JUDGMENT B. S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed against the no claim award dated 31.5.1999, passed by the Labour Court, Varanasi, published on 14.10.1999.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner workman raised the industrial dispute, and the appropriate Government in exercise of the powers under Section 4K of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called Act, 1947) vide order dated 26th July, 1997 made a reference as to whether the termination of the services of the workman w.e.f. 17.4.1995 was in accordance with law, and if not to what relief he was entitled to? In pursuance of the said reference petitioner workman filed a claim petition contending that respondent No. 2 Jal Sansthan was the principal employer and he was employed as a gun man for security purpose on 3rd April, 1992 through the Director of M/s. Smart Ex Serviceman Security. His work was satisfactory as a Watchman/Guard and he had worked under the direct control and supervision of the respondent No. 2. His salary was paid through the contractor. The agreement between the principal employer and the contractor was sham and thus the respondent No. 2 had been guilty of adopting unfair labour practice. More so, the principle of first come last go had not been adopted, In spite of the fact that he had worked for 240 days in a calendar year counting backward from the date of termination, the order dated 17.4.1995 was liable to be set aside as having been passed in violation of the provisions of Section 6N of the Act, 1947. Therefore, he should be reinstated with all consequential benefits and regularized with the principal employer in view of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 (hereinafter called the Act). The management contested the case submitting that the workman was the employee of the labour contractor non-application No. 3 before the labour court and contract had been signed with the said Firm after inviting quotations from various agencies in addition to the per month salary of Rs. 900. Twenty per cent charges were recovered by the said agent. The agreement was signed on 31.12.1992 and as per the terms of contract the workman was not the direct employee of the said management. In spite of service to non-petitioner No. 3 labour contractor (not impleaded in writ petition) he did not enter appearance. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence led by the parties before the Labour Court, the Court came to the conclusion that workman was not the employee of the principal employer and he was the employee of the labour contractor. Thus, no claim award was made. Hence, this petition.
3. Shri S. A. Murtaza, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Shri S. K. Banerji, learned Standing Counsel and Shri M. K. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have raised the same issues and made same submissions which had been raised before the labour court. But Mr. Murtaza could not furnish any explanation as to how the labour contractor who was non-applicant No. 3 before the labour court has not been impleaded in this petition. It appears that as the petitioner workman had not sought any relief against the said contract before that labour court and he was not willing to have any relief against him, he has not impleaded the labour contractor before this Court. But once he was a party before the labour court it was proper to implead him here also.
4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Provisions of the Act do not abolish the contract labour system, it merely authorizes the appropriate Government to abolish the contract labour as is provided under Section 10 of the said Act. The Scheme of the Act provides that even if the labourer/workmen are employed through the contractor, they should not be exploited or there should be no unfair labour practice in the establishment. The purpose of enactment to the case was to curb the abuses to the employment of contract labour and to regulate their employment and to abolish the same in certain circumstances.
6. Similarly, Rule 25 of the U. P. Rules, 1975 provides for various checks for supplying the contract labour as it provides for the grant of valid licence and regarding the liability, etc. of the principal employer to the extent that the wages payable to the workmen by the contractor shall not be less than the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act. Moreover, the provisions of the Act, 1970 particularly, Section 14 provides for revocation/suspension and amendment of the licence. Sections 16 to 21 provide for the welfare and health of contract labourer, which includes the liability of the principal employer to provide the facilities of canteen, rest room, first-aid etc. It also provides that the principal employer shall be responsible for the payment of wages to each workman employed by him as contract labour and such wages shall be paid before the prescribed period. Chapter VI of the Act provides for penalty and procedure for contravention of the provisions regarding employment of contract labour. Section 30 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall have an overriding effect over any other law/agreement for the time being in force.
7. In Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India, 1974 (1) SCC 596, the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the validity of the Act, 1970 and held to be valid observing that the policy of the Act was that working conditions of the contract labour should be so regulated as to ensure payment of wages and provision of essential amenities.
