(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL) 1. The complaint (Exhibit-50) was filed by the victim-Kokilaben, while she was alive, after sustaining burn injuries that in the neighboring house to her, one Jayendra @ Somsinh, who is son of the brother of her father-in-law is staying with his family and there were disputes between her family and the family of the brother of father-in-law. But, the matter used to be settled and no police case was registered. However, the accused, Jayendra @ Somsinh, used to give threats repeatedly in connection with the said dispute. On the date of incident, during evening time at about 10:00 p.m., when she had gone to give fodder to the buffaloes in the yard attached with her residence, there was darkness and she was unable to see anybody. But, after providing fodder to the buffaloes, while she was going inside the house, the accused, Jayendra @ Somsinh, who was standing there with one kerba, caught hold of her 'Chotla' and started saying that she and her husband were making quarrels and raising disputes for the road way nearby her house and as a result thereof, his bad image is created. Thereafter, he over-powered her and shut her mouth with a towel and started saying that he was not going to leave her alive. Thereafter, he poured kerosene on the chest, on the waist and on the legs of the deceased, and thereafter, lit the match stick and thrown over her, and hence, she started burning and in the meantime the accused went away through the backside of the house. When, she removed towel from her mouth and started shouting. At that time, elder brother of her husband, Girvatsinh Rajusinh and Chandansinh Dalpatsinh had come and attempts were made to save hear. Thereafter, she was taken to hospital and treatment was going on and at that time the complaint was filed with Police Sub Inspector, Khanpur, on 07.10.2006 on 11:30 p.m., in Civil Hospital, Godhra.
2. The aforesaid complaint was investigated by the police and, in the meant time, victim succumbed to the burn injuries and expired. The post mortem was under taken and upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed by the police and the case was, thereafter, committed to the Sessions Court being Sessions Case No.203/2006. Since the guilt was not pleaded by the accused, the trial had taken place. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused examined 15 witnesses, the details of whom are given by the learned Sessions Judge at Paragraph-3 of the judgment. Prosecution also produced documentary evidence of 27 documents, the details of which are given by the learned Sessions Judge at Paragraph-4. Thereafter, he recorded the statement of the accused under Section-313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein the accused denied the evidence against him and further stated that because of the dispute of the land, he has been falsely implicated and a false case is filed against him and that he is innocent. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the prosecution as well as defence convicted the accused and after hearing on aspect of sentence, imposed the sentence of life imprisonment with the fine of Rs.2,000/- and further two months Rigorous Imprisonment for default in payment of fine. It is under these circumstances, the present appeal before this Court.
3. Learned Counsel appearing for both the sides have taken us through the entire oral as well as documentary evidence. We have considered the judgment and the reasons recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. We have also heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Sadhna Sagar and learned APP, Ms. Moxa Thakkar, for the respondent-State.
4. The aspect which deserves to be considered is that the complaint is filed by the injured victim-Kokilaben, herself, during her lifetime, and thereafter, she has succumbed to the injuries and expired on 13.10.2006. The registration of the complaint, if considered, in light of the evidence of Dr. P.K. Shah(P.W.-1), (Exhibit-10), Dr. Kishor Pramodrai Desai(P.W.-2), Exhibit-13, Dr. Chandrahas Keshavrao Siknawis(P.W.-11),(Exhibit-36), Dr. Ramesh Nursinh Galasava, (P.W.-12), Exhibit-39 and Dr. Bhavesh Kumar Manubhai Nayak(P.W.-13), Exhibit- 44, it can be said that when the complaint was registered, the complainant-deceased, though, had received burn injuries of about 92 per cent, was in semiconscious condition. The same is apparent because, apart from opinion of the doctor, the medical history has been recorded, as given by the deceased to the doctor, at the relevant point of time. Therefore, the complainant(Exhibit-50) could also be considered as a valid declaration made by the deceased during her life-time before the police officer. Such a declaration is getting support of her consciousness and ability to make declaration with the evidence of the aforesaid three doctors. It can also be treated as, a dying declaration of the deceased, since, it was during her life-time made in conscious condition before the police officer, who registered the complaint.
5. Apart from the above, in the present case dying declaration is also recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Rajendra Jayantilal Shah(P.W.-3), whose deposition is recorded at Exhibit-15. He has fully supported the case of the prosecution and in the cross-examination of the said witness, the defence has not been able to bring out any material contradictions. The dying declaration is at Exhibit-17, recorded by the Executive Magistrate, as per the say of the deceased during her life-time. Said dying declaration is recorded on 07.10.2006 and completed during night time at 03:35 a.m.. As stated by the deceased, in her dying declaration, that the accused, on account of dispute of land in past, entered into her open house, at about 10:00 p.m., and poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze. There is no inconsistency in the statement of the deceased, made before the Executive Magistrate in her dying declaration, on the aspect of pouring kerosene by the accused upon the victim and setting her on fire.
