IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No.13876 of 2003 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.M.CHHAYA Sd/ =====================================================
===================================================== VIJAYSINHJI COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY LTD.Petitioner(s) Versus JOINT REGISTRAR AND BOARD OF NOMINEES & 4Respondent(s) ===================================================== Appearance :
MR BS PATEL for Petitioner(s) : 1 MR JANAK RAVAL, AGP for Respondent(s) : 1, MR RAVINDRA SHAH for Respondent(s) : 2, MR JITENDRA M PATEL for Respondent(s) : 3, MR SHIRISH JOSHI for Respondent(s) : 4 5.
===================================================== CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.M.CHHAYA Date : 25/06/2012 CAV JUDGMENT
(1) By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitionerSociety has challenged judgment and award dated 30.04.1996 passed by Board of Nominees, Vadodara in Lavad Suit No.87 of 1996 (at AnnexureA), judgment and order dated 13.09.2000 passed by Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad (the Tribunal) in Appeal No.41 of 1997 (at AnnexureB) as well as order dated 18.08.2003 passed by the Tribunal in Review Application No.74 of 2000 (at Annexure C).
(2) The facts relevant for the purpose of this petition are as under:
(3) That the petitioner is a cooperative housing society registered under the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act, 1961 (the Act). That respondent No.2 filed Lavad Suit No.87 of 1996 before Board of Nominees, Vadodara under Section 96 of the Act for a declaration and mandatory injunction to the effect that lands bearing City Survey Nos.1/1 to 1/10, 1/12, 1/17, 1/18, 1/39 and 1/59 in B Tika, 13/2, situated in Kazgi Wala Wada in the city of Vadodara are transferred without any consideration and the entry in the books of the petitionerSociety is illegal and having no evidentiary value as no consideration has been paid to the owners of the lands and the entry is creation of a hawala. That respondent No.2 is not a member of the petitionerSociety still, however, the lavad suit came to be filed. As the facts reveal from the petition that the original owner of the suit lands filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Vadodara, however, the same was dismissed and a first appeal is filed against the said judgment and decree before this Court, which is pending adjudication. That summons of the lavad suit was served upon one Shri Piyush Patel, posing himself to be the President of the petitioner Society, who was in fact not a member and not a person connected with the petitionerSociety. That even the Board of Nominees has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit filed by respondent No.2 under Section 96 of the Act, as it relates to the sale deeds executed by the owners of the suit lands in favour of the petitionerSociety, still, however, the suit was entertained and a decree has been drawn against the petitionerSociety on the basis of a compromise arrived at. It is further the specific case of the petitionerSociety to the effect that Special General Meeting of the petitionerSociety was convened and that the resolution which was passed, has been ignored by the Board of Nominees and straightway decree in favour of the original plaintiffrespondent No.2 was passed, which has directly given benefit to the owners of the lands, who are not the parties before the Board of Nominees. It is alleged in the petition that everything has been done in collusion and the Board of Nominees has failed to notice mischief behind the suit and has passed the award. That the petitionerSociety was not having any knowledge about the suit, however, when the original owner, on the strength of the judgment and award of Board of Nominees, made an attempt to mutate the name in the record of rights, upon inquiry all these facts were found by the petitionerSociety. It is the specific case of the petitionerSociety that as the decree is a nullity and is obtained by collusion, the same is without jurisdiction. That the petitionerSociety was advised by its advocate that such a decree being nullity is not required to be challenged in appeal and hence, no appeal was preferred initially by the petitionerSociety in good faith. The petitionerSociety has also contended that as the society was a party by name, however the summons was received by another person, who was not connected with the petitionerSociety, in reality the summons has not been received by the petitionerSociety.
(3.1) That the petitionerSociety thereafter preferred Appeal No.41 of 1997 before the Tribunal wherein an averment has been made that there is no bar of limitation but just to avoid technicality an application for condonation of delay is also been filed after filing of the appeal. That the Tribunal, after hearing the petitioner as well as the original plaintiff, dismissed the said appeal on the ground of limitation vide order dated 13.09.2000.
