JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 10.12.96 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) and the order dated 30.8.96 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) passed by respondent No. 2 in revision filed by the petitioner under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act.
2. The facts may be stated in a narrow compass. The petitioner filed suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the respondent No. 1 on the ground of default in payment of rent. The respondent No. 1 denied the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and further alleged that there were no arrears of rent as the same were paid to the house owner Smt. Kripa Devi and after her the rent was realized by her sons and daughters. The trial court, however, repelled the defence and decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said decree, respondent No. 1 filed revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. During the pendency of revision, an application for bringing on record some rent receipts as additional evidence was moved on behalf of respondent No. 1. By the order, dated 30.8.96, the said application was allowed and thereafter by the impugned order, dated 10.12.96, the revisional court has set aside the trial court's decree and has remanded the suit back to the trial court for a fresh decision after giving an opportunity to the respondent No. 1 to prove the rent receipts filed before the revisional court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Babu Ram v. Additional District Judge. Dehradun and another, 1983 ARC 15. argued that the revisional court committed a gross error of law in admitting additional evidence for setting aside a finding of fact which was not within its Jurisdiction. He further contended that the alleged rent receipts were neither a subsequent nor a new fact which could be brought on record of revisional court.
4. In the aforesaid Division Bench decision, it was held that Order XLI, Rule 27 cannot be pressed into service for admitting additional evidence In revision under Section 25 of the provisions of Small Cause Courts Act. However, it was further held that. "There is no prohibition in either the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act or the Code of Civil Procedure expressly or implledly providing for the bar of admitting additional evidence..... But, the fact that Order XLI, Rule 27 has been excluded does not lead to the conclusion that the Court cannot in exercise of its inherent power admit additional evidence when the ends of justice requires the same to be done..... There is no doubt that the Court of Small Causes can in exercise of its Inherent power admit additional evidence."
In Paragraph 13, the Court further observed :
"A revision under Section 25 can be entertained on a question of taw. The Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact. Under Section 25, therefore, the Court cannot admit additional evidence for reappraising the evidence or for setting aside a finding of fact. It is incorrect to suggest that considerations which prevail in regard to the reception of additional evidence in a first appeal should apply or should prevail in regard to its reception in a revision. In a revision, the Court is required to examine whether the impugned judgment is in conformity with law. The findings of fact recorded by the Judge. Small Causes are finally binding on the revisional court. Additional evidence subsequently discovered by a party cannot be admitted in a revision to demonstrate that the finding given by the Judge Small Causes was erroneous. Similarly, with the aid of expression "substantial cause" used in Order XLI, Rule 27, no evidence can be filed in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to fill in the lacuna."
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 defended the Order of the revisional court dated 30.8.96 whereby the application for admitting additional evidence was allowed. In support of his argument he has placed reliance on a number of decisions.
6. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 is the decision in Mahabir Prasad Sahgal v. VIth Additional District Judge and others, 1991 (2) ARC 405. In this case the petition was filed against the order of the revisional court rejecting the petitioner's application for admitting a partnership deed as additional evidence. The revisional court rejected the said application on the ground that the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. are not applicable in proceedings under the provisions of Small Cause Courts. Act. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition observing that there is no absolute bar for accepting additional evidence at the revisional stage on the principles contained in Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. and the same could be admitted in exercise of inherent jurisdiction provided there appears to be good reasons for accepting it. With great respect to the learned Judge I may say that the observations that on the principles contained in Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. additional evidence can be admitted at revisional stage in proceedings under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act is contrary to the observations made by the Division Bench in the case of Babu Ram (supra). In paragraph 4 of the report, it was observed :
"Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers right on a court of appeal to admit additional evidence. But, since that order has expressly been excluded from application to Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, neither Order XLI. Rule 27 in terms nor in principle can be applied for taking additional evidence. So far as a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is concerned, the Court has a much narrower power than that of the first appellate court. Under Section 25, the Court can interfere only when the decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was not according to law. Order XLI, Rule 27 cannot, therefore, be pressed into service for admitting additional evidence in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act."
(Emphasis laid on the underlined portion)
7. The Division Bench, however, took the view that since Section 151, C.P.C. is not one of the provisions mentioned in the list excluded from application to the Courts constituted under the Small Cause Courts Act. the revisional court can exercise its inherent power to admit additional evidence when the ends of justice so require irrespective of the situation that Order XLI, Rule 27. C.P.C. has been excluded from its applicability.
8. Therefore, it may not be correct to say that the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction has the power to admit additional evidence on the principle contained in Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. but it certainly has the power to admit additional evidence in exceptional cases in its Inherent power which it possesses like any other Court.
9. Even in the decision of Mahabir Prasad Sehgal (supra), the learned Judge has held that while admitting additional evidence at the revisional stage, it has to be seen that additional evidence taken on record is not used for reappraising the evidence or for setting aside the finding of fact. Since the occasion to examine this question had not arisen because of the rejection of the application at the initial stage by the revisional court, the order was set aside and the revisional court was directed to consider whether the additional evidence could be read in evidence in accordance with the law laid down in the case of Babu Ram v. Additional District Judge, Dehradun and others (supra).