However, the learned Counsel for the appellant has raised the contention that on the aspect of site or the place at which the incident has happened, but the same shall be considered separately at a later stage. The evidence of Dr.
P.K Shah(P.W.-1), Exhibit-10, supports the case of the prosecution, fully. The evidence of Dr. Shah, who examined the deceased, at the first instance, during her life-time, has deposed before the Court at Exhibit-10 and his evidence supports the case of the prosecution for the narration of the incident and the burn injuries received by the deceased. As per the said doctor, there were burn injuries all over the body of the deceased and he has further stated that when he inquired about the incident, the victim told her that it was by Soma and she was in semi-conscious condition. It may be recorded that Soma @ Somsinh is another name of the accused Jayendrasinh @ Somsinh. It is true that, in the certificate, there is no reference to the medical history, but, in the cross-examination of the said witness, the defence has not been able to bring out the contradictions on the aspects of conveying of the information by the deceased, during her lifetime, to the doctor, except, bare denial.
6. Dr. Chandrahas Keshavrao Siknawis(P.W.- 11), is another doctor, who next examined the deceased at General Hospital, Godhra and his deposition is recorded at Exhibit-36. As per his testimony, various burn injuries were received by the victim-deceased, from her neck to her legs, and in his opinion total burn injuries received by the deceased was 92 per cent and the same was within the 12 hours from the time, on which he examined the patient. The certificate issued by him is produced at Exhibit-38 and in the said certificate, the history is recorded, as given by the patient-herself that she was set ablaze by her neighbor, Jayendra @ Somsinh, with kerosene. In this manner, his testimony is supporting the case of the prosecution. The said doctor, as per his testimony, since nature of the injures were critical, he had referred the case of the victim to the Sayaji Hospital, Vadodara, on the same date i.e. 07.10.2006, at 02:35 a.m..
7. The victim was next examined by Dr. Bhavesh Manubhai Nayak(P.W.-13), Medical Officer, S.S.G. Hospital, Exhibit-44, and his testimony is supporting the case of the prosecution. As per the said doctor, the medical history was given by the patient and same was recorded in the certificate, Exhibit-46. As per his testimony, the accused, Somsinh Deepsinh Rathod, pushed her on the ground and after pouring kerosene, set fire. As per this witness, the victim had received various injuries on different parts of the body and there was smell of kerosene from her body. The victim was referred to Surgical Unit in the hospital and she had expired on 13.10.2006. As per the said doctor, the burn injuries were serious and it can be caused by pouring kerosene and setting fire. The certificate issued by this doctor is supporting the case of the prosecution. The defence has not been able to bring out any material contradictions.
8. Dr. Kishor Pramodrai Desai(P.W.-2), Exhibit-13, is the doctor, who performed post mortem on the body of the deceased. His evidence is fully supporting the case of the prosecution and the defence has not been able to bring about any material contradictions. As per the opinion of this doctor, the cause of death, as stated in the post mortem report(Exhibit-14), due to shock received following burn injuries and the side effects of the burn injuries. As per his opinion, the death is homicidal. Of course, he has confessed that in the report said aspect is not stated, but, the witness stated that this is a case of homicidal death because of the scattered burn injuries received by the deceased.
9. Hemlataben Manharsinh Rathod(P.W.-4), Exhibit-18, has supported the case of the prosecution, who was a panch witness that the recovery of the clothes of the deceased.
10. Bahadursinh Arjunsinh Rathod(P.W.-5), Exhibit-21, is another panch witness of panchnama for the scene of offence, Exhibit-22, who has supported the case of the prosecution. The said panchnama, Exhibit-22, shows that the towel was found and recovered, whereas carbon particles are found and recovered. The match box, half-lit matches were also found and recovered. Kerba of kerosene, containing residue kerosene of about 150 ml., is found and recovered. Some pieces of burn clothes are found and recovered from the yard. Another panchnama, which was also prepared in the presence of this witness for arrest of the accused, Exhibit-23, and as per the said panchnama, the accused had received burn injuries on the left hand, palm and on the wrist of the left hand. Even on the right-hand wrist also there were marks of burn injuries.
