K. Venkatasamy vs The Director

WP No. 26459 of 2010:-

The question arise for consideration in these batch of cases is whether the petitioners are entitled for extension of the benefits conferred by the Government in G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education (G2) Department dated 10.09.2009 for counting the entire length of their service rendered prior to 01.06.1988 and to confer them selection grade and special grade in the cadre of Secondary Grade Teacher and Elementary School Headmaster. The Government while issuing G.O. Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 extended such benefits in favour of 63 persons alone who have approached the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal by filinig Original Applications after the appeal preferred by the Government against the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by this Court on 21.02.2008.

2. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners have filed the writ petitions for issuing a Mandamus to direct the official respondents to extend the benefits conferred under G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 or challenging the order of rejection passed by the official respondents refusing to extend the benefits which are conferred under G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 in favour of similarly placed persons like the petitioners. However, WP No. 8090 of 2012 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the validity of G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 and to quash the same. In some other batch of cases, the petitioners prayed for quashing the order passed by the Principal Accountant General of Tamil Nadu refusing to re-fix the pensionary benefits based on the proposals sent by the official respondents as per G.O. Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009.

3. For appreciation of the facts involved in these batch of cases, the averments made in WP No. 29288 of 2014 is taken as a test case.

(i) The petitioner was initially appointed as secondary grade teacher and promoted as Elementary School Headmaster after 01.06.1988. According to the petitioner, before 01.10.1970, the post of Secondary Grade Middle School Headmaster, Primary School Headmaster and Secondary Grade Assistants were carrying equal scale of pay and mutually transferrable without following any seniority among these cadres. However, from 01.10.1970, the post of Secondary Grade Middle School Headmaster became promotional post and was awarded higher scale of pay than the post of Primary School Headmaster and SecondaryGrade Assistant. The Government issued GO Ms. No.1381, Education Department dated 05.10.1990 ordering that the Elementary/Primary School Headmasters, who held the post on or before 01.06.1988 shall be awarded selection grade/special grade by taking into account the services rendered by them in the lower cadre namely Secondary Grade. The said GO Ms. No.1381 dated 15.10.1990 was challenged by the aggrieved persons before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal allowed the applications filed by them with a direction to the respondents to confer such benefits in favour of the applicants therein. The writ petitions filed against this order by the Government were dismissed by this Court. After dismissal of the writ petitions, the Government passed G.O. Ms. No.185, School Education Department dated 16.12.2002 and G.O. Ms. No.160, School Education Department dated 23.08.2005 conferring selection grade and special grade in the post of Elementary School Headmaster in favour of those who were promoted before 01.06.1988.

(ii) It is further contended by the petitioner in WP No. 29288 of 2014 that the persons who were promoted after 01.06.1988 were aggrieved inasmuch as they could not get the benefit conferred in the aforesaid Government Orders. Therefore, yet another batch of Original Applications came to be filed in O.A. No. 68 and 177 of 1997 and O.A. No. 5548 of 1998 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal, by order dated 12.07.2002 allowed the original applications. As against the same, the Government filed WP Nos. 29644 and 29645 of 2003 and the same were dismissed by this Court on 21.03.2008. In order to implement the order dated 21.03.2008 passed by this Court in WP Nos. 29644 and 29645 of 2003, the Government issued GO Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 conferring the relief of special grade and selection grade by counting the period of service rendered before 01.06.1988 in the cadre of Secondary Grade Assistant and Head Master of Elementary School.

(iii) According to the petitioner in WP No. 29288 of 2014, before the order dated 21.03.2008 was passed by this Court in WP Nos. 29644 and 29645 of 2003, Tamil Nadu Asiriyar Kootani, an association of teaching faternity, has filed WP No. 8079 of 2006 before this Court seeking to confer the retirement benefits as per G.O. Ms. No.185, School Education Department dated 18.12.2002 and G.O. Ms. No.160, School Education Department dated 23.08.2005, without reference to GO Ms. No.38, School Education Department dated 05.03.2001. The writ petition filed by the Association was allowed by this Court by an order dated 28.04.2006 and it was also implemented by the Government by issuing GO Ms. No.207, School Education Department dated 30.09.2008.

(iv) It is the claim of the petitioner that the persons, who have approached this Court and obtained an order in their favour are similarly placed like him. Therefore, the benefit extended in favour of the 63 persons who are covered by the order passed in G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 has to be extended to him as well without any discrimination. In this context, the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (R.S. Ajara and others vs. State of Gujarat) reported in 1997 (10) SCC 433 and AIR 1997 (2) SCC Page 1, wherein it was held that when once an order was passed by the Court in favour of a person and if the same is accepted and implemented by the Government or instrumentalities of the Government, such a benefit has to be extended in favour of all those who are similarly placed as every one cannot be expected to approach the Court of law. By highlighting the above aspect, the petitinoer in WP No. 29288 of 2014 has submitted a representation dated 15.10.2009 and sought the relief of extending the benefits conferred under GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. As there was no response, he has filed WP No. 107 of 2014 before this Court praying for issuing a Mandamus to direct the respondents therein to consider the representation dated 15.10.2009 and to pass orders thereon. The writ petition No. 107 of 2014 was disposed of by this Court on 06.01.2014 directing the respondents to pass orders on the representation of the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Pursuant to such direction, the third respondent in WP No. 29288 of 2014 has passed an order of rejection dated 29.09.2014 on untenable grounds. Therefore, WP No. 29288 of 2014 has been filed challenging the order dated 29.09.2014 of the third respondent.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, in unison, would vehemently contend that those who held the post of Elementary School Headmaster on or before 01.06.1988 were conferred with selection grade/ special grade of pay by taking into account the service rendered by them as Secondary Grade Assistant as well as Elementary School Headmaster. Such a benefit has been conferred on the persons similarly placed like the petitioners by virtue of the order dated 12.07.2002 passed by the Tribunal in O.A. No. 68 and 177 of 1997 and O.A. No. 5548 of 1998 . As against the same, the Government filed WP Nos. 29644 and 29645 of 2003 and the same were dismissed by this Court on 21.03.2008. To implement the order passed by this Court, Government issued GO Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 whereby the relief was confined only in respect of 63 persons who have approached this Court. Admittedly, the petitioners are also similarly placed like that of the persons in whose favour G.O. Ms. No.234 has been issued by the Government. The petitioners are also admittedly appointed as Secondary Grade Assistant and promoted as Elementary School Headmaster after 01.06.1988 and similarly placed like that of the persons who have approached this Court ealrier. Merely because the petitioners did not approach this Court at the earliest point of time, it will not prevent them to seek the benefits conferred under GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. Therefore, the refusal on the part of the official respondents to extend the benefits conferred under GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in favour of the petitioners on the ground that they did not file any original application or writ petition before this Court is arbitrary and discriminatory.

