JUDGMENT Allsop, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit under Section 92, Civil P.C. The allegations were that mutwalli was denying that there was a public trust in favour of the temple which was subject of the trust and that he was mismanaging the temple. The learned Judge has found that the allegations of mismanagement are grossly exaggerated. The temple is apparently in a perfectly good state of repair and the major festivals are all properly performed. There has been a reduction in the expenditure on minor festivals and possibly on the distribution of sweetmeats and so forth but this is largely due to the fact that the present mutwalli and his predecessors have been subjected to a series of suits. It appears that one Ram Lal was at the bottom of these suits and he appears to be at the bottom of the one which has given rise to this appeal. One of the plaintiffs is his son and another is a friend of his. The third appears to have taken no great interest in the matter and it is very doubtful whether he is not an Aryasamajist who could have no concern with this temple. The learned Judge has found that there are some small irregularities in the accounts but these are of no great importance. There have been some mistakes in addition but on all occasions but one they operated in favour of the trust and against the interest of the trustee. There were some payments made to persons whose names were not entered in ledger accounts and it is possible that the mutwalli paid his son too large a salary for looking after the accounts at one time and collecting the rents. The salary was Rs. 15 a month. This is, how-ever, a moot point. We agree with the learned Judge that no very serious complaint can be made against the management of the trustee. The learned Judge has refused to remove him because he thinks that the plaintiffs were not acting in good faith but that there was an attempt against the interest of the trust to get possession of the property by Ram Lal or his heirs. We think that the order of the learned Judge was justified. It would be useful in cases of this kind if the Advocate-General would go into the question not only of the condition of the trust but also into the question of the bona fides of the would-be plaintiffs and of their capacity properly to represent the public on whose behalf they are purporting to sue. In our judgment, there is no force in this appeal.
2. There is a cross-objection. The learned Judge directed that the mutwalli should pay half the costs of the suit out of his own pocket. This order was justified because the mutwalli had needlessly denied the execution of documents which he knew to be genuine. There is also an order that the mutwalli should furnish accounts to the District Judge once a year. In view of the fact that the accounts have in some instances been rather carelessly kept, we think that this order is also justified. There is no force in the cross-objection and we dismiss it with costs. The appeal is also dismissed with costs.