JUDGMENT D.P. Singh, J.
1. Pleadings are complete and the Counsel for the parties agree that the petition may be finally disposed off under the Rules of the Court.
2. Heard Counsel for the parties.
3. This petition has been filed claiming the relief of mandamus directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner in the Subordinate Courts at Mau.
4. In pursuance of an advertisement dated 26.6.1990 inviting applications for appointment on posts of Process Server, Orderlies, Peons, Office Peons and Farrashes in the judgeship of Mau, several candidates, including the petitioners applied. A waiting list of 45 persons, as contemplated by Rule 12 of U.P. Subordinate Civil Courts Inferior Establishment Rules, 1995 was notified on 7.9.1990. The petitioners were placed at Serial Nos. 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, and 49. It is alleged that in spite of the waiting list the respondent had granted appointment to respondent Nos. 3 to 7 who were not even placed in the waiting list. Thus, this petition.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has firstly urged that for all purposes the waiting list prepared under Rule 12 will continue to operate till all the candidates mentioned therein are given appointment. In support of his contention, he has relied upon two Single Judge decisions of this Court rendered in the cases of Shri Pati Ram and Ors. v. District Judge (Writ Petition No. 1081 of 1981) decided on 14.8.1987 and Bhagwan Das and Ors. v. District Judge (Writ Petition No. 30417 of 1990) decided on 23.7.1992.
6 From a perusal of Rule 4, it is evident that appointment to the post of Process Server, Orderlies Peons, Office Peons and Farrashes had to be made from the waiting list prepared under Rule 12. The said Rule stipulates that a waiting list of candidates should be maintained for each Judgeship for appointment on the aforesaid posts and the list should be of 'reasonable dimensions' which can be revised from time to time by deleting candidates. The learned Single Judges in Shri Pati Ram and Bhagwan Das's case (supra) have held that 'reasonable dimensions', as used in Rule 12 implies preparing a list in the ratio of 1 : 3 with regard to the vacancies available. They have also held that the list would only exhaust when the last person is granted appointment: In a later decision another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ram Babu and Ors. v. District Judge, 1996 AWC 516. has considered both the aforesaid cases. Thus, it would be necessary to first consider the decision rendered in Ram Babu's case.
7. The facts in Ram Babu's case were that a waiting list comprising of 12 persons were notified on 26.5.1990 indicating that the list would remain valid only for a period of three years and would lapse thereafter. The aforesaid list was cancelled by an order dated 29.1.1994 which was challenged. This Court while considering the decisions in Pati Ram and Bhagwan Das's cases, upheld the preparation of the waiting list in proportion of 1 : 3. However, while considering the life of the waiting list the learned Single Judge in Ram Babu's case, after considering several decisions of the Apex Court found that if the life of the waiting list is help to operate till all the candidates are appointed, it would be arbitrary and it will also fail the test of Article 16 of the Constitution. Further, considering the ratio of various decisions of the Apex Court, it went on to hold that the list would automatically exhaust itself once all the notified vacancies or the actual vacancies on the date of preparation of the waiting list are filled up. It gave the District Judge some elbow room by holding that he could take into consideration vacancies of succeeding year and then notify them, but expected vacancies of several years could not be taken into account. It found that the aspect of Articles 14 and 16 and the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions had not been considered either in Pati Ram or Bhagwan Das cases, in a way, the learned Judge in Ram Babu's case did not agree with the contention as raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the present case and also rendered a contradictory decision from the earlier two decisions.
8. The question now is which decision should this Court follow?
9. Two Full Benches of our Court in the cases of UPSRTC v. STA, AIR 1977 Allabahad 1, and Gopal Krishan v. District Judge, AIR 1981 Allahabad 300, while considering a similar question but with regard decisions of the Apex Court, held that in case there are conflicting decisions of equal strength, the latter decision should be followed. Another Division Bench of our Court in the case of Indo Swiss Time Ltd. v. Dundahera, 1997 ALJ 2415, has held that in case of conflicting decisions of equal strength, the one which lays down the law accurately should be followed.
10. If the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it would amount to denial of opportunity to other candidates who had become eligible to be considered for appointment after the notification of the waiting list under Rule 12 till the exhaustion of the list. Like in the present case, there were only 26 vacancies in fact and also advertised, but a waiting list of 45 persons was prepared. Thus, all those persons who became eligible after 7.9.1990 would not be able to apply till all the candidates in this list are appointed. Such a situation directly violates Article 16 which grants equal opportunity for employment. If the contention is accepted, it would not only be infraction of Article 16 but would also be hit by the principles enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge in Ram Babu's case has also considered this aspect of the matter. The decision in Ram Babu's case is not only later in time but also, in my view, lays down the law accurately. Therefore, in my opinion, the decision in Ram Babu's case should be followed.
11. However, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the decision in Ram Babu's case would not operate retrospectively and this petition should be decided on the basis of the law as laid down in Shri Pati Ram and Bhagwan Das cases because the decision in Ram Babu's case came in 1996 while the petitioners had raised their claim in 1995 itself. In may opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel for the' contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. No doubt, the decision in Ram Babu's case would not operate retrospectively, but that is the law laid down. Had the rights of the petitioners been crystallized by grant of appointment, the decision in Ram Babu's case would not have applied to that fact situation. However, when the right of the petitioners is being considered after that decision, the law as declared cannot be overlooked. This question of retrospectively has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Ram Dulari Devi v. Joint Director of Education, (1999) 3 UPLBEC 2069. The facts in that case were that adhoc appointments on substantive vacancies of Teachers was being made by the Management of Inter College and which was also upheld by several decisions of this Court. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, (1994) 3 UPLBEC 1551 (Alld. F.B.), in 1994 held that the Management did not have the power of making any adhoc appointment on substantive vacancies. A question arose in a case where the Management had appointed a Teacher prior to 1994 but the Educational Authorities did not release his salary and he approached this Court through a writ petition. Ultimately, the matter went before a Division Bench which held that if the appointment of the Teacher had been approved or his right had been crystallized prior to the Full Bench, the Educational Authorities were bound to release the salary, but since his right itself was being determined after the decision in the Full Bench, the law as it stood at the time of such consideration would have to be applied. On the same premise, this argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has then urged that in spite of the list having lapsed, the petitioners were better placed to be appointed as their name found placed in the said list as against the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 who were never placed in the waiting list. This argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner is totally misconceived. Once the list stood lapsed, as aforesaid, the petitioners have absolutely no right. Even otherwise, the petitioners have failed to give specific details with regard to respondent Nos. 3 to 7 as to whether they had also applied in pursuance of the advertisement dated 26.6.1990 or as to when they became eligible. Moreover, it is the discretion of the District Judge to make temporary and officiating arrangements when there was no waiting list in vouge.
13. For the reasons given hereinabove, I do not find that this is a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rejected.