8. The objects and reasons of the Act specifically provide that "the working conditions of contract labour should be regulated so as to ensure payment of wages and provisions of essential amenities. Under the Scheme of the Bill, the provisions and maintenance of certain basic welfare amenities for contract labour, like drinking water and first-aid facilities, and in certain cases rest room and canteen, have been made obligatory. Provisions have also been made to guard against delay in the matter of wage payment."
9. Under Section 10 of the Act, the appropriate Government has the power to issue a notification for abolition of the contract labour, but there is no other competent authority under the Act which can deal with the subject. The labour adjudicator has also not been enclothed with the power to pass any order abolishing the contract labour. If the appropriate Government is satisfied and a notification is issued abolishing contract labour in the establishment, the natural corollary would be that from issuance of such a notification the principal employer shall not be permitted to have labour through a contractor but the question does arise that even if such a notification is issued whether the labourers supplied by the contractor can claim the privilege of absorption on permanent basis with the principal employer. The answer has to be in the negative because the statute does not provide for any such remedial measure. [Vide P. Karunakaran v. Chief Commercial Superintendent and Ors.. 1988 Lab IC 1346].
10. In fact the Act of 1970 has taken away the power of the State Government to refer the industrial dispute relating to employment of contract labour to the Industrial Tribunal. [Vide Air France, New Delhi v. Industrial Tribunal Delhi and Anr., 1984 Lab IC 847 and Management Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd. Madras v. Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh and Ors., 1975 Lab IC 165].
11. Section 30 of the Act, 1970 provides that the provisions of the Act would have an overriding effect over other provisions of law for the time being in force. Even otherwise the Act being a special Act would prevail over the general law i.e., the Industrial Disputes Act as the Act deals with the subject of contract labour and it had taken away the power of the Government which is enjoyed previously under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act to refer the dispute relating to contract labour to the Industrial Tribunal. However, under the provisions of the Act, the appropriate Government, if it so desires can prohibit contract labour in any process by issuing required notification, [vide Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1992 (65) FLR 847].
12. In Workmen Food Corporation of India v. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1985 SC 670, the Supreme Court had placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in the case of Dharanga Dhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264 and held that unless a person is thus employed there can be no question of his being a workman within the definition of the term as contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. The Court held as under :
I "Therefore, when the contract system was in vogue, the workmen employed by the contractor were certainly not the workmen of the Corporation."
13. This Court while deciding the Writ Petition No. 14758 of 1990, Indian Explosives Ltd. v. State of U. P. and Ors., vide its judgment dated 25.1.1991 considered the definition of workmen under the Act and compared it with the definition of workmen given under the Industrial Disputes Act and observed as under :
"The definition of 'workmen' as given in C.L.A., therefore, is having a deeming clause also even if such workman is hired in connection with 'such work' by or through a contractor. Therefore, there is a market distinction in the definition of workmen as given in the C.L.A. and the definition of word 'workmen' as given in the Act. The award of the Tribunal is based only upon the definition of 'workmen' as is to be found in the Act with reference to the improvement or changed stand of the Union regarding the relationship of master and servant and that too based upon the statement of witnesses only as regards the nature of work done by them. The said award and the findings of the Tribunal cannot, therefore, be sustained under any circumstances. Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the employers on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian General Navigation and Railway Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Their Workmen, 1966 (I) LLJ 735. In that case the Supreme Court set aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal where the company was directed to pay retrenchment compensation to the workmen. The Supreme Court held that there was no relationship of master and servant between the company and the labour employed by the contractor nor was there any evidence to show that the contract labour became employees of the company at any time. During the course of judgment the Supreme Court held as under :
'.................... Therefore, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the retrenched workmen had been employed by Appellant No. 1. That being so, Appellant No. 1 is not the employer of the 56 workmen in question and as such the Tribunal can give them no relief. If they have any claim at all, it would be against the contractor who was their employer.' On the given facts of the present case, it would be open to the aggrieved persons to get a reference made to the Tribunal for getting reliefs as regards their rights of payment of wages, retrenchment compensation etc. from the contractor."
14. In Standard Vacuum Refining Co. of India Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 948, the Apex Court considered the case wherein the validity of the reference was challenged by the principal employer, inter-atia, on the grounds that as the workman was not his employee there could be no reference to the labour court for any relief whatsoever against it. After considering the case the Court held that reference was competent for the reason that the work entrusted to the contractor was incidental to and necessary for the work of the refinery and was of a perennial nature ; it was sufficient to employ a considerable number of whole time workmen and that type of work was being done in most concerns through regular workmen.
