The present application is filed making a prayer to suspend the order of conviction dated 30.11.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge (ACB), Jetpur, in Special Sessions Case No. 3 of 2001, pending the final disposal of Criminal Appeal No.1921 of 2012. 1.1 With consent of learned advocates for both the sides, the application is taken up for final hearing. Therefore, Rule, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Chetna M. Shah, waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent-State.
2. Learned advocate Ms.R.V.Acharya holding brief for Mr. Girish Ramkrishnan for the applicants, limits the prayer in this application only in respect of applicant No.1. For applicant No.2, the application is not pressed at this stage.
3. The applicant, who was serving as Senior Engineer under the Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited, came to be convicted as per the judgment and order dated 30th November, 2012 of learned Special Judge, Jetpur, in Special Case No.03 of 2001 for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In respect of offences punishable under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and payment of fine. Similarly, he is awarded same sentence for his conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. At the time when Criminal Appeal No.1921 of 2012 against the above judgment and order of conviction and sentence was admitted on 16th December, 2012, this Court by order of even date passed in a separate application, suspended the execution of sentence and the applicant has been released on bail.
3.1 Now by filing the present application, the applicant seeks suspension of conviction order urging that as a consequence of conviction, his services is going to be terminated. A show cause notice dated 18th December, 2012 issued by the employer seeking to terminate applicant’s services on the ground of his conviction as above is produced. The said notice is issued in terms of Regulation No.6 read with Sub Clause (c) of Clause 7 of what is cited as “Bombay State Electricity Board Employees Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Procedure”. Clause 6 provides for procedure about subsistence amount to an employee who is charged for act of misconduct and liable to be suspended. Clause (b) of clause 6 says that a person against whom an action is proposed may be provided with chargesheet and subsequent clauses deal with procedure in the inquiry. Clause 7 contains exception to clause 6 and sub-clause (c) thereof inter alia says that when the order of punishment such as dismissal, removal or reduction is based on facts which have led to the conviction of a person in criminal court.
4. Learned advocate for the applicant with reference to the said clause and in particular Sub Clause (c) of clause 7, submitted that the conviction of the applicant would necessarily entail for him termination from service and that such termination is automatic. Learned advocate further relied on a similar notice issued earlier to another employee in similar set of circumstances to point out that the services of the said employee was terminated and that same fate awaits for the applicant.
4.1 Learned advocate for the applicant therefore submitted that in view of the above specific consequence flowing by virtue of order of conviction, prayer for suspending the conviction is made and is required to be considered. For pressing the prayer, it was further submitted by the learned advocate that the applicant’s case was exceptional deserving stay of conviction, because, according to her, there exists a very strong prima-facie case in appeal and it is unlikely that the conviction would sustain on merits. Highlighting the features of prima-facie case, learned advocate submitted that the complainant himself turned hostile and that one of the panchas was not examined rendering the prosecution case too weak to bring home the conviction. It was further submitted that the complaint against the applicant and allegation of corruption against him were guided by other motives. It was submitted that the complainant was in the habit of filing such complaints as he was given bill in respect of charges for electricity theft. It was pointed out that subsequently also the very complainant has received another bill for electricity theft charges. The compliant against the applicant was only to wreck vengeance, submitted learned advocate.
4.2 Learned advocate for the applicant further submitted that eventhough on evidence, there exists a strong prima-facie case, when conviction, unless it is stayed, would result into specific consequence of dismissal of service. Learned advocate further submitted that the applicant has put in 22 years of service and his ouster from service is sure to follow in terms of the Regulations because of conviction, and that too without any departmental inquiry. On the basis of all the above aspects, it was submitted that case of the applicant was exceptional and extraordinary where the suspension of conviction pending appeal would be justified.
