1. The petitioner, workman in Reference No. LCJ/150/1998 before Labour Judge, Junagadh Labour Court has preferred this petition under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the award & order dated 5/12/2001, where under the Labour Court rejected the reference for the reasons stated there under.
2. Facts in brief leading to filing this petition as could be culled out from memo of the petition are as under.
The workman as per the say before the Labour Court was working as casual labourer on and from 8/2/1982 and on 15/4/1994 he was appointed as work charged employee on purely adhoc basis. Said appointment came to be terminated vide order dated 21/6/1997. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order the workman in the first instance preferred Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997 before this Court inter alia praying his reinstatement and other consequential benefits. In this petition this Court (Coram: Ms. R.M. Doshit, J {as she then was) vacated the ad-interim relief vide order dated 8/8/1997, which was assailed by the workman by preferring Letters Patent Appeal No. 999 of 1997, wherein the workman through his advocate withdrew the Letters Patent Appeal as well as Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997 on 21/8/1997 for availing alternative remedy available to the workman, which permission was granted and thus both the matters came to be disposed of as withdrawn. However it is appropriate to mention here that the order passed in Letters Patent Appeal on 21/8/1997 was not placed on record of Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997, therefore Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997 was listed before this Court (Coram: M.R. Shah, J), wherein the Court has passed following order on 20/12/2006:-
“Shri Rana, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the present application, in view of the order passed in LPA which was filed against the refusal of interim order passed by the learned Single Judge. Permission is accordingly granted. This petition is dismissed as withdrawn. Rule discharged. No costs.”
3. It is appropriate to mention the order dated 21/8/1997 passed by Division Bench in LPA No. 999 of 1997 in SCA No. 4533 of 1997, as under.
“ The learned Counsel seeks permission to withdraw this LPA as well as the main mater i.e. SCA 4533 of 1997 which is admitted as the appellant petitioner intends to avail of an alternative remedy available to him. Permission granted. Disposed of as withdrawn with no order as to costs.”
4. When a contention was raised on behalf of learned advocate for the employer with regard to res judicata and multiplicity of proceedings the matter was required to be adjourned by this Court (Coram: S.R. Brahmbhatt, J) by passing following order dated 3/7/2012, as under:
“ This matter was heard at length. At this stage, learned advocate for the respondent-employer indicated that though in LPA No.999 of 1997 in SCA No. 4533 of 1997, the order of granting permission to withdraw the matter being SCA No. 4533 of 1997 on 21/8/1997 was passed and it was treated to have been withdrawn; after the Labour Court passed an order, SCA No. 4533 of 1997 was withdrawn vide order dated 20/12/1996. Copy is placed on record.
In view of this, Shri Rana submits that in fact in 2006 when the Court passed the order, the LPA order was taken into consideration. However, he seeks time to file appropriate application for clarification that the main mater stood withdrawn on 21/8/1997, that is the day on which LPA Bench granted permission to withdraw the petition. Time at his request is granted and is kept on 23/7/2012.”
5. Accordingly, Misc. Civil Application No. 2123 of 2012 in Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997 was preferred where in this Court passed following order dated 6/8/2012 as under:
“1. Present application has been preferred by the applicant – original petition to recall earlier order dtd. 20/12/2006 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997, by which, recording statement made by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original petitioner, this Court disposed of the said Special Civil Application as withdrawn.
2. Heard the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the applicant – original petitioner. It is to be noted that as such the applicant – original petitioner made a statement before the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 999 of 1997 that he withdraws the said Letters Patent Appeal as well as the main Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997 and in fact he withdrew the said Special Civil Application and therefore, as such this Court passed a formal order in the main Special Civil Application No. 4533 of 1997 permitting him to withdraw the said main Special Civil Application. Under the circumstances, the order passed by this Court is not required to be clarified. Hence, present application is dismissed. No costs.”
6. Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the grounds for resisting the petition on account of res judicata is not available to the employer as the Court passed orders which are to be viewed from the purport and language employed in the orders. The Court need not elaborately delve upon these grounds as Shri Chauhan for the employer – respondent does not insist upon adjudication on the ground of res judicata as sought to be pleaded earlier. Hence the matter was taken up for adjudication on its merits.
7. Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that it was a case of the workman before the Labour Court that workman was working with the respondent employer since 15 to 18 years and had put in continuous service. However vide order dated 21/6/1997 without following due procedure of law especially provision of section 25F of I.D. Act and other provisions of the I.D. Act his service were terminated which ought to have been appreciated by the Labour Court on the basis of the facts and evidences available to it.
8. Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the Labour Court has when unequivocally recorded its findings qua workman being in employment of the employer-respondent herein and that workman establishing that he has completed 240 days as required or defined under section 25B, then there was no reason for not coming to logical conclusion that there was clear breach of provision of section 25F as admittedly no compensation and or no procedure as required to be followed under section 25F was followed by the employer before bringing about unceremonious end to the employment vide order dated 21/6/1997.
9. Learned advocate for the petitioner thereafter contended that the entire award contains contradictory observations and findings which in itself is sufficient to indicate that the award was vitiated on account of lack of appreciation of the evidence and facts before the labour Court. Learned advocate for the petitioner invited this Court's attention to page-22 and the narration of the Court in that paragraph that “looking to the office order at Mark 9/1 the applicant is proved to be workman employed by the respondent employer.” This statement go to indicate that there was appointment order available. However in the narration and observation of the Labour Court subsequent paragraph after setting out section 2 (oo) (bb) definition the Court has observed that, “the appointment order Mark 9/1 produced in this case appears to be office order of work charge clerk Shri D.J. Morasada and the applicant has not produced his appointment order before this court.”
Thus, these two contradictory observations would indicate that the Labour Court has committed serious error resulting into miscarriage of justice warranting quashment of the order itself.
9. Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the appointment order produced on this compilation at page-
27 dated 15/4/1994 would not indicate in any manner that it was a fix term appointment as envisaged under definition of section 2 (oo) (bb) and as such the same cannot be fitted into the definition. Despite this, Labour Court has proceeded on the footing as if the workman's employment was on fixed term employment as the term came to an end the workman was required to be discharged without following due procedure as envisaged under section 25F of I.D. Act.
10. Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that the order produced before this Court at page-27 is not disputed in any manner by the employer. Employer's advocate's submission qua same order not being available on the record of the Labour Court may not weigh with this Court in appreciating the submission canvassed on behalf of the workman as Labour Court could not have proceeded on the footing as if workman was on fixed term appointment so as to oust applicability of section 25F of the I.D. Act.
11. Workman's services were brought to an end unceremoniously without following due procedure of law and as the findings of the Labour Court qua completion of 240 days on the part of the workman and non compliance of section 25F are sufficient to persuade this Court to straightway quash and set aside order of Labour Court and direct reinstatement with backwages as observed by the Apex Court in catena of judgments.
12. Learned advocate for the petitioner relying upon decision of the Apex Court in case of Harjinder Singh V. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, reported in AIR 2010 S.C. 1116, contended that the recent shift in the Courts' approach was not appreciated by the Apex Court in respect of the orders of reinstatement or lack thereof and it is held that when the retrenchment is challenged on the ground that it violates last come first go or that it violates other provisions of I.D. Act, then the earlier principle of reinstatement is ordinarily be followed. In the instant case as it is submitted on behalf of the petitioner's advocate that factum of completion of 240 days is established and recorded by the Labour Court, and has erroneously ousted provision of section 25F on account of its finding qua employment being covered by section 2 (oo) (bb), this Court may not have to remand the matter, except the reason in case if it is appealable to the Court qua non observation of section 25F being fatal to the stand of the employer.
13. Shri Chauhan, learned advocate appearing for the respondent employer produced certified xerox copies which are passed on after offering its perusal of learned advocate for the petitioner, which clearly indicated that mark 9/1 was in fact an order in respect of Junior Clerk Morasada only and therefore no mileage could be scored on account of so called ambiguity attempted to be projected by learned advocate for the petitioner and in fact same is of no avail.
14. Learned advocate for the respondent employer further contended that the workman has in fact left no stone unturned in pursuing his remedies which has resulted into multiplicity of proceedings which have been recorded by Labour Court in its award which itself is sufficient to dissuade this Court to hold in favour of workman in any manner.