15. In R. K. Panda v. Steel Authority of India, 1994 (5) SCC 304, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that to determine as to whether the contract labourers had become the employees of the principal employer in course of time or whether the engagement and employment of labourers through a contractor was a mere camouflage and a smokescreen, has to be established before the Industrial Court/Tribunal and cannot be agitated before the writ court, being pure question of fact.
16. In Gujarat Electricity Board Thermal Power Station, Ukai v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1893, wherein the Supreme Court after considering the entire law and a catena of judgment decided by the Apex Court earlier, came to the following conclusion :
(i) "In view of the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, it is only the appropriate Government which has the authority to abolish genuine labour contract in accordance with the provisions of the said section. No court including the industrial adjudicator had jurisdiction to do so.
(ii) If the contract is sham or not genuine, the workmen of the so-called contractor can raise an industrial dispute for declaring that they were always the employees of the principal employer and for claiming the appropriate service conditions. When such dispute is raised, it is not a dispute for abolition of the labour contract and hence, Section 10 of the Act will not bar either the raising of the adjudication of the dispute. When such dispute is raised, the industrial adjudicator has to decide whether the contract is sham or genuine. It is only if the adjudicator comes to the conclusion that the contract is sham, that he will have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that the contract is genuine, he may refer the workmen to the appropriate Government for abolition of the contract labour under Section 10 of the Act and keep the dispute pending. However, he can do so if the dispute is espoused by the direct workmen of the principal employer. If the workmen of the principal employer have not espoused the dispute, the adjudicator, after coming to the conclusion that the contract is genuine, has to reject the reference, the dispute being not an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the I. D. Act. He will not be competent to give any relief to the workmen of the erstwhile contractor even if the labour contract is abolished by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act.
(iii) If the labour contract is genuine, a composite industrial dispute can still be raised for abolition of the contract labour and their absorption. However, the dispute, will have to be raised invariably by the direct employees of the principal employer. The industrial adjudicator, after receipt of the reference of such dispute will have first to direct the workmen to approach the appropriate Government for abolition of the contract under Section 10 of the Act and keep the reference pending. If pursuant to such reference, the contract labour is abolished by the appropriate Government, the industrial adjudicator will have to give opportunity to the parties to place the necessary material before him to decide whether the workmen of the erstwhile contract should be directed to be absorbed by the principal employer how many of them and on what terms. If, however, the contract labour is not abolished, the industrial adjudicator has to reject the reference.
(iv) Even after the contract labour system is abolished, the direct employees of the principal employer can raise an industrial dispute for absorption of the Ex-contractor's workmen and the adjudicator on the material placed before him can decide as to who and how many of the workmen should be absorbed and on what terms."
17. In Secretary Haryana State Electricity Board v. Suresh and Ors.. AIR 1990 SC 1160, the Apex Court held that in a case of a contract labour, the Industrial Tribunal must examine after appraisal of evidence as to whether the contract between the principal employer and the labour contractor was genuine or not and if it was merely a camouflage and a smokescreen and disguised in a most transparent veil which would easily be pierced and the real contractual relationship can be determined and court comes to the conclusion that the workmen were employees of the principal employer, relief should be granted.
18. In Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, 1997 (9) SCC 377, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after examining the Scheme of the Act categorically held that the statute did not intend to denude the contract labour of their source of livelihood and in case the Court comes to the conclusion that employment was in violation of the provisions of the Act, the Court could grant the appropriate relief of absorption in the employment of the principal employer. The matter was considered by the Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India Ltd: v. National Union Waterfront Workers, 2001 (7) SCC 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the entire scheme of the Act, 1970 came to the conclusion that the law laid down in Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union (supra) was not good for the reason that it was beyond the scope of interpretive legislation to provide for something which has not been intended by the Legislature while enacting the statute and the said judgment was overruled. The Court laid down three following principles :
(i) Where contract labour is engaged in or in connection with the work of an establishment and employment of contract labour is prohibited either because the industrial adjudicator/ court ordered abolition of contract labour or because the appropriate Government issued notification under Section 10(1) of the C.L.R.A. Act, no automatic absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment ordered :
(ii) Where the contract was found to be a sham and nominal, rather a camouflage, in which case the contract labour working in the establishment of the principal employer were held, in fact and in reality, the employees of the principal employer himself. Indeed, such cases do not relate to abolition of contract labour but present instances wherein the court pierced the veil and declared the correct position as a fact at the stage after employment of contract labour stood prohibited ; and
(iii) Where in discharge of a statutory obligation of maintaining a canteen in an establishment the principal employer availed the services of a contractor the contract labour would indeed be the employees of the principal employer.