4.3 In support of her contentions, learned advocate of the applicant relied on a decision of this Court in Pravinkumar Paraskumar Gokhroo Vs State of Gujarat [2009(3) GLH 256], on the basis of which it was submitted that in that case this Court suspended the conviction in the similar facts and circumstances, where also the conviction of the said petitioner was under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. She also relied on decisions of the Apex Court in Navjot Sing Sidhu Vs State of Punjab [2007(2) SCC 574] and in Rama Narang Vs Ramesh Narang [1995(2) SCC 513] for the preposition that the Appellate Court has powers to suspend the order of conviction when the convict specifically shows the consequences which may follow if the conviction is not stayed.
4.4 Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Chetna Shah, on the other hand, opposed the prayer. It was submitted by her that the suspension of order of conviction is to be granted only in rarest of the rare cases, where exceptional circumstances exist. She submitted that if on the basis of mere prima facie case the conviction is to be suspended pending the final hearing of the main appeal, then, virtually in all cases the conviction would have to be suspended. She relied on decision of the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Jaganathan [AIR 1996 SC 2449]. It was contended that the suspension of conviction in cases where the conviction is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 can hardly be granted. In support, learned Additional Public Prosecutor also relied on decision in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra) in this regard. With reference to merits of the conviction, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that one of the Panchas gave evidence in support, and that the contents of the complaint were corroborated by the other evidence on record. It was submitted that merely because the complainant was declared hostile, it cannot be readily inferred that the conviction was bad. It was submitted that there may be other evidence on the basis of which it can be sustained. Therefore, in her submission, it cannot even be said that there was a prima facie case against conviction, as sought to be canvassed by the applicant.
5. The implication of suspension of sentence by the Appellate Court under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is that sentence based on conviction gets postponed or is kept in abeyance during the pendency of appeal. The conviction itself continuous till it is set aside. Therefore, any disciplinary action taken against the government servant, such as dismissal from service, which is based upon such conviction stands unimpaired.
5.1 While it cannot be gainsaid that the Appellate Court on being satisfied for suspending the conviction, is empowered to pass such order under Section 389 of the Code, it is well settled that the power should be exercised where the circumstances of the case are exceptional justifying the suspension of conviction. While recognizing the power to stay the conviction, the Apex Court has, in Ravikant S. Patil Vs Savabhouma S. Bagali [2007(1) SCC 673], sounded a caution and clarified that the power should be exercised in exceptional case, in the following words:
“It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay.”
5.2 In Navjot Sing Sidhu (Supra), it was held, “The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case.”
(Para 6)
5.3 When a government servant is convicted for criminal offence, the consequences of such conviction do entail in his service career. The contention cannot be countenanced that because of such consequence and, for that reason alone, the conviction order may be stayed. As observed in Navjot Sing Sidhu (Supra), the further requirement is that the case should be one admitting special facts. Depending upon special facts, stay of conviction can be resorted to.
5.4 In State of Pujnab Vs Navrajsing [2008 (11) SCC 71], the conviction of the respondent was for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay fine. The High Court entertained the contents that notice for dispensing the services of respondent, who was Patwari Halqa, was given by the Collector and if the suspension of the conviction was not granted, the respondent would have lost his job, the Apex Court set aside the order of learned Single Judge of the High Court which stayed the conviction as well as the order refusing to recall the said order by emphasizing the settled law holding that though the power to suspend an order of conviction is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases.
5.5 Furthermore, as laid down by the Supreme Court in A. Jaganathan (supra), mere sufferance of some disadvantage is to be the criteria, then evey conviction will have to be suspended pending appeal or revision. If the appeal against conviction and sentence is finally allowed, the disadvantage can be made good and the benefits of service can be regained.
