JUDGMENT Janardan Sahai, J.
1. The petitioner is the guarantor of a loan taken by the respondent No. 6 from the Bank of Baroda. The loan was taken for poultry farming. It appears that the respondent No. 6 defaulted and consequently recovery proceedings were initiated against the petitioner as well as against the respondent No. 6 by means of a recovery certificate issued on 22.9.1998. This certificate was issued by the Bank and sent to the Collector under the provisions of Section 11-A of the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act for recovery of the dues as arrears of land revenue. The Parliament has also passed an Act known as the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the R.D.B. Act). This Act applies to recovery of debts of not less than Rs. 10 lacs due to a bank or a financial institution. Section 17 of the Act provides for the establishment of a Tribunal to entertain and decide applications of banks and financial institutions in respect of recovery of debts. Section 18 of the Act provides that no other court or authority except the Supreme Court and High Court under Article 226 would have jurisdiction, power or authority over a matter for which relief can be granted by the tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. Section 34 of the Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of this Act over all other laws except the enactments listed in Sub-section 2 of that Section. The U.P. Agricultural Credit Act is not included in that list.
2. The guarantor has filed this writ petition challenging the recovery proceedings against him on the ground that after the Parliament has passed the R.D.B. Act the bank can only recover its dues by moving under the provisions of that Act and the recovery proceedings under the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act are not maintainable. It has been held by the Apex Court in Allahbad Bank v. Canara Bank that the jurisdiction of the tribunal under the R.D.B. Act is exclusive. If therefore the application for recovery can be entertained by the tribunal it is the tribunal alone which can order recovery. It has not been disputed by the counsel for the parties that the tribunal under the R.D.B. Act had been constituted when the recovery certificate was issued.
3. The R.D.B. Act provides for recovery of debts. Debts have been defined under Section 2(g) as follows;
2 (g) "debt' means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application.
4. This definition is a very wide one and it does not make any distinction between a debt relating to an agricultural loan or other debts if the debt is due to a Bank or other Financial Institution. Under the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act it is the recovery of an amount given as financial assistance, which can be made. 'Financial assistance' has been defined under Section 2 (e) of the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act as "assistance given by way of loan, advance, guarantee or otherwise to an agriculturist or cooperative society....". The loans granted by the Bank as financial assistance would also be covered within the wide definition of debt under the R.D.B. Act. For this reason if the R. D. B. Act is found to have primacy over the Agricultural Credit Act the jurisdiction of the tribunal under the R.D.B. Act would be exclusive.
5. The question whether primacy is to be given to the R.D.B. Act or to the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act has to be decided in the light of the Constitutional provisions. Article 246(1) of the Constitution provides that notwithstanding anything in Clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the seventh Schedule. Article 246(2) empowers the Parliament and subject to Clause (1) the State Legislature to make laws on subjects covered under List III. Article 246(3) gives to the State legislature, subject to Clauses (1) and (2), exclusive power to make laws on subjects covered under List II. It is clear from the provisions of Article 246 that primacy has been given to the law made by Parliament and the power of legislation of the State Legislature to make laws on subjects enumerated in List II is subject to the power of Parliament. As regards legislation over subjects in List III (concurrent list) the power of the State legislature is subject to Clause (1). Article 254(1) of the Constitution further provides in regard to matters covered under the concurrent list that if the State Law conflicts with the law made by Parliament the State law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be repugnant and void. Exception to this rule is contained in article 254(2), which provides that if the State Act is a later Act and has received the assent of the President the State law would prevail. There again if the Parliament makes a law after the State law it is again the Parliamentary legislation, which would prevail. In view of the language of Article 254 decided cases have held that the question of repugnancy is relevant only to the legislation under List III. The question of repugnancy under Article 254 is not relevant in regard to legislation made by Parliament on subjects under List I and by the State Legislature on subjects in List II in exercise of their respective powers under Article 246(1) and 246(3) vide Krishna Utensils Rampur v. State Financial Corporation FB. .
