JUDGMENT Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This is a unique case where the petitioner has considered to have a licence to abuse the process of the Court and approached the Court without complying with the order passed by this Court passed earlier. The petitioner was sent a bill for electricity charges by the respondents. As it was not paid, recovery proceedings were initiated against him and citation was issued. Instead of making the payment, he filed a Writ Petition No. 4558 of 2002, wherein this Court vide order dated 30.1.2002 considered it proper that an opportunity be given to the petitioner for making representation and, therefore, one month's time was given to the respondent-authorities to consider his representation. The said representation for adjusting his bills for the work done by him in the Elections for the State Assembly and Parliament was rejected.
2. Being aggrieved petitioner again filed Writ Petition No. 47654 of 2002, which was disposed of vide order dated 11.11.2002 observing as under :
"In our opinion, no ground has been made out to quash the citation and the prayer made in that behalf is refused.
Sri Arun Tandon has submitted that some time may be granted to the petitioner to enable him to deposit the amount. Sri Vinod Misra has, however, submitted that the petitioner must show his bonafides by depositing one-fourth of the amount within a week. If he does so, sometime may be given to him to deposit the balance amount.
Taking into consideration the specific feature of this case, as per the averments made in para 28 of the writ petition, we dispose of the writ petition with a direction that the proceedings for recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue shall remain suspended provided the petitioner deposits one-fourth of the amount due by 18.11.2002 and the entire balance amount by 18.12.2002.
In case of default in depositing the amount as indicated above, the stay order shall stand automatically vacated and it will be open to the respondents to recover the entire amount in accordance with law."
3. The present writ petition has been filed to quash the citation on the basis of which recovery is being made, i.e., the same subject matter which has already been adjudicated upon by this Court and rejected on merit. However, on sympathetic consideration certain observations had been made in favour of the petitioner which he did not comply with at all. Such a petition cannot be held to be maintainable being barred by res judicata/constructive res judicata and other principles based on public policy enshrined in various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
4. The issue of filing successive writ petition has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again and held that even if the earlier writ petition has been dismissed as withdrawn, public policy which is reflected in the principle enshrined in Order XXIII Rule 1, C.P.C., mandates that successive writ petition be not entertained for the same relief. (Vide Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1987 SC 88 ; Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Development Authority, 1994 (6) SCC 97 and Khacher Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1995 (1) AWC 599 ; AIR 1995 All 332).
5. Even if a party does not pray for the relief in the earlier writ petition, which he ought to have claimed in the earlier petition, he cannot file a successive writ petition claiming that relief, as it would be barred by the principle of constructive res judicata enshrined in Explanation IV to Section 11 and Order II Rule 2, C.P.C. as has been explained, in unambiguous and crystal clear language by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. T.P. Kumaran, 1996 (10) SCC 561 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Punni Lal 1996 (11) SCC 112 and D. Gudasji & Co. v. State of Mysore, AIR 1975 SC 813.
6. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, 1997 (2) AWC 673 (SC) : (1997) 2 SCC 534 and by the other Court in Uda Ram v. Central State Farm and Ors., AIR 1998 Raj 186 and Rajasthan Art Emporium, Jodhpur v. Rajasthan State Industrial and Investment Corporation and Ors., AIR 1998 Raj. 277.
7. In D. Cawasji and Co. etc. v. State of Mysore and Anr., AIR 1975 SC 813, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"Be that as it may, in the earlier writ petitions, the appellants did not pray for refund of the amounts paid by way of cess for the years 1951-52 to 1965-66 and they gave no reasons before the High Court in these writ petitions why they did not make the prayer for refund of the amounts paid during the years in question. Avoiding multiplicity of unnecessary legal proceedings should be an aim of the Courts. Therefore, the appellants could not be allowed to split up their claims for refund and file writ petitions in this piecemeal fashion. If the appellants could have, but did not, without any legal justification, claim refund of the amounts paid during the years in question, in the earlier writ petitions, we see no reason why the appellants should be allowed to claim the amounts by filing writ petitions again. In the circumstances of this case, having regard to the conduct of the appellants in not claiming these amounts in the earlier writ petitions without any justification, we do not think, we would be justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in dismissing the writ petitions which were filed only for the purpose of obtaining the refund....In view of the above, the petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable and it is dismissed accordingly....."