5.6 The next question is whether the ground that there is some prima facie case by itself can be said to be coveting the case with special circumstance, and whether on the footing of consideration of prima facie strength alone of the case, order of conviction can be suspended pending the appeal. In Alwin Laurance Meendonsa Vs State of Gujarat [2002(1) Crimes 673], this Court was considering the prayer for suspension of conviction made by the appellant, who was a traffic police constable, convicted for accepting bribe of Rs.20/- and convicted and sentenced under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court held that a prima-facie case was not enough for staying the conviction. It was observed, “Learned Counsel Shri Nanavati for the appellant accused submitted that though the order of sentence passed by the learned Judge is suspended by this Court in appeal itself, he was required to file the aforesaid application because of the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court the appellant is likely to lose his job. Shri Nanavati vehemently submitted that the judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Judge convicting the appellant accused for the aforesaid offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act is ex-facie bad and liable to be quashed and set-aside on several grounds. He, therefore, submitted that if the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Special Judge is not suspended, then the appellant accused will suffer irreparable loss because on the basis of conviction he will be dismissed from service as per the rules.”
5.7 In the above decision, the court further observed that Whether the learned Special Judge has rightly or wrongly convicted the accused is not a question to be decided at this stage. Whether the judgement and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Judge is right or wrong can only be examined at the time of final hearing of the matter after hearing the learned Counsel for the accused as well as the learned Public Prosecutor for the State. Admission of an appeal is totally different matter. When the Court is satisfied that there is some prima- facie case, then the appeal is ordinarily admitted and the sentence is suspended on the facts and circumstances of that case, so that if the appeal is not heard early then his appeal may not become infructuous if the period of sentence is over.
5.8 The court further held, “ ... Therefore, in such type of cases if this Court suspends the order of conviction, then the accused may continue in service even after his conviction for a pretty long time. And, if ultimately his appeal is dismissed and the order of conviction is upheld then by that time he may perhaps even retire from service which will not be in the interest of justice. If the submission of Shri Nanavaty is to be accepted, then the accused who is found guilty by the trial Court as well as by this Court in appeal can plead before the Department that his SLP is granted and Criminal Appeal is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, he should not be dismissed from service.”
(para 11)
5.9 In State of Punjab Vs Dipak Mattu [2007 (11) SCC 319], it was observed by the Apex Court that an order of suspension of conviction admittedly is not to be readily granted. The order of the High Court which was passed on the grounds of possible delay in disposal of appeal and that there were good points to argue in appeal was held to be out of an incorrect approach, it was held that possible delay in disposal of appeal and that there are arguable points by itself may not be sufficient to grant suspension of sentence. It was observed that the High Court while passing the order merely noticed some points which could be raised in appeal. In the said case, the conviction was under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
6. In Sanjay Dutt Vs State of Maharashtra [2009(5) SCC 787], the petitioner, who was found guilty under Sections 3 and 7 read with Section 25(1-A) and (1-B) of the Arms Act, 1959 and sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment, wanted to contest election but due to the aforesaid conviction and sentence, he was incurring disqualification from contesting the election. A prayer for stay of conviction was made before the Apex Court by submitting that the petitioner was cine artist, and was not habitual criminal or involved in any other criminal case. The Apex Court, however, turned down the prayer holding that despite all these favourable circumstances, it was not a fit case where conviction could be suspended since the petitioner was found guilty of serious offences.
6.1 As could be culled out from Sanjay Dutt (supra), incurring of disqualification to contest the election by virtue of conviction in a criminal case and that the convict person wants to contest the election, may not be a good circumstance by itself for staying the conviction where the conviction was for serious offences under the Arms Act. However, in Navjotsing Sidhu (supra), the appellant had sought stay of suspension of the order of conviction passed by the High Court against him, on the ground that he was a sitting Member of Parliament on the date of conviction. The Apex Court accepted the prayer for suspension of conviction. Considerations which appealed the apex court may be gathered from the following observations.
