement in favour of female member of the family and that made almost in similar circumstances to a junior male member of a joint Hindu family. The principle of this decision was followed in Latchandhora v. D.Chinnavada AIR 1963 Andh Pra 31 in which it was held that properties acquired out of the income and the savings by a member of the joint family shall be deemed to have been acquired by him in circumstances entirely disassociated from the ownership of the joint family property. It was also observed that it would be unjust and inequitable that such properties should also be divided between others who had nothing to assist the member concerned in acquiring the lands. It was observed as follows at page 36-
"If out of the income derived from the lands allotted to a member of the joint family for his maintenance, he saves enough to acquire new properties, they must be deemed to have been acquired by him in circumstances entirely dis-associated from the ownership of the joint property, to adopt the language of Lord Buckmaster in Rani Jagadamb Kumari v. Wazir Narain Singh, 50 at p.61. Further it would be unjust and inequitable that properties acquired by one member out of the income from the lands allotted to his maintenance, should also be divided between others who had nothing to assist the member concerned in acquiring the lands."
All these cases have been discussed in the recent Bench decision in 1966-1 Mad LJ 471:(AIR 1966 Mad 266), and it is sufficient to refer to the observations of Natesan J.at pages 493 to 496 (of MLJ):(at pp.283-285 of AIR). The learned Judge pointed out that the acquisitions out of the savings and income from the joint family property given to the acquirer would not be partible property as between the other members of the family and the branch of the acquirer, but the character of such acquisition in the hands of the acquirer vis-a-vis his male children would not be the same.
21. From the foregoing it has to be held that even if the second defendant had utilised the income from the properties left in his possession during the period 1947 to 1957, to acquire properties whether in his name or in the names of defendants 3 to 5, they are not partible properties. In this view no further question would arise in respect of C, D and E schedule properties, because they were all acquired after 1952. There is the further fact that in para 31 of the plaint, plaintiffs have admitted that till 1957, the second defendant had given them their share of the income, with the result that it has to be necessarily held that the acquisitions made by the second defendant during that period must have been only out of the share of the income from the properties of his branch. This is another independent ground on which also it has to be held that the acquisitions during this period cannot be regarded as joint family properties. In this connection it has to be noticed that the properties which have been purchased in the name of the plaintiffs during this period have not been brought into the hotchpot. Vide for instance Ex.B. 129 sale deed dated 15.7.1954 in favour of the first plaintiff of an extent of seven acres. The other seven acres were purchased in the name of the third defendant. There are also other items. It will be highly inequitable and unjust if the plaintiffs and the first defendant who kept for themselves the properties purchased by them are allowed to claim a share in the properties purchased by the contesting defendants. The scheme of the purchases themselves shows that by common consent, properties purchased in the names of the individual members, were agreed to be their own properties and not partible."
(ii) AIR 1963 ANDHRA PRADESH 31 (V 50 c 14) DUVVARA LATCHANDHORA (DIES) L.Rs.Venkanadhora and others vs. Duvvari Chinnavadu and others.
(iii) 1939(II) MADRAS LAW JOURNAL REPORTSS 639 RAMAYYA GOUNDAN V. KOLANDA GOUNDAN AND OTHERS.
29. The gist and kernal, the pith and marrow, the warp and woof of those precedents are to the effect that if at all there is an amicable and volitional, voluntary and consensual family arrangement and there-at the coparceners started enjoying the portions allotted to them and if out of their own exertions, earned income and purchased some other property, then in that eventuality only such newly acquired properties cannot be dragged into the common hotchpot at the time of effecting regular partition of the coparcenary properties and only this point is found expressed and expatiated in the cited famous treatise Hindu Code.
30. However, in this case, unassailably and indubitably, incontrovertibly and indisputably, the previous so called partition and family arrangement are all turned out to be a farcical and in the previous proceedings the High Court did not accept such division and consequently the alleged partition and the alleged convenient enjoyment of properties in moieties are all turned out to be an ill wind that blow no one any good There is a bottomless analysis and chasm between a voluntary arrangement among coparcenary and a controversial act of one or a few coparcener in enjoying the coparcenary properties. Here the controversial enjoyment, as held by this Court earlier, would not enure to the benefit of D4, D5 and D6 to press into service the concept as found enunciated in the cited Hindu Code supra and in other related precedents relied on by the learned Senior counsel D4, D5 and D6.
