This petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is filed by the widow of one deceased Gee Varghese who was allegedly murdered by the fourth respondent herein. In connection with the unnatural death of petitioner's husband, crime No.183 of 2012 of Pampady Police Station was registered against the fourth respondent herein. After the investigation, filing of final report and committal, it is now pending before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Special), Kottayam as S.C.No.276 of 2012 carrying an indiction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The fourth respondent moved C.M.P.No.2927 of 2012 thereon for grant of bail and the same was allowed with certain stringent conditions as per Annexure-VI order dated 24.9.2012. The petitioner herein seeks for quashment of Annexure-VI order and a further order to proceed with the trial keeping the fourth respondent as an under-trial prisoner considering the gravity and the nature of the offence. The conspectus of facts that constrained the petitioner to come up before this Court with such prayers is as follows:-
2. The fourth respondent who is accused of murdering her husband Gee Varghese was enlarged on bail as per order in C.M.P.No.2927 of 2012 in S.C.No.276 of 2012 mainly considering the fact that he had been in jail since 24.3.2012. As per Annexure-VI, the impugned order, the fourth respondent was enlarged on bail with the following conditions:-
1. Execute bond for `25,000/- with two solvent sureties each for the like amount.
2. He shall appear before the Circle Inspector of Police, Pampady on all Thursdays at 11 AM till the disposal of the case.
3. He shall not intimidate witnesses while on bail.
4. He shall not enter into the local limits of Pampady panchayat until further orders.
5. He shall not leave Kerala without the permission of this court.
3. The contention of the petitioner is that taking into consideration the serious nature of the charge against the fourth respondent and his conduct and the threat posed by him to the lives of herself and her family members and also considering the hapless and helpless situation on account of her widowhood, it is only appropriate to quash the impugned order granting him bail. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the very case of the prosecution would reveal that the fourth respondent is an accused in another murder case viz., crime No.473 of 2011 which is also now pending before the same court as S.C.No.267 of 2012 and both the sessions cases are now ripe for trial. The first information statement was given by the father of the petitioner. Therefore, the case of the prosecution is that on 18.3.2012, at about 7.15 pm, the fourth respondent criminally trespassed into the house of the daughter of the first informant with a view to commit murder of her husband Gee Varghese owing to previous enmity and stabbed Gee Varghese with a knife and on the way to Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, he succumbed to the stab injuries. The contention of the petitioner is that the learned Sessions Judge had not bestowed serious consideration into relevant and material facts. It is in the said context that the petitioner seeks for quashment of the impugned order and a further direction to the trial court to proceed with the trial against the fourth respondent. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent submitted that consideration of grant of bail and consideration of cancellation of bail stand on different footing and naturally, the scope of consideration is also bound to be different. It is also contended that the conditions imposed by the learned Sessions Judge while enlarging the fourth respondent on bail, as is obvious from Annexure-VI, would reveal that they are stringent and capable of averting the apprehension of the petitioner. It is submitted that condition No.4 would reveal that the fourth respondent is interdicted from entering into the local limits of the Pampady Panchayat until further orders and going by condition No.5 therein the fourth respondent could not leave Kerala without the permission of the Sessions Court. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the apprehension of the petitioner cannot be said to be devoid of any basis. In other words, the learned Public Prosecutor also endorsed the contentions raised by the petitioner.
4. To contend that the fourth respondent is not entitled to be enlarged on bail rather, the order enlarging him on bail is liable to be cancelled, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan [2012 (4) KLT SN 105 (C.No.93) SC], Pooja Bhatia v. Vishnu Narain Shivpuri & Anr. [2014 AIAR (Criminal) 518], Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [ AIR 2013 SC 2216] and Nanda Sethi and others v. State of Orissa [2014 Crl.LJ 536]. Based on the aforesaid decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the primary considerations in cases of this nature should be whether the accused is likely to tamper with evidence or attempt to interfere with due course of justice and whether he is likely to pose threat to the witnesses. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent contended that all the relevant factors were appropriately considered by the learned Sessions Judge while passing the impugned order and therefore, this Court will not be justified in interfering with and cancelling the order granting bail to the fourth respondent. To buttress the said contention, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent placed reliance on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex court in Khushi Ram v. Hashim [AIR 1959 SC 542]. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the apprehension of the petitioner is having basis and in such circumstances, the impugned order is liable to be quashed. In this context, it is to be noted that the prosecution has not moved any petition seeking quashment of the impugned order though it is borne out from records that a day after the passing of the impugned order the prosecution moved a petition for cancellation of the bail order under section 439(2) Cr.P.C. Evidently, no order has so far been passed thereon and therefore, at this distance of time considering the facts that the impugned order was passed on 24.9.2012 and despite the order granting bail, the fourth respondent is still continuing in judicial custody based on order dated 16.10.2012 in C.M.A.No.6776 of 2012 in this Crl.M.C, I think it only just and proper to proceed with consideration of this case, on merits. As per the said order, operation of Annexure-VI order was suspended and the said order is extended from time to time and it is still in force. In short, despite Annexure-VI order dated 24.9.2012, the fourth respondent is still in judicial custody.
