JUDGMENT R.H. Zaidi, J.
1. Heard Mr. S. M. K. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Srikant Singh, learned counsel for the respondents and also perused the record of the case. As requested by the learned counsel, this petition is disposed of finally at this stage.
2. By means of this petition, petitioner prays for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 18.10.1997 passed by respondent No. 3, whereby appeal filed by the petitioner under Rule 9 of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1978 was dismissed as barred by limitation.
3. Assessment order was passed against the petitioner on 15.7.91 by respondent No. 2, the Prescribed Authority, under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act. 1977. Challenging validity of the said order, petitioner filed appeal before the appellate authority on 5.9.1991, along with an application for condonation of delay, wherein it was asserted that the assessment order was communicated to the petitioner on 26.7.91 and that the petitioner in the meanwhile also preferred review application on the advice received from the counsel : but since it was not decided, he was advised to file appeal. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, it was pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned. Appellate authority dismissed the application for condonation of delay and also appeal as barred by limitation, holding that he had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond forty-five days.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the appellate authority, is manifestly erroneous, illegal as same is contrary to provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that from the facts stated in the application for condonation of delay, no case for condonation of delay in filing appeal, was at all made out. Therefore, appellate authority did not commit any error of law in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner on the ground of limitation.
6. I have considered submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record.
7. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 framed under the Act provides for filing of appeal and power to condone delay in filing of appeals, which reads as under:
9. Appeal ...... .....
(1) ...................................
Provided that if the Chairman of the appellate Committee is satisfied that there was good and sufficient reason for the delay in preferring the appeal, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow the appeal to be preferred at the expiry of the aforesaid period of thirty days and before the expiry of forty five days from the date of communication of the order of assessment, or the order imposing penalty, on the appellant.
Reading of the aforesaid provisions reveals that limitation for filing appeal is to be counted from the date of communication of the order of assessment. Hence, if the appeal is filed within forty five days, the Chairman of the Committee has got jurisdiction to condone delay, if he is satisfied that there was good and sufficient reason for delay in preferring the appeal.
8. Appellate authority held that it had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing appeal beyond 45 days. In the present case, as stated above, limitation had to be counted from the date the order of assessment was communicated to the petitioner, i.e., 26.7.1991. Appellate authority committed error, which is apparent on the face of record, in counting limitation from 15.7.1991, the date on which the assessment order was passed.
9. Respondent No. 1, Chairman of the appellate committee, has also not applied his mind to the facts of the case and to the question as to whether there was good and sufficient reason for the delay in preferring the appeal. He has simply dismissed the appeal holding that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, as the appeal was filed beyond forty-five days. Mistake committed by the Chairman of the committee, is apparent on the face of the record. Order impugned in the present petition is, therefore, liable to be quashed.
10. Writ petition succeeds and is allowed. Order dated 16.8.97 is, hereby, quashed. Case is remanded to the appellate Committee for decision afresh in the light of observations made above. in accordance with law.