The Court further considered the issue whether on a contract engaging contract labour in connection with a work of the principal employer, the relationship of master and servant between him and the contract labour emerges. After considering a large number of judgments, including Maharashtra Sugar Mitts Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 313 ; Shivnandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., AIR 1955 SC 404 ; Bastt Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar, AIR 1964 SC 355 ; and Hussain Bhai v. Alath Factory Thezhilali Union, 1978 (4) SCC 257, the Court came to the conclusion that it would depend upon the facts of individual case to be examined by the Court and held as under :
"................. The industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the service of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose ..........................."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further cautioned that it is the industrial adjudicator who has to determine the genuineness of the contract and being a question of fact, such an issue cannot be determined in writ jurisdiction. However, undoubtedly, the award of the labour court shall be amenable to judicial review.
19. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. After considering the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, the labour court has recorded the following finding of fact :
(i) The work was not of a perennial nature nor there was any sanctioned post.
(ii) Similar work is not being taken by employing the regular employees in other such establishments.
(iii) The supervisory and administrative control was not with the principal employer as even the duties were changed by the contractor as suggested by the principal employer and workman was replaced also in terms of the contract.
(iv) The terms of the contract provided that such workman shall not be the employee of the principal employer nor they would become the members of the union of workers employed by the principal employer.
(v) The payment was made to the workman through the agent also paying him the 20% service charges. Appointment of the workman was through the labour contractor called by the principal employer.
(vi) The establishment was concerned with the supply of water and to look after the sewerage of the city and therein there was no provision for engaging the security guards.
(vii) The workman was not supplied the dress, etc. by the principal employer.
(viii) The contract between the parties was genuine, not sham or a camouflage but was given by the labour contractor.
And in view thereof, the no claim award was made by the Court.
20. In case like instant, the Court can review only the "decision making procedure" and not the "decision" of the authority. The Court, not being a court of appeal, is not competent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in "exceptional circumstances".
[Vide Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 ; State Bank of India and Ors. v. Samarendra Kishore Endow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 ; State of Punjab v. Surjtt Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 350 ; State of U. P. v. Ashok Kumar Singh and Anr., AIR 1996 SC 736 ; State of U. P. v. Wand Kishore Shukla and Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1561 ; Transport Commissioner, Madras v. Thiru A.R.K. Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 ; Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1908 ; State of Punjab v. Bakhshish Singh, 1998 (1) AWC 57 (SC) : AIR 1997 SC 2696 ; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 739 ; Union of India v. Lt. Gen. R. S. Kadyan and Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 698 ; Food Corporation of India v. A. Prahalada Rao and Anr., (2001) 1 SCC 165 ; Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors., 2001 (1) AWC 83 (SC) : (2001) 1 SCC 182 ; N. R. Nair v. Union of India and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 84 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Ashutosh Kumar Srivastava. (2002) 1 SCC 188 and Ouseph Mathai and Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir, 2002 (4) AWC 2.8 (SC) (NOC) : (2002) 1 SCC 319).
21. In State of Tamil Nadu v. S. Subramaniam, AIR 1996 SC 1232, the Apex Court held that the only consideration the Court/Tribunal has, in its judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion is based on the evidence on record and support the finding, or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence.