5. In this context, the learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, in unison, relied on the Judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 07.07.2011 in W.A. Nos. 815, 1531, 1691 to 1693 and 1165 of 2010. By the said Judgment dated 07.07.2011, the Division Bench of this Court set aside the orders passed by the single Judge and directed the official respondents to extend the benefit of G.O. Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in favour of the appellants therein. Even in the said case, the Division Bench has noted that the appellants therein have been repeatedly sending representations to the Government and therefore, the cause of action arose for them for filing the writ petition is a continuous one. The Division Bench further held that the Government considered the demand of a section of erstwhile Headmasters of Elementary Schools and awarded them selection grade pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal, while so, there is no logic in saying that such benefit should be denied to those employees who have not approached the Court or approached the Court belatedly. The Division Bench therefore held that the case of the appellants are covered by the earlier order passed by the Tribunal as well as this Court and the refusal on the part of the Writ Court to extend such benefits to the appellants has to be interfered with. By holding so, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeals. Therefore, by citing the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court on 07.07.2011, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the petitioners are entitled for the benefit of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. The Division Bench of this Court in the above Judgment dated 07.07.2011, held as follows:-

"19. It is true that the appellants have not approached the Court within a reasonable time. The Government order in GO Ms. No.234, dated 10 September 2009 was issued to protect the interest of similarly placed employees. The issue also remains the same.

20. The appellants are all senior citizens and they have been corresponding with the Government to grant them similar relief. In fact, the cause of action is a continuing one. In a matter like this, delay alone cannot be the determining factor to reject the claim. When it is found that the claim of the appellants are also covered by the issue decided in the Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.234 dated 10 September 2009, they should have been given similar treatment. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the learned single Judge was not justified in dismissing the Writ Petitions solely on the ground of delay.

21. It is also a matter of record that the Government have considered the claim made by 65 of the retired employees and the benefits of the earlier Government Orders were extended to them. The Government Order in G.O. Ms. No.210, School Education (G1) Department dated 14.06.2009 clearly supports the case of the appellants. When it is made out that the Government have considered the demand of a section of erstwhile Headmasters of Elementary Schools and awarded them selection grade pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal, there is no logic in saying that such benefits should be denied to those employees who have approached the Court at a belated point of time. The appellants are aged persons and ultimately, they would be given only the benefit of re-fixing their pension. The appellants have served the Education Department for a long time and at this point of time, they wanted only a similar treatment. The Government having issued orders conferring benefits to the similarly situated employees cannot be heard to say that such benefits would not be given to those who have not approached the Court within a reasonable time.

22. In fact, the Government should have extended the benefits to all the similarly placed employees without driving them to the Court and that too during their old age.

23. The case of the appellants are covered by the earlier orders of the Tribunal and the corresponding order passed in the Writ Petitions which culminated in passing the Government Orders in G.O. Ms. Nos. 210 and 234 dated 14 August 2009 and 10 September 2009 respectively. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to succeed."

6. The learned counsel for the petitioners would further contend that the Government has passed various orders such as G.O.Ms. No.270, School Education (G2) Department dated 20.09.2010, G.O. Ms. No.216, School Education (G-2) Department dated 30.12.2011, which was cancelled and superseded by issuing GO Ms. No.179, School Education Department dated 06.09.2013. In all these orders passed by the Government, reference was made to G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 whereby the benefits of conferring selection and special grade was extended to the persons who have approached this Court. Following the same, the aforesaid Government Orders were also issued by specifically using the words "restricted to those persons who have got specific orders of the Court". While so, refusing to extend the same benefits in favour of the petitioners amount to discrimination and it is liable to be interfered with by this Court. In this context, on behalf of the petitioners, reliance was placed on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh) (2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 648 to contend that the claim of the petitioners cannot be rejected on the ground of delay and laches. It is further stated that where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. In Para No.7 and 8, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court as follows:-

"7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.

8. In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances."

7. Above all, it is brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners that yet another Division Bench of this Court passed a judgment dated 09.12.2015 in W.A. (MD) Nos. 312 to 318 of 2011 wherein it was held that a particular order passed in favour of another person can never be a ground for issuing a Writ. It was further held that merely because a few cases are allowed, it is not open to the other people to insist upon the Court to follow the very same order. By citing the above decision passed by the subsequent Division Bench on 09.12.2015, the learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that there are two conflicting decisions rendered by two Division Benches of this Court, while so, it is proper to refer the issue for adjudication to a larger bench and accordingly, he prayed appropriate orders to that effect. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in (State of Jharkhand vs. State of Bihar and another) (2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 431 wherein it was held that a decision rendered by a coordinate Bench will have a bearing on the other Bench dealing with similar matter. It was further held that judicial discipline demands that matter has to be referred for examination of the question by a larger bench. Useful reference can be made to para No.11 of the above said decision which reads as follows:-

"11. We regret our inability to agree with the conclusion recorded in State of M.P. vs. Union of India that in an original suit under Article 131, the constitutionality of an enactment cannot be examined. Since the above decision is rendered by a coordinate Bench of two Judges, judicial discipline demands that we should not only refer the matter for examination of the said question by a larger bench of this Court, but are also obliged to record broadly the reason which compel us to disagree with the abovementioned decision."