“The incident took place on 27.12.1988. It has no correlation with the public life of the appellant which he entered much later in 2004 when he was elected as a Member Parliament. It is not a case where he took advantage of his position as MP in commission of the crime. As already stated, it was not necessary for the appellant to have resigned from the membership of Parliament as he could in law continue as MP by merely filing an appeal within a period of 3 months and had he adopted such a course he could have easily avoided incurring any disqualification at least till the decision of the appeal. However, he has chosen to adopt a moral path and has set high standards in public life by resigning from his seat and in seeking to get a fresh mandate from the people. In the event prayer made by the appellant is not granted he would suffer irreparable injury as he would not be able to contest for the seat which he held and has fallen vacant only on account of his voluntary resignation which he did on purely moral grounds. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances mentioned above we are of the opinion that it is a fit case where the order of conviction passed by the High Court deserves to be suspended.” (Para 18)
7. In the instant case, there is an additional overriding circumstance, namely, that the applicant is a convict in respect of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In K.C. Sareen Vs CBI, Chandigarh [2001(6) SCC 584], the Apex Court took judicial notice that corruption by a public servant has reached a monstrous dimension in the country. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. The court observed that if a corrupt public servant is allowed to enjoy the suspension of conviction until before he is judicially absolved from such findings, it is the public which will suffer irreparably. The court observed, "The legal position, therefore, is this : though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter.”
(Para 11)
7.1 The apex court took note that the corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India, and that its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Then proceeded to state-
“Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic polity. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant is found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior court. The mere fact that an appellate or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings.”
“...When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. Hence it is necessary that the court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only (sic) public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a court order suspending the conviction.”
(Para 12)
7.2 Sareen (Supra) summarized the statement of law in the following words, “...the legal position can be laid down that when conviction is on a corruption charge against a public servant the appellate court or the revisional court should not suspend the order of conviction during the pendency of the appeal even if the sentence of imprisonment is suspended. It would be a sublime public policy that the convicted public servant is kept under disability of the conviction in spite of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal or revision."
(Para 13)
7.3 A caravan of decisions followed K.C. Sareen (supra) reaffirming the preposition that where the conviction is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the same should not be suspended or stayed during the pendency of appeal. In Navjot Singh Sidhhu (supra) also K.C.Sareen (Supra) was referred to and the proposition of law was emphasized with following observations, “The cases cited have no application to the facts of the present case as both of them related to conviction on charges of corruption and in that context it was observed that when conviction is on a corruption charge, it would be a sublime public policy that the convicted person is kept under disability of the conviction instead of keeping the sentence of imprisonment in abeyance till the disposal of the appeal. In such cases it is obvious that it would be highly improper to suspend the order of conviction of a public servant which would enable him to occupy the same office which he misused. This is not the case here.”
7.4 In State of Maharashtra Vs Gajanan [2003(12) SCC 432], K.C. Sareen (supra) was relied on and the Apex Court expressed itself to state that the High Court could not have stayed the conviction in absence of being pointed out the exceptional facts or the circumstance. Again in Union of India Vs Atar Sing [2003 (12) SCC 434], the position of law was reiterated by the Apex Court in the following words:
“This appeal is directed against the impugned order of the High Court. The respondent-accused, who has been convicted under Section 409 IPC and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, preferred an appeal to the High Court, which has been entertained. On an application being filed under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court has suspended the conviction solely on the ground that non- suspension of conviction may entail removal of the delinquent government servant from service.”
7.5 In Navrajsing (supra) also the conviction was under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The order of the learned Single of the High Court staying the conviction was not approved by the Apex Court. In Shiv Kumar Vs State of NTC of Delhi [2008(17) SCC 122], where again it was held that “This Court has observed in several cases that where the accused is convicted for offence punishable under the (Prevention of Corruption) Act, it would not be prudent and desirable to give protection under Section 389 of the Code.”
7.6 In Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi Vs Roshanlal Saini [AIR 2009 SC 755],where the respondent was convicted for offence of corruption, the Apex Court set aside the order of the Appellate Court, which suspended the conviction, relying on decision in K.C. Sareen (supra) and other decisions reiterating preposition of law with regard to suspension of conviction.