10. The next case on which reliance has been placed from the side of the respondent No. 1 is Smt. Gyatri Devi and others v. Additional District Judge/Special Judge, (E. C. Act), Etawah and another, 1992 (1) ARC 148. In this case also, writ petition was filed against the Order of the revisionat court dismissing petitioner's application for taking additional evidence on record only on the ground that the revisional court has got no jurisdiction to admit any additional evidence in a Small Cause revision. Placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of Babu Ram (supra), learned single Judge held that under inherent powers of the Court, the revisional court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 25 has also the power to take additional evidence for doing complete justice between the parties, and it depends on the facts of individual case as to when a document or an additional evidence is necessary for doing justice between the parties.
11. Reliance is next placed on a recent Division Bench decision in the case of Virendra Singh Kushwaha v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Agra and others, 1996 ALJ 1827. The Division Bench approved the decision of Babu Ram (supra) and held that it lays down the correct proposition of law that in exercise of its inherent power the Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act may admit additional evidence.
12. The position of law which emerges out from the aforesaid decisions is that since Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. has been expressly excluded from its applicability to the proceedings before the Small Cause Courts, the same, neither in its terms nor in principle, can be pressed into service by the Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 for taking additional evidence but such a Court certainly possesses power to admit additional evidence in exercise of its inherent powers for doing justice between the parties. That power, however, has to be exercised cautiously only in appropriate cases subject to the limitation that the additional evidence should not be admitted for reappraising the evidence or for setting aside a finding of fact. On the same analogy, evidence alleged to be subsequently discovered by a party should normally be not admitted in revision to demonstrate that the finding given by the trial court was erroneous. Similarly, additional evidence also cannot be permitted to be brought on record in a revision under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act to fill in the lacuna.
13. A perusal of the order, dated 30.8.96, whereby the application of respondent No. 1 for bringing on record some rent receipts was allowed, would indicate that the ground for taking the said additional evidence on record was that the rent receipts could not be filed in the trial court as they were not traceable at that time and thus according to the contention of the respondent No. 1, the said additional evidence was discovered subsequently on 19.4.96. The revisional court took the view that it was necessary to bring the said rent receipts on record so that the matter in controversy might be adjudicated finally between the parties. The revisional court, however, has not recorded any good reasons as to why the admission of the rent receipts at revisional stage was necessary for deciding the matter finally between the parties. It also failed to note that it was merely an attempt of respondent No. 1 to fill in the lacuna. It may be stated here that the trial court had recorded a finding of fact that the respondent No. 1 committed default in payment of rent. This finding of fact could not be set aside on the basis of additional evidence filed before the revisional court, in view of the aforesaid case of Division Bench wherein it has been specifically held :
"Additional evidence subsequently discovered by a party cannot be admitted in a revision to demonstrate that the finding given by the Judge.
Small Causes Court was erroneous."
14. It was not a subsequent event or a new fact which the revisional court could have permitted to be brought on record. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the order of the revisional court, dated 30.8.96 allowing the application of respondent No. 1 for admitting alleged rent receipts on record and thereafter to remand the case to the trial court giving another opportunity to the defendant-respondent No. 1 to prove the said receipts suffers from a manifest error of law.
15. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 invited the attention of the court to the order passed in Writ Petition No. 12596/97 which was filed by tenant Jagdish Chandra Nagpal, who is respondent No. 1 in the present writ petition, whereby the writ petition was dismissed summarily without even issuing notices to the present petitioner. On the basis of this order, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 contended that the order of the revisional court remanding the case to the trial court which was challenged in the said writ petition, has been upheld and in the present writ petition, no other view can, therefore, be taken. As already pointed out above, the said writ petition was dismissed summarily without issuing notice to the present petitioner and in that writ petition, the question of the validity of the order admitting additional evidence was not under challenge. The present petitioner who had no opportunity of hearing in the said writ petition cannot be precluded from contending before this Court in this writ petition that the order admitting additional evidence and the consequential order remanding the case to the trial court for giving opportunity to respondent No. 1 to prove the rent receipts filed before the revisional court are unjustified, illegal and without jurisdiction. The summarily dismissal of Writ Petition No. 12596/97, therefore, cannot operate as res judicata,
16. For the reasons stated above, neither the order, dated 30.8.96 admitting additional evidence on record nor the order of remand giving an opportunity to respondent No. 1 to prove the documents brought on record of the revisional court can be sustained in law and are liable to be quashed.
17. The revisional court shall hear the revision afresh and examine whether the findings of fact recorded by the trial court are sustainable on the evidence on record and are contrary to law.
18. This writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The order, dated 30.8.96 as well as order dated 10.12.96 contained in Annexures-5 and 6 respectively passed by respondent No. 2 are quashed and the revisional court is directed to restore the revision to its original number and decide the same afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances, no order as to costs is made.