5. True that the petitioner is not seeking for cancellation of the bail; but virtually the nature of the prayer is nothing but cancellation of bail as the very prayer of the petitioner is for quashment of Annexure-VI, the impugned order whereby the fourth respondent was granted bail. Cancellation of bail can be sought only under section 439(2) Cr.P.C. Going by the decision in Kushi Ram's case (supra), inherent power under section 482, Cr.P.C is exercisable only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is not seeking cancellation of bail granted to the fourth respondent under section 439(2) Cr.P.C and the petitioner is seeking quashment of the impugned order and for a further direction to proceed with the trial against the fourth respondent keeping him as under-trial prisoner under section 482 Cr.P.C. A bare reading of section 439(2) Cr.P.C would make it abundantly clear that it is a power conferred on High Court and Court of Session and that there is nothing there limiting the liberty to move an application for cancellation of bail only to the State or investigating agency or a Public Prosecutor. In other words, it can be invoked by an aggrieved party. But, at the same time, I see no obstacle or any inhibition in the said provision for an aggrieved party to move the High Court seeking invocation of the inherent jurisdiction under section 482, Cr.P.C. The inherent power under section 482, Cr.P.C of this Court is not affected by the provisions under section 439(2) Cr.P.C as the power under section 482 is available to interfere with an order if it causes miscarriage of justice or if it is palpably illegal or unjustified and based on absolutely irrelevant materials. This position is fortified by a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in Puran v. Rambilas [(2001) 6 SCC 338]. In the said circumstances, the petitioner being the widow of the deceased is having the locus standi to move or could have moved a petition under section 439(2) Cr.P.C cannot be a reason to decline consideration of the case of the petitioner in this proceedings especially because of the fact that the grievance of the petitioner is against the grant of bail. But, at the same time, while considering the prayer for quashment of an order granting bail the grounds for cancelling the bail have also to be borne in mind.
6. In the light of the submissions made hereinbefore by the petitioner the Investigating Officer was directed to file statement and pursuant to the same statements were filed. It is discernible from such statements that subsequent to the passing of the impugned order enlarging the 4th respondent on bail the prosecution has moved a petition before the Court itself, a day after its passing, to cancel the bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. True that, it is also stated therein that the petitioner herein and other family members were put to threat by the 4th respondent and he had in fact, threatened certain police officers as well. Evidently, the petitioner voiced her concern and rancour firstly through Annexure-V and it would reveal that the 4th respondent has allegedly committed threat on the lives of the petitioner and her family members while he was taken to the place of occurrence, as part of the investigation, on being given to police custody. Apart from the same no other instance of threat has been alleged. Annexure-V was made to the Chief Minister. It is very difficult to swallow such a contention that a person while under police custody and was taken to the place of occurrence as part of the investigation raised such threats in the presence of the police party and had any such incident been taken place it would have been duly revealed in the report of the Investigating Officer. In this context, it is to be noted that in the impugned order the learned Sessions Judge specifically stated that no material was produced even to substantiate the report of the Investigating Officer that the 4th respondent threatened certain persons with dire consequences and they made complaints before the Investigating Officer. In the decision in Raj Kumar Jain v. Kundan Jain reported in AIR 2004 SC 3794 the Hon'ble Apex Court declined to cancel the bail on the allegation of threat to witnesses on the ground that it is far from truth and there is delay in lodging FIR about the threat. In this case, admittedly, so far in that regard no case was registered. When evidence is lacking to show that the accused had terrorized the prosecution witnesses or the members of the family of the deceased bail could not be cancelled or on that ground, in the absence of evidence order granting bail could not be quashed invoking the inherent jurisdiction. Evidently, in this case, both the aforementioned crimes are now pending respectively as S.C.Nos. 267 and 276 of 2012 before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge (Special), Kottayam. In both the cases the 4th respondent moved applications for bail and in both cases he was enlarged on bail with conditions as per orders dated 24.9.2012. This case is concerned only with the grant of bail in S.C.No.276 of 2012 pursuant to the application made as per C.M.P.No.2927 of 2012. A perusal of Annexure-VI viz., the order in C.M.P.No.2927 of 2012 would reveal