8. The conspectus of above referred decisions of the Apex Court bring out clearly and unequivocally that suspension or stay of conviction pending appeal is a rare exercise of power by the Appellate Court. Significantly Section 389(1) of the Code does not expressly mention about stay of conviction, although such power flows from the said provision available with the Appellate Court, but to be exercised in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances.
9. From the foregone discussed position of law, the principles emerging may be outlined. The reason that the order of conviction would result into ouster or removal or dismissal from service, is not sufficient nor is a good ground for that reason. Such ramifications arising out of conviction under the criminal law for a convict government servant are normal consequences often arising from the relevant service rules with which a government servant is governed. The effect of such service rules applicable to the government servant, which operate upon his conviction, is not to be confused with the merits of staying of conviction. Therefore, such consequences by themselves also do not constitute a case to be an exceptional case where the Court would stay the conviction.
9.1 Secondly, the possibility of delay in disposal of main appeal is held not to be a good ground in all normal circumstance, and justifying suspension or stay of conviction on such consideration is held to be a wrong approach. Thirdly, that there are arguable points in the appeal is also no ground. Fourthly, existence of prima facie case against conviction may be one of the considerations, but it is not a consideration by itself. They are the considerations on the basis of which the court has admitted the appeal.
9.2 It is not the only consideration. The requirement to be insisted is that the case is exceptional or extraordinary or has special circumstances involved. Fifthly, it is the requirement insisted that the case must be informed by special or exceptional circumstances. The special or exceptional circumstances would vary from case to case. They are facts and circumstances which are peculiar to a particular case. No straight-jacket formula can be evolved. A rare and exceptional circumstance which may justify the staying of conviction pending the appeal are those clinching circumstances or factors on the basis of which can be scanned through the facts and which, by virtue of their very kind and nature, have strong debilitating effect against continuing the effect of conviction and its operation. They are the factors which operate at the core of facts of the case. They are indeed one which appeals to the conscience of the Court. The factors discounted hereinabove can not become the special circumstances in isolation.
9.3 Sixthly, it has to be shown that specific consequences would entail because of the special and exceptional circumstances. A prima facie case coupled with peculiar or special circumstances involved in the case may place the case in exceptional or extra ordinary category when entailment of specific consequences is shown. The all of the above or few of them may be pressed into service for staying of conviction order. In rarest of rare case, a singular consideration, if the facts providing such single consideration are clinching strong, may become relevant. It goes without saying that in every case where suspension of conviction is present, is unlikely to have the combination the above features mentioned above. Therefore, the cases would be rare which could be characterized by above attributes of special or exceptional circumstances that the court would suspend conviction order.
9. 4 The parameters on the basis of which stay of conviction may be justified are stricter in the cases where the conviction is under the corruption law, as emphatically held in K.C. Sareen (supra) and in subsequent later decisions. The connotation “exceptional case” in respect of the conviction under the Corruption laws has to be of higher degree and it would be rare case where the Court would be inclined to stay the conviction of those government servants found to be acting corrupt and having been convicted for such offence. The reason is that, the corrupt practices and the corrupt act on part of a government servant has repercussion on the society and system as a whole, inasmuch as the corruption corrodes from within.
10 The above enumerated parameters torch-bearing, reverting back now to consider the contention of the learned advocate for the applicant that present applicant’s case has prima-facie merits making out a cogent case for stay of conviction, the lone ground that the complainant has turned hostile may not by itself lead to a situation rendering the conviction bad in law in the ultimate and final analysis of the total evidence on record. If the prosecution case can be corroborated from other evidence, the conviction may be sustained, as rightly submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. The evidence on record referred to and discussed in the impugned judgment and order of conviction suggests that there is also other evidence of prosecution witnesses. Therefore, it cannot be said to be a case where on the basis of first hand consideration of the evidence, a conclusion in favour of the applicant and against his conviction may be culled out. It would be premature to conclude at this stage that the evidence against applicant’s conviction is such and so strong by itself to make an exceptional case for staying the conviction pending the appeal.