6. It has therefore to be first determined under which of the three lists the R.D.B. Act and the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act have been enacted. In Union of India v. Delhi Bar Association the apex court has held that the R.D.B. Act is a legislation on 'Banking' Entry 45 of List I. Para 14 of the report is extracted below;
14. The Delhi High Court and the Guwahati High Court have held that the source of the power of Parliament to enact a law relating to the establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is Entry 11-A of List III, which pertains to "administration of justice; Constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts". In our opinion, Entry 45 of List I would cover the types of legislation now enacted. Entry 45 of List I relates to "Banking". Banking operations would, inter alia, include accepting of loans and deposits, granting of loans and recovery of the debts due to the bank. There can be little doubt that under entry 45 of List I, it is parliament alone, which can enact a law with regard to the conduct of business by the banks. Recovery of dues is an essential function of any banking institution. In exercise of its legislative power relating to banking Parliament can provide the mechanism by which monies due to the Banks and Financial Institutions can be recovered. The Tribunals have been set up in regard to the debts due to the banks. The special machinery of a Tribunal, which has been constituted as per the preamble of the Act, "for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions and for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto" would squarely fall within the ambit of Entry 45 of List I. As none of the items in the lists are to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, the term "Banking" in Entry 45 would mean legislation regarding all aspects of Banking including ancillary or subsidiary matters relating to Banking. Setting up of an adjudicatory body like Banking Tribunal relating to transactions in which banks and financial institutions are concerned would clearly fall under Entry 45 of List I giving Parliament specific power to legislate in relation thereto.
7. Neither the counsel for the petitioner nor the counsel for the respondent has questioned the competence of the Parliament or of the State Legislature in making the two enactments. The well-settled rule of interpretation of constitutional entries is to give them the widest meaning that is reasonably possible. It is clear that the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act is a legislation on the subject of 'agriculture' included in entry 14, 'agricultural loan' included in entry 18 and 'money lending' included in entry 30 of List II. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the subject of agricultural loan included in entry 18 of List II would include the recovery of agricultural loans and therefore this area of legislation falls within the exclusive domain of the State legislature and entry 45 of List I 'Banking' should be reconciled to give effect to entry 18. It is true that in case reconciliation is possible both the legislations will operate in their respective field within the State. If the subject of Banking under entry 45 can be reconciled to carve out a territory, which is wholly different from the territory carved out by entries 14, 18 and 30 of the State List the reconciliation would be possible and the State Act would prevail. That a constitutional entry has to be given the widest meaning is the normal rule of interpretation but when competing entries have to be interpreted the normal rule does not apply if there would be a clash. In such a case the two entries have to be read together and if necessary in the process of interpretation the language of one may be modified by the other so that effect can be given to both. Moreover a general power cannot be interpreted in a manner to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field and that in such a case the Rule of interpretation is to restrict the meaning of the general power so as to give effect to the particular power in its plain meaning vide In re C.P. Motor Spirits A.I.R. 1939 FC 1. If even after applying this method of interpretation it is found that it is not reasonably possible without distortion to read the entry in a restricted sense and the two competing entries would cover a separate as well as a common territory the parliamentary legislation over the common territory would prevail. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the Delhi Bar Association Case (Supra) recovery of dues is an essential function of a banking institution. The subject of recovery of loans due to a Bank whether for agricultural purpose, industrial purpose, housing purpose or for any other purpose would be covered within the normal activity of banking if the loan relates to the Bank. If the subject of recovery of loans is covered under 'Banking', which indeed it is in view of the apex court's decision it is not possible without distortion to give a restricted meaning to 'Banking' so as to exclude from within its scope the activity of recovery of agricultural loans. On the other hand the subject of agricultural loan covered under entry 18 in the State list would include not only agricultural loans given by Banks but also agricultural loans by financial institutions and other bodies including agricultural loans by government. Entry 18 would therefore cover agricultural loans by bodies other than banks also and this part of the subject is not covered by entry 45. The common territory between the two entries is the territory of agricultural loans given by a bank. The question in this case is not whether the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act is legislation on the subject of Banking under Entry 45 of List I, which it is not as there are entries in the State List 14, 18 and 30 to which it is clearly referable. The question is whether the subject of agricultural loan referable to entries 14, 18 and 30 of the State list and particularly entry 18 to which the State legislation directly relates overlaps entry 45 of List I and whether Parliament can legislate on the subject of grant or recovery of agricultural loans given by banks.