that after hearing the 4th respondent and also the learned Public Prosecutor the 4th respondent was enlarged on bail with the aforementioned conditions. A perusal of the conditions would reveal that stringent conditions were imposed by the learned Sessions Judge to avert the apprehension of threat. But, at the same time, it appears that there is an incongruity in so far as the imposition of conditions 2 and 4 are concerned inasmuch as, as per condition No.4 the 4th respondent was interdicted from entering into the limits of Pampady Panchayat until further orders and as per condition No.2 he was directed to appear before the Circle Inspector of Police, Pampady on all Thursdays at 11 am till the disposal of the case. In such circumstances, condition No.4 can be understood only as a condition interdicting the 4th respondent from entering into the local limits of Pampady Panchayat until further orders except for the purpose of complying with condition No.2.
7. As noticed earlier, while considering the prayer of the petitioner for quashment of Annexure-VI order granting bail to the 4th respondent the principles governing consideration of a prayer for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. have to be borne in mind. As noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner has relied on various decisions to support the contention that the bail granted to the 4th respondent as per the impugned order is liable to be interfered with. In fact, those decisions relied on by the petitioner essentially deal with the principles in the matter of consideration of cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. The principles to be followed while considering the question of cancellation of bail settled as per earlier decisions have been restated in the decision in Manjit Prakash and Others v. Shobha Devi and Another ((2009) 13 SCC 785). The principles and circumstances when a bail granted could be cancelled were highlighted therein as follows:- (1) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, (2) interferes with the course of investigation, (3) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses, (4) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, (5) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, (6) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, (7) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. True that these grounds are not exhaustive. At the same time, there cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that rejection of bail stands on one footing and cancellation of bail already granted is a harsh order as it interferes with the liberty of an individual obtained by him by virtue of an order passed by a competent court and therefore, it could not be lightly interfered with. True that the 4th respondent has allegedly committed heinous crimes and admittedly, the same court enlarged the 4th respondent on bail in S.C.Nos. 267 and 276 of 2012 on the same day viz., on 24.9.2012. A scanning of the impugned order would reveal that before passing the impugned order both sides were heard and the records including the report of the Investigating Officer were perused. The learned Sessions Judge gave reasons for passing the order including the one that the 4th respondent was under judicial custody for a period of six months since 24.3.2012. In paragraph 7 of the order it is stated that there is nothing in the report of the Investigating Officer to show that the petitioner therein, the 4th respondent herein, would tamper with the evidence or would flee from justice or would intimidate the witnesses. The only apprehension stated thereunder in the report is that he threatened certain persons with dire consequences and they made complaints before the Investigating Officer. The impugned order reveals that no material was produced before the court to substantiate the report of the Investigating Officer to that effect. The court also took note of the position that a judicial custody could not be equated with a preventive detention as bail could not be denied on flimsy grounds. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case could not and should not be undertaken. But, giving reasons is different from discussing the merits and demerits of the case. True that, the case of the prosecution is that in Crime No.473 of 2011 the 4th respondent was enlarged on bail and thereafter he allegedly involved in Crime No.183 of 2012 which is later taken into file as S.C.No.276 of 2012 in which the impugned Annexure-VI order was passed. In such circumstances, I am of the view that it would have been better if the learned Sessions Judge clearly and extensively indicated the reasons for granting the bail, without going into the merits and demerits of the case, considering the fact that the 4th respondent is involved in heinous crimes. At the same time, it cannot be said that the learned Judge was not aware of the involvement of the petitioner in another case viz., in S.C.No.267 of 2012 as it is the very case of the prosecution and all the records in that regard were perused by the learned Sessions Judge before passing the impugned order. It is an admitted position and borne out from records, that orders granting bail in both the cases were passed on the same day