$~54 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + LPA 122/2012 JANGE RAM GANDWAL . Appellant Through: Mr. R. Venkataramani Sr. Adv. with Mr. Shekhar G. Devasa and Ms. Neelam Singh, Advs.
versus CHAIRMAND & MANAGING DIRECTOR SYNDICATE BANK & ANR . Respondent Through: Mr. Jagat Arora and Mr. Rajat Arora, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
O R D E R
% 11.02.2013
1. The appellant joined the respondent Bank as a Clerk on 24th October, 1978 and was promoted to the cadre of Junior Management Scale-I Officer on 3rd June, 1985. On 9th July, 1989, the appellant debited a sum of Rs.500/- in the savings account of one Vinod Rai and credited the said amount to his personal account. On 28th August, 1991, Mr. Vinod Rai lodged a complaint in this regard with the Chief Manager, Syndicate Bank claiming unauthorized withdrawal of the aforesaid amount from his account. On 3rd September, 1991, another letter was written by Mr. Vinod Rai withdrawing the complaint dated 28th August, 1991 made by him and stating therein that the appellant was authorized to debit Rs.500/- to his account and transfer the said amount to his account by way of an authorization letter. Later, the Bank initiated an inquiry against the appellant and pursuant to the report of the Vigilance Officer, two charges were framed against the appellant on 30th June, 1997 under Regulation 6 of Syndicate Bank Officer Employee(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1997. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report stating therein that the charges levied against the appellant were established. The Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 4th January, 1999, held the appellant guilty of committing breach of Regulation No.3(i) read with Regulation No.24 of Syndicate Bank Officers Employee (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 and dismissed him from service. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the appellant preferred an appeal which came to be dismissed vide order dated 10th March, 1999.
2. The appellant thereupon filed W.P.(C) No. 5260/1999. Vide impugned order dated 8th September, 2011, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the finding on the second article of charge was based on „no evidence‟ and was unsustainable in law. He, however, upheld the decision on the first article of charge against the appellant. Since the quantum of punishment was based upon the finding rendered on two charges, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the same needed to be re- examined by the Disciplinary Authority and accordingly, he set aside the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority on the quantum of punishment. Being aggrieved from the view taken by the learned Single Judge with respect to the first article of charge, the appellant is before us by way of this appeal.
3. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant assailed the finding in respect of the first article of charge on the ground that the respondent bank did not examine the complainant as its witness and even when the appellant produced, during the course of enquiry, an authorization letter which had been given to him by the complainant, no attempt was made by the respondent to examine him with respect to that document.
4. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the appellant had debited Rs.500/- in the account of complainant Vinod Rai on 9th July, 1989 and had credited the said amount to his personal account. The learned counsel also admitted that no cheque was issued by Mr. Vinod Rai in favour of the appellant, for transferring the aforesaid amount of Rs.500/- to his account. He also did not dispute that no authorization letter from the complainant was placed by the appellant on the record of the bank when the aforesaid amount was debited in the account of the complainant and credited in the account of the appellant.
5. It is not in dispute that the amount of Rs.500/- could not have been debited in the account of the complainant and credited in the account of the appellant unless either a cheque of Rs.500/- was issued by the complainant to the appellant or a letter authorizing debit of the aforesaid amount in the account of the complainant and credited in the account of the appellant was issued by the complainant. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted LPA 122/2012 page 3 of 8
that though the authorization letter was actually issued by the complainant, the appellant by mistake did not place that letter on the record of the bank at the time the amount of Rs.500/- was debited in the account of the complainant and credited in the account of the appellant. In our opinion, had the complainant actually given the letter of authorization to the appellant on or before 9th July, 1989, the appellant would certainly have placed it on record of the bank because being a bank Officer he knew that unless he places such a letter on record, debit of the aforesaid amount in the account of the complainant and credit in his personal account would not be appropriate in terms of the rules and practices of the bank. In these facts and circumstances, when there is no dispute that neither any cheque was issued by the complainant in favour of the appellant nor was any authorization letter placed on the record of the bank, we cannot say that the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer and accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority was based on „no evidence‟ at all. It is settled legal proposition that in the matters relating to disciplinary proceedings, the scope of interference by the Court with the findings of facts recorded in the disciplinary inquiry, is extremely limited and the Court cannot interfere with such a finding unless it is based on „no evidence‟ or is otherwise perverse being a finding which no reasonable person acting on the basis of the material available during the course of the inquiry could have recorded. In our opinion, this was not a case of the finding being without any evidence or otherwise perverse in law.