10.1 Vehement reliance on the decision on this Court in Pravinkumar (supra) was placed to contend that facts and circumstances of the said case and one obtained in the instant case are similar, that the conviction in case of Pravinkumar (supra) was also under the Corruption Act and the Court held that the facts of that case offered rare and exceptional circumstances justifying suspension of conviction. Examination of facts and ratio of Pravinkumar (supra) may now be adverted to. On attentive reading of decision in Pravinkumar (supra), the clinching consideration which weighed with the Court is exceptional circumstances, which could be gathered from paragraph 7 of the judgment, which reads as under:
“In the facts of the present case, at least a prima facie conclusion could be drawn in favour of the applicant in view of the incontrovertible evidence that the complainant himself (PW 1) had turned hostile before the Court and admitted that the applicant had not demanded any bribe; that trap money was provided by Mr. A.D. Maru, Advocate of the ship breaking companies, which were aggrieved by levy of huge amount of tax and most importantly the trap money was found on the wooden cot and not recovered from the applicant. It was emphasized by learned Counsel Ms. Sancheti that, even according to prosecution case, the applicant was not accused of having touched the money, offered by way of bribe. Ms. Sancheti submitted that the applicant had taken major initiative in filing appeal before CEGAT which resulted into gain of Rs. 40 crores of revenue to the customs department. That is reflected in the ACRs of the applicant for the year 2001-02 which were approved even before laying of the trap.”
10.2 Therefore, the highlighting aspect in Pravinkumar (supra) constituting an exceptional circumstance in the facts of that case was that the entire trap was noticed to have been designed by a third party, an advocate of the shipping company. The said advocate had arranged the trap and provided the trap money, because his clients were aggrieved by levy of huge amount of tax. It was on the basis of such uncommon feature surfacing from the facts and evidence of that case, the Court treated it to be a rare case, and tentatively viewed that the conviction of the said petitioner may not sustain finally, accordingly stayed the conviction.
10.3 At the same time, in Pravinkumar (supra), the Court was alive to the requirement that for justifying suspension or stay of conviction, a case has to be rare and exceptional. It also considered in case of K.C.Sareen (supra) and noted the principle propounded therein, however, it was upon consideration and having been satisfied with the facts involved, which were peculiar to that case, the Court examined whether the applicant should be visited with civil and penal consequence only on account of conviction and ultimately found that it was a rare and exceptional case. While remaining in respectful agreement with the said decision in Pravinkumar (supra), on careful consideration and analysis of the facts of this case with reference to the principles of law emanating from the decisions discussed hereinabove, it has to be held that no such peculiar feature or aspect or circumstance, as was noticed in Pravinkumar (supra), which can be considered to be a clinching consideration for staying the conviction, has been noticed in the present case. The facts of the present case are not comparable with the facts involved in Pravinkumar (supra).
10.4 In the present case, the applicant government servant is found guilty of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. If he ultimately succeeds in the appeal, he would get the damage and consequence suffered undone. As discussed above, in the present case, there is no clinching factor in terms of evidence on record or prima-facie case or peculiar aspect, which would make an exceptional circumstance. Such factor was found on facts in the decision by this Court in Pravin Kumar (supra) relied on by learned advocate for the applicant. As the facts of the case do not reveal any exceptional or extraordinary circumstance so as to accept the prayer for suspension of his conviction, no ground is made out on facts to entertain the prayer made in the application. The application is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged without any order as to costs.
11. While dismissing the present application, in the totality of facts and circumstances, it is proper to expedite the hearing of the main Appeal by directing the Registry to place the Criminal Appeal No.1921 of 2012 for final hearing at the earliest after the paper book is ready, for preparation of which the Registry shall take necessary steps without delay.
(N.V.ANJARIA, J.) Anup