itself. It is taking note of the apprehension as mentioned hereinbefore and also the fact that the 4th respondent, by then, had been in judicial custody for six months that he was enlarged on bail with stringent conditions. There is no case that the learned Sessions Judge took into consideration irrelevant materials while passing the impugned order. The fact that the petitioner had been in jail for six months by itself could not be taken as a sufficient reason for enlarging an accused in such a heinous crime, on bail. Normally, when the allegation of commission of murder is raised against a person who is on bail in another murder case the order granting bail, on the aforesaid reason is liable to be interfered with. However, when there is delay of more than three years for trial and when the accused is remaining in judicial custody all these years and when the accused had not contributed to the delay in trial on the ground of speedy trial implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and in the absence of any supervening circumstances making a fair trial impossible after admitting the accused to bail even the grant of bail cannot be said to be illegal or unjustifiable. In such circumstances, in a case where even after the grant of bail the accused remained in judicial custody owing to the interim order against the grant of bail for about three more years there is no reason to continue with the said order or to quash the order granting bail. Even now, the trial in the aforementioned cases is yet to be commenced. In such circumstances, continuance of the accused in jail is akin to make him undergo punishment before trial. Going by the conditions of Annexure-VI bail order only for the purpose of appearing before the Circle Inspector of Police, Pampady on all Thursdays at 11 am the 4th respondent could enter into the local limits of Pampady Panchayat. Obviously, the petitioner and the other members of her family and witnesses in the aforesaid cases are residing within the limits of Pampady Panchayat. In the said circumstances, the petitioner is not justified in contending that the 4th respondent should be made to undergo the trial as an under trial prisoner. When the 4th respondent was interdicted from entering into the limits of Pampady Panchayat as per Annexure-VI order to avert the apprehension and the said order was passed after taking into account the relevant materials going by the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as extracted above and taking into account the fact that interfering with an order granting bail is a harsh step as it interferes with the liberty of a person I am of the view that the grant of bail as per the impugned order did not call for interference. However, considering the incongruity between condition Nos.2 and 4 and also the apprehension sounded by the widow of the deceased, as mentioned hereinbefore, I am inclined to modify the order to the extent it pertains to the conditions of bail. As stated earlier, despite the order dated 24.9.2012 the 4th respondent is still continuing in judicial custody and as on 24.9.2012 he had been in judicial custody for six months. In the circumstances thus obtained I am of the view that the impugned Annexure-VI order do not call for a cancellation and there will not be any failure of justice if interference in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is declined.
8. In the result, this Crl.M.C. is liable to fail to the extent it challenges the grant of bail to the 4th respondent. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the sessions cases in which the 4th respondent is arrayed as accused viz., S.C.Nos.267 & 276 of 2012 are ripe for trial. I do not find any reason to issue any specific directions to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge (Special), Kottayam in the matter of trial of the aforementioned Sessions Cases as it is for that court to schedule the trial in respect of the said Sessions Cases. At the same time, I may hasten to add that considering the fact that the 4th respondent is an accused in both the aforesaid Sessions Cases and also taking into consideration the circumstances involved in this case it will only be appropriate for the learned Sessions Judge to schedule and conclude the trial of the cases as early as possible. Though I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned order at this distance of time, taking note of the allegation of commission of heinous crimes against the 4th respondent and the apprehension of the petitioner as also the incongruity between condition Nos.2 and 4 in Annexure-VI, I am of the view that condition No.4 has to be modified as hereunder:-
“He shall not enter into the limits of Kottayam District until further orders except for the purpose of complying with the conditions in the bail orders in S.C.Nos. 267 & 276 and of 2012 ordering him to report before the Circle Inspector of Police, Pampady on all Thursdays at 11 am and for any other purposes for which specific court orders are obtained or issued.” It is made clear that all other conditions are not interfered with. Subject to the above, this Crl.M.C. is dismissed.
spc/TKS Sd/-
C.T.RAVIKUMAR Judge C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
JUDGMENT September, 2010