(3.2) Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner Society preferred Review Application No.74 of 2000 before the Tribunal, inter alia, pointing out that there is an apparent error on the face of record and, therefore, the powers of review, as envisaged under Section 151 of the Act, may be exercised and the order passed in the appeal dated 13.09.2000 may be set aside, the said application came to be dismissed vide order dated 18.08.2003. Hence, the present petition.
(4) Heard Mr.B.S.Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr.Janak Raval, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No.1, Mr.Ravindra Shah, learned advocate for respondent No.2, Mr.Jitendra M. Patel, learned advocate for respondent No.3 and Mr.Shirish Joshi, learned advocate for respondent Nos.4 and 5.
(5) Mr.Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitionerSociety is a housing society registered under the Act and the petitionerSociety purchased the suit lands by 73 registered sale deeds, which were executed by the original owner of the lands in favour of the petitionerSociety. It was submitted that thereafter son of the original owner challenged all the 73 sale deeds by filing Civil Suit No.339 of 1984 before Civil Judge (S.D.), Vadodara on the ground of want of consideration and he being the coparcener of Hindu undivided family. The said suit came to be dismissed and an appeal filed by the original plaintiff of that suit is pending adjudication before this Court. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 herein, who was not a member of the petitionerSociety, claiming to be its member filed Lavad Suit No.87 of 1996 for setting aside those 73 sale deeds. It was submitted that the summons on behalf of the petitionerSociety came to be served upon a person who was not connected with and/or authorized by the petitionerSociety and even the Board of Nominees, who has no jurisdiction, decreed the same against the petitionerSociety. It was further submitted that such a decree is nullity in the eye of law and the petitionerSociety was legally advised that a decree is nullity and need not be required to be challenged in any higher forum. It was pointed out that the petitionerSociety did file the appeal and the same was admitted and summons was issued. That in the said appeal, after the parties appeared, a dispute was raised that the appeal is barred by limitation by nine months and four days and, therefore, an application for condonation of delay was also filed. It was further submitted that the advocate, who gave advise also filed an affidavit stating that the Society was advised by the concerned advocate that such a decree passed by the Board of Nominees is a nullity as under Section 96 of the Act the Board of Nominees has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit for cancellation of the sale deeds and, therefore, the delay has occurred. Relying upon the affidavit of the said learned advocate Shri S.T.Patel (Exh.93) in the appeal proceedings, it was mainly contented that the Tribunal while dealing with the appeal has committed an error apparent on face of record. It was further submitted that the Tribunal in the impugned orders (at AnnexureB and AnnexureC to the petition) has not taken into consideration that the petitionerSociety has been able to establish the case for the delay caused in filing the appeal. It was further pointed out that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal while dismissing the appeal by drawing an inference that there is a mala fide intention on the part of the petitionerSociety is without any basis and even though there are no pleadings to that effect, the Tribunal has come to such a conclusion. It was further submitted that the Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it on extraneous grounds. There is no such averment and the Tribunal has overlooked the averments made in the application for condonation of delay. It was reiterated that the Tribunal has failed to consider the contentions raised before it, more particularly on the ground that it was a genuine mistake on the part of the petitioner because of advise given by the learned advocate for the petitionerSociety. It was further submitted that instead the Tribunal has based its judgment on the judgments cited only by respondent No.2, whereas the authorities cited on behalf of the petitionerSociety are not even referred to. It was submitted that as per the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SCC 1353 a liberal approach is to be taken by the court while considering the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was submitted that the petitionerSociety was able to establish that there was sufficient cause which prevented the petitioner from preferring the appeal within time. It was further submitted that from the facts of the case it cannot be established that the society was culpable negligent in view of the legal advise given by the learned advocate of the society. It was submitted that no prejudice is likely to be caused if the delay is condoned and especially when a glaring fact was brought to the notice of the Tribunal, wherein it was revealed by the petitioner how the jurisdiction of the Board of Nominees has been utilized for getting a decree in favour of the original plaintiffrespondent No.2 herein, who was not even a member of the petitionerSociety. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The State of W.B. Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Ors., AIR 1972 SCC 749 it was submitted that the present one is a case of fraud and, therefore, even this Court should exercise its jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was thus, submitted that the petition requires to be allowed in toto as prayed for.