8. The apex court in the Delhi Bar Association case has held that it is the Parliament alone, which can enact a law in regard to conduct of banking business, which includes recovery of debts due to bank. But the Apex Court was not considering the clash of two legislations and scope of entries 14, 18 and 30 of List II, which as we have seen would cover recovery of agricultural loans by Banks. Therefore even after arriving at the conclusion that the two legislations are over a territory, which is common to List 1 as well to list II the parliamentary legislation would prevail in view of the non obstante clause in Article 246(1). The doctrine of occupied field would apply to determine what field has been covered by Parliament. Where a field of legislation is already occupied by Parliament the State Legislature is not competent to enter. Where the legislation by Parliament is subsequent to the State Legislation operating in the same field the legislation made by Parliament would drive out the State Legislation.
9. It was submitted by Sarvasri Pradeep Kumar and A.N. Shukla, counsel for the Bank that the field of operation of the Agricultural Credit Act is different from the field, which Parliament has covered under the R.D.B. Act. It is difficult to accept this contention. The preamble to the R.D.B. Act states that the enactment is for expeditious recovery of dues of banking and financial institutions. The preamble of the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act enacts that it was made to facilitate adequate flow of credit for agricultural production and development through Banks and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. Sri Pradeep Kumar referred to the statement of object and reasons and submitted that the Agricultural Credit Act was enacted to provide financing to agriculturists who were not being given credit by commercial banks. Chapter II of this Act deals with rights of agriculturists to alienate land or interest in land in favour of Bank. Chapter III deals with charges and mortgages in favour of Banks and their priorities. Chapter IV deals with recovery of dues by Banks. The subject of charges and mortgages in favour of Banks and their priority is linked to Recovery of Dues by Bank. The R.D.B. Act also deals with the recovery of debts due to Bank and other financial institutions. Section 34 of the R.D.B. Act gives overriding effect to that Act over other laws. In the Allahabad Bank Case (supra) the question was whether primacy should be given to the Companies Act or to the R.D.B. Act both of which are Central Acts. It was held that the R.D.B. Act is a special Act and even if both the Acts are special Acts the R.D.B. Act being the later one would prevail. In that case there were debts due to both the banks against the same party. Canara Bank applied for prorata distribution. It was held that question of priorities can be decided by the Tribunal in accordance with Section 19(II) and Section 529A Companies Act and that the Company Court cannot use powers under Sections 442, 446 and 537 Companies Act to stay the proceedings.
10. In N.K. Shah v. Joint Registrar Cooperative Societies a full bench of the Bombay High Court was required to consider the question of primacy between the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 a State legislation on the one hand and the R.D.B. Act on the other hand. The question referred so far as relevant for our purpose was whether the courts and authorities under the Maharashtra Act would continue to have jurisdiction to entertain applications/disputes for recovery of debts of cooperative banks after the establishment of the Tribunal under the R.D.B. Act.
11. The Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 provides for recovery of dues of cooperative bank also. Some of the petitioners in that case were persons against whom a recovery certificate was issued by the Registrar under Section 101 of the Act or those against whom award had been given by the cooperative court/tribunal. The Maharashtra Act was enacted on the subject covered by entry 32 of List II.
32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; co-operative societies.