11. Dr. Ramesh Nursinh Galasava(P.W.-12), Exhibit-39, is the doctor, who was working in Cottage Hospital in Lunawada. He examined the accused on 08.10.2006 and as per his testimony, the accused had received burn injures on the left hand as well as there were marks of burning on his right hand. As per the opinion of the doctor, said injuries could be of within 4 to 7 days and he treated the accused. The aforesaid shows that the prosecution has been able to show that the accused, who is said to have poured kerosene and set the deceased on fire, had also received burn injuries on his palm and wrist of left hand and the right hand, too.
12. The testimony of Chandansinh Dalpatsinh Rathod-(P.W.-6), Exhibit-28, is the neighbor, having house on the other side of the house of the deceased and as per the said witness, because of the shouts of the victim he had gone to the place and that when he inquired, the victim told him that the accused, Jayendra, had poured kerosene on her and after shutting her mouth with towel, set fire, and thereafter, he had run away.
13. The evidence of Kailasben Girvatsinh Rathod(P.W.-7), who is wife of the neighbour, is also supporting the case of the prosecution (Exhibit-29).
14. Karansinh Dalpatsinh Rathod(P.W.-10), Exhibit-34, is the husband of the victim and in his testimony, he has stated that he was not present, at the time, when the incident had happened and he was at Ahmedabad. On receiving information, he, first, went to Lunawada Hospital, and thereafter, he went to Godhra and when he inquired from his wife, the victim, who was in conscious condition, told him that adjoining neighbor, the accused, Jayendrasinh son of Deepsinh Parvatsinh, caught her 'Chotla' and shut her mouth with a towel and then poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The victim had tried to caught hold of the accused and as a result thereof, the accused had also received burn injuries.
15. The evidence of Investigating Officer, Pratapsinh Umedsinh Sisodiya(P.W.-14), Exhibit- 49, is also supporting the case of the prosecution.
found from the towel, which was recovered from scene of the offence. Moreover, burn particles / pieces of the clothes recovered from the scene of the offence, five match sticks recovered from the scene of the offence, the sample of clay at the scene of the offence with which the floor was made, recovered from the scene of offence. The aforesaid evidence, as such goes to show that the prosecution has been able to prove the case that the deceased-victim received burn injuries on account of pouring of kerosene and lighting of match sticks and her mouth was also shut with the towel.
17. As per the complaint and the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, the accused had caught hold of the deceased and had poured the kerosene and fire was set by lighting the match-stick and on account of that she received the burn injuries. The prosecution is also able to show that, during the said incident, the victim had tried to caught hold of the accused and on account of that the accused also sustained burns on the palm and the wrist of his left hand and some burns on the right hand too.
18. The motive of the accused to kill the victim on account of dispute and the quarrel with regard to road, having a past history, is also demonstrated by the prosecution. The medical evidence as well as scientific evidence supports the case of the prosecution that, initially, burn injuries were received by the accused, and thereafter, victim having succumbed to the injuries, expired on 13.10.2006. The recovery of various items from the scene of the offence and from the clothes of the deceased read with the scientific evidence, corroborates the case of the prosecution.
19. However, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant raised a contention that there is material contradictions in the complaint and the dying declaration. It is also submitted that the dying declaration is not signed by the deceased and that there is no endorsement of the doctor in the dying declaration stating that the patient is in conscious condition. She, therefore, submitted that this Court may discard the dying declaration and the benefit be given to the accused of acquittal.
20. In our view, it is not a case, where there is any inconsistency about the occurrence of the incident and the injuries received by the victim on account of pouring of the kerosene by the accused and setting fire by match stick upon her. Therefore, if, the complaint and dying declaration, both are considered there is consistency on the part of the victim to the extent that when she had gone for providing fodder to the buffaloes in the yard, the accused caught hold of her 'Chotla' and after pouring kerosene on her, lit match stick and the fire was set and on account of that the deceased received burn injuries. As such, there is no inconsistency on the aforesaid aspects over the role played by the accused in setting the victim on fire, who ultimately died on account of the said burn injuries.
21. Further, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that there is contradictions in the story narrated in the complaint and the dying declaration regarding the place at which the incident had taken place. She submitted that, at one place, it has been stated that the incident had taken place at yard, whereas, at another place it has been stated that the incident took place in the house. Therefore, the whole dying declaration can be said to be unbelievable and this Court may discard the same.
22. In our view, it is not a matter where there is inconsistency in the declaration or in the statement made in the complaint and made before the Executive Magistrate, which may lead the Court to disbelieve the statement made by the deceased during her life-time. Further, the yard is the place, where the buffaloes are kept and is a part of the house. In popular language one may say house and not in a specific language one may say that the constructed place, where the human beings are residing is the house or home. Such, in our view, cannot be termed as a material contradiction, resulting into leading the Court to discard the dying declaration.