8. Per contra, the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents would mainly contend that the petitioners herein are fence-sitters/ watchers. They have conveniently kept quiet all these years and were waiting for a judicial pronouncement at the instance of others who are similarly placed like them even though they have also similar grievance to be ventilated. The petitioners have been keeping watch over the judicial proceedings all these years and after the disposal of the writ petitions at the instance of similarly placed persons and implementation of the same by the Government, they have either sent representations or filed writ petitions seeking for a direction to the official respondents to extend the benefits conferred under GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. Therefore, according to the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the petitioners are not entitled for extending the benefits of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in their favour. The learned Advocate General relied on the Judgment dated 09.12.2015 rendered by the subsequent Division Bench of this Court in W.A. (MD) Nos. 312 to 318 of 2011, wherein the relief sought for by the Writ Court was set aside and the writ appeals filed by the appellants were dismissed.

9. The learned Advocate General also submitted, by placing reliance on the counter affidavit filed in WP No. 32154 of 2014, that the Government considered the issue of awarding selection grade and special grade to the Headmaster of Primary School who were holding the post on 01.06.1988 by computing the period of service rendered as Secondary Grade Teachers as well as Primary School Heaadmasters prior to 01.06.1988 as the post of Heaadmaster carries higher scale of pay above that of the Secondary Grade Teachers who are promoted as Headmasters after 01.06.1988 and therefore they were allowed fixation of pay in the post of Headmaster. For this purpose, the Government issued GO Ms. No.1381, Education Department dated 05.10.1990. Seeking similar benefits, O.A. Nos. 2899, 3009 and 3010 of 1989 were filed before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal quashed the G.O. Ms. No.1381 by passing the following order:-

"Even if as a policy Government decide that the appointments made prior to 01.06.1988 may be continued irrespective of seniority such differentiate benefits as is contemplated by GO Ms. No.1381, Education Department dated 05.10.1990 is totally unjustified and the classification of persons appointed as Headmasters on the basis of cut off dated 01.06.1988 is totally devoid of basis.

....When the upgraded post has come into being on 01.06.1988 only, there can be no basis for giving credit for service earlier in a lower scale of pay for the purpose of pay in the higher scale by way of selection and special grade. Even the persons were designated as Headmaster within the cadre of Secondary Grade teacher with a special pay for a part of their service, that cannot justify the entire service period being treated as service equivalent to that in the higher grade for the purpose of any benefit. In the case of persons who had worked as Headmaster for any period and been in position as on 01.06.1988, their services as secondary grade teacher is viewed as service entitling them to advancement in the higher scale which had come into being on 01.06.1988, while denying same benefit to others appointed thereafter. The fact of a person having been in position with the designation of Headmaster as on 01.06.1988 cannot justify service as secondary grade teacher being taken into account for benefits in the upgrade scale. That cannot be the basis for different manner of pay fixation and advancement to selection and special grades. As between persons in the secondary grade who were designated as Headmaster on 01.06.1988 and who were not taking into account the period of service as designated as Headmaster may be justified and could be the basis for a differential treatment in pay fixation between those who had been designated and others. But credit for the entire service in the secondary grade for such category is totally devoid of basis and therefore constitutes unreasonable classification.

10. The Tribunal therefore quashed the observations made in Para No.3 and 4 of GO Ms. No.1381 dated 05.10.1990 and directed the Government to re-issue orders on a more rational basis to confer uniform benefit to all those in the post of Headmaster of Primary School. Pursuant to such order, the Government issued GO Ms. No.300, Education, Science and Technology department dated 07.04.1994 whereby it ordered that the Headmasters of Primary School be awarded selection grade and special grade based on the length of service rendered in the post of Headmaster of Primary School. Further, all those Headmasters of Primary School who have already availed the benefit of selection grade/special grade as per GO Ms. No.1381 dated 05.10.1990 shall serve as Headmaster of Primary School compared to a senior who would be entitled for selection grade or special grade in the post of Headmaster from a later date for the reason he would have rendered lesser number of years of service as Headmaster of Primary School.

11. According to the learned Advocate General, in the meantime, aggrieved by the ealrier order of the Tribunal in O.A. Nos. 2899, 3009 and 3010 of 1989, the Government filed WP No. 8896 of 1994 and it was dismissed by this Court on 18.04.2001 by this Court. While so, another 63 teachers have filed O.A. Nos. 68 of 1997, 177 of 1997 and 5548 of 1998 before the Tribunal seeking to count their earlier services as secondary grade teacher or Elementary School Headmaster and by order dated 12.07.2002, the Tribunal allowed their Original application holding that they are entitled to selection grade/special grade in the cadre of Elementary School Headmaster by taking their service rendered earlier as Headmaster and Secondary Grade Teacher before 01.06.1988 or after 01.06.1988. This order dated 12.07.2002 was appealed by the Government in WP Nos. 29644 and 29645 of 2003 and it was dismissed by this Court on 21.02.2008. In compliance with the order of the Tribunal dated 12.07.2002 and the order dated 21.02.2008 passed by this Court, the Government issued GO Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 conferring selection grade and special grade in favour of the petitioners therein. Subsequently, the Government also issued GO Ms. No.270, School Education Department dated 20.09.2010 extending the benefit of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 only in favour of those who have obtained specific orders from the Court.