15. Learned advocate for the employer further contended that the interim order passed by this Court (Coram: Ms. R.M. Doshit, J) on 8/8/1997 is eloquently clear qua workman not being eligible for receiving any benefits on account of employment which he alleges to have ended without following due procedure of law, the said observations cannot be said to be of no relevance as though observations were in fact relied upon by the employer in justifying its stand before the Labour Court.
16. Learned advocate for the respondent further contended that the findings qua workman completing 240 days is though not challenged by the employer before this Court but that finding of the Labour Court cannot be said to be based upon sound principle of law as could be seen from the narration in the findings which would unequivocally go to show that the question in favour of the workman on account of lack of production of requisite documents on behalf of the employer which is being not the requirement of law as could be seen form the judgments pronounced by the Apex Court wherein it is unequivocally said that onus for establishing completion of 240 days employment is cast upon the workman himself. However employer has not challenged this finding by preferring any independent proceeding but this Court may appreciate the submission made on behalf of the employer qua the finding which cannot stand alone to be defended on its own strength.
17. Learned advocate for the respondent thereafter contended that the workman even if is said to have proved and established that he has completed 240 days then also same would not have been entitled for any other reliefs as there exists concluded and unequivocal findings qua workman being employed on project and when project came to an end the workman's services were terminated as a natural course which did not require employer to follow provisions of section 25F as held by Apex Court in many judgments.
18. Learned advocate for the respondent invited this Court's attention to the findings recorded in the award qua workman's own admission with regard to he being employed on a project for the purpose of project and as project was over and grant was not available workman services were terminated by order dated 21/6/1997.
19. Learned advocate for the respondent contended that the production of appointment order before this Court cannot be said to be a piece of evidence which could have worked in favour of workman as firstly same was not forming part of the proceeding before the Labour Court as it was not produced before the Court, and secondly the order thus referred to the workman liability to be terminated as could be seen form the condition attached there under without any notice etc. Said order read with termination order dated 21/6/1997 would persuade this Court to hold that the workman cannot be said to have not been appointed on project work / construction activity which fact is also admitted in its testimony. Therefore Labour Court has rightly held that in view of finding under section 2 (oo) (bb) workman termination vide order dated 21/6/1997 cannot be said to be illegal in any manner. Learned advocate for the respondent relied upon following decisions in support of his aforesaid submissions.
(2003) 5 SCC pg. 12 (2003) 5 SCC, pg. 388;
(2006) 13 SCC pg. 15;
(2003) 13 SCC pg. 524;
2002-1-LLJ 548;
(2001) 5 SCC 540.
Learned advocate for the respondent has further contended that the advocate for the workman has not indicated anywhere as to how and in what manner the order impugned could be said to have been erroneous or required quashment and in absence of such submissions the Court in exercise of power under article 226 as well as 227 of the Constitution of India would certainly not interfere with the order impugned.
20. This Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the award and documents appended to this petition. The following indisputable aspects emerging therefrom deserve to be set out as under before adverting to rival submissions of learned advocates for the parties.
1) The workman is said to have been working with the employer, prior to his employment in the year 1994. But unfortunately no one has highlighted this aspect in any manner. The fact remains to be noted that the entire controversy is proceeded on the basis of appointment order dated 15/4/1994 and ended with 21/6/1997. Therefore this Court need not go into earlier portion as pleadings are conspicuously lacking in this behalf even before the Labour Court order and before this Court.
2) The workman has, as could be seen from the narration in the award put up his case that workman was given employment order dated 15/4/1994 and when he has completed 240 days his services could not have been terminated without following due procedure of law.
3) The workman in fact moved this Court as could be seen from the pleadings. Prior to approaching Labour Court, as ground of res judicata is given up, the Court has not gone into this aspect elaborately.
4) The findings recorded by Labour Court indicated that workman produced 3 documents which were marked 9/1, 9/2 and 9/3, i.e. office order of appointment, letter addressed to Vice Chancellor and letter in respect of workman's working. This reference by the Labour Court in this paragraph no.4 has to be accepted by his Court as that is the part of the pleadings and procedure which indicate that 3 documents were adduced on the part of the workman in support of his case.