8. Similarly, in State of U. P, and Anr. v. Labh Chand, 1993 (2) AWC 1139 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 754, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :
"This reason is not concerned with the discretionary power of the Judge or Judges of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a second writ petition whose earlier writ petition was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy but of such a Judge or Judges having not followed the well established salutary rule of judicial practice and procedure that an order of a single Judge Bench or a Larger Bench of the same High Court dismissing the writ petition either on the ground of laches or non-exhaustion of alternative remedy as well shall not be bye-passed by a single Judge Bench or Judges of a larger Bench except in exercise of review or appellate powers possessed by it...............But as the learned, single Judge constituting a single Judge Bench of the same Court, who has in the purported exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution bye-passed the order of dismissal of the writ petition made by a Division Bench by entertaining a second writ petition filed by the respondent in respect of the subject-matter which was the subject-matter of the earlier writ petition, the question is, whether the well established salutary rule of judicial practice and procedure governing such matters permit the learned single Judge to bye-pass the order of the Division Bench on the excuse that High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a second writ petition since the earlier writ petition of the same person had been dismissed on the ground of non-availing of alternative remedy and not on merits.........Second writ petition cannot be so entertained, not because the learned single Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition would render the order of the same Court dismissing the earlier writ petition, redundant and nugatory although not reviewed by it in exercise of its recognised power. Besides, if a learned single Judge could entertain a second writ petition of a person respecting a matter on which his first writ petition was dismissed in limine by another single Judge or a Division Bench of the same Court, it would encourage an unsuccessful writ petitioner to go on filing writ petitions after writ petition in the same matter, in the same High Court and for it brought up for consideration before one Judge after another. Such a thing, if is allowed to happen, it would result in giving full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in that any order of any Bench of such Court refusing to entertain a writ petition could be ignored by him with impugnity and the relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh writ petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder confusion and chaos relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court, for there could be no finality for an order of the Court refusing to entertain a writ petition. It is why the rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second writ petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject-matter respecting that the writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same Court even if the order of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as salutary rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of the Court."
9. In Burn and Co. v. Their Employees, AIR 1954 SC 38, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under : -
"That would be contrary to the well-recognised principle that a decision once rendered by a competent authority on a matter in issue between the parties after a full enquiry should not be permitted to be re-agitated. It is on this principle that the rule of res judicata enacted in Section 11, C.P.C., is based. That section is, no doubt in terms in application to the present matter, but the principle underlying it, expressed in the maxim "interest reipublicae up sit finis litium", is founded on sound public policy and is of universal application. (Vide Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, page 218). The rule of res judicata is dictated observed Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. in Sheoparasan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh, 43 Ind. App. 91 : ILR 43 Cal 694 : AIR 1916 PC 78 (C), by a wisdom which is for all time'. And there are good reasons why this principle should be applicable to decisions of Industrial Tribunals also."
10. Therefore, in view of the above referred judgments, it is abundantly clear that even if the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction, the principle enshrined therein can be resorted to for the reason that the principles, on which the Code of Civil Procedure is based, are founded on public policy and, therefore, require to be extended in the interest of administration of justice. Any relief not claimed in the earlier writ petition should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner to the extent of the cause of action claimed in the subsequent writ petition and in order to restrain the person from abusing the process of the Court, such an order/course requires not only to be resorted to but to be enforced.
11. In Dr. Buddi Kota Subbarao v. K. Parasaran, AIR 1996 SC 2687, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. However, access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions."
Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573.
12. In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Anr. v. N. Rajureddiar and Anr. AIR 1997 SC 1005, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that filing successive misconceived and frivolous applications for clarification, modification or for seeking a review of the order interferes with the purity of the administration of law and salutary and healthy practice. Such a litigant must be dealt with a very heavy hand.
13. In Sabia Khan and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 271, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that filing totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and such litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly.
14. In Abdul Rahman v. Prasoni Bai and Anr., 2003 AIR SCW 14, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the process of the Court is being abused, the Court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse the party from pursuing the remedy in law.
15. Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that petitioner has considered himself to be a valid licensee to use, misuse and abuse the process of the Court by filing successive writ petitions merely because he has considered that it would be better to prolong litigation and spend money on litigation by filing misconceived and not maintainable petitions rather than making the payment of the outstanding dues of the respondent authorities. The practice of filing the successive writ petitions in such manner is deprecated and the conduct of the petitioner is held to be reprehensible.
16. The petition is dismissed with cost of Rs. 10,000 which shall be recovered by the learned District Collector along with the other dues to be recovered as arrears of land revenue and shall be deposited with the U. P. Legal Service Authority, Lucknow.
A copy of this judgment and order will be sent to the learned District Collector forth with by the Registry for its compliance.