12. The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents placed reliance on the order dated 04.01.2010 passed by this Court in WP Nos. 26608, 27201 to 27220 and 27267 to 27276 of 2009. In the above order dated 04.01.2010, this Court had an occasion to consider similar claim made by the petitioners in this batch of cases. The learned Judge, by the said order dated 04.01.2010, dismissed all the writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches. It was specifically observed that the petitioners therein retired 5 to 6 years before filing the writ petitions. It was further observed that the petitioners therein cannot seek the benefit akin to the Teachers covered by the earlier Government Order or for reviving the cause of action after three decades. As against the said order, the petitioners therein filed the above said Writ Appeal Nos. 815, 1531, 1691 to 1693, 1165 of 2010 before the Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench, by judgment dated 07.07.2011 set aside the order passed by the writ Court and directed the Government to extend the benefits of the Government Order in their favour. According to the learned Advocate General, even at that time, the petitioners herein did not approach this Court and they filed the present batch of writ petitions from various period ranging from 2010 to 2016. Most of the petitioners in the present batch have filed the writ petitions during the year 2014, 2015 and 2016 with much delay. Therefore, the learned Advocate General would oppose the writ petitions filed by the petitiners herein.

13. The learned Advocate General specifically pointed out that in view of the delay in asserting their claim, on par with the persons who are similarly placed like the petitioners, the subsequent Division Bench of this Court passed the Judgment dated 09.12.2015 in W.A. (MD) Nos. 312 to 318 of 2011. In that Judgment, the Writ Court refused to issue direction to the official respondents to extend the benefit of GO Ms. No. 234 dated 10.09.2009. On appeal, the Division Bench held that either in 1997-1998 or in 2002 or till the Government issued the order in GO Ms. No.234, Department of School Education dated 10.09.2009, the appellants did not seek the benefits. It is only after G.O. Ms. No.234, Department of School Education dated 10.09.2009 was issued, the appellants claimed that the Government gave a fresh cause of action to go to Court. Even at the time of passing the Judgment dated 09.12.2015, the Division Bench has referred to the earlier Judgment in W.A. Nos. 815 of 2010 batch dated 07.07.2011. However, the Division Bench has held that in the light of the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court cited by the learned Judge at the time of passing the writ petitions, the appellants are not entitled to the benefit of extending the benefits of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. Therefore, it is not as if the earlier Judgment dated 07.07.2011 in W.A. No. 815 of 2010 batch was not brought to the notice of the subsequent Division Bench in W.A. (MD) Nos. 312 to 318 of 2011 and only after referring to the judgment of the earlier Division Bench, the subsequent Division Bench has dismissed the writ appeals and refused to issue any direction to the official respondents to extend the benefit of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in their favour. Thus, the learned Advocate General would only contend that when the judgment passed by the earlier Division Bench was brought to the notice of the subsequent Division Bench and after referring to the same the subsequent Division Bench refused to extend the benefits in favour of the appellants therein, there is no need to refer the issue to a larger bench as pleaded on behalf of the petitioners. Further, as against the Judgment of the Division Bench dated 09.12.2015 in W.A. (MD) Nos. 312 to 316 of 2011, there was no further appeal preferred by the appellants therein and it has reached a finality. Therefore, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that one co-ordinating bench cannot over ride the decision rendered by another Division Bench cannot be accepted. Further, a Review Application was filed on behalf of the Government to review the Judgment dated 07.07.2011 passed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 815 of 2010 etc., but it was dismissed.

14. Above all, the learned Advocate General would contend that if the claim of the petitioners herein is accepted, it would result in enormous financial burden on the exchequer. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that if the claim of the retired Primary School Headmasters or serving Headmasters are to be extended the benefits of selection grade and special grade without any time limit or cut-off date, the Government have to incur a sum of Rs.278 crores by way of payment of pensionary benefits to approximately 11239 retired Primary School Headmasters, which includes persons who have obtained orders of the Court in their favour, not obtained Court orders even though the cases are pending and who are likely to file cases in the Court in the near future seeking similar benefits. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that the Government has already issued orders in GO Ms. No.179, School Education Department dated 06.09.2013 ordering that 1528 retired Primary School Headmasters who were promoted as Headmasters of Primary Schools between 01.06.1988 to 31.12.1995 alone will be entitled to selection grade and special grade provided that they were not granted selection grade/special grade earlier in the cadre of Primary School Headmaster by counting the service rendered by them as Secondary Grade Teacher. The said order passed by the Government in G.O. Ms. No.179, School Education Department dated 06.09.2013 extending the benefits of special grade and selection grade only in respect of 1528 teachers has not been challenged by any one and it has also reached a finality. Therefore, according to the learned Advocate General, fixation of cut-off date is proper and reasonable and it was decided to impose a cut off date keeping in view the huge financial burden the exchequer would be subjected to. The learned Advocate General also placed reliance on the decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in (Ranveer Singh (deceased) by LRs and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) AIR 2011 Madhya Pradesh (FB) Page No.27 wherein in Para No. 29 it was held as follows:-

"29. The purpose of quoting catena of decisions hereinabove is that the suo motu power cannot be exercised by the revisional authority, after the expiry of several years. It has been held in almost every decision that such powers should be exercised within the reasonable period and in the most of decisions it has been held that it should be exercised within few months. We are also of the view that the suo motu powers cannot be at the whims and sweet will of the revisional authority to exercise whenever and whatever it wanted to exercise it. If this type of unfettered right to exercise such power is conferred to the authority under Section 50 of the code, according to us, it would amount to giving a naked sword without any scabbard to such authority which will not be beneficial to the welfare of the society at large. Indeed, at least, it should be within a reaasonable period from the date of knowledge of the revisional authority exercising such power under Section 50 of the Code in respect of the illegality or impropriety of any order which has been passed by the REvenue Officer subordinate to it or irregularity of proceeding of any such officer."

15. By citing the above decision, it is stated that even the exercise of suo motu power vested in the quasi judicial authorities is subject to limitation and within a reasonable period. While so, the claim made by the petitioners herein belatedly need not be considered and it would result in enormous financial burden on the exchequer.