12. The Bombay High Court held:
28. As observed above, under Entry 32 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Legislature of the State has powers to legislate in relation to incorporation, regulation and winding up of co-operative societies. Obviously, therefore, the Legislature of the State has powers to legislate in relation (to) incorporation, regulation and winding up of a co-operative society doing banking business. The Legislature of a State, therefore, while making a general law in relation to the co-operative societies obviously can make a law making provision for the co-operative societies to recover their dues from their members and that provision made in the general law by the State Legislature would also be available to a co-operative society, which is doing banking business. No doubt, the general provision made in the Co-operative Societies Act in its application to the co-operative societies doing banking business would overlap and may be relatable to the law that can be made by the Parliament under Entry 45 relating to the business of banking. But merely because of such overlapping the law made by the State Legisluture cannot be said to be beyond its legislative competence. This may happen in relation to the Entries also in List I, because it is now a settled law that the legislative heads, which are given in the three Lists must receive large and liberal meaning. But when the Legislature of a State has competence to legislate in relation to co-operative Societies, incidentally, it will have the powers to legislate in relation to the co-operative societies, which are doing banking business and make a provision which may relate to the aspect of banking business and such incidental provision which is made by the State Legislature cannot be said to be beyond its legislative competence, and will continue to operative till the Parliament intervenes and makes a specific law covering that field.
30. Thus to our mind even leaving aside the aspect that the 1960 Act being a general law and the 1993 Act being a special law coupled with the provisions of Sections 18 and 34 in the 1993 Act, even in terms of the provisions contained in Clause (1) of Article 246 and Clause (3) of Article 246, the moment the Parliament enacted the 1993 Act covering specifically the field of recoveries to be made by the banks, the provisions in 1960 Act on that aspect in so far as they relate to banks will get displaced.
13. In that case the Bombay High Court relied upon a decision of the Apex court in Fateh Chand Himmat Lal v. State of Maharashtra 1977 SC 1825. Para 62 of the Fateh Chand is quoted below
62. We may sum up the legal position to the extent necessary for our case. Where Parliament has made a law under Entry 52 of List I and in the course of it framed incidental provisions affecting gold loans and money lending business involving gold ornaments, the State, making a law on a different topic but covering in part the same area of 'gold loans' must not go into irreconcilable conflicts. Of course, if Article 254(2) can be invoked - we will presently examine it -then the State law may still prevail since the assent of the President has been obtained for the Debt Act. Thirdly, the doctrine of 'occupied field' does not totally deprive the State Legislature from making any law incidentally referable to gold. In the event of a plain conflict, the State law must step down unless, as pointed out earlier in the previous passage, Article 254(2) comes to the rescue.
14. Sri K. Ajit, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Unique Butyle Tube Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. U.P. Financial Corporation. The Apex Court held that the R.D.B. Act would prevail over the U.P. Public Money Recovery of Dues Act as the U.P. Act is not one of the Acts, saved under Section 34(2) of the R.D.B. Act. The other decisions cited is Suresh Chandra Gupta and Ors. v. The Collector and Ors. . In this case a Full Bench of this Court held that recovery of debts against a guarantor too can be made under the R.D.B. Act and that proceedings for recovery of debts against a guarantor under the U.P. Public Money Recovery of Dues Act are not maintainable. Reliance was also placed on certain decisions, which hold that if an Act in pith and substance is within the legislative competence of the legislature, which passed it incidental trenching into a subject within the competence of another legislature would not affect the validity of the legislation. The decision cited is (V 47 C 74) Chaturbhai M. Patel v. Union of India and Ors.. He also cited J.T. 1990 (3) SC 533 Bharat Coking coal Ltd v. State of Bihar and Ors. on the point that law made by Parliament would prevail.