22. In General Court Martial and Ors. v. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, AIR 1998 SC 983, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, in its limited power of exercise of judicial review, may interfere by appreciating the evidence only if there is an omission on the part of the authority to consider the relevant evidence. Similarly, in Rajendra Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration. (1984) 4 SCC 635, the Court observed as under :
"It is equally well-settled that where a quasi-judicial tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated .......... Viewed from either angle, the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer ....... are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sight of and the High Court ought not to have short-circuited the writ petition."
23. In view of the above, as there is a very limited scope of judicial review and there is nothing on record on the basis of which it can be held that the findings of fact recorded by the labour court are perverse being based on no evidence or contrary to the evidence on record, thus there is no occasion for this Court to reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of fact.
24. Certain issues have halfheartedly been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as the contractor was not having the licence, and, therefore, the contract itself was signed in violation of the provisions of Act and should be ignored.
25. No such plea had been taken by the workman before the labour court nor any evidence had been led on this issue. Being a question of fact, it is neither desirable nor permissible for this Court to enter into this issue. It was the petitioner's duty to take proper pleadings before the labour court and prove the same in accordance with law.
26. It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. [Vide Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181 ; Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1608 ; National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2779 ; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rai and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141 ; Chitra Kumari v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1237 and State of U. P. and Ors. v. Chandra Prakash Pandey, 2001 (2) AWC 1399 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 1298].
27. In Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Guruachan Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :
"The findings in the absence of necessary pleading and supporting evidence cannot be sustained in law."
Similar view has been reiterated in Vithal N. Shetti and Anr. v. Prakash N. Rudrakar and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 18.
28. More so, it is not permissible for the writ court to examine the question of fact raised by the party first time in the petition. The petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the factual dispute for the first time in writ jurisdiction.
29. It is settled proposition of law that a pure question of law, which does not require any investigation of fact, can be raised first time in writ jurisdiction. An issue which requires investigation of facts, cannot be allowed to be agitated, [Vide Ratan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, (1993) 4 SCC 10 ; St. Arunchallai Pillat v. Southern Roadways Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 1191 ; A. M. Allison v. State of Assam, AIR 1957 SC 227 ; Cantonment, Ambala v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1966 SC 108 ; State of U. P. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, 1992 (3) AWC 1804 (SC) : AIR 1992 SC 932 ; Bhanwar Lal v. T. K. A. Abdul Karim, AIR 1992 SC 2166 ; Rajeshwari Amma v. Joseph, AIR 1995 SC 710 ; Commissioner of Income Tax v. U. P. Forest Corporation, AIR 1998 SC 1125 ; P. R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507 ; State of Punjab v. R. N. Bhatnagar, (1999) 2 SCC 330 ; Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. M. C. Chelland Engineers S. A., (1999) 4 SCC 327 ; Rajasthan Agriculture University v. Ram Krishna Vyas, (1999) 4 SCC 720 ; Warner Hindustan Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1999) 6 SCC 762 ; Atlas Export Industries v. Kotak and Co., (1999) 7 SCC 61 ; and Ram Kumar Agarwal v. Thawar Das, 1999 (4) AWC 3341 (SC) : (1999) 7 SCC 303].
30. In Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal and Ors., (1999) 8 SCC 304, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a plea, for which no foundation has been laid before the trial court or Tribunal, cannot be entertained in writ jurisdiction.
31. Similar view has been reiterated in Gopichand Gupta v. Jain Plastic Industry, 2002 (5) SCC 274 ; Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and Ors. v. J. Venkateshwara Rao and Ors., 2003 (1) SCC 116 and Sahadevan alias Sagadevan v. State, 2003 (1) SCC 534.
32. In the instant case, the finding of fact recorded by the labour court has been that the contract between the principal employer and the labour contractor was genuine and not sham. Workman had been engaged through the agency. Contract was recorded in writing between the parties, according to which workman had to be the employee of the labour contractor, and in addition to his monthly salary, the agent would recover the service charges. The service rendered by the workman was not of perennial nature as gunmen are not generally required in such a establishment looking after the water supply and sewerage. No regular employees are. engaged for such a work by other similar establishments. Thus, workman was not the employee of the principal employer. There is nothing on record to hold that the findings so recorded are perverse being based on no evidence or contrary to evidence on record warranting any interference in a limited Jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution.
33. Petition is devoid of any merit, and is accordingly dismissed. No cost.