31. The contention of the learned Senior counsel for D4, D5, and D6 is that the 'D' scheduled properties were purchased by the joint exertion of D1 and D2 after the earlier partition, would take away those properties from being treated as coparcenay properties of Nachimuthu Gounder and his sons.
32. At this juncture it is just and necessary to briefly refer to the earlier proceedings.
33. The learned Advocates appearing in this case in unison would highlight and spotlight the fact that earlier there were a prolonged litigations between the parties as per the proceedings in O.S.No.1627 of 1973, A.S.No.117 of 1997 and S.A.1271 of 1997 and what transpired at the end of such pro longed litigation, which was litigated up to this Court, was that the parties were directed to file a partition suit, ignoring the said partition which even now D4, D5 and D6 would try to press into service. Once the said partition, which D4, A5 and D6 relied on turned out to be a farce and not valid, their contention that as per the partition or oral arrangement D1 and D2 were in possession and enjoyment of specific portions in the then coparcenary property and earned profit and purchased the 'D' scheduled properties out of the joint exertion, would not hold water. It is the fundamental principle of Hindu Law relating to coparcenary properties that whatever property purchased from out of the income derived from the undivided coparcenary should be treated as coparcenary property only.
34. It is not the case of D1, D4, D5 and D6 that D1 had separate source of income, de hors the income which D1 got from the coparcenary properties. Hence, in this view of the matter, the contention of D4, D5 and D6 fails to carry conviction with this Court. Accordingly, 'D' scheduled properties also should be made available for partition.
35.The learned Senior counsel for D4, D5 and D6 would submit that inasmuch as the plaintiffs themselves in their pleadings as well as during trial did not claim any share in the 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties, the lower Court was not justified in awarding shares in favour of them. By way of buttressing and fortifying his contention, the learned Senior counsel would cite the following decisions:
(I) AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 160 GULABRAO BALWANTRAO SHINDE AND OTHERS V. CHHABUBAI BALWANTRAO SHINDE AND OTHERS, an excerpt from it would run thus:
"7. Counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that in the absence of any pleadings and evidence to the effect that Balwantrao Shinde had given the property to Chhadubai in lieu of maintenance, the High Court has erred in recording a finding that the property in possession of Chhabubai was in lieu of maintenance which could be enlarged into full ownership rights on her. Counsel for the respondents virtually conceded that Chhabubai did not either raise the plea nor led any evidence to prove that the properties were given to her by way of maintenance by Balwantrao Shinde. It is also not disputed that properties in the hands of Balwantrao Shinde were ancestral in nature. We agree with the plea raised by the counsel for the appellants that in the absence of any pleadings to the effect that Balwantrao Shinde had given the properties to Chhabubai by way of maintenance and in the absence of any evidence to that effect, the finding the properties were given in lieu of maintenance to Chhabubai which right could be enlarged into ownership right could not be recorded. The High Court clearly fell in error in recording a finding to the effect that Chhabubai had become absolute owner of the properties left by Balwantrao Shinde. Another factor which persuades us to take this view is that the properties were ancestral in hands of Balwantrao Shinde in which plaintiff No.1 had a right by birth. The entire property therefore could not have been given to Chhabubai by way of maintenance.
36. The facts involved in the cited decision of the Honourable Apex Court is different from the case in hand and factually much of a muchness and the between the cited case and the present case could not be seen, as in that case even though there were no pleadings and evidence to the effect that a property was given to a lady in lieu of maintenance, the High Court wrongly recorded a finding that the property in the possession of the said lady was in lieu of maintenance and that it got enlarged into full ownership in her favour. But here it is quite obvious and axiomatic that the facts are entirely different and as such, the cited decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.