15. Sri Pradeep Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that Section 11-A of the Agricultural Credit Act provides a different mode of recovery to that under the R.D.B. Act in that no adjudication is required in proceedings under Section 11-A of the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act and, therefore, the U.P. Act does not operate in the same field as the R.D.B. Act. In my opinion the contention is misconceived, The field of recovery of Banking dues not less than Rs. 10 lacs has been occupied by Parliament completely. By virtue of Section 17 read with Section 18 and 34 of the R. D. B. Act all applications in the matter of recovery of debts of the Bank and other financial institutions now lie exclusively within the domain of the tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. Section 18 takes away the power of all courts and authorities in respect of matters falling under Section 17. The Collector is covered under the expression 'authority'. It is not in dispute that the dues of the Bank in this case fall within the definition of debt. It is, therefore, open to the Bank to initiate recovery proceedings under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act. Once it is determined that the Act made by the Parliament as well as by the State Legislature is upon a territory, which is common to both the Parliament Act would prevail. The question of comparison of the provisions of the two Acts to bring out the inconsistency in the provisions is not necessary if the Parliament's enactment intends to cover the whole field. This is the view taken by the Apex Court in State of Orissa v. M.A. Tullock That apart adjudication is also involved in proceedings under Section 11-A. The recovery certificate issued under Section 11-A is sent to the Collector. Under Section 287-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act it is open to the defaulter to deposit the amount due under protest and then to institute a suit against the Bank and the State. No doubt the stage of adjudication is different.
16. Reference may now be made to some of the cases upon the point cited by Sarvsri Pradeep Kumar and A.N. Shukla, learned Counsel for the respondents. The first is (Modern Syntax (I) Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur and Ors.. The Rajasthan State Legislature had enacted the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking Act. That Act provides for suspension of recovery of debts dues from relief undertaking declared under that Act so long as the industry continues to be a relief undertaking. Recovery proceedings were initiated under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act and the question arose about the primacy of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act viz-a-viz the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking Act. It was held by the Rajasthan High Court that the State Legislation under the Rajasthan Act covers a field different from that under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act. The Rajasthan Act applies in the field of social security and for relief against unemployment whereas the R.D.B. Act applies in field of Banking. The decision cited bus no application to this case. As was held by the Rajasthan High Court itself the subject matter of the two legislations in pith and substance is different. The impact of the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking Act was to suspend the recovery so long as an undertaking continued to be a relief undertaking whereas the R.D.B. Act provides for the manner of recovery of debts "legally recoverable on the date of the application" vide definition of 'debt' in Section 2(g). If the debt itself is not recoverable the R.D.B. Act does not apply. In Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. rehed upon by Sri Pradeep Kumar the Court was called upon to consider the challenge to the validity of Section 5 (1) and (3) of the Bihar Finance Act on several grounds including the ground that it contravened the provisions of Para 21 of the Drugs Control Order issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. Under Section 5 (1) of the Bihar Finance Act the dealer was required to pay surcharge at 10% and was prohibited under Section 5 (3) from passing on the liability upon the consumers. It was contended in that case that the Drugs Control order however permitted the liability to be passed on to the consumer. The Apex Court held that the subjects of the legislation were different. While Sub-section 3 of Section 5 of the Bihar Act is relatable to entry 54 of List II, which is a tax entry. Paragraph 21 of the Control order issued by the Central Government under Section 1(3) of the Essential Commodities Act is relatable to entry 33 of List III. It was held vide paragraphs 73 and 76 that there was under the constitution a complete separation of the taxing power of the Union and of the States under Article 246 and no intrusion by a law made by the Parliament under entry 33 of List III into the taxing power of the State to levy tax on sale or purchase under Entry 54 of List II is permissible and that there is no question of clash between the two laws and the question of repugnancy relevant to List III does not come into play. Incidental trenching of the State Act into the law made by Parliament it was observed was in consequential. The two legislations before us, the R.D.B. Act and the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act cannot however apply simultaneously; the reason being that Section 34 of the R.D.B. Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the R.D.B. Act and Section 18 makes the jurisdiction of the tribunal in respect of matters for which relief can be granted under Section 17 of the Act, exclusive. The two Acts cannot operate simultaneously in the State of U.P. in respect of recovery of agricultural loans of not less than Rs. 10 lacs due to banks and that field has now been occupied by Parliament. The R.D.B. Act must therefore prevail in the field of recovery of Bank debts not less than ten lacs.