(6) As against this, Mr.Joshi, learned advocate appearing for respondent Nos.4 and 5, has vehemently supported the orders impugned in the present petition. Attention was invited of this Court to the various dates. It was submitted that the Board of Nominees has passed judgment and award on 30.04.1996 and, therefore, as provided under Section 102 of the Act, the petitionerSociety ought to have preferred an appeal before the Tribunal latest by 30.06.1996. Relying upon the affidavit (at Exh.93) it was pointed out that the petitionerSociety approached their learned advocate Shri S.T.Patel after expiry of the said statutory period of appeal and the appeal is thereafter filed, after about six months. Inviting attention of this Court to the concerned regulation of the Gujarat Cooperative Tribunal Regulations it was pointed out that no appeal, which is beyond the time of limitation can be entertained. It was further submitted that the Tribunal has wrongly registered the appeal and because of such a mistake, the parties have to suffer. It was further pointed out that in fact the appeal should have been dismissed on that ground alone and could not have been registered. It was further pointed out that only when objections were raised by the learned advocate of respondent No.2 before the Tribunal, an application for condonation of delay was filed at the stage when the matter was kept for orders. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab & Ors., Vs. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar, AIR 1992 SCC 111 as well as judgment of this Court in the case of Habron Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. Meenakshiben Anantkumar Macwan, 2002 (1) G.L.H.
272 it was pointed out that the affidavit (at Exh.93) does not mean any affidavit. The facts on record do not disclose as to when the advise was given or the same was legal or not. It was, therefore, submitted that this Court while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction would be loath to disturb the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal and would not interfere with the concurrent findings.
(7) Mr.J.M.Patel, learned advocate appearing for respondent No.3, has adopted the arguments made by the learned advocate on behalf of respondent Nos.4 and 5. It was submitted that as per the settled law the appeal filed beyond the limitation period is not competent by the condonation of delay, supported by the affidavit would be time barred and the same would be liable to be dismissed. It was therefore submitted that both the impugned orders (at AnnexureB and AnnexureC to the petition) are legal and proper and do not require any interference of this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd., Through Deputy Engineer, Jamkhambhalia Vs. Khemchand Nathabhai Gadhavi, 2011(3) G.L.R. 1867 wherein Division
in nature and noncompliance is fatal. It was further submitted that even if a decree is nullity the same requires to be challenged. It was therefore submitted that the appeal filed by the petitionerSociety was not competent and maintainable on the date of which it was filed and hence, the Tribunal was correct in dismissing the same and the orders impugned in the present petition do not require any interference by this Court. Following judgments were also relied upon by the learned advocate appearing for respondent No.3 to substantiate his case:
(i) State of Punjab & Ors., Vs. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 111;
(ii) Adambhai Sulemanbhai Desai, Chairman, Desai Coop. Housing Society Ltd., Dhandhuka Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2004 (1) G.L.R. 906;
(iii) Rohini Housing Complex Owner's Association Vs. Raiben Wd/o. Dhiraji Ugraji & Ors., 2009(2) G.L.R. 1710;
(iv) Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai Vs. Parmar Karsanbhai Dhulabhai, 2001 (1) G.L.R. 16;
(v) Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors., (2009) 6 SCC 194;
(8) Mr.Ravindra Shah, learned advocate for respondent No.2, as such adopted the arguments made by the learned advocates on behalf of respondent Nos.45 and respondent No.3 respectively.
(9) Considering the contentions raised by both sides and on perusing the orders impugned in the present petition, more particularly order dated 13.09.2000 as well as order dated 18.08.2003 (at AnnexureB and AnnexureC to the petition), it is clear that the petitionerSociety as well as respondent Nos.2 to 5 have raised majority of the contentions for the first time, which were not raised before the Tribunal. Even though the petitionerSociety has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India predominantly what is prayed for is quashing and setting aside the impugned orders (at AnnexureA, AnnexureB and AnnexureC to the petition) passed by the Board of Nominees and the Tribunal under Sections 96, 102 and 151 of the Act and, therefore, predominantly the present petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India only.