16. The learned Advocate General further brought to the notice of this Court that the retired teachers who were promoted as Primary School Headmaster between 01.06.1988 to 31.12.1995 form a distinct and separate class than the petitioners who were promoted as Primary School Headmaster after 01.01.1996 by virtue of which they form a separate and distinct class. Therefore, according to the learned Advocate General, there is no discrimination in the matter of extending the benefits of G.O. Ms No.234 dated 10.09.2009 to a set of persons and refusing it to another set of persons, as alleged by the petitioners. Further, the petitioners have approached this Court much after their retirement. Further, some of the petitioners have died during the pendency of the writ petitions and therefore also, the relief sought for in these writ petitions need not be granted.

17. The learned Advocate General placed reliance on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in (V. Chandrasekaran vs. Administrative Officer) (2012) SCALE 142 wherein in para No.10, it was held as follows:-

"The relief obtained by some persons by approaching the Court immediately after the cause of action has arisen, cannot be the basis for other persons who have belatedly filed their petition, to take the benefit of earlier relief provided for the reasons that, such persons cannot be permitted to take impetus of an order passed by the Court at the behest of another more diligent person."

18. By citing the above decision, the learned Advocate General would contend that the petitioners have filed the writ petitions belatedly and they are not entitled to revive a stale or dead claim. In this context, the learned Advocate General relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in (Col.B.J. Akkara (Retd) vs. Government of India) (2006) 11 SCC 709 wherein it was held as follows:-

"25. A particular judgment of the High Court may not be challenged by the State where the financial repercussions are negligible or where the appeal is barred by limitation. It may also not be challenged due to negligence or oversight of the dealing officers or on account of wrong legal advice, or on account of the non-comprehension of the seriousness or magnitude of the issue involved. However, when similar matters subsequently crop up and the magnitude of the financial implications is realized, the State is not prevented or barred from challenging the subsequent decisions or resisting subsequent writ petitions, even though judgment in a case involving similar issue was allowed to reach finality in the case of others. Of course, the position would be viewed differently, if petitioners plead and prove that the State had adopted a 'pick and choose' method only to exclude petitioners on account of malafides or ulterior motives. Be that as it may. On the facts and circumstances, neither the principle of res judicata nor the principle of estoppel is attracted. The Administrative Law principles of legitimate expectation or fairness in action are also not attracted. Therefore, the fact that in some cases the validity of the circular dated 29.10.1999 (corresponding to the Defence Ministry circular dated 11.9.2001) has been upheld and that decision has attained finality will not come in the way of State defending or enforcing its circular dated 11.9.2001."

19. By citing the above decision, the learned Advocate General would contend that the petitioners have approached this Court belatedly. Many of the petitioners retired during the year 2005 to 2015 and they have approached this Court atleast a decade or after 5 to 10 years of their retirement. Some of the petitioners have died. Therefore, on the ground of delay and laches, the learned Advocate General prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions.

20. I heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners on the one hand and the learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents on the other side. I have perused the pleadings of the petitioners, the decisions rendered by the earlier Division Bench of this Court as well as other materials placed on record.

21. The question arise for consideration in this batch of writ petitions is as to whether the petitioners are entitled for extending the benefit of G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education (G2) Department dated 10.09.2009 to count the services rendered by them in the post of Secondary Grade Teachers and Primary School Headmaster prior to 01.06.1988 for the purpose of awarding selection grade and special grade and for other consequential service and monetary benefits on par with others who are similarly placed like the petitioners.

22. It is seen from the records that the Government passed G.O. Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 by way of implementing the order dated 12.07.2002 passed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai in O.A. Nos. 68 and 177 of 1997, O.A. No. 5548 of 1998 which was confirmed by this Court in the order dated 21.02.2008 in W.P. No. 29644 of 2003 and 29645 of 2003. Thus, it could be seen that the Tribunal passed the order way back in the year 2002 in the Original Applications filed by the similarly placed persons like the petitioners in the year 1998. At the time when such Original Applications were filed in the year 1998, the petitioners in the present batch of cases were very much in service. As against the order passed by the Tribunal, Writ Petitions were filed by this Court and they were dismissed on 21.03.2008 and even at that time, either the petitioners were in service or some of them have retired from service. However, for the reasons best known, the petitioners have not approached this Court with similar writ petition in the year 2008. As mentioned above, by way of implementing the orders passed by this Court, the Government issued GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in which a cut off date was fixed for the purpose of counting the services rendered by the Secondary Grade Teachers as well as Elementary School Headmasters after 01.06.1988. Of course, this order was restricted only in so far as 63 persons who have approached this Court with writ petitions. Subsequently, the Government passed GO Ms. No.216, School Education Department dated 30.12.2011 on the basis of the recommendations made by the Directorate of Elementary Education for extending the benefits of GO Ms. No.234 in favour of those who have obtained orders from the Court in their favour; or those who have filed cases and were pending for adjudication and even some of those who have not even filed cases before the Court. However, the Government cancelled GO Ms. No.216, School Education Department dated 30.12.2011 and issued revised Orders in GO Ms. No.179, School Education (EE.1(2) Department dated 06.09.2003 on the ground that Primary School Headmasters pay was fixed at a higher scale as compared to Secondary Grade Teachers in the V Pay Commission which came into force from 01.06.1988. Resultantly, by virtue of GO Ms. No.179 dated 06.09.2003, selection grade and special grade was awarded to the Primary School Headmasters by counting their service as Secondary Grade Teacher and Primary School Headmaster prior to 01.06.1988 and it was extended to 1528 retired Primary School Headmasters who have obtained orders from this Court and who have been promoted as Primary School Headmasters in Government Primary Schools/ Panchayat Union Primary Schools during the V Pay Commission from 01.06.1988 to 31.12.1985 after ascertaining that the above said persons have not been granted selection grade/special grade either in the cadre of Primary School Headmaster by counting the service rendered in the post of Secondary Grade Teacher. This order passed by the Government in GO Ms. No.179 dated 06.09.2013 has not been challenged before the Court of law and it has become final.

23. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents, only after the government issued GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 did some of the petitioners sent a representation to the Government seeking extension of similar benefits in their favour. In fact, some of the persons who are similarly placed like the petitioners have filed Writ Petitions before this Court even in the year 2009 in WP Nos. 12255 of 2009 etc., batch seeking for extending the benefit of GO Ms. No.234, School Education Department dated 10.09.2009 and consequently direct the official respondents to pay arrears of pay and other benefits to them. While dismissing the writ petitions on 17.09.2010, this Court passed the following order:-

"8. Per contra, Mrs.V.Chellammal, learned Additional Advocate General stated that the issues are squarely covered by the earlier decision of this court in Palanisamy Vs. The State of Tamilnadu rep. By its Secretary to Department of School Education and others reported in MANU/TN/0005/2010. She stated that there is no case for reconsideration of that decision. The said decision was based on reasons and legal precedents. She also stated that G.O.Ms.No.234, School Education Department, dated 10.09.2009 has been issued as some cases reached finality and there was no option for the Government except to implement the same. But that does not give rise to a cause of action for the present writ petitioners whose cases are stale and no directions can be issued to revive the stale cause of action.

9.The Supreme Court in Col.B.J.Akkara (Retd.) vs. Government of India and others reported in 2006 (11) SCC 709 has held that merely because the Government had chosen to implement a wrong order which became final, that by itself will not give any cause of action to the other persons without deciding the issue on merit. It is therefore necessary to extract para 26 of the judgment and it reads as follows:

"A particular judgment of the High Court may not be challenged by the State where the financial repercussions are negligible or where the appeal is barred by limitation. It may also not be challenged due to negligence or oversight of the dealing officers or on account of wrong legal advice, or on account of the non-comprehension of the seriousness or magnitude of the issue involved. However, when similar matters subsequently crop up and the magnitude of the financial implications is realised, the State is not prevented or barred from challenging the subsequent decisions or resisting subsequent writ petitions, even though judgment in a case involving similar issue was allowed to reach finality in the case of others. Of course, the position would be viewed differently, if petitioners plead and prove that the State had adopted a pick-and-choose method only to exclude petitioners on account of mala fides or ulterior motives. Be that as it may. On the facts and circumstances, neither the principle of res judicata nor the principle of estoppel is attracted. The administrative law principles of legitimate expectation or fairness in action are also not attracted. Therefore, the fact that in some cases the validity of the circular dated 29-10-1999 (corresponding to the Defence Ministry circular dated 11-9-2001) has been upheld and that decision has attained finality will not come in the way of the State defending or enforcing its circular dated 11-9-2001.

10.The Supreme Court in Chandigarh Administration Vs. Jagjit Singh reported in 1995 (1) SCC 745 held in paragrpah 8 as follows:

8.  Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent authority has passed one illegal/ unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/ unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to lawindeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with lawbut even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners case is similar to the other persons case. But then why examine another persons case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another persons case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a coursebarring exceptional situationswould neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world".

11.The Supreme Court in Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee reported in 1996 (2) SCC 459 held in paragraph 9 as follows:

9.  There appears to be some confusion in respect of the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. This guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State or an authority which can be held to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, so far such petitioners are concerned, on the reasoning that they have been denied the benefits which have been extended to others although in an irregular or illegal manner. Such petitioners can question the validity of orders which are said to have been passed in favour of persons who were not entitled to the same, but they cannot claim orders which are not sanctioned by law in their favour on principle of equality before law. Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been discrimination....

12.These two judgments came to be quoted with approval in a recent judgment in Bondu Ramaswamy Vs. Bangalore Development Authority reported in 2010 (7) SCC 129.

13. The Supreme Court in a case in Shanti Sports Club & Another vs. Union of India & others reported in 2009 AIR SCW 6953 = 2009 (15) SCC 705 after referring to all the previous case laws has held that no court shall issue such a mandamus on the specious plea of either discrimination or they were unequally treated. It is necessary to extract the following passages found in paragraphs 71 and 72 which read as follows:

71. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that:

14. Equality before law.The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The concept of equality enshrined in that article is a positive concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities.....

72.Similar is the ratio of the judgments in Narain Das v. Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2 SCC 265,Gursharan Singh v.New Delhi Municipal Committee (1996) 2 SCC 459, Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others (1996) 1 SCC 334, State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3 SCC 321], Faridabad CT. Scan Centre v. D.G.Health Services [(1997) 7 SCC 752], Style (Dress land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh [(1999) 7 SCC 89], State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh (2000) 9 SCC 94, Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta Sakthi Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 10 SCC 337, Sanjay Kumar Munjal v. Chairman, UPSC (2006) 3 SCC 42, K.K.Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others (2006) 3 SCC 581, National Institute of Technology v. Chandra Sekhar Chaudhary (2007) 1 SCC 93, Vice Chancellor, M.D.University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77, State of Kerala and others v. K.Prasad and another (2007) 7 SCC 140, Punjab State Electricity Board and others vs. Gurmail Singh (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi v. State of Rajasthan and others (2009) 2 SCC 589.

14. It must also be noted that in the present cases, the petitioners have sent representations belatedly. The question whether such belated representations can be directed to be considered by courts came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in C.Jacob vs. Director of Geology & Mining and another reported in 2008 AIR SCW 7233 = 2008 (10) SCC 115, wherein the Supreme Court held that by giving such a direction to consider the representation, a stale cause of action can never be revived. It is relevant to refer paragraphs 8 to 11 of the said judgment.

"8.Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation.

9.The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.

10.Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.