17. Sri Pradeep Kumar relied upon Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals, Trichur and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors.. It was held that the Kerala Abakari Act made by the State Legislature on the subject of Entry 8 List II 'intoxicating liquors' or entry 51 of List II for levying excise duty on alcoholic requirements for human consumption operates in a field different from the Central Act Medicinal and Toilet Preparation (Excise Duties) Act by Parliament on the subject of entry 84 List I and the fact that the Rules under the Central Act to some extent trench upon the field reserved for the State Legislature was merely incidental to the main purpose to levy duties of excise on Medicinal and toilet preparation containing alcohol. Similarly some of the provisions of the State legislation were similar to some of the provisions of the Central Rules, but that it was held did not imply that the State legislature had no competence to enact them. The contention that the legislation was in occupied filed was repelled. Some cases have been cited by Sri Pradeep Kumar on the point of repugnancy between the State Law and the Central Law. As we have noticed the question of repugnancy is not relevant to a case where the legislation of Parliament and of the State Legislature fall under List I or List II. The question of repugnancy is relevant only in case of conflict between Central Legislation and the State Legislation in respect of matters covered under List III. It therefore is not necessary to examine the ases on the question of repugnancy.
18. Sri G.N. Verma, learned senior counsel for respondent No. 6 assisted by Ms. Madhu Tandon placed reliance upon State of Kerala and Ors. v. Rajmohan Cashew Pvt. Ltd., Kollam and Ors.. In that case the State government claimed to have first charge upon certain property, which were attached in respect of sales tax dues. The recovery proceedings were initiated under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act and the question for consideration was whether the matter could be adjudicated under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act. It was held by the Kerala High Court that Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act provides only for recovery of debts of Bank and other Financial Institutions and not for recovery of dues of the State. The decision cited is clearly distinguishable. The reason being that the sales tax dues could not have been recovered by the government by recourse to the provisions of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks Act. In the present case it is the recovery of debts of a banking institution that is sought to be made. Reliance is placed upon 2004 JT V.6 page 305 Pawan Kumar Jain v. Pradeshiya Industrial Investment Corporation of U.P. and Ors.. This decision is upon the point that recovery of dues from a guarantor can be made only after the mortgaged property is first brought to sale. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of the U.P. Public Money Recovery of Dues Act. Section 4 of that Act itself provides that the recovery would first be made from the mortgaged property. No provision similar to Section 4 exists in the R.D.B. Act. The decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, rendered in the context of the U.P. Public Money Recovery of Dues Act is to be interpreted as confined to that Act. This decision also, therefore, does not apply. Sri G.N. Verma then submitted that the scope of the definition of debt contained under Section 2(g) of the R.D.B. Act is different from the scope of 'financial assistance' defined under Section 2 (e) of the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act. This contention also does not appear to be correct. The definition of debt under the R.D.B. Act is very wide and it would also cover whatever is comprehended in financial assistance as defined under the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act. Sri Verma also submitted that the principal borrower has also offered time and again to the bank to recover the dues from his mortgaged property and that the bank should proceed against that property. It is well settled that the liability of a guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor. In State Bank of India v. Indexport a decree of a civil court for recovery of certain dues was passed against the borrower as well as against the guarantor. The apex court took the view that it is open to the Bank to proceed either against the principal borrower or against the guarantor.
19. In the result, the writ petition succeeds. The proclamation dated 20.10.2005 and the certificate of recovery dated 20.9.1998 and the recovery proceedings under the U.P. Agricultural Credit Act against the petitioner are quashed. It will be open to the Bank to proceed in accordance with law.