(10) The contentions which are raised on behalf of the petitionerSociety before this Court only some of them are raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal. Similarly, the contentions which are raised by the respondents were never raised before the Tribunal. From the record it transpires that only respondent No.2 was a party respondent before the Tribunal and it transpires from the record of this case that this Court by orders dated 23.12.2004 passed in Civil application No.8542 of 2004 and Civil Application No.8875 of 2004 permitted respondent No.3 to 5 to be joined as parties respondents in the present petition. The Tribunal while considering the aspect of condonation of delay has considered the affidavit (at Exh.93). This Court finds that the Tribunal while dismissing the appeal having discussed the judgments cited by learned advocate for respondent No.2 and has rejected the said application. The Tribunal while rejecting the application on its own has come to the conclusion that there is mala fide intention for delaying the matter and, therefore, the appeal memo is filed too late and even after filing the said appeal memo, application for condonation of delay is also filed too late. Such conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is based on no material before it to make such observations. From the contentions raised before the Tribunal, it appears that no such contention is raised by the respondents before the Tribunal. This Court finds that the Tribunal while rejecting the application has not only considered the aspect of mala fide intention, without there being pleadings or arguments but even while coming to the conclusion it is observed that this is not a fit case for condonation of delay. The contentions raised by the petitioner as well as respondent No.2 are not properly considered and thus, this Court finds that the Tribunal has committed an error apparent on face of record in considering the application for condonation of delay. The contentions raised by both sides before this Court therefore require reexamination by the Tribunal. Without entering into the merits of such contentions, few of them are raised for the first time before this Court, the matter requires to be remitted back to the Tribunal. At this juncture it would be appropriate to mention that Section 102 of the Act provides for filing of an appeal against judgment and award rendered by the Board of Nominees in lavad suit under Section 96 of the Act. Similarly, Section 154 of the Act provides for power of the Tribunal to consider an application for condonation of delay. Similarly, as pointed out by the learned Counsel of the parties the procedure for filing the appeal is governed by the Government Resolution.
(11) In view of the aforesaid, judgment and order dated 13.09.2000 passed by Gujarat State Co operative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Appeal No.41 of 1997 (at AnnexureB) as well as order dated 18.08.2003 passed by the Tribunal in Review Application No.74 of 2000 (at AnnexureC) respectively deserve to be quashed and set aside and the matter deserves to be remitted back to the Tribunal for its rehearing on merits.
(12) Resultantly, the petition is partly allowed, judgment and order dated 13.09.2000 (at AnnexureB) as well as order dated 18.08.2003 (at AnnexureC) are hereby quashed and set aside and the application for condonation of delay as well as the main appeal are restored to the file of the Tribunal for its reconsideration on its own merits and the order dated 18.08.2003 (at AnnexureC) is quashed and set aside. It is made clear that this Court has not opined anything on merits as regards judgment and award dated 30.04.1996 (at AnnexureA) passed by the Board of Nominees in Lavad Suit No.87 of 1996 as the application for condonation of delay as well as appeal are remanded back for rehearing.
(13) Considering the fact that the issue is very old, the Tribunal is directed to give utmost priority to the proceedings so remanded and decide the same in accordance with law as early as possible, without being influence by the fact that the earlier orders are quashed and set aside on its own merits.
(14) As the matter is remanded back for rehearing, the matter is not dealt with on merits especially on the points which are urged by the learned Counsel for the parties on the merits of the the main matter and it would be open to the parties to take all contentions available under law before the Tribunal. Respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 may file an appropriate application for being joined as parties before the Tribunal, if they so desire, and the Tribunal shall consider the same in accordance with law.
(15) For the foregoing reasons, the petition is partly allowed. RULE is made absolute to the aforesaid extent only. There shall be no order as to costs.
Bhavesh* *** Sd/ [R.M.CHHAYA, J ]