37. The one other decision cited on the side of the plaintiffs is found reported in AIR 1991 SUPREME COURT 409 OM PRAKASH AND OTHERS VS. RAM KUMAR AND OTHERS, an excerpt from it would run thus:
". . . . . . . A party cannot be granted a relief which is not claimed, if the circumstances of the case are such that the granting of such relief would result in serious prejudice to the interested party and deprive him of the valuable rights under the statute. In an action by the landlord the tenant is expected to defend only the claim made against him . . . . . . "
38. The above decision emerged relating to a dispute between a landlord and his tenant. Whereupon the Hon'ble Supreme Court mandated that if the circumstances of a case are such that granting of relief not asked for would result in serious prejudice to the interest of a party, then it should not be granted.
39. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision reported in AIR 2006 MADRAS 112 SUBAIDA AND ANOTHER VS. K.A.M.P.MEERANIA MUSLIM EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY to highlight the point that the Court cannot grant the relief which is not asked for.
40. Once again I would like to point out that in that cited decision also the facts are entirely different and it is not one with regard to a partition suit.
41. Here, to the risk of repetition, without being tatalogous, I would like to reiterate that in a partition suit, simply because a party makes some averment incommensurate with the relief claimed by him, the Court cannot pin down the party by holding that the party would be entitled only to certain right claimed by him and not to the actual right adjudged by the Court as the one to which he is entitled.
42. The learned Senior counsel for D4, D5, and D6 would place reliance on the decision rendered by the Patna High Court in GOBIND KPRASAD SINHA VS. MST.KULWANTI AND OTHERS AIR 1985 PATNA 31. However, the said judgement is on a different set of facts and it is not a judgement relating to a partition suit.
43. Not to put too fine a point on it, a fortiori, eventhough the plaintiffs have not prayed for relief relating to 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties and only at the instance of the defendants 4, 5 and 6 those 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties were included in the suit property, yet the plaintiffs could be allotted shares in them and that too in the wake of the evidence marshaled before the Court.
44. I would like to incidentally point out that simply because the plaintiffs have not got the plaint amended including a prayer for allotting shares in the 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties, the Court is not precluded or prevented from allotting shares in those items also when the defendants voluntarily had chosen to bring them within the ambit of the suit.
45. Accordingly point No.(i) is decided to the effect that 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties are all coparcenery properties, liable for partition.
46. Point No.(ii) is answered to the effect that the plaintiffs are having right to claim share in the 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties also.
47. Point No.(iii) is adjudged to the effect that the sale deeds and settle deed relating to the 'C' scheduled properties do not have the effect of depriving the plaintiffs' right to claim partition in the 'C' scheduled properties.
48. Point No.(iv): In view of the ratiocination adhered to in deciding the aforesaid points, the 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' scheduled properties should be divided into three equal shares, as there were originally three coparceners, viz., Nachimuthu Gounder, and his two sons D1 and D2. Consequently, the 1/3rd share of Nachimuthu Gounder shall be divided into four shares in view of the fact that Nachimuthu Gounder had four children.
49. Accordingly the first plaintiff, being the son of deceased Palaniammal, the daughter of Nachimuthu Gounder, is entitled to 1/12th share, P2-Nachiammal-the daughter of Nachimuthu Gounder is entitled to another 1/12th share, D2 is entitled to 1/12th share plus 1/3rd share, D4, D5 and D6-being the legal heirs of deceased Subbanna Gounder-the son of Nachimuthu Goudner, is entitled to 1/12th share plus 1/3rd share, in the entire suit properties. Accordingly, preliminary decree is passed.
50. To say the least, the lower Court, without au fait with law and au courant with facts, surprisingly, in the decree adopted certain equities, which are not akin to legal reasoning at all. The parties are at liberty to apply for final decree and also praying for the routine and usual reliefs as permissible in a partition decree, in addition to their right to apply under Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for getting assessed the mesne profits and for awarding the same as per law. Regarding the valuation of properties, the parties are at liberty to adduce evidence during final decree proceedings and accordingly obtain verdict before the trial Court.
51. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed modifying the judgement and decree of the lower Court as set out supra. No costs.