LPA 122/2012 page 4 of 8
6. In our opinion, since the authorization letter was not available in the record of the bank, it was for the appellant who produced the aforesaid document during the course of the inquiry and not upon the bank to produce the complainant to prove that the document in question was actually authored by the complainant. Even if the bank did not examine the complainant as a witness, nothing prevented the appellant from examining him as a witness, in order to prove the document relied upon by him. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that one of the witness admitted during the course of inquiry that the signature on the authorization letter were identical to the signature on the complaint which Mr. Vinod Rai had sent to the bank, though the same were different from the signature of Mr. Vinod Rai with the bank. The contention was that the witness of the bank having admitted the signature of the complainant on the authorization letter produced by the appellant during the course of inquiry, the aforesaid document could not have been excluded from consideration and if that document is taken into consideration, it would be evident that the complainant had actually authorized the appellant to transfer Rs.500/- from his account to the personal account of the appellant. We, however, find ourselves unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. In our opinion, primarily it is for the author of the document to come in the witness box to prove the document purporting to be written by him and reliance upon the opinion of the another witness in this regard would not be appropriate in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for not examining the author of the document and also considering the fact that even in the opinion of that witness, the signature on the authorization letter were different from the signature of the complainant available in the record of the bank. We, therefore, find no fault with the view taken by the learned Single Judge with respect to the first article of charge.
7. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was delay in instituting the departmental proceedings since the transaction in question on 9th July, 1989 whereas the charges against the appellant were framed only on 30th January, 1997. The learned Single Judge noted in this regard that the trigger for the first charge was the complaint made by Mr. Vinod Rai which resulted in a questionnaire being issued to the appellant in respect of the transactions which were the subject matter of the charges framed against him. He also noted that the appellant did produce some documents by way of explanation and the charge-sheet was issued only after considering those documents. This whole process took some time. Considering these circumstances and the fact that the charges touched upon financial irregularities, honesty and personal integrity of a bank officer, the plea of delay was not accepted by the learned Single Judge. We take note of the fact that the appellant has failed to establish any prejudice being caused to him on account of delay in institution of the inquiry. The relationship between the bank and the customer is that of an immense trust and faith. If the account of a customer is unauthorizedly debited by a bank officer, it is a matter of grave concern to the bank and may result in tarnishing the image of the bank in the eyes of the customers. If the sanctity of a bank account is violated by a bank employee, that may have the effect of eroding the faith of the public in the credibility of the banking system and thereby do irreparable damage to the image of a bank in such such an act is committed. Therefore, we are in agreement with the learned Single Judge that in regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate to discard the inquiry report merely on account of delay in institution of the inquiry.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154], where the Court in the context of the delay in institution of a departmental inquiry observed and held as under:
“19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay ”
LPA 122/2012 page 7 of 8
The appellant has failed to establish any prejudice to him on account of delay in institution of the inquiry. This is not his case that any vital evidence which could be available to him in his defence has been lost on account of delay in institution of the inquiry against him. The appellant did not suffer in any manner on account of delay in institution of the inquiry. He was given opportunity to give his explanation before the charge-sheet was issued to him and since he also took some time to submit the documents in support of his explanation, he also is partly responsible for the delay in institution of the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer was appointed on 7.3.1998 and he submitted his report on 30.10.1998. Therefore, there was no delay in conducting the inquiry.
9. Considering the nature of charge against the appellant and in the absence of any prejudice having been shown to the appellant on account of delay in institution of the inquiry, we find no good reason to interfere with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in this regard.
For the reasons stated hereinabove, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, there shall be no orders as to costs.
CHIEF JUSTICE V.K. JAIN, J FEBRUARY 11, 2013 sn/rd
LPA 122/2012 page 8 of 8