11.When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of 'acknowledgment of a jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action." (Emphasis added)

15. The Supreme Court very recently in Union of India and others vs. M.K.Sarkar reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59 in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 had observed as follows:

"14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing the appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C.Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining "9. The courts/Tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High courts routinely entertain such application/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obligerated or ignored."

15. When a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.

16. A court or tribunal, before directing "consideration" of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a "live" issue or whether it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue. If it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale " issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct "consideration" without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect. (emphasis added)"

16. Apart from these contentions, the petitioners' counsel had also contended that the question of delay and latches will not arise in these cases, since it involves issue relating to pay and allowances, there is a continuing cause of action. Further the relief if granted will not affect the rights of the others. They placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317. Reliance was placed upon the following passage found in para 10 and it reads as follows:

"10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back as November 1, 1956 by the Government Resolution of that date, and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select-list, which was a necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/ Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of years, at any rate from April 7, 1961, and the Rules of July 30, 1959 were also given effect to since the date of their enactment and yet the petitioner did not file the petition until July 14, 1969. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi1 is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. (Emphasis added)

17.It is also stated that earlier order of the Tribunal was upheld by an order of this Court. It had become final and implemented by the Government. The order of the Tribunal is judgment in rem and the benefit must go to all similarly placed persons. An unreported decision was also produced in W.P.Nos.29644 and 29645 of 2003 dated 21.2.2008. But, there the Division Bench dealt with order passed by the Tribunal in Original Application relating to the year 1997. But the petitioners have chosen to come to Court 12 to 13 years after those petitions. The decisions relied on by the petitioners do not help the case of the petitioners. In fact, it goes against the contentions made by them."

24. As against the above said order dated 17.09.2010 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court, W.A. (MD) No. 312 to 318 of 2011 etc., batch were filed before the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench, while dismissing the writ appeals on 09.12.2015 filed by the persons similarly placed like the petitioners, held as follows:-

4. There is a chequered history of cases of this nature on the file of this Court. Therefore, a peep into the history may be necessary to understand whether what the learned Judge did was right or wrong.

5. In the State of Tamil Nadu, the posts of Headmaster of Elementary Schools and Higher Secondary Teachers carried the same scale of pay upto 01.06.1988. After the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission with effect from 01.06.1988, the pay scale differed. Since the pay scales of posts are one and the same, some teachers who were Secondary Grade Teachers were made to work as Headmaster of Elementary School before 01.06.1988. Therefore, after the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission, some teachers started making a claim that for the purpose of grant of selection grade and special grade after their regular promotion to the posts of Headmaster, the services rendered in either of the posts before 01.06.1988 should also be counted. The earliest cases came to be filed in the year 1997-98 on the file of the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal in O.A.Nos.68 of 1997, 177 of 1997 and 5548 of 1998. Those applications were allowed by the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal by common order dated 12.07.2002. It must be pointed out at this juncture that the appellants herein who were in service in 1997- 98 as well as in the year 2002 did not rise a little finger either at the time when original applications were filed in the year 1997-98 or at the time when the original applications were allowed by the Tribunal in 2002.

6. As against the order passed by the Tribunal a couple of writ petitions in W.P.Nos.29644 and 29645 of 2003 came to be filed before the Principal seat of this Court. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court by a judgment dated 21.02.2008. Therefore, left with an alternative the Government issued an order in G.O.No.234, Department of School Education (G2) dated 10.09.2009, granting the benefits to 63 persons who were parties to the applications before the State Administrative Tribunal and before the High Court.

7. This Government Order virtually became a hand in the hornet's nest. All the teachers including those already retired from service or retired from the world started making the representations seeking the benefit of re- fixation of pay and pensionary benefits. Unfortunately, some of those writ petitions were disposed of at the stage of admission, on the basis that the issues raised therein were already covered by the judgment in W.P.Nos.29644 and 29645 of 2003. Therefore, this Court was flooded with hundreds of writ petitions. A few of the cases were grouped together by the learned Judge and the learned Judge by common order dated 17.09.2010 dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of delay and laches.

8. Keeping the above background in mind, if we come back to the cases on hand, the petitioners as we stated earlier, were in service in 1997-98 and in 2002. Either in 1997-98 or in 2002 or till the Government issued an order in G.O.234, Department of School Education (G2) dated 10.09.2009, the appellants did not seek the benefits. It is only after G.O.No.234, Department of School Education (G2) dated 10.09.2009, was issued, the appellants thought that the Government gave a fresh cause of action to go to Court.

9. As rightly pointed out by the learned Judge the Supreme Court condemned the practice of Government servants renewing the dead and gone cases by giving fresh representations or by giving representations after an earliest order is implemented. As pointed out by the learned Judge, the Honourable Supreme Court pointed out in Col.B.J.Akkara (Retd) -vs- Government of India and others, reported in 2006 (11) SCC 709 that merely because a few cases are allowed in case the Government did not take it on appeal, it is not open to the other people to insist upon to follow the very same order.

10.The learned Judge also cited the decision in Chandigarh Administration and another -vs- Jagjit Singh and another reported in (1995) 1 SCC 745 to the effect that a particular order passed in favour of another person can never be a ground for issuing a writ. In Gursharan Singh and others -vs- New Delhi Municipal Committee and others reported in (1996) 2 SCC 459, even the impact of Article 14 of the Constitution of India was analysed. All these cases were discussed thread bare by the learned Judge to reject the claim on the ground of delay and laches. We do not see anything wrong in the order of the learned Judge.

11. However, Dr.D.Gnanasekaran, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon the judgment of another Division Bench of this Court dated 07.07.2011 in W.A.Nos.815 of 2010 batch. This judgment is relied upon to show that the pensionary benefit is a continuing cause of action and that when a similar benefit has been given to one set of employees the same cannot be refused to another set of employees.