23. An attempt was made to contend that there is no endorsement of the doctor, at the time, when the dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, prima facie, also cannot be countenanced in view of the facts and the circumstances of the present case inasmuch as all the doctors, who examined the patient during her lifetime i.e. testimony of Dr. P.K. Shah(P.W.-1), Dr. Chandrahas Keshavrao Siknawis(P.W.-11), Dr. Rameshbhai Narsinh Galasava and Dr. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai Nayak(P.W.-13) go to show that the victim was in conscious condition after the burn injuries were received on 07.10.2006. Further, it is not a law that the Court should discard the dying declaration, since, the reliability of the dying declaration is at doubt. In a given case, when the Court finds that the contents of the dying declaration are to be further examined, court may seek the corroboration of other evidence before relying upon the dying declaration.
24. In the present case, the statement made in the complaint as well as dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate show that (1) the deceased was in conscious condition, (2) therefore, she could be termed as in a position to make statement before the Executive Magistrate, (3) further, the Executive Magistrate in dying declaration has recorded that, as per the opinion of the doctor, the patient is in conscious condition to make a declaration, (4) there is, further, corroboration of the burn injuries received by the accused himself and that aspect is proved by the prosecution, (5) the use of the kerosene, various items recovered from the scene of offence, the scientific evidence, showing presence of hydro carbon particles of kerosene at the said place and the articles which were recovered from the scene of incident, also corroborates the statement made by the victim in the dying declaration. Under the circumstances, we find that when the dying declaration of the victim-deceased is getting corroboration from the various other evidences brought on record by the prosecution, it is not a case, where dying declaration deserves to be discarded for the purpose of considering the case of the prosecution nor it is a case where it can be said that the case of the prosecution is frustrated on account of the dying declaration, which has come on record. At this stage, we may refer to a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of “BHAJJU @ KARAN SINGH VS. STATE OF M.P.”, reported in 2012 (4) SCC 327, wherein the Apex Court observed at paragraphs-22 to 30 as under:
“22. The law is very clear that if the dying declaration has been recorded in accordance with law, is reliable and gives a cogent and possible explanation of the occurrence of the events, then the dying declaration can certainly be relied upon by the Court and could form the sole piece of evidence resulting in the conviction of the accused. This Court has clearly stated the principle that Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Act’) is an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Clause (1) of Section 32 makes the statement of the deceased admissible, which is generally described as a ‘dying declaration’.
23. The 'dying declaration’ essentially means the statement made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting into his death. The admissibility of the dying declaration is based on the principle that the sense of impending death produces in a man’s mind, the same feeling as that the conscientious and virtuous man under oath. The dying declaration is admissible upon the consideration that the declaration was made in extremity, when the maker is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to file a false suit is silenced in the mind and the person deposing is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.
24. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, it undoubtedly can base its conviction on the dying declaration, without requiring any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence.
25. There is a clear distinction between the principles governing the evaluation of a dying declaration under the English law and the Indian law. Under the English law, credence and relevancy of a dying declaration is only when the person making such a statement is in hopeless condition and expecting an imminent death. So under the English law, for its admissibility, the declaration should have been made when in the actual danger of death and that the declarant should have had a full apprehension that his death would ensue. However, under the Indian law, the dying declaration is relevant, whether the person who makes it was or was not under expectation of death at the time of such declaration. The dying declaration is admissible not only in the case of homicide but also in civil suits. The admissibility of a dying declaration rests upon the principle of nemo meritorious praesumuntur mentiri (a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth).
26. The law is well-settled that a dying declaration is admissible in evidence and the admissibility is founded on the principle of necessity. A dying declaration, if found reliable, can form the basis of a conviction. A Court of facts is not excluded from acting upon an uncorroborated dying declaration for finding conviction. The dying declaration, as a piece of evidence, stands on the same footing as any other piece of evidence. It has to be judged and appreciated in light of the surrounding circumstances and its weight determined by reference to the principle governing the weighing of evidence. If in a given case a particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmity, either of its own or as disclosed by the other evidence adduced in the case or the circumstances coming to its notice, the Court may, as a rule of prudence, look for corroboration and if the infirmities are such as would render a dying declaration so infirm that it pricks the conscience of the Court, the same may be refused to be accepted as forming basis of the conviction.