5) The workman himself was examined at exhibit-12. Management witness was examined at exhibit-20, purshish of closing evidence was passed by both the sides, written submissions were also tendered by both the sides. Labour Court has recorded findings qua workman being in employment of respondent and competing 240 days prior to his termination.
6) Labour Court has held that the employer established that the workman was employed on a project and invoking section 2 (oo) (bb) the reference is rejected as no breach of section 25F was held to be helping the workman as non applicability of section 25F was held to be existing on account of applicability of section 2 (oo) (bb).
7) Labour Court has recorded at many places in the judgment itself that it is an admitted position on the part of the workman that he was employed for the project and his services were to be terminated on account of completion of project.
8) The workman's appointment order is placed in this proceedings before this Court at page-27 which do not indicate any fixed period though it does indicate that workman's service is liable to be terminated without notice. In other words one can unequivocally say that this appointment order does not contain any fixed term which could be classified to be an employment term so as to govern section 2 (oo) (bb).
9) This Court has recorded rival contentions qua the observations of the Labour Court in respect of existence of order on record and lack thereof has pleaded by advocate for the respondent.
10) Labour Court has proceeded on the footing that the workman was employed on project and as the project came to an end on account of provision of section 2 (oo) (bb) his services were not required to be terminated only after following section 25F of I.D. Act.
21. Against the aforesaid factual backdrop, now the Court has to examine rival contentions of learned advocates for the parties.
a) The Court is of the considered view that the contention canvased on behalf of learned advocate for the petitioner workman qua the employment order cannot be accepted by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, as this Court is of the considered view that the findings of the Labour Court qua non existence of appointment order before the Court cannot be brushed aside in any manner.
b) Learned advocate for the workman is correct in saying that the Court has in fact recorded existence of appointment order but when the court is embarking upon elaborate discussion qua the nature of employment the court has elaborately referred to the order mark 9/1 with the name of person called Morasada. This fact leaves no room for doubt that there was an order of appointment before the Court. Moreover xerox copy of certified copy of documentary evidence produced by advocate for the employer concludes against workman that there was no order of his appointment produced before the Labour Court. Though the Labour Court did not clearly indicate that the appointment was that of project appointment, this Court cannot now go into examining the aspect only on ground of production of appointment order before this Court in the writ petition especially when this appointment order and the period thereof is sought to be confronted by inviting this Court's attention to specific finding recorded by the Court qua workman's own testimony and his admission that he was appointed for work of project. Besides, it would not be out of place to even say that the termination order elaborately refers to the facts which would otherwise also go in favour of the employer's contention that workman was in fact appointed on project work and for project work only. The nature of work, and marking of copy of that appointment order to the engineering department and the elaborate discussions qua availability of grant in the termination order are sufficient enough to indicate that the workman's employment could not be said to be an employment not covered by definition of section 2 (oo) (bb) as rightly held by the Labour Court.
c) The Court therefore is of the view that on mere strength of the language employed in the appointment which does not spell out a specific term so as to classify to be an order under (oo) (bb). The subsequent circumstances and circumstances attended on the matter leaves no room of doubt qua the nature of employment of the workman which was nothing but of project employment so as to oust the applicability of section 25F of I.D. Act.
d) The decision cited at the bar on behalf of learned advocate for the petitioner in case of Harjinder Singh (supra) would be of no help in any manner to the workman as there cannot be dispute with regard to principle enunciated in that judgment, but the fact of the present case would not indicate that the said judgment has any applicability to the facts in the present case, as in the instant case the Labour Court has in unequivocal term held that nature of employment of the workman was that of project employment and as (oo) (bb) is invoked and rightly invoked, the factum of completion of 240 days and/or factum of employment would be required to be governed only by that provision which will oust applicability of section 25F of I.D. Act, would be of no avail.
e) The Court need not now elaborately delve upon decision cited by learned advocate for the employer as those decisions support the case of employer unequivocally. Suffice it to say that when this Court has also endorsed the findings recorded by the Court below no elaborate delving is required in the matter.
22. The petition, therefore, being bereft of merits deserve dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Rule discharged. However there shall be no order as to costs.
[ S.R. BRAHMBHATT, J ] /vgn