12. But with respect, the learned Judge, in the order cited all the seven judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court which clearly show that the appellants are not entitled to the benefit. Therefore, all these writ appeals are dismissed as devoid of merits. Accordingly, these writ appeals are dismissed. No costs.

25. In Para No. 11 of the order dated 09.12.2015, the Division Bench of this Court has taken note of the earlier Judgment dated 07.07.2011 passed by another Division Bench in W.A. Nos. 815 of 2010 etc., batch. It is true that the earlier Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment dated 07.07.2011 in W.A. Nos. 815 of 2010 etc., batch has granted relief in favour of some of the persons similarly placed like the petitioners by holding that they are also equally and similarly placed as that of those in whose favour the Government has passed GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. However, when such a claim was made by some other persons, the subsequent Division Bench in the Judgment dated 09.12.2015 refused to extend similar benefits on the ground that they have approached the Court seeking relief much later and therefore their claim was rejected on the ground of delay and latches. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, the subsequent Division Bench, in the judgment dated 09.12.2015 has also taken note of the earlier order dated 07.07.2011 passed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in WA Nos. 815 of 2010 etc., batch, while so, the question of referring the issue for consideration before the larger bench does not arise. The subsequent Division Bench of this Court has taken note of all these aspects and held that the petitioners therein are guilty of delay and laches and therefore they are not entitled to get similar benefits on par with those in whose favour GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 was issued by the Government.

26. As regards the earlier order passed by the Division Bench of this Court on 07.07.2011 in W.A. Nos. 813, 1531, 1691 to 1693 and 1165 of 2010, it is true that the Division Bench of this Court passed an order by setting aside the order of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petitions and issued a direction to the official respondents to extend the benefit of the GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in favour of the appellants therein. It is brought to the notice of this Court that as against the Judgment dated 07.07.2011, the Government has filed a Review Application and it was also dismissed. In such circumstances, according to the learned Advocate General, the Judgment dated 07.07.2011 passed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court was implemented and it will not confer any right on the petitioners to seek the relief in these writ petitions.

27. In the judgment dated 09.12.2015 passed in W.A. (MD) No. 312 to 318 of 2011 etc., batch, the subsequent Division Bench has taken into consideration the earlier Judgment dated 07.07.2011 passed by the previous Division Bench of this Court and eventually held, based on the decisions relied on by the learned single Judge, that the appellants therein are not entitled for the benefits of G.O. Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009. The Appeals in W.A. (MD) No. 312 to 318 of 2011 etc., batch were filed before the subsequent Division Bench as against the order dated 17.09.2010 passed in WP Nos. 12255 of 2009 etc., batch wherein the learned single Judge has relied on several decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court while dismissing the writ petitions which was confirmed by the Division Bench in the order dated 09.12.2015 and refused to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge. When the subsequent Division Bench dismissed similar relief by even referring to the earlier Judgment of the Division Bench dated 07.07.2011, it is just and proper for this Court to follow the ratio laid down by the subsequent division bench decision. Even otherwise, as per the order of precedence, the decision rendered by the subsequent Division Bench alone has to be followed by this Court. In such view of the matter, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.

28. The learned Advocate General relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in (U.P. Jal Nigam and another vs. Jaswant Singh and another) (2006) 11 Supreme Court Cases 464 wherein in Para Nos. 13 and 16, it was held as follows:-

"13. In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents has acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussion on the financial management of the Nigam. Why the Court should come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence.

16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if similar relief is to be given to the persons who have not approached the Court that will unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment to these persons in terms of two years' salary and increased benefit of pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the Court after their retirement. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others. We have been given a chart of those nine persons, who filed writ petitions and obtained stay & are continuing in service....."

29. Applying the above decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court to this case, the petitioners in these batch of cases have knowledge about the benefits conferred by the Government in favour of similarly placed persons like them, however, they have not chosen to approach this Court immediately, rather, they have filed the present writ petitions belatedly, conveniently after their retirement. In such view of the matter, I am of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to succeed and the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. This conclusion can be fortified from the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of (Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and others) (1974) 1 SCC 317 which was relied on by the learned single Judge of this Court in his order dated 17.09.2014 wherein it was held that there was more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the casue of complaint, and such delay was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief under Article 32 of The Constitution of India. In the present case also, the petitioners have approached this Court much after their retirement and some of the petitioners have even died. The petitioners have not any justifiable reason as to why they did not approach this Court at the earliest point of time to seek the relief which are sought for in these batch of writ petition when cause of action for them to file such writ petitions was very much subsisting at the relevant point of time. Therefore, I find force in the argument of the learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents that the petitioners are fench-sitters/watchers and they were waiting for the litigation engineered at the instance of similarly placed persons to conclude before they file the present batch of writ petitions.

30. In some of the writ petitions, which are filed challenging the orders passed by the Principal Accountant General of Tamil Nadu, it is seen that the office of the Principal Accountant General has rejected the proposal sent by the concerned educational officers for extending the benefits of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in favour of the petitioners on the ground that the concerned petitioner is not one of the beneficiaries of the order passed by the Government in his or her favour or the petitioner has not obtained any orders from the competent Court. However, it was stated that if any Government Order issued in favour of the individual petitioner, the same shall be forwarded for consideration. Therefore, the Principal Accountant General has rightly refused to extend the benefits of GO Ms. No.234 dated 10.09.2009 in the absence of any order passed by the Government in favour of the petitioners and it does not call for any interference by this Court.

31. For all the above reasons, I hold that the petitioners are not entitled for the relief sought for in these writ petitions. Hence, all the writ petitions fail and accordingly they are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

15-12-2016 rsh Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No To The Director Directorate of School Education College Road Chennai - 600 006 B. RAJENDRAN, J rsh Pre-delivery Common Order in WP No. 26459 of 2010 etc., batch 15-12-2016 WP No. 423 of 2015 These bundles are not available WP No. 30832 of 2015 http://www.judis.nic.in