27. Another consideration that may weigh with the Court, of course with reference to the facts of a given case, is whether the dying declaration has been able to bring a confidence thereupon or not, is it trust-worthy or is merely an attempt to cover up the latches of investigation. It must allure the satisfaction of the Court that reliance ought to be placed thereon rather than distrust.
28. In regard to the above stated principles, we may refer to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Ravikumar @ Kutti Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) 9 SCC 240, Vikas and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 2 SCC 516, Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2000) 1 SCC 310, Laxmi (Smt.) v. Om Prakash & Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 118, Panchdeo Singh v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 577.
29. In the case of Jaishree Anant Khandekar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 647, discussing the contours of the American Law in relation to the ‘dying declaration’ and its applicability to the Indian law, this Court held as under: -
“24. Apart from an implicit faith in the intrinsic truthfulness of human character at the dying moments of one's life, admissibility of dying declaration is also based on the doctrine of necessity. In many cases victim is the only eyewitness to a crime on him/her and in such situations exclusion of the dying declaration, on hearsay principle, would tend to defeat the ends of justice.
25. American law on dying declaration also proceeds on the twin postulates of certainty of death leading to an intrinsic faith in truthfulness of human character and the necessity principle. On certainty of death, the same strict test of English law has been applied in American jurisprudence. The test has been variously expressed as “no hope of recovery”, “a settled expectation of death”. The core concept is that the expectation of death must be absolute and not susceptible to doubts and there should be no chance of operation of worldly motives.”
30. It will also be of some help to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Muthu Kutty and Another v. State by Inspector of Police, T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 113 where the Court, in paragraph 15, held as under:-
“15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat [(1992) 2 SCC 474 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 403 : AIR 1992 SC 1817] (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 18-19)
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P.)
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar.)
(iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. RamachandraRamachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor)
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P.)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P.)
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P.)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu.)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar.)
(ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P.)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan.)
(xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra.)””
25. In our view, if the facts of the present case are considered in light of the above referred position, it can be said that not only dying declaration is proved and found to be trustworthy, but, it can also be said that there is, further, corroboration to the statement made in the dying declaration and there is no material contradictions, which may lead the Court to disbelieve the case of the prosecution or to discard the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate.
26. As such, the conviction can be based on the dying declaration, once, it is found to be trustworthy. But, even if the second test for getting corroboration is applied, in the facts of the present case, it can be said that there are ample corroborative evidences supporting statement made in the dying declaration about role played by the accused for causing death of the deceased by pouring kerosene on her and by setting on fire, which ultimately resulted into taking away life of the deceased. The degree of burn injuries received by the deceased, at the first instance, were to the extent of 92 per cent and merely because she undergone treatment and resisted the death for about six days, in our view, is also not a ground to take any lenient view on the aspect of sentence as sought to be canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellant.
27. Learned Counsel for the appellant lastly contended that the incident had happened on account of sudden provocation, and therefore, it would not be a case for the offence under Section-302 of the Indian Penal Code, but, it may be an offence under Section-304(Part-I or II), and therefore, this Court may consider the matter accordingly and the sentence may be reduced.
28. We cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant because it is not a case, where the incident has happened on account of sudden provocation. On the contrary, it is proved by the prosecution that the accused had hidden himself inside the house of the victim and he had procured kerosene. He had also shut mouth of the deceased with the help of a towel and by overpowering the victim, poured kerosene on her and then set her ablaze by lighting the match stick. When the victim tried to caught hold of the accused, he had run away, without making any attempt to extinguish the fire. The entire evidence led by the prosecution, in our view, shows that accused had premeditation to kill the victim and in furtherance of his intention he poured kerosene and set on fire. Therefore, in our view, it is a case where the offence is proved under Section-302 of the Indian Penal Code and not a case which may fall under Section-304 (Part-I or II) of the Indian Penal Code. Once, the offence is proved under Section-
302 of the Indian Penal Code, the minimum sentence is imprisonment for life, which has been imposed by the learned Sessions Judge and the fine is also imposed of Rs.2,000/-. Under the circumstances, the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the learned Sessions Judge has not committed any error in convicting the accused under Section-302 of the Indian Penal Code and in imposing sentence of imprisonment for life under Section-302 of the Indian Penal Code with fine of Rs.2,000/- and further two months rigorous imprisonment for default in payment. Hence, the conviction of the appellant, original accused, and the sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Judge do not call for any interference and are hereby CONFIRMED. Consequently the appeal deserves to be dismissed, and therefore, DISMISSED.
(JAYANT PATEL, J.)
(MOHINDER PAL, J.)
Umesh/